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President Obama is justifiably proud of having fulfilled his campaign vow to settle accounts with Osama bin Laden. But he might want to dial back the euphoric White House claims that killing al Qaeda’s chief marks a turning point in Afghanistan.

The Washington Post today quotes an unnamed administration official as saying bin Laden’s demise “changes everything” and begins the “endgame” in Afghanistan. In this view, it will make the Taliban more tractable and ready to negotiate an end to the fighting in return for a share in the Afghan government.

I’d love to be proved wrong, but this assessment seems wildly optimistic. The theory that the Taliban will now be eager for talks is based on two premises.

First, that America’s surgical strike on bin Laden’s compound deep into Pakistan shows Taliban leaders who have taken refuge in Quetta that we can reach them too. No doubt we could, but there must be a reason why we haven’t yet struck at Taliban chief Mohammad Omar and the Quetta Shura. Maybe it’s because there will be no one left with the authority to enforce a truce if we decimate the high command. More likely it’s because Pakistani intelligence, which helped create the Taliban, is protecting its leaders.

Second, bin Laden’s death relieves Omar of any obligation to continue protecting al Qaeda or allow it to entrench itself again in Afghanistan. After all, the Taliban suffered greatly when Omar, after 9-11, refused to expel al Qaeda. U.S. and Afghan forces routed the Taliban and sent its leaders scurrying into exile in Pakistan. Now that al Qaeda is a spent force, there’s no longer any reason for Afghans to suffer on its behalf.

There’s only one thing wrong with this theory, but it’s a big one: It overlooks the role of ideology. Omar and the Taliban, after all, are Islamist fundamentalists who imposed precisely the kind of puritanical rule on Afghanistan that bin Laden and his ilk prescribe for the whole Muslim umma. They enforced Sharia law with fanatical zeal, banned music and dancing, had women accused of adultery stoned to death in stadiums, barred girls from school, and destroyed ancient Buddhist carvings they considered idolatrous.

As Peter Bergen and other terrorist analysts have noted, al Qaeda and the Taliban have essentially experienced a kind of ideological mind-meld in recent years. Bin Laden swore allegiance to Omar, who likewise seems himself leading a jihad against foreign infidels. The assumption that Omar and his claque in Quetta are Afghan nationalists who will compromise their religious beliefs for a slice of power seems naïve.

What might induce them to sue for peace, however, is the military battering they’ve received at the hands of the United States and NATO forces. The U.S. surge has severely depleted the Taliban’s ranks and driven it out of wide swaths of the country, especially its Pashtun heartland in the south. Drone strikes in Pakistan have killed hundreds of its leaders. Sustained military pressure could crack the Taliban’s resolve, and the Obama administration ought to have a blunt talk with Pakistan about Omar and the Quetta shura. Until they decide to make peace, they, not less than bin Laden, are legitimate targets for U.S. strikes.

If, on the other hand, the United States, having killed the 9-11 mastermind, now seems over-eager to withdraw from Afghanistan, we’ll give the Taliban incentives to wait us out. The Obama administration is not wrong to seek negotiations with Taliban leaders at various levels, but we need to be persistent and patient, and not start declaring premature victory. The death of bin Laden doesn’t change the reality that the Taliban, not al Qaeda, pose the greatest threat we face in Afghanistan.