Hats off to Hochul! NY Governor Demonstrates Courage, Sets Example for Other Democrats

Never underestimate the power of New York City’s (NYC) and state teachers unions. For decades, even when the city was desperate for funds to run its schools, it was spending tens of millions to pay hundreds of teachers their full salary and benefits to sit around and do crossword puzzles, engage in other hobbies, or nap. Those teachers were consigned to reassignment centers — also derisively known as “rubber rooms” — because they were so problematic that they had to be removed from the classroom. Still, thanks to the United Federation of Teachers (UTF), and its affiliate, the New York State United Teachers (NYSUT), the school district couldn’t, and still can’t, easily dismiss ineffective or even abusive teachers. Now known as the “Absent Teacher Reserve,” idle UFT members reportedly cost NYC $150 million in 2016.

That example gives context to the courage it took to do what Democratic Governor Kathy Hochul did yesterday when she released her budget proposal. In it, Hochul made good on a campaign promise to do what she could to allow new public charter schools to open in NYC.

Tens of thousands of students — most in communities of color — are on public charter school waiting lists in NYC, but there has been no relief in almost a decade for parents seeking better schools for their children. Since the passage of the state’s charter school law in 1998, the NYSUT and UTF, through their Democratic proxies in the state legislature, have artificially “capped” the number of charter schools permitted in the state, with a smaller subset cap for NYC. The law was amended in 2007, 2010, and 2015 to allow slight increases in charter school numbers, but then, thanks to Democrats’ obeisance to the teachers unions, progress ground to a halt. Charter school expansion has been synthetically halted in NYC for about five years, despite ever-growing, organic demand.

Too many teachers union leaders reflexively oppose public charter schools, not least because the vast majority of charters aren’t unionized. Charters cost unions dues paying members. They also embarrass them when they outperform traditional district schools, as most do in NYC.

Hochul’s budget does not propose doing away with the caps, even though a new poll by the nonprofit Democrats for Education Reform found that almost two-thirds of NYC parents want the cap lifted, including half of Democrats.

But a proposal to eliminate the cap likely would have been a fool’s errand. Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie (D-Bronx), once supportive of charters, couldn’t ascend to the speaker’s chair until he’d won the unions’ backing — and it’s obvious he had to make promises about maintaining the cap to get it. At the same time, Deputy Senate leader Mike Gianaris (D-Queens) has sung the praises of one charter waiting to open in his district, but he hypocritically refuses to even ease the cap because the NYSUT and the UFT are having none of that.

What Hochul did propose is more pragmatic, and hopefully will be more palatable to her legislative colleagues. Her proposal would keep the statewide cap of 460 charters in place — at least for now — but it would eliminate regional caps to make 85 more slots available for new charter schools anywhere in the state — including New York City.

NYC parents who don’t care how the sausage gets made but do care very much about their kids’ education should cheer Hochul on. But they should push themselves to keep an eye on the sausage-making, too. They must ensure their assembly members understand just how much this issue matters to them as the legislative session grinds on. It’s going to be a heavy lift.

And those of us who advocate for public charter schools need to raise our voices too — especially those of us on the Democratic side of the aisle. We need to praise Hochul for doing a hard thing; the right thing. We also need to hold her up as an example of a Democrat who has the courage — and the pragmatism — to understand that while Democrats appreciate union support, that doesn’t translate to permitting them to indefinitely trample constituents’ right to something as basic as seeking a decent public education for their children.

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: The U.S. has 13,200 fewer small/medium business exporters since 2016

FACT: The U.S. has 13,200 fewer small/medium business exporters since 2016.

THE NUMBERS: U.S. export share of GDP –

2022    11.6%

2016    11.9%

2013    13.6%

 

WHAT THEY MEAN:

A worried look at the American export economy this afternoon, taking as a point of departure the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ first full-year 2022 estimates for American GDP:

(1) Export share of U.S. GDP is down: BEA’s “first estimate” of GDP finds $2.98 trillion in American exports last year, in a $25.5 trillion economy. The export figure combines $2.06 trillion in “goods” (cars, oil, wheat, semiconductors, planes, beef, etc.) with $0.92 trillion in “services” (software downloads, fees for architecture and telemedicine, tourism student tuition, international air cargo earnings, etc.), and made up 11.6% of U.S. GDP. The total, though above the COVID low of 10.2%, remains noticeably below not only the mid-2010s peak (13.6% in 2012, 2013, and 2014) but the 2007-2018 average of 12.6%.

(2) U.S. share of world exports is also down: The World Trade Organization and IMF have not yet published tallies of worldwide exports for 2022. But comparing their figures for 2021 with those of 2016, the WTO’s World Trade Statistical Review report shows that in 2016, the U.S.’ share of the year’s $16.0 trillion in world goods exports was 9.1%, and the U.S.’ share of the $4.8 trillion in commercial services exports was 15.2%. In 2021, the comparable figures were 7.9% of $22.3 trillion in goods and 12.9% of $6.0 trillion in services. Sifting a little more finely, from 2016 to 2021 the American share of world manufacturing exports fell from 8.6% to 7.3%, and of agricultural exports from 10.4% to 9.4%. Or by region, the IMF’s “Direction of Trade Statistics” database reports that in 2016 American factories, farms, and mines supplied 8% of exports to Asia, 33% of exports to Latin America, and 5.3% of exports to sub-Saharan Africa, while (b) in 2021, the figures were 7%, 31%, and 5.1%.

(3) Most recent U.S. export growth in natural resources: Looking more closely at the things Americans were selling, the eleven months of Census Bureau trade data available for 2022 show that nearly half of all U.S. export growth since 2016 — about $290 billion of $610 billion, unless the December figures reveal some unexpected and drastic shift in direction — is in crude oil, natural gas, and refined petroleum. This has reordered the top tier of American exports. Where in 2016 the top five U.S. exports* were airplanes, refined oil, and automobiles, followed by auto parts and integrated circuits; and in 2022 the top five were refined petroleum products, crude oil, and natural gas — together accounting for about $380 billion of the $2.07 trillion in goods exports — with planes and cars now ranked respectively fourth and fifth.

(4) Fewer exporting businesses: And perhaps reflecting this greater concentration of exports in energy, the U.S. export community has shrunk from a mid-2010s peak of 305,000 exporting companies to 290,600 by 2016, and (again with some rebound from a Covid low in 2020), to a preliminary count of 277,500 in 2021.

What to make of this?

Dramatic terms like “inflection point” or “crisis” feel premature. The GDP share of exports is not far below the pre-pandemic level. With growth in 2021 and 2022 heavily driven by federal fiscal stimulus and the post-crisis consumer boom, some erstwhile U.S. exporters may simply have decided to concentrate on local customers for a while. And despite un-robust export figures in the second half of 2022, American manufacturers hired pretty enthusiastically and farmers got reasonably good income. Perhaps, with fiscal stimulus fading and consumers now pulling back, companies will return to exporting and the trade stats will improve in 2023.

On the other hand, perhaps not. If there isn’t yet a case for “drama” and “crisis,” one for “concern” and “guarded pessimism” seems reasonable. In this reading of the trends, policy is taking a toll. On one hand, the tariff increases in 2018 and 2019 mainly fell on industrial inputs, and so to some extent raised costs for U.S. factories and ag producers as well as eliciting foreign retaliations against U.S. exports. On the other, the trade policy environment, especially in Asia, is turning against U.S.-based farms and factories as intra-Asian tariffs fall and technical standards become more compatible through the implementation of the two big regional trade agreements CPTPP and RCEP. All grounds, at least, to look back at the trends of the last five years, and ahead to the next years, with concern.

* At HTS-4 level. Using NAICS-4 the top-five count is slightly different: aerospace, petroleum and coal products, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and auto parts in 2016; oil and gas, petroleum and coal products, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and basic chemicals in 2021.

 

 

Further Readings

The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ GDP database, with (among lots else) export and import totals and shares of GDP.

Census “FT-900” series has the basic monthly trade figures, complete through November with the December (and thus full-year 2022) release next Tuesday.

… and the accompanying “Historical Series” with a convenient one-page summary of annual imports, exports, and balances from 1960 through 2021, also (hopefully) to be updated for 2022 on Tuesday.

… and also from Census, the “Profile of Importing and Exporting Companies” releases a count of exporters and importers by size, with state-by-state figures, SMEs, 25 countries, sectors, etc.

World perspective:

The WTO’s World Trade Statistical Review series.

And the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics.

And in Asia:

ASEAN announces entry into force for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 2021.

P.M. Fumio Kishida reviews Japan’s Asian strategy, with thoughts on the U.S. alliance, nuclear weapons, China relationship, CPTPP, and the potential economic role of the U.S.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week

Maag for The Hill: Affordable Child Care Key to Getting People Back to Work

By Taylor Maag, PPI’s Director of Workforce Policy

The start of 2023 presented some good news for America’s economic outlook. In the first week of January, the December jobs report was released, showing unemployment edging down to 3.5 percent with over 200,000 more people employed full-time. But even with this good news, an enduring conundrum remains: our country’s stagnant workforce participation rate.

The workforce participation rate represents the number of people working or actively looking for work. This job report showed that the U.S. labor participation rate is 62.3 percent, which has not changed since the beginning of 2022 and is only 1 percentage point higher than it was at the start of the pandemic. This means roughly 38 percent of Americans who could be working are detached from the labor market because they believe there are no jobs available for them, or they are facing personal challenges that make it hard to retain employment. As a result, these individuals have stopped looking for work altogether, leaving employers desperate for talent and policymakers wondering where everyone went.

Read more in The Hill.

New U.S. Policy on Rare Earths Elements Critical for America’s Future Security and Economic Prosperity, Argues New Innovation Frontier Project Report

Today, the Progressive Policy Institute’s Innovation Frontier Project (IFP) released a new paper urging United States policymakers to establish a new framework on domestic rare earth element production, including streamlined permitting, tax reform, and high-impact R&D. Report author Daniel Oberhaus argues this new framework is critical for America’s future economic prosperity and the fight for innovation and economic leadership with China.

“When it comes to establishing a robust American rare earths industry, time is of the essence,” writes Daniel Oberhaus in the report. “…China’s dominance of this sector has been wielded for political leverage in the past with disastrous economic consequences that were felt across the globe. This may very well happen again in the future, but the stakes will be even higher given the increasingly central role that rare earths play in our daily lives.”

The report outlines four policy recommendations for a Rare Earths Elements strategy in the U.S., including:

  • Introducing tax incentives for domestic rare earth elements producers
  • Establishing a federal coordinating body for rare earths elements mine permitting
  • Establishing a federal rare earths elements recycling program; and
  • Prioritizing federal support for rare earths elements alternatives

Read and download the paper here:

Daniel Oberhaus is a science writer based in Brooklyn, New York. He was previously a staff writer at Wired magazine covering space exploration and the future of energy. His first book, Extraterrestrial Languages, is about the art and science of interstellar communication and was published by MIT Press in 2019.

Based in Washington, D.C., and housed in the Progressive Policy Institute, the Innovation Frontier Project explores the role of public policy in science, technology and innovation. The project is managed by Jordan Shapiro. Learn more by visiting innovationfrontier.org.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow PPI on Twitter: @ppi

Find an expert at PPI.

###

Media Contact: Aaron White; awhite@ppionline.org

Rare Earths for America’s Future

ISSUE BRIEF

There are few materials that are quite as important for America’s future security and economic prosperity as rare earth elements (REEs). These 17 metallic elements are essential inputs for weapon systems, clean energy technologies, and consumer electronics, yet for the past 20 years the United States has been almost entirely reliant on China for sourcing these critical materials. Today, the U.S. produces just 15% of the world’s REEs and exports 100% of mined material abroad — primarily to China — for separation and refining. China, by contrast, mines about 60% of all REEs produced globally and has increased domestic production of REEs by 60% over the last five years alone. The national security implications of China’s dominance of the rare earth supply chain are obvious, but viable solutions to securing America’s rare earth supply are not.

This policy paper provides an overview of the past, present, and future of the REE industry in the United States. Its primary goal is to establish a framework for a sustainable domestic REE industry through streamlined permitting, tax reform, and high-impact R&D. It considers how to mitigate the environmental impact of REE mining, the challenges and opportunities for REE manufacturing and recycling, the hype and hope for unconventional REE sources, and concludes with four recommendations for a U.S. REE strategy, namely:

1. Introduce tax incentives for domestic REE producers
2. Establish a federal coordinating body for REE mine permitting
3. Establish a federal REE recycling program
4. Prioritize federal support for REE alternatives

Although these are not the only pathways to securing a domestic rare earths supply, we believe that these policies are the most feasible and effective solutions available to policymakers today. When it comes to establishing a robust American rare earths industry, time is of the essence. As we’ll explore throughout this paper, China’s dominance of this sector has been wielded for political leverage in the past with disastrous economic consequences that were felt across the globe. This may very well happen again in the future, but the stakes will be even higher given the increasingly central role that rare earths play in our daily lives. The key to avoiding this scenario will be decisive action designed to support the domestic rare earths industry at every step in the value chain from basic research and mining to processing and manufacturing. America was once the global leader in rare earth production and processing, and it can regain its leadership position once again through the intelligent policy decisions we make today.

 

Read the Full Report from the Innovation Frontier Project

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: Scandinavia has the world’s highest union-membership rates

FACT: Scandinavia has the world’s highest union-membership rates.

THE NUMBERS: Labor union membership as a share of the workforce for OECD countries –

2020    15.8%

2010     17.8%

2000    20.9%

 

WHAT THEY MEAN:

PPI President Will Marshall, writing in 2007 for the online journal Democratic Strategist, imagines some new directions for American labor unions after 25 years of falling membership:

“[New-model unions] could help workers acquire valuable marketable skills and create “virtual hiring halls” to match them to employers. They could also provide services like portable pensions and health insurance, which would smooth workers’ transitions from job to job. And they could experiment with novel concepts like wage or mortgage insurance, which aim at keeping families’ living standards from collapsing when workers lose their jobs. … Modern labor associations could help workers bargain with their employers for a better work-family balance — for flextime, paid leave, telecommuting and part-time jobs with decent benefits. They could operate, in short, like a back-to-the-future update on the old craft unions, which were defenders of quality workmanship as well as workers’ interests.” 

Appealing though this vision may have been (and still might be), no such large-scale transition took place. Instead the trends of the ensuing 15 years looked about the same as those of the previous quarter-century. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ first systematic survey of union membership in 1983* had reported 11.9 million private-sector workers enrolled in unions, which was 19% of that year’s 92 million private-sector workers. A decade later, in 1993, BLS found 9.6 million union members among 85.5 million private sector workers (11.2%). The 2003 release then reported 8.5 million or 8.2% of 102.6 million; the 2010 and 2015 releases, a sharp financial crisis drop to 7.1 million of 103 million workers (6.9%) and then a recovery to 7.6 million of 113.1 million (6.7%) by 2015.  The COVID pandemic brought another drop, to 7.03 million of 115.8 million private-sector workers (6.1%) in 2021. And last Thursday’s release brought the figures to 2022, with a modest rebound in total enrollment to 7.2 million private-sector union members, or 6.0% of their 120.4 million private-sector worker total. This is the lowest share noted in the BLS release archives and possibly (though not certainly, since data collection methods have changed) the lowest since the 1890s. Looking at “industrial sectors” rather than economy-wide totals, alternatively, since 1983 unionization rates have fallen from 28% to 7.8% in manufacturing, from 40% to 14.5% in transport, and from 41% to 8% in telecommunications.

How does this experience look in an international context? Is the U.S. different, or do American trends resemble those elsewhere? In one sense, labor laws differ widely and overall U.S. union membership rates are below the figures the OECD reports for most European countries. Trends over time, though, look pretty similar. The OECD’s statistics, which cover 37 upper- and middle-income country members, show an overall drop in union membership from 20.9% of workers (combining government and private-sector workers) in 2000 to 15.8% as of 2020.  I.e., a decline slightly slower than the one the BLS reports in the United States, but not a fundamentally different trend. Among individual countries, OECD figures show unionization rates dropping from 24.6% to 16.3% in Germany from 2000 to 2021; from 24.9% to 13.7% in Australia; 23.5% to 13.4% in Poland; 21.5% to 16.8% in Japan; 29.8% to 23.5% in the U.K.; and from 16.5% to 12.5% in Spain.  OECD’s Latin American members are a bit of an exception, with sharply different trends by country:  stable at about 11% in Chile, up from 14% to 20% in Costa Rica, down from 16.5% to 12.4% in Mexico and also down from 12.5% to 9.5% in Colombia.

The similarity across countries suggests that BLS’ annual U.S. releases are picking up something general about work in upper- and middle-income countries. Perhaps, as Marshall was suggesting 16 years ago, this reflects a broad shift away from long careers in single companies and seniority-based promotion, and consequently an erosion of the appeal of traditional collective bargaining-based unionization among workers.

The big exception is in Europe’s far north. Scandinavian unionization rates, though also dropping a bit since 2000, are vastly above those in other countries. Unions continue to enroll more than 60% of workers in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, are barely lower at 59% in Norway, and are a startling 91% in Iceland. The difference may reflect different approaches. Though Scandinavian unions are obviously concerned with contracts and retirement benefits, they appear to give more weight than unions elsewhere to career service and support policies such as skill development programs, financial support during periods of unemployment, and job placement services enabling workers to move to find new or higher-paying jobs. To some extent this approach recalls Marshall’s ideas 16 years back, suggesting that while they may not have taken root back then, they likely still carry value.

* One partial exception, linked below, is a 1985 report with some figures drawn 1980 survey (14 million union members among 71.4 million private-sector workers, or 20% of the total, though this probably isn’t strictly comparable to the post-1983 reports), and still higher figures from earlier decades though these are definitely not directly comparable.

** Trends in public employee unions are quite different: steady growth from 5.7 million in 1983 to a peak of nearly 8 million in 2012, followed by a drop back to 7.1 million as of 2022.

Further Readings

The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ annual report on union membership, trends in different industries, wage rates for members and non-members, age and sex, etc, in 2022.

And PPI’s Will Marshall on a new model and possible path forward for unions in 2007.

More Data:

BLS for some reason hasn’t posted its 1980s releases, but does have the data from 1992 forward. BLS’ unionization archives.

… and the 1985 BLS report noted above with some early-1980s figures and comparisons as far back as 1945.

Also, a database maintained by Trinity College & Georgia State academics reprints data back to 1973 (though the 1973-1982 figures come from a different survey and aren’t strictly comparable to those of 1983 and afterward).

Points of Comparison:

OECD tracks its 37 members.

The International Labor Organization has a table of recent union membership rates in 129 countries. Iceland is on top with 91% of about 195,000 Icelandic workers, and Venezuela at the bottom with 0.2%. Data collection probably isn’t consistent across countries though, so the figures likely aren’t totally comparable.

And the International Trade Union Congress, an international association of 163 union federations representing 200 million workers in 163 countries.

Points of Comparison (2):

The Canadian experience at first seems a sharp contrast to that of the United States, with unionization rates stable at about 29% or 28% of workers since 2000. The apparent stability conceals a very sharp public/private divergence though, with 70% of Canadian government workers in unions as against a falling 13% of private-sector workers.

World’s most successful union federation? The 14 members of Sweden’s Landsorganisationen i Sverige, despite their federation’s dismaying domain name (www.lo.se), enroll 1.5 million of Sweden’s 5.1 million workers.

Korea’s Trade Union Confederation.

The Australian Council of Trade Unions.

Costa Rica’s Confederación de Trabajadores Rerum Novarum.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week

PPI’s New Skills for A New Economy Project hosts Webinar on Youth Career Development with Expert Panel of Workforce Champions

This week, the Progressive Policy Institute’s (PPI) New Skills for a New Economy Project hosted a webinar on the importance of preparing young people for career success. An esteemed panel discussed the policies and practices they are championing in their states and communities, as well as the rising political will to ensure young people learn the skills needed to succeed in the U.S. economy.

Panelists for this webinar included Hon. Jim Rosapepe, Maryland State Senator; Don Fraser of Education Design Lab; and Lateefah Durant of Cityworks DC. The webinar was hosted by Taylor MaagDirector of Workforce Development Policy at PPI. This event was co-sponsored by PPI’s New Skills for A New Economy Project and the Reinventing America’s Schools Project, and The 74.

Watch the event here:

The New Skills for a New Economy Project at the Progressive Policy Institute helps shape policy discussions at the federal and state levels around investments in a robust workforce development system that is fully-funded, modern, industry-responsive, and equips current and future workers with the skills they need to get ahead. The project promotes policy solutions that address the current challenges facing workers’ success and helps the U.S. remain competitive by lifting up new ideas and best practices happening across the country.

The Reinventing America’s Schools Project inspires a 21st century model of public education geared to the knowledge economy. Two models, public charter schools and public innovation schools, are showing the way by providing autonomy for schools, accountability for results, and parental choice among schools tailored to the diverse learning styles of children. The project is co-led by Curtis Valentine and Tressa Pankovits.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C., with offices in Brussels and Berlin. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

Find an expert at PPI.

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Media Contact: Aaron White; awhite@ppionline.org

Amicus brief submitted by PPI highlights potential risks to America’s digital economy 

Today, PPI submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the case of Gonzalez v. Google. The brief highlights the potential risks to America’s digital economy under the circumstances of a ruling against Google, considering the implications of changes to what falls under the liability protections provided to online platforms through Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act. Though there is certainly room for reform to Section 230 to better reflect the harms associated with the modern internet, efforts to do so must tread carefully and be targeted to specific harms to avoid destabilizing the digital economy.

The brief highlights the following points:

1.  “The digital economy, fortified by Section 230, is critical to the American economy.”

The digital economy is an enormous creator of American jobs, thus, significant changes to the fundamental legal regime through which that economy operates risks the stability of a robust industry. This is also a sector that has proven otherwise stable in the face of pandemic shutdowns and periods of high inflation.

2. “Algorithmic recommendation is critical to the digital economy.”

Action against curated algorithms will have impacts that reverberate through the economy. They are the fundamental mechanism behind a variety of business models that empower both online entrepreneurship and the use of access to information for consumers. Potential changes to liability protections for algorithms would also be misguided from a technological standpoint, as algorithms of varying complexity are the means through which all online platforms sort third-party content.

3. “Section 230 reform is warranted, but that reform should be the result of careful, holistic policymaking.” 

Given the significance of online platforms in Americans’ everyday lives, changes to Section 230 must be made with great intentionality. Internet policy should be made by Congress, not the courts. There is a need to address issues posed by dangerous online content, but a catch-all approach may result in significant unintended consequences.

PPI’s full amicus brief can be read here.

Progressive Policy Institute Files Amicus Brief Urging Caution in Section 230 SCOTUS Case

Today, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in the case of Gonzalez v. Google LLC, written in support of the respondent.

In the amicus brief, PPI argues the digital economy, fortified by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, is critical to the American economy, and that the digital economy — which has proven resilient during and after the pandemic — is a key driver of job growth, while holding down inflation. The amicus brief also cautions against altering Section 230 liability protections for the algorithmic recommendations provided by search engines and social networking applications, citing their importance to user experience and online entrepreneurship. Subjecting these companies to liability in this way would harm the digital ecosystem.

“The economic impact of the digital economy, which is supported by Section 230, is enormous,” said Dr. Michael Mandel, Vice President and Chief Economist at the Progressive Policy Institute.

“Anyone who would reform Section 230 must approach that task with the utmost care. Massive advances in Americans’ standard of living and enormous economic gains can be laid at the feet of our digital economy and the protections it has enjoyed. That these protections sometimes enable ugliness amidst all those soaring gains may be reason to reform the digital economy with prudence and a view to the whole — not destroy it,” writes the Progressive Policy Institute in the amicus brief.

Read and download the full text of the amicus brief:

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow PPI on Twitter: @ppi

Find an expert at PPI.

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Media Contact: Aaron White; awhite@ppionline.org

PPI’s Ben Ritz on Reaching the Debt Limit 

Ben Ritz, Director of the Progressive Policy Institute’s Center for Funding America’s Future, released the following statement in reaction to the United States officially hitting the debt limit:

“Maintaining the full faith and credit of the United States is a basic fiduciary duty of Congress that cannot be made subject to legislative haggling and horse-trading. We need to have a real conversation about bringing down inflation and the role excessive borrowing by the Federal Government played in making it worse, but that should be separate from agreeing to pay the bills policymakers have already incurred. PPI urges Congress to swiftly raise or suspend the federal debt limit and follow that up with serious bipartisan negotiations on a package of real reforms that fixes our unsustainable fiscal trajectory.“

Further Reading: 

 

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C., with offices in Brussels and Berlin. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

Find an expert at PPI.

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Marshall for The Hill: Biden Gets Real on Immigration

By Will Marshall, President of PPI

No issue better illuminates America’s debilitating political stalemate than immigration. Everyone knows there’s a mounting humanitarian and law enforcement crisis on our southern border, but our political leaders find it safer to appease their most militant partisans than to work together to forge pragmatic solutions.

That may be changing. After ignoring an unprecedented surge of migrants for two years, President Biden has announced some modest steps toward restoring order. His reward for taking on this combustible issue is a fusillade of criticism from rightwing nativists who say he’s not serious, and leftwing activists worried that he is.

During Biden’s first visit to the border earlier this month, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott handed him a churlish letter blaming him for the whole mess. “This chaos is the direct result of your failure to enforce the immigration laws that Congress enacted,” it charged.

Read more in The Hill.

PPI Issue Brief Recommends Expanding Exports of U.S. Natural Gas to Help Global Climate Goals

Urges Deep Cuts in U.S. Methane from Gas to Maximize Climate Benefit

new issue brief authored by the Progressive Policy Institute’s Paul Bledsoe argues the United States can help become a clean energy superpower by leveraging both green innovations and exports of low-emitting U.S.-made natural gas. The issue brief is the first of a series authored by Mr. Bledsoe on the role of U.S. natural gas in the ongoing domestic and global clean energy transition, and is titled “The Climate Case for Expanding U.S. Natural Gas Exports.”

“The policy question for America is: Can and should the U.S. systemically produce and export more gas to reduce domestic and global emissions? This study suggests the answer is emphatically: Yes,” writes report author Paul Bledsoe. “But achieving large security, economic, and climate benefits from increased gas production will require additional actions by the U.S., the industry, our allies, and even coal-consuming nations, especially major reductions of methane emissions.”

Key policy recommendations from the issue brief include:

  • Increase Domestic Gas Production
  • Double U.S. Gas Exports
  • Cut Life Cycle Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas to 0.3%
  • Retire Coal Plants More Quickly
  • Improve Gas Infrastructure
  • Set Goal of Zero-Net Emissions from Gas by 2040
  • Establish Accurate Global Methane Emissions Data Center; and
  • Urge Gas-Importing Nations to Establish Methane Emissions Content Standards

 

Read and download the full report:

The Progressive Policy Institute will be releasing a series of issue briefs on key topics supporting the policy recommendations outlined in this report in the coming weeks, including briefs on how the entrenchment of global coal power locks in record global emissions; Europe’s continuing need for U.S. LNG to displace the use of coal and Russian-exported gas; the actions needed to increase U.S. natural gas production and exports; and how reducing methane and CO2 from U.S. natural gas will maximize climate benefits.

Paul Bledsoe is a strategic adviser at the Progressive Policy Institute and a professorial lecturer at American University’s Center for Environmental Policy. He served on the White House Climate Change Task Force under President Clinton, at the U.S. Department of the Interior, as a staff member at the Senate Finance Committee and for several members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Read his full biography here.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C., with offices in Brussels and Berlin. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

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The Climate Case for Expanding U.S. Natural Gas Exports

ISSUE BRIEF

A key question for current American climate, energy, and security policy is what role abundant U.S. natural gas should play in the ongoing domestic and global clean energy transition. This report finds that expanding U.S. natural gas production and exports can cut coal use, lowering domestic and global greenhouse gas emissions, along with other policies to increase renewable power and other forms of clean energy.

Studies consistently show that coal-to-liquefied natural gas (LNG) switching provides net greenhouse gas emissions reductions, usually between 40-50%, meaning the extent of global emissions reductions from coal displacement will be in part determined by how much U.S. liquefied natural gas reaches overseas coal-using nations. In China, for example, coal emissions have grown by 15% over the last decade due to new coal-fired power plants, and data shows gas power plants have the potential to reduce Chinese emissions by up to 35%.

Large reductions in coal emissions are urgently needed for climate protection. Last year, global coal consumption reached an all-time high, fueled by record coal output in China, India, and Indonesia, the world’s three largest producers. Europe, facing sharp reductions in Russian natural gas, also increased coal consumption for the second year in a row, and the U.S. still uses coal for 22% of its electricity. Global coal-fired generation reached an all-time high in 2021, pushing CO₂ emissions from coal power plants to record levels. These increases in coal use drove worldwide greenhouse gas emissions to record highs in 2022, belying any notion that current climate policies alone have been effective in rapidly reducing coal emissions.

In addition, recent investigations by Bloomberg News have found that Chinese coal mines emit massive plumes of methane so large that they accounted for roughly a fifth of total global methane emissions from all oil, gas, coal, and biomass combined. Such huge methane emissions from coal mining suggest that the overall greenhouse gas emissions footprint from China’s coal industry is larger than previously understood, making the case for coal-to-gas switching in China and other coal-producing nations around the world even more compelling.

But to maximize the climate change benefits of American gas displacing coal at home and abroad, the U.S. must also pursue increasingly aggressive reductions of fugitive emissions of methane. Not only is methane a greenhouse gas 86 times more powerful than carbon dioxide in causing warming over the next two decades, but mitigation of methane is uniquely important for limiting near-term global temperature increases that are causing dangerous and expensive climate impacts.

The good news is that ambitious new U.S. methane mitigation regulations from the Biden Administration, methane emission taxes, mitigation funding in recent legislation, and renewed efforts by industry can drive down fugitive emissions of methane from U.S. gas rapidly and far below recent levels. Moreover, three-quarters of methane emissions can be mitigated with current technology, and half can be eliminated at zero net costs to the oil and gas industry. In contrast, estimates of methane emissions from Russian gas are at least 2.8% of total gas volume, and likely much higher, since Kremlin estimates are unreliable and deliberately misleading, and are not subject to any serious new mitigation efforts, making Russian gas worse than coal for the climate.

The climate value of the U.S. shale gas revolution has been evident for many years. According to EIA data, coal to gas switching accounted for as much as 61% of the U.S. emissions reductions over the period 2005-2020. More than 100 U.S. coal plants were converted to natural gas plants from 2011 to 2020.

Meanwhile, abundant U.S. gas has lowered energy and heating prices for U.S. consumers and benefited American manufacturing, not to mention the large balance of payments benefits of revenue flowing into the U.S. from gas exports. If the geopolitical value of U.S. gas was not already evident, Russia’s war on Ukraine has dramatically illustrated its vital importance to America’s allies. U.S. gas exports to Europe over eight months of 2022 tripled, as detailed recently by PPI’s Elan Sykes, rapidly helping Europe move toward its new goal of shaking free of Vladimir Putin’s energy blackmail, while keeping EU natural gas prices far lower than expected in the last several months. Indeed, U.S. gas supplies have now been credited with lowering overall European inflation, boosting the EU economy at a crucial moment.

But Russia’s war on Ukraine shows no signs of resolution, so increased U.S. LNG exports will continue to be crucial to Europe’s emissions reductions for many years to come, helping the EU further reduce its reliance on high-methane-leaking Russian natural gas while also limiting EU coal use. 

Leading analysts like Kaushal Ramesh at Rystad Energy expect large growth in EU LNG demand from about 72mn tons a year in 2021, to more than 110mn tons each year from now until at least 2030. Trevor Sikorski of Energy Aspects anticipates tight EU and global gas supply through 2025, and says that gas will play an EU role until 2040.

Similarly, expanding U.S. gas exports to fast-growing Asian nations and others around the world now primarily reliant on coal consumption can cut emissions and help prevent Russia from dominating new global gas export markets. Economic growth in the region, particularly in China and India, is expected to drive demand for a wide range of energy sources, including natural gas. Due to low lifecycle emissions of methane, U.S. liquefied natural gas delivered to China has, on average, at least 30% lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than Chinese coal does, and according to many measures, U.S. LNG has about 50% less or even lower lifecycle emissions than older Chinese coal-fired plants. A similar industry study finds a 48% emissions reduction.

A private study by a leading environmental organization finds that net reductions from existing coal-fired power plants in Vietnam switching to U.S. LNG would be about 40%. Research by EQT, a leading U.S. gas supplier, finds that replacing older coal plants in Vietnam with Northeastern Pennsylvania gas would result between 53% and 58% life-cycle net emissions reductions. The EQT analysis finds that U.S. LNG is currently replacing ~900,000 tons of international coal per day. As noted, IEA finds in general that coal-to-gas switching reduces emissions by 50%.

On this basis, we argue that Asia should not only increase its use of natural gas to displace coal, but do so particularly by purchasing LNG imports from the United States and other lower methane-emitting sources, rather than sourcing natural gas from Russia. We find that lower methane emissions gas systems give the United States a significant competitive advantage versus other sources of gas, an advantage that is likely to grow as the U.S. institutes ever more stringent methane regulations.

U.S. proven natural gas reserves are massive and can accommodate large increases in domestic and global use for several decades, to help reduce coal domestically and globally. But as a practical matter, large increases of U.S. LNG exports will require even larger domestic production increases so that domestic gas prices stay low and popular political support for exports continues. Studies show that the U.S. can dramatically increase gas exports and production for more than two decades during the clean energy transition while keeping domestic prices low, at roughly $3 per million British thermal unit (MMBtu), which is likely to be the benchmark for cost-effective production in the long term. Additional U.S. gas production will be needed to meet growing EU demand of perhaps 7 billion and 8 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) demand in the next three to five years, but can offer export prices of less than $8/MMBtu, compared to recent peak European gas prices of $40 to $70/MMBtu.

But this will require expanding U.S. natural gas infrastructure, including gas pipelines, LNG export terminals, and other facilities as part of an overall energy deployment policy based on permitting reform, which will provide even greater benefits to renewable energy. In particular, the U.S. should prioritize efforts to provide pipelines and other infrastructure to bring low-cost Appalachian gas to domestic and international markets, helping to limit inflation. All of this suggests that along with unprecedented U.S. incentives for other forms of cleaner energy passed in major bills over the last two years, American policymakers should now add the climate change benefits of expanding U.S. gas production and exports to the already strong geopolitical and domestic economic case for greater gas production in the near-term.

Indeed, the combination of a huge build-out of American clean energy technologies and low-emitting natural gas puts the U.S. in a uniquely enviable position to both dramatically reduce its domestic greenhouse gas emissions and help catalyze major global greenhouse gas reductions, in effect becoming a clean energy superpower. The U.S. will increasingly export not only natural gas, but also key technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and electricity storage, and others. CCS, in particular, will be necessary for economies around the world to not just limit emissions from natural gas power plants, but to decarbonize heavy industries like steel, cement, aluminum, and other sectors that make up roughly 20% of U.S. and global carbon dioxide emissions. Advances in using CCS in natural gas plants can play a role in this process, especially if industrial use brings down costs. Overall, one can imagine a sustainable U.S. system in which renewable energy, electric vehicles, electricity storage, nuclear power, hydropower, and natural gas with carbon capture create a near-or-net-zero emissions energy economy well before 2050.

Yet, ironically, some left-leaning climate advocates oppose coal-to-natural gas fuel switching, even as worldwide coal consumption has continued to grow. These doctrinaire advocates insist on grouping coal and natural gas together as sources that must be immediately curtailed, despite the fact that gas displaced roughly half of U.S. coal in the last 15 years, and coal-to-gas switching was responsible for more than 60% of U.S. emissions cuts during that period. It’s time honest climate advocates faced a fundamental fact: Natural gas production can have a crucial role in a successful global climate and clean energy transition, especially in the near-term. Indeed, it seems clear that as a practical economic and geopolitical matter, the greatest extent of near-term climate progress cannot be made without gas (along with renewable power) helping to balance electricity grids and rapidly phase out coal, in the West, in Asia, and elsewhere.

At the same time, small but vocal elements on the political right are in denial about the need to deeply and quickly cut methane emissions from natural gas (and, over time, CO₂) so that gas can reduce emissions to the greatest extent possible. But analysis consistently finds that both coal-to-gas switching and deep methane cuts must take place to maximize the economic, geopolitical and climate value of overall U.S. energy approaches. Policymakers should ignore these ideological, not factual, appeals emanating from both fringes of the political debate. 

In the next two decades, much more electric power will be needed in America and globally. Electricity demand will grow significantly, in part due to the electrification of transportation through the adoption of electric vehicles, which could raise U.S. electric power demand alone by as much as 38%. One underappreciated advantage of natural gas power plants is their ability to provide rapid onset baseload power to balance electric grids increasingly dependent on intermittent renewable energy, with gas plants able to cycle up to full power within five or 10 minutes, providing synchronicity with renewable energy. In contrast, other forms of baseload power like nuclear and coal plants take far longer to deliver power to the grid when the sun stops shining and the wind stops blowing. Natural gas-fired plants that operate in a combined-cycle configuration are more efficient than coal-fired plants, producing electricity with significantly less energy input than coal, helping to further lower CO₂ emissions.

But U.S. gas must continue to dramatically reduce emissions of both methane and carbon dioxide. As new methane detection technologies are deployed, the U.S. gas industry will be able to prove that American natural gas can achieve among the lowest emissions of methane of any gas exports in the world, gaining a competitive advantage over higher-leaking systems and rival exports like those from Russia. Currently, many

gas-importing nations, especially in Europe, are skeptical of large methane emissions reductions achieved by the U.S. in recent years. Such a competitive advantage of proving low fugitive emissions of methane from U.S. gas should also jumpstart global efforts by other major gas exports to limit methane leaks from their gas exports, as importers favor lower methane-leaking gas.

This “race to cut methane” can greatly increase the climate benefits of using gas to displace higher-emitting coal globally, and has already begun as evidenced by methane emissions reductions programs by major gas exports like Qatar. More rapid adoption of carbon capture technologies on gas fired power plants will be needed to cut overall GHG emissions from gas.

Total U.S. LNG exports increased only slightly in the first eight months of 2022, since short-term capacity is largely fixed, so the main way that gas shipments to the EU increased involved exporters redirecting shipments away from other destinations, mainly Asia. Europe received 23% of U.S. LNG in 2021, but 54% through August of 2022.

Of course, a main reason U.S. LNG was redirected to Europe was the higher price, with European spot natural gas prices often running several times those in other markets, including Asia. But for now, thanks in part to U.S. LNG, European prices have moderated.

In 2022, U.S. exports of natural gas as LNG rose 8% to 10.6 bcfd, just behind Australia’s 10.7 bcfd. The United States remained ahead of Qatar, which in third place shipped 10.5 bcfd., though the U.S. is set to take the global lead on LNG exports early in 2023.

Overall, the U.S. gas industry is forecast to produce approximately 100 bcfd in 2023, so exports are likely to be somewhat more than 10% of national production. 

Total U.S. LNG exports are expected to rise in 2023, although by how much is uncertain, as major new export facilities are not expected to reach full output until 2025.

The long-term role of gas beyond this decade is less clear. It may turn out that over the coming years renewable energy will continue to see dramatic price reductions making it far cheaper than other sources, although renewable energy would still need to be built more quickly and at tremendous scale. And other technologies like electricity storage may see advances that allow for electric grids to absorb greater amounts of intermittent renewable energy. But these developments are also uncertain. What is clear is that both the U.S. and EU have used gas to displace coal in large amounts, and to stabilize their electric grids to use more renewable energy, while much of the rest of the world has not. That presents a near-term opportunity for U.S. LNG exports to reduce global coal use significantly, limiting emissions in the process.

The policy question for America is: Can and should the U.S. systemically produce and export more gas to reduce domestic and global emissions? This study suggests the answer is emphatically: Yes. But achieving the security, economic, and climate benefits from increased gas production will require additional actions by the U.S., the industry, our allies, and even coal-consuming nations. To gain these benefits from increased gas production and exports, this report recommends the following policy actions.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Increase Domestic Gas Production

The United States should increase natural gas production substantially to allow for expansion of exports to Europe, Asia, and other markets through this decade, while at the same time keeping domestic natural gas prices low to help U.S. consumers, America’s industrial economy, and further phasing out of domestic coal. The precise size of U.S. gas production and export increases will be dependent on a range of market, gas price, regulatory, and investment factors, but a national goal of increasing overall gas production from 2022 levels by 2028 is achievable and in U.S. economic, security, and climate interests. For example, to account for a doubling of new LNG exports, U.S. overall gas production would expand by about 10%.

Double U.S. Gas Exports

Internationally, the U.S. should increase LNG export levels as an explicit goal of U.S. policy, as articulated by President Joe Biden in 2021, specifically to help Europe end its dependence on Russian gas and help the EU reduce their dependence on high-emitting coal. The U.S. should also increase LNG exports to many other coal-dependent nations, including China, to encourage

coal-to-gas switching as a critical element in reducing overall global greenhouse gas emissions. The total size of U.S. LNG export growth will be in part dependent on natural gas prices in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. But given new LNG export facility construction, we propose an overall U.S. goal of doubling LNG exports over 2022 levels by 2028, in keeping with increases in total U.S. gas production with some of that increase going to phase out domestic coal more quickly. Today the U.S. has six major LNG export terminals. Three new U.S. LNG export facilities now under construction will be at full output by 2025, and provide about half the LNG needed to meet the doubling goal. But several additional export facilities would still need to be built or existing exports expanded. The U.S. Energy Information Agency expects U.S. LNG exports to increase 65% by 2033.

Retire Coal Plants More Quickly

The U.S. should increase the pace of unabated coal-fired power plant retirements (coal still provides 22% of U.S. electricity) as a climate policy priority, using all available methods, including new power plant emissions regulations, increased energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear and hydropower, and coal-to-natural gas switching; the latter which has been responsible for well over half of U.S. emissions reductions since 2005.

Improve Gas Infrastructure

Meeting these objectives will require significant new investments in and permitting of U.S. natural gas pipelines and export facilities, as well as broader energy permitting reforms that will benefit renewable energy, gas, long-distance, high voltage electric power lines, and other elements of America’s clean energy infrastructure. U.S. policy should encourage all of these investments consistent with broader U.S. decarbonization and clean energy goals.

Cut Life Cycle Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas to 0.3%

The U.S. should adopt a national goal of driving down lifecycle methane emissions from domestically-produced gas to less than 0.3% of overall gas volume by 2030, from about 1.7% in recent years, so that U.S. gas has demonstrably the lowest methane emissions in the world. New methane detection technologies in the U.S. can help prove these reductions. Overall, the net cost of such mitigation is low, and will be more than made up for on a national level by revenue from increased LNG exports.

Set Goal of Zero-Net Emissions from Gas by 2040

The U.S. should also embrace a goal of near-zero methane emissions by 2040, as well as net-zero carbon dioxide emissions from U.S. natural gas power plants by 2040, through carbon capture and storage, hydrogen, direct air capture, and other technologies.

Establish Accurate Global Methane Emissions Data Center

OECD nations should within two years establish a definitive, accurate inventory of methane emissions from major natural gas producing and exporting countries, to improve on the current situation in which wildly differing methane data are offered by governments, industry, and NGOs, each with their own agendas and methods. It is in the interest of the U.S. that such definitive and accurate methane emissions data numbers be derived, since U.S. methane emissions are far lower than many other global exporters, specifically Russia, and falling rapidly. New satellite, drone, and other methane detection technologies should allow the accumulation of accurate statistics regarding methane emissions in the next year or two if needed investments are made. The International Energy Agency could be one organization considered to act as a clearinghouse for such accurate methane emissions data.

Urge Gas-Importing Nations to Establish Methane Emissions Content Standards

As accurate methane data is established, major gas-importing regions like the EU should establish methane emissions regulations for all gas imports, driving the global system toward stringent methane standards to make gas even more beneficial to the climate while freezing out Russia’s antiquated, leaky system, and in the long-run forcing it to reform.

NOTE TO READERS

PPI will be releasing additional Issue Briefs on key topics supporting these recommendations in the next few weeks, including on:

 

  • Entrenchment of Global Coal Power Locks in Record Global Emissions
  • Europe’s Continuing Need for U.S. LNG to Displace Coal and Russian Gas
  • Asia’s Growing Opportunity for Coal-to-Gas Switching
  • Actions Needed to Increase U.S. Natural Gas Production and Exports
  • Reducing Methane and CO₂ from U.S. Natural Gas to Maximize Climate Benefits

 

Taken together, today’s recommendations and these upcoming briefs will compromise a comprehensive report on the topic.

The UK Online Safety Bill is well intentioned but will undermine privacy

In Britain, Parliament is debating the oft-revised U.K. Online Safety Bill, which seeks to regulate harmful and illegal content on the internet for children and adults. Without further modifications, however, the bill could undermine that laudable goal.

Fashioned by Ofcom, the U.K.’s digital communications regulator, the bill creates a formal “duty of care” for online platforms to remove harmful content on their websites with additional responsibilities for websites that also serve young people. If passed, adult websites would need to establish age verification and commit to removing illegal content such as content depicting hate crimes, sexual abuse, and terrorism. Websites with youth users would need to prevent young people from seeing illegal content as well as potentially harmful, but not illegal, content such as that promoting eating disorders, self-harm, or suicide. Penalties for failure to comply with these requirements include fines and potential criminal liability for platforms and tech executives if they fail to comply with Ofcom’s information requests.

As I’ve written previously, managing harmful content online, and creating specific youth-protection schemes, raises a host of thorny questions. In a recent blog looking at a U.S. youth online safety bill, I wrote that content moderation is technically challenging, because content moderation systems aren’t perfectly accurate at flagging inappropriate content. The systems can overcorrect and potentially censor acceptable information. In another piece about children’s privacy, I noted that definitively identifying internet users’ age online is both technically challenging and undermines everyone’s privacy.

The latest version of the U.K. Online Safety Bill fails to strike the right balance on content moderation versus censorship, or on privacy.

Content moderation creates a host of challenges, like defining what content is harmful, censorship of content that is not illegal, and encoding all the rules into an algorithm. Even with clear definitions, content moderation is technically challenging.

Content moderation algorithms are not perfectly accurate at flagging harmful content. This means that if an algorithm is 98% effective, 2% will slip through the cracks. On popular websites, 2% could be millions of posts. It remains unclear if firms will be punished if some illegal content passes through the filters. Free speech advocates worry that firms will overcompensate content removal because of the harsh penalties and the technical compliance challenge.

In addition to challenges of censorship, the bill also threatens privacy. First, by requiring users to disclose more personal data to access websites. Second by requiring a backdoor on encrypted messaging platforms for Ofcom to scan private messages for illegal conversations or content.

There is no easy way currently to verify age online without the user voluntarily giving up personal information. While the main trend in privacy legislation is toward decreasing the amount of personal information consumers have to provide to apps and websites, the U.K. bill points in the opposite direction, requiring users to make accounts and verify age through technologies like facial recognition checks or uploading a government-issued ID card to a website.

If personal information disclosure for every website wasn’t enough, the bill also contains provisions to allow Ofcom to search private messages on encrypted platforms. The bill as currently written gives new, large scale, citizen surveillance abilities to Ofcom regardless of wrongdoing. Seventy organizations, cyber security experts, and elected officials signed a letter to warn against allowing Ofcom to search private messages. Their main message is that creating a backdoor for the government creates a backdoor for anyone and undermines the rights of British citizens to privacy.

The U.K. government isn’t the only entity searching for a better solution to make the online space safer for users. This bill, however, stifles free speech online while undermining too many peoples’ privacy.

Platform Work and the Care Economy the Focus of New PPI Webinar

Event featured a rideshare app driver from California speaking on how flexible platform work enables her unpaid caregiving 

 

Today, the Progressive Policy Institute hosted a webinar on how platform work – including companies such as Lyft, Uber, Doordash, and Instacart – can offer flexible earning opportunities for unpaid caregivers across America. The webinar also discussed the possibility that platform work may help narrow the longstanding gender gap in unpaid caregiving.

Webinar panelists included PPI’s Vice President and Chief Economist Dr. Michael Mandel, author of PPI’s “Platform Work and the Care Economy” report, and Cora Mandapat, a rideshare driver and caregiver from California. 

Watch the event livestream here:

This event discussed the Progressive Policy Institute’s (PPI) recently released report on the intersection of caregiving and the gig economy. The report shows that on the average day, 36% of working-age Americans provide unpaid care for children, parents and other loved ones. This unpaid labor is worth $980 billion per year. Report author Dr. Michael Mandel examines how the stress of this immense burden can be eased by the availability of flexible platform work, including companies such as Lyft, Uber, Doordash, and Instacart. He also explores the possibility that platform work may help narrow the longstanding gender gap in unpaid caregiving.

Read and download the report here:

Dr. Michael Mandel is Vice President and Chief Economist at the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington DC and senior fellow at the Mack Institute for Innovation Management at the Wharton School (UPenn). He was chief economist at BusinessWeek prior to its purchase by Bloomberg.With experience spanning policy, academics, and business, Dr. Mandel has helped lead the public conversation about the economic and business impact of technology for the past two decades. His work has been featured by the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, and Financial Times, among others.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow PPI on Twitter: @ppi

Find an expert at PPI.

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Media Contact: Aaron White; awhite@ppionline.org

The internet as we know it relies on Section 230

With the Supreme Court set to take on Gonzalez v. Google this term — a case with momentous implications for the legal viability of internet services as we know them — the fate of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is in question.

Section 230 is the statute that grants online platforms protection from liability for the content posted by their users, a fundamental protection that has been integral to the internet ecosystem’s explosive growth. By allowing internet platforms to take down third-party content that they deem harmful to their users in “good faith,” while also ensuring that they are not treated as the publishers of such content, Section 230 is the legal mechanism that has facilitated innovative business models which give a platform to user-generated content, shaping a robust digital economy enjoyed by both consumers and entrepreneurs today.

From a consumer standpoint, these business models provide a plethora of free resources, entertainment, and educational materials. In the case of entrepreneurs, the online creator economy is estimated to be worth more than $100 billion worldwide, with more than 425,000 full-time equivalent jobs reportedly supported by the YouTube platform alone.

In Gonzalez v. Google, however, the central question goes beyond Section 230’s protections for third-party content, asking instead whether the targeted algorithms employed by these platforms enjoy the same protections.

Most major online platforms use data at various levels to recommend content to users, whether by using specific personal or demographic information to tailor the experience to a user’s specific interests, or by presenting users with popular or relevant content at the top of the feed. These automated decisions curate a feed appealing to the user and beneficial to the content creator, whose work is then highlighted to new audiences.

Colloquially, those referring to social media algorithms are most likely referring to the sophisticated code used by many of these companies to target content to their users. However, from a technological standpoint, the term “algorithm” refers to any type of content sorting — whether it be a simpler iteration that might show content ordered chronologically or alphabetically, or the more complex, individually curated version. There is no default method of content sorting, meaning that every company or developer must choose an algorithm to sort content. The only difference lies in the complexity of the algorithm they chose to employ.

It is difficult to draw legal lines around this complexity. For example, if a platform lists a seemingly harmful piece of content first, thus making it the most obvious choice for users to select, are they liable for that content only if proven to be the result of a curated algorithm, or are they also liable if the reason it is listed first is that the feed is shown chronologically? Either way, there is some risk of exposing users to harmful third-party content. Prohibiting one platform’s algorithms — say Google’s — thus doesn’t provide a general solution.

That means the Supreme Court would either have to define algorithms in such a way that only specific types are implicated for liability, or rule that Section 230 liability protections are lost for all types of content displayed online.

Let’s be clear: A court decision that ended Section 230’s liability protections would make hosting third-party content functionally impossible for websites. On YouTube alone there are over 500 hours of content uploaded every minute, making vetting every video prior to each upload a monumental task. The risk of getting sued will lead most companies to conclude that it’s not worth it for them to offer third-party content. And in the case where only data-driven, targeted algorithms are ruled to be exposed to liability, how likely is it that users would sort through 500 hours of content with no curation in hopes of discovering useful information?

Moreover, the ramifications of making all content providers liable to lawsuits will spread across the entire Internet ecosystem, including online shopping, travel sites, and app stores, all of which rely on user reviews that are curated to reduce fakes and “ballot-stuffing.” In an era of deep fakes and sophisticated artificial intelligence chatbots, it’s all the more essential for online platforms to be able to apply algorithms that users can trust.

There’s no doubt that Section 230 raises difficult issues that need to be carefully considered by policymakers. But subjecting online platforms to lawsuits because their algorithms occasionally highlight content that someone objects to would fundamentally destroy the internet economy, while failing to address the threat posed by truly dangerous online content.