Michael Cohen’s new piece in Dissent is a perfect blueprint for a colossal disaster in Afghanistan that would seriously jeopardize American security.
Michael, whose company I very much enjoyed during an ill-fated 72-hour effort to get to Afghanistan as election monitors, argues for a less-ambitious plan for American involvement in Afghanistan. It is deeply flawed.
The very first line, “The United States has been fighting the war in Afghanistan for more than eight years,” hints at the sentiments underlying his views: exhaustion with the war, a desire to end it. The piece makes a pitch for a new way forward in Afghanistan by offering a different strategy, something he calls an “enemy-focused approach.” His strategy calls for incorporating the Taliban into the government, shrinking the size of the Afghan army by some 80,000 troops and abandoning the entire South and East to the Taliban.
Where to begin? I’ve argued time and time again against the possibility of incorporating anything but the Taliban’s foot soldiers into the government. The most succinct argument I’ve seen against it is from Barbara Elias in last year’s Foreign Affairs:
[The Taliban’s] legitimacy rests not on their governing skills, popular support, or territorial control, but on their claim to represent what they perceive as sharia rule. This means upholding the image that they are guided entirely by Islamic principles; as such, they cannot make concessions to, or earnestly negotiate with, secular states.
Then there’s Cohen’s suggestion to scale back the size of the Afghan army, reasoning that 170,000 poorly trained Afghan soldiers trained by Americans are worse than 90,000 “trained to fight like an Afghan army — not an American proxy force.” Huh? Does anyone have a good example of what a model Afghan army looks like? Why does Cohen believe 90,000 is the right number? And why is Cohen so certain that American training efforts will fall flat for 170,000? And, if we did cut it off 90,000, what would we do with the extra 80,000 recruits to whom we’ve given basic firearms skills but have just lost their paycheck and would now feel betrayed by the U.S.?
And finally there is Cohen’s idea of just abandoning the South and East of the country. You know, the Marjas and Kandahars of Afghanistan where the U.S. is now either deeply invested or creating expectations that they’re about to be. Compounding the sense of betrayal that Afghans in those regions might feel (notice a theme?) would be the mistake of offering the Taliban the safe haven they require.
I suspect Cohen’s strategy is merely a fig leaf to preempt the inevitable right-wing cries of “cutting and running.” But while such sound-bite attacks are repulsive, there is a case to be made that Cohen offers his strategy disingenuously. Cohen thinks that “the original goal of the mission has been achieved; al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan has been destroyed and its Taliban allies pushed from power.” But if that’s the case, why would we need a new strategy — why not just pull out entirely? And why advocate returning the Taliban to power if we’ve already pushed them out of it?
Cohen may be justifiably war-weary — we all are. But I happen to believe what Cohen wrongly calls President Obama’s “rhetorical tricks” about the “risks of an al-Qaeda return to Afghanistan” if we do not create a stable environment that can endure after we leave. And I also think that the counterinsurgency strategy that Cohen curtly dismisses as “a fad” is a sound plan that’s our best shot at lasting security in Afghanistan. Cohen mistakes U.S. gains in Afghanistan for victory and says we can leave now; I see it as proof that what we’re doing is working and that we should keep at it.
Michael, I’m sorry to be so blunt, but if you’re just sick of the war, it would be better to say it straight out and not offer half-baked, ineffective solutions that would seriously jeopardize American and Afghan security. Competent governance is about making really difficult decisions with the best information available. That’s exactly what this White House did with its careful, deliberative process, and that’s why I’m going to trust them on this one.
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