U.S. public disapproves of Trump tariffs by about 63% to 35%

October 15, 2025
Ed Gresser

FACT: U.S. public disapproves of Trump tariffs by about 63% to 35%.

THE NUMBERS: Trump administration tariffs on goods from –

Brazil	50%
Venezuela	15%

WHAT THEY MEAN:

A concise 73-word resolution from Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.), and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.):

“Pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622), the national emergency declared on April 2, 2025, by the President in Executive Order 14257 (90 Fed. Reg. 15041) is terminated effective on the date of the enactment of this joint resolution.”

This resolution would repeal the Trump administration’s April decree imposing a worldwide 10% import tax, plus various country-by-country rates ranging from 15% to 40%. It’s up for a vote before the end of October. So are two more from Sens. Kaine (D-Va.), Paul, Wyden, and others, which would terminate a February administration tariff decree on Canadian-made goods and another from July on Brazilian products. A look at each, and their effects so far:

The decrees: The Trump administration has been trying since February to replace the Congressionally authorized “Harmonized Tariff Schedule” with a new one, but also to evade the Constitutional approach to changes in tariff rates — Congressional bills — through a series of decrees declaring states of “emergency” or “national security” need. The three at issue this month use a 1974 law, the “International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” meant for quick action in the outbreak of wars, pandemics, or similar events. They are:

1. Canada, February 1: The first decree — “Executive Order 14193” — claimed Canada is “failing to devote significant attention or resources, or cooperate with U.S. law enforcement” on drug trafficking (in particular fentanyl), and imposed 25% tariffs on Canadian-made and -grown goods. It has since been revised to cover just products not ‘compliant’ with the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Per CBP’s data, northern-border drug trafficking is small: of the 21,100 pounds of fentanyl seized at borders and within the U.S. in 2024, only 49 pounds — about 0.2% — were “northern border” seizures. This includes some internal U.S. production in border states as well as international traffic. Canadian law enforcement, meanwhile, reports seizures of about 6.4 kilos (14 pounds) of fentanyl last year, so it’s possible more flows north from the U.S. to Canada than comes down.

2. Worldwide, April 2: The second, “Executive Order 141257,” declares the U.S. trade balance a ‘national emergency’ justifying the wholesale replacement of the Congressionally authorized tariff schedule with dozens of new rates set by country, plus a worldwide 10%. Overall, it has hiked U.S. tariff rates from last year’s 2.4% to about 18%. The U.S. has run a goods-trade “deficit” since 1975. Since then U.S. GDP has quadrupled (per BEA from $6 trillion to $24 trillion, in real 2017 dollars) and U.S. employment has doubled from 77 million to 160 million. As to whether this long deficit pattern is a problem, reasonable analysts disagree; it’s hard, though, to see a 50-year stretch enduring through booms, recessions, etc. as an “emergency.”

3. Brazil, July 30: This one, “Executive Order 14233,” revises the April 2 decree to put a 40% on most Brazilian goods (though with many exemptions), on top of the original 10%. So, a 50% total. Identical goods from next-door Venezuela get 15%. Entitled “Addressing Threats to the United States from the Government of Brazil”, this decree cites as “threats” overly intrusive online content moderation and the prosecution of ex-President Bolsonaro for attempting to overthrow Brazil’s 2022 presidential election. It probably isn’t controversial to note that Venezuelan speech policies and court procedures are pretty far below Brazilian standards.

Now to some real-world results:

1. Lost growth, higher inflation: In “macro” terms, yesterday’s IMF “World Economic Outlook” projections for the United States show the U.S. losing about a point of growth and gaining a point of inflation. More locally, here’s an Ohio sample — higher costs, higher prices — from the Cleveland Fed’s September Beige Book:

“Many manufacturers reported that tariffs had increased the costs of electronic components, tools, metals, and other raw materials, with multiple contacts noting a lack of domestic suppliers for some items. Retail contacts cited higher costs related to tariffs on vehicles, beef, and other commodities. One healthcare contact said tariffs had affected hospital drug pricing, pushing up the cost per unit of service. Some manufacturers and auto dealers reported passing along 100 percent of tariff increases to customers, while others said they were slowly raising prices in response to higher tariffs. … Several contacts in manufacturing and professional and business services reported waiting to see “how things settle” before increasing prices but anticipated doing so in the near term.”

2. Industrial contraction: The core goals of all this, according to U.S. Trade Representative Greer, are a higher manufacturing share of GDP and a lower trade deficit. Since the administration’s decrees began in February, manufacturing has dropped from 9.8% of GDP in 2024 to 9.4%. Automakers in particular have been hit hard, with the three Michigan-based U.S. producers losing about $6 billion. The trade balance has jumped up and down, but overall is $150 billion more in deficit than in 2024.

* Lost exports and tourism revenue: Tariffing Canadian products — concentrated in industrial supplies such as fertilizer, aluminum, energy, and lumber — is proving a good way to raise production costs for American manufacturers like the Cleveland Fed’s Ohioans, as well as farmers and building contractors. It’s also damaging the U.S. economy in less obvious ways. For example, though the Canadian government isn’t retaliating, a lot of Canadians are doing so individually. The Cleveland Fed’s Boston cousins, in their own, September Beige Book, point to a sharp drop in Canadian tourist visits as a blow to the northern New England economy: Maine got 1.1 million Canadian visitors in the summer of 2024, and a third less —780,000 – this summer. Kentucky and California get similar unexpected shocks, with exports of bourbon and wines down by half this year, as Canadians seek out recognizably “American” things so as not to buy them.

The Census hasn’t yet published August trade data, so we don’t know what happened vis-à-vis Brazil that month. It’s likely, though, that the main cost increases come in agricultural products — particularly coffee and orange juice — and that lost exports will be most painful in Texas and Florida. Texas is the top exporter to Brazil at $11.6 billion; Florida is most Brazil-reliant, with Brazilian customers buying a fifth of Florida’s $11 billion in aerospace exports, half of its $2.4 billion in semiconductors, and a third of its $1.6 billion in agricultural chemicals.

* Unhappy public: The public reaction, based on polling, is pretty negative and (depending on the pollster) either steadily bad throughout or bad at the start and worse since. The Washington Post’s May survey, for example, reported 64% of Americans disapproving and 34% approving, and an identical 64/34 split in September. Fox News’ poll differs a bit, finding slightly less unhappiness early on, but a deteriorating trend over time towards a September finding like the Post’s: 53%-28% disapproval in March, 57%-28% disapproval in June, 63%-36% disapproval in September.

Last thought: The administration’s decrees this year have different targets and varying pretexts. Their effects are more uniform: unfounded claims of threat, real-world harm to U.S. industry and consumers, and unpopularity. In terminating them, the Senate can do some real-world good, but also fulfill a more basic, abstract, and important responsibility.

To state the obvious, when presidents — in the U.S. or anywhere else in the world — try to declare states of emergency and rule by decree, it’s a bad sign. The public is right to oppose it. And in the U.S. specifically, the Constitution unambiguously gives Congress authority over “Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.” An American president who wants a higher tariff rate should therefore ask Congress to pass a bill. If he or she tries to impose this tariff rate alone, Congress should stop him, as Sens. Wyden, Paul, Kaine, et. al. propose to do this month.