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How to Understand the Chinese Military

• October 7, 2010
• Jim Arkedis

Next week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will sit down with his Chinese counterpart, General Liang Guanglie, in Hanoi.  Relations between China and the US – at least militarily – have been frosty recently after the US inked an arms deal with Taiwan. This meeting would suggest that no matter how upset either side becomes, each realizes that their long-term interests are better served by dialogue, not confrontation.

The talks take place as China is attempting to consolidate a sphere of influence over the South and East China Seas. It’s likely that China views these areas as part of an “anti-access/area denial” strategy.  Beijing realizes that its military couldn’t prevail in a conflict against the United States, but by controlling these strategic bodies of water, it could deny American access to them in the event of conflict over Taiwan.

The good news is that your buddies at PPI are all over it.  We’ve teamed up with Mike Chase, a professor at the Naval War College and fellow at the Truman National Security project, to produce a policy memo on China’s anti-access/area denial strategy.

He seeks to answer the following questions:

• How and why did China’s approach shift in this new direction?
• What are the most potent anti-access and area denial capabilities in Beijing’s arsenal?
• And what are the implications for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region?

He concludes:

Beijing responded by increasing its defense budget, deploying conventional ballistic missiles across from Taiwan and working on a variety of capabilities intended to target American aircraft carriers. In short, Beijing embraced technologies designed to limit America’s access to critical battlefield areas.
[…]
An AA/AD strategy has limits. Though AA/AD raises the barrier on a decision to use force, once a decision to use force is made, China could not count on prevailing quickly or at low cost.

Then, he offers the following recommendations for US policymakers:

1. Developing new military capabilities like long-range carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicles and new operational concepts like “Air Sea Battle”—an emerging concept that the military is studying to sustain power-projection in AA/AD environments.
2. Ongoing diplomatic attention to decreasing tensions within the U.S.-Sino relationship over the Taiwan and South China Sea issues.
3. Increased attention to the global commons of cyber and space. America must continue to develop defensive and offensive capabilities to ensure network continuity in case of an information offensive, and practice operating without the full range of cyber and space assets.
4. Sensitivity to China’s sensitivities. Perhaps most important, attempts to strengthen deterrence must be carefully calibrated so that they will not inadvertently fuel China’s worst fears about U.S. intentions, which would only risk further exacerbating the mutual strategic suspicion that is already threatening to make one of the most important bilateral in the world a rocky one.

But don’t take my word for it, read the whole enchilada here.