China’s President Hu is winging his way to DC as I type, set to dine with President Obama this evening. The summit will be an interesting mix of symbolism and substance — most summits share elements of both, of course, because the two sides are usually equally interested in the wonkery and pageantry. This time, not so — the substance and symbolism are bifurcated. China values the image of a proper reception on the world’s stage, while the U.S. is more interested in taking a hard line, discussing military ties, North Korea, human rights, currency revaluation and the like.
PPI has churned out a fair bit of China-related material in the last several months, and if you’re trying to read up on everything China-related during the summit, here’s a good guide to set you on the right path:
1. In December, PPI hosted a forum on US-China relations, featuring Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE), Asst SecDef for Asia Chip Gregson, plus James Fallows, Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Mike Chase (see below). We were trying to get at the question of balance in dealing with China’s rise — emphasizing cooperation where we can, being aggressive when we must, while properly understanding the limits of China’s power. As Nye put it during the panel:
There is a rise in Chinese power, but it’s a mistake to over-estimate it. The size of China’s economy and our economy may be equal in size by 2030, but they will not be equal in composition, and per capita income will only be 1/3 of our per capita income.
You can watch the CSPAN coverage here.
2. Naval War College professor and PPI author Michael Chase has written three memos on the Chinese military, which you can read here (on China’s military budget), here (on its anti access and area denial strategy), and here (on its growing naval capacities). Here’s his basic conclusion:
In short, the U.S. will need to strengthen its ties to key countries in East Asia and develop strategic and tactical military concepts and capabilities that would allow it to counter China’s growing military power. Meanwhile, U.S. policy makers must seek collaboration with the Chinese military in an effort to highlight the benefits of being a global stakeholder to Beijing.
3. Finally, yours truly has penned a series of China-related posts in the last few months, on issues like North Korea, Chinese soft power (or lack thereof), and open-seas sovereignty issues.
Even though there seem to be a thousand pressing issues, here’s an overarching one that could could have grave implications in years to come:
Sino-American tensions in military relations are nothing new, but Secretary Gates’ trip continues to expose a fascinating—and potentially dangerous—rift inside the Chinese bureaucracy: the lack of communication between Beijing’s military and civilian leaders.
This week, China unveiled the J-20, its first and only stealth fighter. China’s bizarre choice of this week—during Gates’ visit—to flex its newfound military muscles by test-flying the J-20 for the first time. When Gates signaled to President Hu that the test flight was unnecessarily provocative, Hu replied that it had “absolutely nothing to do” with Gates’ visit. Pointedly, Gates acknowledged his concern about the Chinese military acting independently of the political leadership, a problem that could in a worst-case scenario lead to unauthorized military action against, for example, Taiwan.
Getting China’s leaders to communicate with one another is well-outside the Obama administration’s powers, of course, but continuing to press Beijing’s political leadership on the issue is a good start.
