Publication

As someone who will be offering regular political analysis here at Progressive Fix, I thought I’d lay down some personal markers about the current political landscape and how progressives should think about their immediate and long-range objectives. There’s quite a bit of “analysis” out there right now of very dubious value, particularly on the right but occasionally on the left, and it’s a good idea to address some of the basic disagreements about where the country is moving politically.

First of all, demographic trends in electoral politics don’t typically create iron laws of voting behavior, but they do matter a great deal. And once you discount some rhetorical overreach involving a few claims that Barack Obama was engineering an FDR-style realignment of gigantic and irreversible proportions, the pro-Democratic trends exhibited by the American electorate in 2006 and 2008 are indeed very significant, even if events undermine their strength or delay their effect. To put it simply, most growing segments of the electorate have been trending strongly Democratic, while Republican appeal has been concentrated in declining segments. And in the long run, any disappointment felt by Democratic-trending groups at actual Democratic governance may well be offset by the manifest tendency of the GOP to reflect the most unpopular views of its shrinking base.

Second of all, long-term trends don’t always match short-term results. As it happens, midterm elections typically attract a notably different electorate than presidential elections, dominated especially by the one major voting segment that trended Republican in 2008: culturally conservative white seniors. And participation in midterms by the most rapidly Democratic-trending group, under-30 voters, has been invariably very low. (The record is a bit more uneven with respect to another Democratic-trending segment, minority voters, particularly African-Americans, who occasionally have relatively high midterm turnout rates). This historic pattern, more than any “turn to the right” or “buyer’s remorse about Obama,” is the legitimate source of Republican optimism and Democratic pessimism in 2010. The reality is that Obama’s approval ratings right now are close, in aggregate numbers and among most Democratic groups, to his actual vote levels in 2008; they are not lower.

Third of all, tempting as it is to look at future elections, and especially 2010, as turnout battles, there is a good reason for paying special attention to swing voters, defined as very likely voters who have no stable attachment to either party. (To be clear, “swing voters” are not – repeat, not — the same as “self-identified independent” voters, a majority of whom are actually partisans who don’t like the label). The reason is simple and arithmetic: in a two-party context, “turning” a true swing voter gains two net votes (one in your column and one less in your opponent’s), while “mobilizing” a “base” voter gains one, and perhaps less than that if the mobilization technique helps the other party mobilize its own base.

Fourth of all, “swing voters” are by no mean monolithic, or necessarily “moderate”; they do, however, have high levels of mistrust of both parties, and of government. So all other things being equal, they tend to have high anti-incumbent feelings, and also tend to vote at low levels in times of general unhappiness with the direction of the country.

The Challenge in 2010

So adding it all up, the big challenge for Democrats in 2010 is to minimize the demographic edge Republicans have in midterms and to neutralize the tendency of true swing voters to blame the incumbent party for general disgruntlement with the political status quo.

Obviously enough, improvements in the real-life conditions of the country will benefit Democrats tremendously (though, ironically, it could also help prop up vulnerable Republican incumbents, particularly in state elections). Beyond that, three Democratic desiderata are apparent — (1) a record of accomplishment on widely appreciated national challenges; (2) an effort to disassociate Democrats from aspects of the status quo (e.g., corruption, power-grabbing, excessive partisanship, and scary-sounding developments like very large budget deficits or skyrocketing health care costs) that are especially unpopular; and (3) aggressive exploitation of past and present Republican extremism, making elections a conscious choice rather than a referendum on the status quo.

So if this basic analysis is right, what are the implications for current debates among Democrats about political strategy?

A False Choice for Progressives

For one thing, it’s long past time to end the false choice between base- and swing-voter strategies. Repeat after me: a vote is a vote. At present, Democrats are probably more threatened by poor base turnout in 2010 than by the loss of true swing voters, but that could change, and it’s by no means clear that what we need to do to “energize the base” (which is a lot less liberal ideologically than some of its champions suggest) differs significantly from what we need to do to win swing voters.

For another thing, the idea that Democrats must be governed strictly by the views of self-conscious “progressives” or “moderates” represents another false choice. Democratic “centrists” are right in saying that an ideologically diverse set of elected officials increases the party’s electoral reach; Democratic liberals are right in saying that a “progressive” coalition unwilling or unable to address basic progressive policy objectives isn’t worth a whole lot. Party discipline in Congress or elsewhere ought to be based on what is necessary to achieve those objectives in the long run, in full recognition of the high cost of allowing Republicans the opportunity to misgovern America at this crucial juncture.

So there’s no easy “fix” for our political challenges. But we should approach these challenges with the same attitude of principled pragmatism that guides our substantive policies.