FACT: U.S. public disapproves of Trump tariffs by about 63% to 35%.

THE NUMBERS: Trump administration tariffs on goods from –

WHAT THEY MEAN: 

A concise 73-word resolution from Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.), and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.):

“Pursuant to section 202 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622), the national emergency declared on April 2, 2025, by the President in Executive Order 14257 (90 Fed. Reg. 15041) is terminated effective on the date of the enactment of this joint resolution.”

This resolution would repeal the Trump administration’s April decree imposing a worldwide 10% import tax, plus various country-by-country rates ranging from 15% to 40%. It’s up for a vote before the end of October. So are two more from Sens. Kaine (D-Va.), Paul, Wyden, and others, which would terminate a February administration tariff decree on Canadian-made goods and another from July on Brazilian products. A look at each, and their effects so far:

The decrees: The Trump administration has been trying since February to replace the Congressionally authorized “Harmonized Tariff Schedule” with a new one, but also to evade the Constitutional approach to changes in tariff rates — Congressional bills — through a series of decrees declaring states of “emergency” or “national security” need. The three at issue this month use a 1974 law, the “International Emergency Economic Powers Act,” meant for quick action in the outbreak of wars, pandemics, or similar events. They are:

1. Canada, February 1: The first decree — “Executive Order 14193” — claimed Canada is “failing to devote significant attention or resources, or cooperate with U.S. law enforcement” on drug trafficking (in particular fentanyl), and imposed 25% tariffs on Canadian-made and -grown goods. It has since been revised to cover just products not ‘compliant’ with the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Per CBP’s data, northern-border drug trafficking is small: of the 21,100 pounds of fentanyl seized at borders and within the U.S. in 2024, only 49 pounds — about 0.2% — were “northern border” seizures. This includes some internal U.S. production in border states as well as international traffic. Canadian law enforcement, meanwhile, reports seizures of about 6.4 kilos (14 pounds) of fentanyl last year, so it’s possible more flows north from the U.S. to Canada than comes down.

2. Worldwide, April 2: The second, “Executive Order 141257,” declares the U.S. trade balance a ‘national emergency’ justifying the wholesale replacement of the Congressionally authorized tariff schedule with dozens of new rates set by country, plus a worldwide 10%. Overall, it has hiked U.S. tariff rates from last year’s 2.4% to about 18%. The U.S. has run a goods-trade “deficit” since 1975. Since then U.S. GDP has quadrupled (per BEA from $6 trillion to $24 trillion, in real 2017 dollars) and U.S. employment has doubled from 77 million to 160 million. As to whether this long deficit pattern is a problem, reasonable analysts disagree; it’s hard, though, to see a 50-year stretch enduring through booms, recessions, etc. as an “emergency.”

3. Brazil, July 30: This one, “Executive Order 14233,” revises the April 2 decree to put a 40% on most Brazilian goods (though with many exemptions), on top of the original 10%. So, a 50% total. Identical goods from next-door Venezuela get 15%. Entitled “Addressing Threats to the United States from the Government of Brazil”, this decree cites as “threats” overly intrusive online content moderation and the prosecution of ex-President Bolsonaro for attempting to overthrow Brazil’s 2022 presidential election. It probably isn’t controversial to note that Venezuelan speech policies and court procedures are pretty far below Brazilian standards.

Now to some real-world results:

1. Lost growth, higher inflation: In “macro” terms, yesterday’s IMF “World Economic Outlook” projections for the United States show the U.S. losing about a point of growth and gaining a point of inflation. More locally, here’s an Ohio sample — higher costs, higher prices — from the Cleveland Fed’s September Beige Book:

“Many manufacturers reported that tariffs had increased the costs of electronic components, tools, metals, and other raw materials, with multiple contacts noting a lack of domestic suppliers for some items. Retail contacts cited higher costs related to tariffs on vehicles, beef, and other commodities. One healthcare contact said tariffs had affected hospital drug pricing, pushing up the cost per unit of service. Some manufacturers and auto dealers reported passing along 100 percent of tariff increases to customers, while others said they were slowly raising prices in response to higher tariffs. … Several contacts in manufacturing and professional and business services reported waiting to see “how things settle” before increasing prices but anticipated doing so in the near term.”

2. Industrial contraction: The core goals of all this, according to U.S. Trade Representative Greer, are a higher manufacturing share of GDP and a lower trade deficit. Since the administration’s decrees began in February, manufacturing has dropped from 9.8% of GDP in 2024 to 9.4%. Automakers in particular have been hit hard, with the three Michigan-based U.S. producers losing about $6 billion. The trade balance has jumped up and down, but overall is $150 billion more in deficit than in 2024.

* Lost exports and tourism revenue: Tariffing Canadian products — concentrated in industrial supplies such as fertilizer, aluminum, energy, and lumber — is proving a good way to raise production costs for American manufacturers like the Cleveland Fed’s Ohioans, as well as farmers and building contractors. It’s also damaging the U.S. economy in less obvious ways.  For example, though the Canadian government isn’t retaliating, a lot of Canadians are doing so individually. The Cleveland Fed’s Boston cousins, in their own, September Beige Book, point to a sharp drop in Canadian tourist visits as a blow to the northern New England economy: Maine got 1.1 million Canadian visitors in the summer of 2024, and a third less —780,000 – this summer. Kentucky and California get similar unexpected shocks, with exports of bourbon and wines down by half this year, as Canadians seek out recognizably “American” things so as not to buy them.

The Census hasn’t yet published August trade data, so we don’t know what happened vis-à-vis Brazil that month. It’s likely, though, that the main cost increases come in agricultural products — particularly coffee and orange juice — and that lost exports will be most painful in Texas and Florida. Texas is the top exporter to Brazil at $11.6 billion; Florida is most Brazil-reliant, with Brazilian customers buying a fifth of Florida’s $11 billion in aerospace exports, half of its $2.4 billion in semiconductors, and a third of its $1.6 billion in agricultural chemicals.

* Unhappy public: The public reaction, based on polling, is pretty negative and (depending on the pollster) either steadily bad throughout or bad at the start and worse since. The Washington Post’s May survey, for example, reported 64% of Americans disapproving and 34% approving, and an identical 64/34 split in September. Fox News’ poll differs a bit, finding slightly less unhappiness early on, but a deteriorating trend over time towards a September finding like the Post’s: 53%-28% disapproval in March, 57%-28% disapproval in June, 63%-36% disapproval in September.

Last thought: The administration’s decrees this year have different targets and varying pretexts. Their effects are more uniform: unfounded claims of threat, real-world harm to U.S. industry and consumers, and unpopularity. In terminating them, the Senate can do some real-world good, but also fulfill a more basic, abstract, and important responsibility.

To state the obvious, when presidents — in the U.S. or anywhere else in the world — try to declare states of emergency and rule by decree, it’s a bad sign. The public is right to oppose it. And in the U.S. specifically, the Constitution unambiguously gives Congress authority over “Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.” An American president who wants a higher tariff rate should therefore ask Congress to pass a bill. If he or she tries to impose this tariff rate alone, Congress should stop him, as Sens. Wyden, Paul, Kaine, et. al. propose to do this month.

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

Law:

The relevant three decrees: Canada on February 1, worldwide on April 2, and Brazil on July 30.

Data:

IMF’s sunny October 2024 outlook.

… and the chilly October 2025 reprise.

Census Bureau trade data, with no October release due to the current “government shutdown.”

Around the country:

The Boston Fed’s September Beige Book notes falling Canadian tourism in northern New England.

And the Cleveland Fed’s September Beige Book has Ohio manufacturers, retail, and hospitals all facing higher costs and expecting prices to rise.

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FACT: U.S. imports from Russia are up 30% this year, likely to hit $5 billion.

THE NUMBERS: U.S. fertilizer imports,
January – July 2025* –

* U.S. International Trade Commission Dataweb

WHAT THEY MEAN: 

Secretary of State Marco Rubio used a September 23 NBC appearance to term it “absurd” that some EU countries are still buying Russian energy. As the EU develops a new set of sanctions on Russian use of cryptocurrency, “shadow fleet” oil transport, and banking, the Trump administration has cited these purchases to avoid new sanctions on Russia itself. A day before Rubio’s appearance, though, Politico trade reporter Doug Palmer published a startling find about the United States’ trade with Russia:

“Russia’s fertilizer exports to the United States are rebounding in 2025 after falling in 2023 and 2024, according to Commerce Department data. The data also shows that U.S. imports of Russian enriched uranium and platinum are on their way to higher levels this year. In total, imports from Russia are up nearly 30 percent from 2024, and could reach close to $5 billion by the end of the year.”

Not only have U.S. imports from Russia jumped, but the Russian fertilizer and  specialty metals — mainly platinum-group metals palladium and rhodium, used in catalytic converters, along with the uranium — still arrive duty-free despite the tariffs the Trump administration has imposed on similar goods from allies and other suppliers. Here’s the background:

Before the war in 2021, American purchases from Russia looked like this:

Two weeks after Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Biden administration banned Russian energy, diamonds, seafood (mainly Arctic crab), and luxury goods. As they fell to zero, American imports of Russian goods accordingly dropped by 90%, from the $29.7 billion of 2021 to $3.0 billion in 2024. Biden’s team left a couple of holes, though, as it didn’t ban fertilizer or specialty metals. The EU’s Russian imports are down from $174 billion in 2021 to $36 billion.

A week later, Congress withdrew Russia’s ‘Most Favored Nation’ tariff status. Legally, this shifts tariff rates from the generally low ones of the normal, Congressionally authorized tariff schedule to those set in the 1930 “Smoot-Hawley” tariff bill. For most countries, this would be a very big hit, shriveling up the trade that the Biden administration hadn’t already banned. But as we noted at the time, Russia was an unusual exception. The Congressional tariff-writers in 1930 wanted high rates on finished manufactured goods and farm products, but low ones or zero on natural resources and other factory and farm inputs. In practice, that’s mostly what Russia was selling: the ‘non-MFN’ tariffs on fertilizer (see Column 2 here) are all zero, as are those on uranium, palladium, and rhodium. So withdrawal of MFN status didn’t matter for these things.

The Trump administration’s April tariff decrees, meanwhile, exempted Russian goods on the unconvincing grounds that the U.S. already sanctions Russia in other ways. In practice, that means leaving Russian fertilizer and metals duty-free. Mr. Trump’s July 31 decree then taxed identical stuff from other sources at 10% and up: 10% on fertilizer from Saudi Arabia or Qatar, and 15% if it’s from Nigeria, Israel, or Trinidad; 30% on South African palladium and rhodium. (Canadian fertilizer and potash remain duty-free for now under the bruised-but-still-in-force “U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement”.) So Russia is now picking up market share at their expense. In sum, as Palmer notes, imports from Russia are up about 30% this year and are likely accelerating.

Across the Atlantic, meanwhile, the EU — after some strong persuasion of the populist semidemocrats in Hungary and Slovakia, the main European buyers of Russian oil and gas — is supposed to stop buying Russian energy altogether by the end of 2027. Mr. Rubio isn’t wrong to urge them to stop sooner, though it’s hard to see why that means the U.S. should hold back on financial and shipping sanctions. And with U.S. imports of Russian fertilizer and metals jumping this year, Europeans aren’t alone in earning adjectives like “absurd.”

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on new EU sanctions proposals.

On NBC last month, Sec. Rubio’s strong words for European buyers of Russian energy.

… and a day earlier, Palmer reports for Politico Pro (subs. req.) on rising U.S. fertilizer and metal imports from Russia.

Policy: 

The Biden administration’s bans on energy, seafood, diamonds, and luxuries.

The EU’s current schedule for ending Russian energy buying.

Data:

Census’ topline summary of U.S.-Russia trade by month.

Finland-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air tracks purchasing of Russian energy by country; also see their aggregate totals.

The U.S. Energy Information Agency on U.S. energy production, importing, exporting, and use.

And the U.S. Geological Survey on platinum-group metal uses, reserves, production, and trade.

PPI perspectives:

PPI’s New Ukraine Project, led by Kyiv-based Tamar Jacoby, reports on Ukrainian economic reform, the mood at the front, military industry growth, and more.

Energy and Climate Policy Director Elan Sykes (2023) on American liquefied natural gas as a replacement for European purchases of Russian energy.

And our Trade Fact reminder: Isolationism and appeasement are dangerous.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

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