The Network Law Review is pleased to present you with a special issue curated by the Dynamic Competition Initiative (“DCI”). Co-sponsored by UC Berkeley and the EUI, the DCI seeks to develop and advance innovation-based dynamic competition theories, tools, and policy processes adapted to the nature and pace of innovation in the 21st century. This special issue brings together contributions from speakers and panelists who participated in DCI’s second annual conference in October 2024. This article is authored by Diana L. Moss, Vice President and Director of Competition Policy, Progressive Policy Institute.
***
1. Introduction
Competition policy has a difficult relationship with the digital sector. Rates of innovation and productivity are some of the highest across the U.S. economy and ongoing advancements in technology (e.g., artificial intelligence (AI)) threaten to displace incumbent business models.[2] On the other hand, the digital ecosystems grow rapidly through acquisition, and many exhibit economic characteristics that foster market concentration. Until recently, antitrust enforcement in the U.S. has been reluctant to address market power in the digital sector. But it is now working overtime, with several unsuccessful merger challenges and pending monopolization cases that, when all is said and done, will take years to resolve.[3]
This article asks how antitrust’s history informs the debate over which models of competition—static, dynamic, or a hybrid approach—are fit for purpose in the digital sector.[4] The static model’s focus on efficiency in narrowly-defined equilibrium markets appears increasingly out of sync with the pace of innovation, unique economics, and new product development, especially for the digital ecosystems. This article explores the notion that U.S. antitrust enforcers, knowingly or not, put more weight on dynamic competition principles during the rise of the digital ecosystems but reverted more recently to a static competition framework.
