Book Review: The Disappearing Center, By Alan Abramowitz
That our politics are now deeply polarized is a well-known fact. But do the polarized politics in Washington reflect the deep divides in the country between red and blue voters (and their respective desires for increasingly opposite policies on both sides)? Or do these elite divisions exist in spite of an essentially purple, moderate America?
Alan Abramowitz, a professor of political science at Emory University, is on the side of Washington as mirror of a deeply fractured electorate rapidly losing its political middle. His new book, “The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy” is the story of how voters migrated to the extremes over the last five decades.
Essentially, four big, interlinked things happened. The first is that the parties “sorted” better. The second is that the number of safe districts and safe states increased. The third is that Americans as a whole became more educated. The fourth is that the engagement gap between strong partisans and political moderates widened.
In their 1960 plumage, Republicans and Democrats were both diverse species, loose-fitting labels that meant very different things depending on where you were from. Northern “liberal” Republicans and Southern “conservative” Democrats made up large minority factions, and both often found more common cause with their fellow “liberals” or “conservatives” across the aisle than their fellow partisans. In such an environment, bipartisanship was the norm, rather than the exception.
Then the tumultuous ‘60s shook the snow globe of American politics. The fight over civil rights broke the Democrats’ hold on the “Solid South,” turning Southern Democrats into Republicans. The Republican center of gravity gradually migrated deep below the Mason-Dixon line, taking on a much redder hue: much more socially conservative, more skeptical of government. Democrats, meanwhile, freed from the need to keep placate the conservative southerners, grew bluer: more socially liberal, and less skeptical of government.
Once upon a time, congressional districts were highly competitive, and a Democrat (or Republican) had to be sensitive to the concerns of voters in the competing party to maintain a seat. Even as late as the 95th Congress (1977-1978), only 24 percent of Democrats and 27 percent of Republicans were in “safe” districts; By the 108th Congress (2004-2005), 49 percent of Democrats and 40 percent of Republicans were in “safe” districts. The consequence: they were far more likely to be worried about fending off extreme challengers in their primaries than about winning the general election by moving to the center. Thus, more extreme politicians replaced more moderate ones.
In 1976, the eight most populous states were all battleground states in the presidential election, and the average winning margin among them was 3.1 percentage points. In 2004, only four of the eight most populous states were battlegrounds, and the average winning margin in the eight states was 9.3 percentage points. Thanks to both realignment and demographic change, Abramowitz writes, “Red states, counties, and congressional districts have been getting redder while blue states, counties, and congressional districts have been getting bluer.”
At the same time, the American public got a whole lot better educated. In 1956, 37 percent of Americans had only a grade school education, and just 19 percent had some college; in 2004, only three percent of Americans had just a grade school education, and 61 percent had at least some college.
This matters, Abramowitz argues, because “College-educated citizens are generally more interested in politics, more politically active, and better informed about candidates and issues than high school-educated citizens. This is especially true with regard to one important form of political engagement: ideological awareness.”
So: the parties got better sorted into distinct camps, districts became less competitive, and an increasingly educated electorate was better able to pick up on the differences and to respond accordingly, sorting themselves likewise into the appropriate categories. Abramowitz notes that especially among the better educated, there has been increased “partisan-ideological polarization” – that is, that high-information liberals are indeed reliably liberal across all issues, and high-information conservatives are reliably conservative across all issues.
All of this polarization has actually been good for political engagement generally. Abramowitz cites numerous measures of a public that now cares more about politics, follows it more closely, and talks about it more to their friends – partly because they are more educated, and partly because if the parties are highly polarized, the stakes of political victory are significantly greater (high stakes are a terrific motivator.)
But, at the same time, a certain slice of the electorate has been left behind: “The American public appears to be increasingly divided into two groups,” writes Abramowitz, “the politically engaged, who view politics in ideological terms, and the politically disengaged, who do not.”
For example, 56 percent of strong liberal or conservatives reported being politically engaged in 2004, as compared to 36 percent of those who “lean” liberal or conservative, and just 20 percent of those who say they are moderate, or of no ideology. In the 1950s, this gap did not exist.
To Abramowitz, the story of the disengaged moderates is mostly a story about less-educated, less-engaged citizens who don’t know or care enough about politics to pick a side. Were they to get wealthy and educated, like the partisans, they would presumably then know enough to pick one of the two distinct teams in American politics. But lacking the means or the will to pick a side, they call themselves moderate, feel disengaged and disenchanted by politics, and try to get on with the business of making a living.
On the descriptives, The Disappearing Center is a terrific compendium to what’s happened. The parties have pulled apart, and in particular strong partisans on both sides are further apart than ever before. There are fewer competitive states, fewer competitive districts, and politicians who dare to compromise are increasingly punished. Nor is this likely to change: “A coalition of moderates is no longer possible because the center is a shrunken remnant of what it was forty or fifty years ago,” concludes Abramowitz. The forecast is for more partisan rancor, far as the eye can see.
But the analysis lacks in a few areas. For one, Abramowitz doesn’t engage with the possibility that political moderates have become less engaged out of frustration with extremism; his preferred explanation is that they remain moderate only out of an ignorance of the stakes involved. More frustratingly, his analysis is based heavily on reported self-identifications, rather than actual issue positions, and the issues he choose to measure polarization tend to be particular hot-button issues, like abortion and the Iraq war. More thorough issue-based measuring of public opinion (see, for example, Morris Fiorina’s Disconnect, or Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron’s research on leapfrog representation) has found a much more moderate public on the issues, a public that has been left behind by two increasingly extreme parties.
