Publication

By Eric Leeper
Contributing Author for the Progressive Policy Institute

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) gained popularity at a time when U.S. inflation was benign, income and wealth inequality was on the rise, and progressive politicians saw a political opportunity to pass big-ticket spending programs. To the nagging perennial question, “How do we pay for it?,” MMT serves up a tasty answer. You don’t need to raise taxes or reduce other spending. You don’t need to secure low-cost borrowing. A monetarily sovereign nation, like the United States, can create more currency to buy the goods and services that the programs require.

Large new spending programs often invoke in U.S. voters fears of persistent budget deficits and rising inflation. MMT delivers the reassuring message that those fears are grounded in defunct “orthodox” economic reasoning that limits the federal government’s capabilities: we have nothing to lose but our outmoded fiscal bromides and much to gain by replacing historic policy norms with fresh ideas. MMT explicitly ties itself to populist policies, self-labeling their plans “the birth of the people’s economy” [subtitle of Kelton (2021)]. Any sensible elected leader, whose vision is not impaired by conventional economic thought, would happily gobble up such a fiscal banquet.

MMT is the progressive counterpoint to supply-side economics. It supplants the claim that tax cuts pay for themselves with the claim that “…[federal] spending is self-financing” [Kelton (2021, p. 87), emphasis in original]. Both claims contain a germ of economic substance. Both claims are carefully crafted to provide elected officials seemingly plausible economic grounds to support their preferred fiscal policies (though at opposite ends of the political spectrum). Both offer policy makers an ideology freed of trade offs.

Because economic policy is too important to be reduced to catchy phrases and clever marketing, this essay analyzes MMT economics dispassionately. It does not assess the worthiness of MMT’s goals. Instead, it asks if MMT can achieve its goals without doing grave damage to America’s fiscal standing and, quite possibly, its economy. The answer: probably not.

MMT suffers from several flaws:

1. It denies a fundamental concept in economics: in a society with finite resources but unlimited wants, market prices adjust to induce individuals and policy makers to make trade offs that ultimately align supply and demand. Economics quantifies the costs and benefits of those trade offs to inform policy makers.

2. That denial leads MMT to see no need to offer a comprehensive theory of inflation. It maintains that inflation gets triggered when economy-wide demand for resources exceeds the economy’s resource limit, but has little to say about inflation and its determinants when, as it usually does, the economy operates below that limit.

3. MMT’s solution to inflation from high resource utilization is to raise “taxes,” without specifying which taxes. Governments have many tax instruments at their disposal—labor, sales, capital, wealth, and inflation—and each tax affects individuals and the macro economy differently. Generic advice to control inflation with higher taxes is vacuous until MMTers provide far more detail.

4. MMT does not acknowledge that even well-intentioned policy makers face incentives to use inflation to achieve employment or fiscal financing goals. Because those incentives to inflate are especially powerful for elected officials, many countries, including the United States, have adopted the norms of (i) independent central banks tasked with inflation control and macroeconomic stabilization and (ii) fiscal policies that largely pay for government spending with current and future taxes. Those policy norms have improved inflation performance and social welfare. MMT overthrows those norms to move inflation control and countercyclical policies from the Federal Reserve to Congress, to finance federal spending by creating new currency, and to subjugate monetary policy to fiscal needs.

5. It does not appreciate the central role that safe and liquid U.S. Treasurys perform in the global financial system. Neither does it apprehend the extent to which its policy proposals may destabilize financial markets and undermine the special status of Treasurys and the dollar in the world economy, a status that strengthens the U.S. economy.

The problems begin with the basic assumptions that underpin MMT. Its advocates attribute all unemployment to insufficient demand for workers and believe unemployment should be alleviated through a federal guaranteed jobs program. Weak demand frequently underlies unemployment, particularly during economic downturns. But workers themselves have a say in their employment status. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a broad cross section of workers left the labor market and voluntarily have not re-entered. From March 2020 to October 2021, labor force participation rates were depressed relative to the previous year: 2.5% for men, 2.6% for women, and 3.8% for workers 55 and older. Employers across the country have positions that remain unfilled. COVID is surely an unusual situation, but it serves to illustrate that employment outcomes are not always driven by insufficient demand.

MMT is at its weakest when addressing inflation, how it gets determined and how policies can control it. Its most common argument reduces to: inflation control is not a problem until it is. Problems arise when resource utilization reaches some limit, at which point higher taxes can keep inflation in check.  But resource utilization is not the only factor that affects inflation. In late 2021, consumer price inflation hit a 40-year high of over 6%, yet compared to their pre-COVID levels, employment, capacity utilization, and industrial production are lower, while the unemployment rate is higher. Inflation is not rising because the overall economy has hit its resource limit. To be sure, supply-chain issues have driven up some prices relative to others, but these issues are not what anyone means by economy-wide resource limits. MMT’s weak theory of inflation is stunning because the potential of the MMT agenda to trigger inflation is the most frequently voiced criticism of the theory [Summers (2019), Cochrane (2020), Hartley (2020), Mankiw (2020)].

The guaranteed jobs program points to a more general theme of MMT: the federal government can solve big problems once policy makers grasp the key tenets of MMT. Kelton (2021) identifies seven “deficits,” defined in terms of both quantity and quality, that MMT can help to close: good jobs, saving, health care, education, infrastructure, climate, and democracy. MMT promises to address each of these deficiencies by first altering policy makers’ understandings of fiscal financing matters.

MMT abandons two long-standing policy norms. The first came from Alexander Hamilton in 1790 and can be summarized as “federal budget deficits beget budget surpluses,” meaning that debt-financed spending is backed by future taxes. This norm has contributed to less costly financing and bestowed on U.S. treasurys status as the world’s go-to safe and liquid assets, enabling their critical role in global financial markets. The second norm evolved from the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord to make monetary policy operationally independent. Legislation houses countercyclical policy primarily in the Federal Reserve with the mandate that the Fed achieve price stability, maximum sustainable employment, and low long-term interest rates, and facilitate financial stability.

MMT instead posits that a dollar of new government debt need not carry any assurance of tax backing. It regards treasury securities solely as a means for the central bank to achieve its interest rate target. MMT shifts responsibility for achieving full employment and controlling inflation from monetary policy to fiscal policy. The central bank’s primary tasks are to serve as the Treasury’s bank and to maintain zero interest rates. Despite MMT claims to the contrary, monetary policy is completely subservient to fiscal policy, tossing aside Federal Reserve independence and the social benefits that accrue from it.

Full embrace of MMT’s policy proposals and new norms—whatever they may be—carries significant risks. Those risks include higher and more volatile inflation and interest rates and financial market instability, which would disrupt and depress real economic activity and harm most the people MMT aims to benefit.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Eric Leeper is a contributing scholar for the Progressive Policy Institute. He is also the Paul Goodloe McIntire Professor in Economics at the University of Virginia, a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, director of the Virginia Center for Economic Policy at the University of Virginia, and a visiting scholar and member of the Advisory Council of the Center for Quantitative Economic Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.*

* The author thanks Joe Anderson for many helpful discussions and insights and Campbell Leith, Jim Nason, and PPI staff for detailed comments.