At first glance, it seems like an obvious call: al Qaeda hasn’t attacked the U.S. in over eight years, so why endanger more American lives and spend billions to fend off a group that’s on the ropes?
Or, even for many who believe al Qaeda continues to pose a threat, it’s hardly obvious why the Obama administration is considering Gen. McChrystal’s request of 40,000 more troops for Afghanistan. After all, the terrorist group has withered to maybe 100 members, most of whom are across the border in Pakistan. Shouldn’t a counterterrorism strategy that disrupts plots as they develop be enough?
A friend who works in Hollywood once told me that movie producers emphasize that the audience should understand exactly what’s at stake throughout the picture. In the Afghan security drama, the audience — the American public — has long since been lost and bored by the plot. Who can blame them? Think of all the twists and turns that have diverted their attention over the last eight years: Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, a torture debate, Gitmo, wiretaps, and, of course, Afghanistan, among many other factors, have all desensitized, frustrated, or angered much of the country to the point that many are sick of thinking about national security. If George McGovern dusted off his presidential campaign slogan, “Come Home, America,” and ran this year, he might fare better than last time.
That’s why as the White House contemplates its choice for strategy and resources in Afghanistan, it’s crucial that Americans become reacquainted with what’s still at stake.
Right now, it’s true that al Qaeda’s senior leadership — the only one of the many different “al Qaeda” groups worldwide that has a serious interest in attacking the U.S. — probably doesn’t have the capability to plan and execute a devastating 9/11-style terrorist attack. Al Qaeda’s core leadership remains intact, but after eight years of pounding by American and NATO forces, it’s highly questionable whether Osama Bin Laden’s intimate cadre could today mount an intricate logistical and financial campaign necessary for a large-scale operation half a world away.
One can’t blame Americans for thinking that the stakes aren’t particularly high. America feels relatively secure today, and some complacency may have set in.
But as Steve Coll first suggested in Ghost Wars, his history of intelligence services in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it’s helpful to think of America as a soccer goalie defending against Team al Qaeda. It’s possible to pitch shut-out after shut-out for several games in a row, but no matter how good the goalie is, at some point, he’s bound to let one through.
To build on Coll’s metaphor, al Qaeda, unfortunately, is prepared for a long season. One of al Qaeda’s under-appreciated strengths is its patience. Bin Laden’s modus operandi is that it’s better to do nothing than to try and fail. Al Qaeda took five years to plan the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, two years for 2000’s U.S.S. Cole attack, and another two for 9/11. Plot development time would no doubt be much longer today.
That’s why al Qaeda is effectively sitting on the sidelines in Pakistan. It has been pinned down by the American and NATO presence in Afghanistan and is biding its time, hoping that the Taliban can retake control of Afghanistan and re-open the playing field.
Gen. McChrystal’s plan is a proposal to keep them off the field for good. Instead of worrying about disrupting plots as American intelligence learns of them, McChrystal’s strategy, if successful, would permanently deny al Qaeda a chance to slip one past the goalie by forever taking away the safe haven it needs to plot a massive terrorist operation.
Some question the links between al Qaeda and the Taliban, wondering whether, should the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan, it would necessarily facilitate al Qaeda’s return. But in an essay in Foreign Affairs, Barbara Elias provides a convincing rebuttal: “If key Taliban officials behaved as representatives of a government seeking to maintain control of their territory, they would have given up al Qaeda in the fall of 2001, just as Pakistan supposedly agreed to give up the Taliban. Why would they turn against al Qaeda now if they didn’t then?”
As I argued in an article for Foreign Policy, al Qaeda needs a safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border to have any hope of conducting a massive terrorist attack against the U.S. The Obama administration and European leaders may never be able to fully defend against a Madrid- or London-style attack, but America can defend against another 9/11 by denying al Qaeda the cover it needs to conceive, plan, train for, and execute a terrorist plot.
There’s no question that Gen. McChrystal’s request is a bitter pill to swallow as the administration asks for billions more to finish off a distant enemy seemingly on its last legs. It is tempting to wager that America will remain secure even if the Taliban retake parts of Afghanistan by keeping al Qaeda off balance with less expensive Special Forces raids and targeted air strikes.
That roll of the dice isn’t worth it. If al Qaeda regroups and re-grows by implanting itself in Afghan territory, it would establish itself anew as a serious security threat to the U.S. And if it were able to launch another 9/11-style attack, the White House — regardless of its occupant — would be back at square one, making new decisions about thousands more American lives and hundreds of billions fresh dollars. It’s not an attractive option, but on the whole, it makes more sense to swallow the castor oil and adopt Gen. McChrystal’s recommendations. They offer the best chance of permanently quashing the al Qaeda threat.
That’s what’s at stake.