During his 60 Minutes interview Sunday night, President Obama underscored the point that Seal Team 6 collected a “treasure trove” of information that could prove of incredible valuable to the intelligence community. So what’s in all the thumb drives, and how might, as the president asserted, the information “serve us very well”?
To be clear, part of what you’re about to read is speculation. It’s at least informed speculation, based on my time as a DoD counter terrorism analyst. As far as I can tell, the bottom line is that we’re now entering a crucial period — the United States has a strong short-term advantage and can exploit this find to hit al Qaeda while the group is scrambling. Here’s why:
First: Whenever the IC gets a major intel dump from a high value al Qaeda target, the very act of exposing new intelligence forces the remaining leadership’s hand. You can be sure that’s why President Obama emphasized our possession of the new material in the interview. The rest of AQ Core doesn’t know what we have, but must assume that its cover has been blown, which means their current lodging has become temporary quarters. The upshot is that in the coming days, they will be making plans to move. To accomplish this task, they’ll have to activate a support network of operatives, any of whom could unwittingly expose targets while in transit. In other words, the mere act of capturing substantial information has set up the United States to execute a number of near-term raids or bombings that could strike a fatal blow to AQ’s remaining leadership.
Second: Initial post-raid intelligence indicates that OBL was more involved in ongoing operations than previously believed, including a possible railway plot. It is an IC maxim that al Qaeda has always valued successful plot execution over adherence to a specific date or timeline. Exposing existing plans effectively compromises them, and AQ operatives — rather than risk a potentially compromised plot — are likely to delay or cancel ongoing operations while sending mid-level lieutenants into hiding for a period.
Third: Al Qaeda’s hierarchy has traditionally been composed of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, plus a chief of external operations and a chief of internal operations (defined as Af/Pak). These nodes all have to communicate with one another, and have long-since abandoned the creature comforts of technology in the 21st century. The key to finding OBL was identifying the courier who was in contact with him, and new information could expose other members of this network’s identities. This means that known couriers, too, will have to go into hiding, and the remaining AQ leaders will have to develop a new cadre of trusted sources. Building trust takes time and further delays ongoing operations of all stripes.
Forth: Follow the money — Al Qaeda’s financial network has to assume it is blown. The group traditionally channels money from all over the world into a few operatives near AQ Central. If OBL was maintaining a higher operational profile than we had previously believed, it stands to reason that he was involved with collecting and distributing finances. He might not have had much of a hand in the cookie jar, but the information on his computer drives might say who did.
Fifth: New information will likely shed light on the extent to which al Qaeda’s “branch offices” in failing states like Somalia and Yemen are taking direction from the Af/Pak-based leadership. If these regions had truly taken over some operational planning, newly captured information may reveal the nodes of international contact, which could theoretically be exploited. Information on the “abroad” AQ groups should also send a powerful message to Congress on the necessity of cutting aid to failing states, as they could now take on even greater prominence in the wake of OBL’s demise.
In sum, OBL’s death and the cache of new information it has created open a stark window of opportunity for the United States. The remaining leadership may be forced to expose themselves when they don’t want to, while delaying ongoing operations and reconstituting communications and financial networks from scratch. The Obama administration has proven its willing to take risks against al Qaeda. Now it has to keep its foot on the gas.