President Obama made a splash in Florida last month when he announced the award of federal stimulus money to start building a high-speed rail (HSR) line between Tampa and Orlando. “I’m excited. I’m going to come back down here and ride it,” he told a cheering audience at a town hall meeting.
The president certainly got it right when he said that we must break our dependence on the automobile and imported oil. Safe, reliable, and incredibly fast rail promises a breakthrough that people will be willing to pay for and private investors willing to operate. Passenger trains cruising at 150 miles per hour provide a decisive margin of superiority over highway travel and can compete effectively with commercial air in short- and medium-distance markets while cutting overall fuel consumption and greenhouse gases.
But for all the hype surrounding the president’s announcement, this exciting new mode of transportation won’t be arriving in America anytime soon unless the Obama administration and Congress make some “course corrections.” The crux of the problem is that the administration has begun a major civic work without laying down engineering and design protocols that match the standards of fast train lines built elsewhere in the world. Even worse, the distribution of funds from the stimulus package ensures that the most promising projects will remain underfunded.
One thing that’s been little understood by policy makers and the public is that HSR trains operate quite differently from conventional Amtrak trains. First and foremost, they cannot share tracks with much slower freight trains and must be walled off in their own protected corridors. They can climb steeper gradients than regular trains, allowing them to “hug” the landscape and minimize noise and environmental impacts. But in order to maintain top speeds, the lines they travel on must be built with the fewest possible curves. And where curves are unavoidable, they must use larger turning circles to change direction.
Trains running at more than 150 mph need to be far more powerful than conventional trains and use overhead electric lines for power rather than diesel engines. Trainsets are lightweight and based on aerodynamic designs that make for quicker acceleration and more economical braking.
A regular diesel-powered train running on track shared with freight trains is not high-speed rail. It never will be. It cannot and will not compete with highways and commercial air because it is stuck on a 19th-century right-of-way filled with curves and narrow clearances that reflect a period when trains ran no faster than 60 mph. And yet such projects, designated as “Emerging HSR” by the Obama administration, got far too much of the HSR stimulus pot last month.
Of the 29 rail projects that shared $8 billion in Recovery Act stimulus funds, only two – the Tampa-Orlando proposal in Florida and a projected San Diego-Sacramento line in California – qualify as high-speed rail by international standards. The rest can most accurately be called “higher speed rail” or “improving Amtrak on-time performance rail.”
The best of these projects, a $1.1 billion upgrade of the existing rail corridor between Chicago and St. Louis, will eventually permit Amtrak trains to achieve 110-mph maximums and 70-mph averages between the two cities. That’s far below the 150-mph standard set by the European Union. Several other corridor projects funded last month won’t even reach 100-mph speed maximums because they are limited by the curves and congestion on track they share with freight railroads.
The Florida and California proposals that we believed should have served as templates for an emerging HSR program got far fewer funds than they deserved. Both proposals call for lightweight, electrically propelled trains on dedicated guideways running at 150 to 220 mph. Each state got enough stimulus money ($1.25 billion for Florida and $2.25 billion for California) to begin construction, but without any assurance that a working segment can be finished and placed in revenue service. This is a big problem that needs to be remedied.
The Recovery Act provided the first-ever direct federal funds for passenger rail improvements outside of the Northeast Corridor. Responsibility for the program was handed to the Federal Railroad Administration, a small branch of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) that deals primarily with railway safety. There was no precedent for what it had been tasked to do by President Obama. Awarding high-speed passenger projects was a new responsibility for which the agency was largely unprepared and unequipped.
Because it lacked personnel with backgrounds in HSR, the FRA fell back on what it knew best – conventional railway operations – to evaluate grant applications from the states. And the state applications were mostly dusted-off commuter-rail or incremental Amtrak projects, because most state DOTs have no more experience in executing HSR projects than the federal government.
Out of this confluence of modest state applications chasing humble FRA guidelines came a welter of small-scale upgrades – fixing signal systems here and adding a new siding there – that collectively do little to advance a new mode of intercity travel in America.
We have to do better. Minor upgrades of low-speed freight systems will give government critics a perfect target to paint HSR as a “runaway spending train” (as the Wall Street Journal dubbed it) that benefits only a small group of people. If the public’s current enthusiasm for HSR turns into disappointment, there will be little political support for the expenditure of hundreds of billions needed to construct real high-speed networks.
To rectify this situation, we make the following policy recommendations to the administration and Congress:
There is no doubt that President Obama is committed to upgrading intercity passenger rail. But last month his administration failed to exert optimal leadership by spreading federal stimulus funds far and wide rather than concentrating on two or three corridors that would give us trains equal to those in Europe and China.
No one said that building a passenger rail network worthy of the 21st century would be easy or cheap. But neither was the transcontinental railroad nor the interstate highway system that transformed overland travel in America in the past. Each required a bold vision accompanied by smart planning, perseverance, and sustained financial support.
The administration’s current plans for HSR represent a welcome change from the neglect of years past. But unless improvements to our HSR strategy are made, we risk squandering the renewed momentum for building a true high-speed network.
