One of the functions of The Progressive Fix is to not only to provide an online outlet for “pragmatic progressives” but also to demonstrate that their antipathy to ideological litmus tests extends to their own ranks.
In that spirit, I will take issue with a post published here on Friday by Scott Winship, who is an esteemed friend and colleague, and my predecessor as managing editor over at The Democratic Strategist. Scott offered a defense of the Senate filibuster on traditional, anti-tyranny-of-the-majority grounds, and then suggested that the real problem in the Senate is partisan polarization, with the solution being reforms in primary laws to reduce the power of the “ideological extremes.”
To be clear, my disagreement with Scott on this issue is only partial. I am not hell-bent on eliminating the filibuster as a possibility under the Senate rules (though not opposed to that step in principle, either). But what I object to categorically is the routinization of filibuster threats in recent years, to the point where the Senate has come perilously close to creating an entirely new, non-constitutionally-sanctioned 60-vote requirement for the enactment of all significant legislation (other than provisions taken up under specified exceptions to the usual rules, like the Congressional Budget Act).
Since the Senate already has a built-in red-state bias, a supermajority requirement would basically represent a death sentence for progressive initiatives in the near future. Yes, I know some Democrats (though not me) celebrated the filibuster when the shoe was on the other foot a few years back, but on the other hand, nobody was excoriating Republicans for demanding that their own senators vote for cloture, were they?
And that’s the crux of the matter today — not the possibility of filibusters, but the elimination of any disincentive to engage in a filibuster on every single piece of legislation. Some senators are acting as though the right to vote one’s conscience or interests on a bill is identical to the right to obstruct it by denying it a floor vote, meaning that the normal practice of party discipline on procedural matters somehow does not extend to the most important procedural matter: votes to end a filibuster — i.e., cloture votes. So even if Democrats have (as they do right now) an improbable and (probably) unsustainable 60 Senate votes, that’s not enough unless they also have 60 votes for a specific bill. That particular shoe has not been on the other foot in living memory, but even if it had been, I certainly think Republicans should have been free to sanction their members for combining with the opposition to bring the Senate, and the country, to a standstill.
If Joe Lieberman or Ben Nelson considers it a matter of deep principle to vote against cloture to block final passage of health care reform (probably for the next decade or so, given the precedents on this topic), that’s well and good, but they should have to pay a price — such as losing a rung on the seniority ladder.
Scott, as noted above, argues that the current situation in the Senate is the product of “polarization,” which he seems to blame equally on both parties, and offers the remedy of electoral reforms to reduce that polarization. By this I assume he means some form of open primary. Scott is a very smart man who knows, I am sure, that “polarization” hasn’t simply been produced by closed primaries. Much of it has resulted from a gradual process of ideological sorting-out between the two major parties that is entirely healthy and natural, as compared to the longstanding dependence on ethnic, religious, and regional factors for party identification that may have made “bipartisanship” technically easier but didn’t really offer most voters (e.g., southerners choosing between Democratic and Republican conservatives and northeasterners choosing between Democratic and Republican liberals) more choice than they have today. If you look at the Senate right now, it’s hard to identify more than a few senators whose behavior would change if they were exposed, say, to primary voting by registered independents (many hard-core southern conservative Republicans are from states with no party registration at all).
More to the point, the unity of Senate Republicans right now flows less from the fear of primary opponents from the hard right than it does from a corporate decision by the GOP as an institution that it must destroy the Obama administration by any means necessary. A contributing factor to this decision is the strange but overwhelmingly maintained belief of Republicans that the only way to distance themselves from the hyper-partisan Bush administration’s disastrous record is by claiming it was too liberal! When it comes to big-ticket issues like health care reform and climate change, Republicans have clearly shifted to the right during the last few years, even as Democrats have consistently sought middle ground (e.g., market-based carbon cap-and-trade and a “premium support” approach to universal health care).
So in my opinion, the immediate solution to the polarization of the Senate isn’t an impossible effort to reach accommodation with more than a very few Republicans, or letting a few “centrists” write every bill. Instead, there ought to be a reasonable insistence that Democrats reject the supermajority requirement and support the party on cloture votes as a matter of course. We can then maintain our big-tent party by letting heterodox Democrats stray on final passage of key legislation as they wish. And we can also invite Republicans to go to the country with a stirring, populist campaign slogan of “throw the cloturers out.”
