To say Ken Adelman – Ronald Reagan’s UN ambassador – takes thin appreciation for the benefits of foreign assistance would be an understatement. Writing in response to Joe Nye’s article on the importance of “smart power,” his rebuttal piece in Foreign Policy paints is a myopic view of American foreign aid, and in Adelman’s rush to end the practice, manages to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Here’s Adelman’s conclusion:
For decades now, the United States has been the No. 1 foreign-aid donor … but this hasn’t translated in making America the most popular or most influential country around the world. …
Four of the largest U.S. foreign-aid recipients today — Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, and Afghanistan — all take contrary positions on issues of critical importance to the White House. South Vietnam once got gobs — gobs upon gobs — of U.S. foreign aid. That didn’t help much. Likewise with Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Zaire (now the “Democratic” Republic of the Congo), and other “friendly” (read: graciously willing to take U.S. money) countries. …
Put bluntly, this aspect of soft power — foreign aid, by far the biggest in dollar terms, amounting to some $30 billion* a year — may not constitute much power at all.
In Adleman’s world, the only reason America should give to impoverished countries is to buy quid pro quo support in the UN, or to compel local governments and populations to unambiguous pro-American stances.
So a thought exercise, let’s enter Adelman’s world and imagine what would happen if we distributed foreign aid on his terms. Actually, we don’t have to imagine very hard, because there’s already a glowing exemplar of Adelman’s approach: North Korea.
In America’s dealing with Pyongyang, we only dole out aid only when there’s an immediate quid pro quo. Certainly the depths of North Korea’s poverty and recalcitrance of its leadership create a truly unique situation, but the basic premise holds: America is rich, North Korea is poor, and important strategic issues must be discussed between them.
Here’s what happens: Without regular American aid, North Korea throws a two-year-old style temper tantrum by testing (or threatening to test) a nuclear warhead; the United States and Europe scramble to put together an assistance package; Pyongyang temporarily calms down… until the next time they need something. In other words, we’re negotiating with the DPRK on its terms. American- and European-led efforts to engage North Korea have only been fleetingly successful: the regime will sit down with us when it pleases and then stall without giving much up until it needs something.
The converse case is how America deals with pretty much the rest of the developing world: We provide the developing world money on a regular basis. Yes, a lot of it is skimmed off by corrupt local officials, and some is directed at narrow strategic objects that help tighten local despots’ grip on power. To fault aid for supporting individuals, rather than institutions, is perfectly valid, and has contributed to the Obama administration’s inconsistent policy across the Middle East.
But a good chunk gets to where it’s intended (to military, infrastructure, health, or civil society groups) that is appreciated for one reason or another. The sum total is that the “payoff”(if you want to be callous) of American foreign is helping to create stable, working relationships with countries the world over. Foreign governments and their populations aren’t going to side with the United States on every issue (or even most issues), but maintaining open channels of communication to the ruling class and opposition groups are critical to productive dialogue that shapes policy over the long arc. And yeah, it just may help build democratic and stable societies, which are inherently aligned with America’s values and interests.
The bottom line is that foreign aid, however imperfect, creates the contours for America’s role in the world. Take it away, and we’re left bribing everyone. Just ask Kim Jong Il.
