The Washington Post’s new series Top Secret America is well intentioned:
When it comes to national security, all too often no expense is spared and few questions are asked – resulting in an enterprise so massive that nobody in government has a full understanding of it.
That’s right. As an intelligence community analyst for some five years, I’ve seen plenty of the bureaucratic inefficiencies, excess and unchecked spending, and unwieldy sprawl that have mushroomed since 9/11. From this perspective, it’s important that questions get asked, money be justified, and overlap — where necessary and possible — be reduced.
My beef with the article — the first in a three-part series — is that it is framed as “big = bad.” Its thesis seems to be that more construction, more analysts, more information, more publications are all fleecing America. The series’ lede lays out this premise:
The investigation’s other findings include:
* Some 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States.
* An estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances.
* In Washington and the surrounding area, 33 building complexes for top-secret intelligence work are under construction or have been built since September 2001. Together they occupy the equivalent of almost three Pentagons or 22 U.S. Capitol buildings – about 17 million square feet of space.
* Many security and intelligence agencies do the same work, creating redundancy and waste. For example, 51 federal organizations and military commands, operating in 15 U.S. cities, track the flow of money to and from terrorist networks.
* Analysts who make sense of documents and conversations obtained by foreign and domestic spying share their judgment by publishing 50,000 intelligence reports each year – a volume so large that many are routinely ignored.
If you’re writing a piece of investigative journalism that is an implicit call for more oversight, pointing out physical size is an obvious organizing frame that seems to illustrate the problem. If there are a bunch of big buildings and no one knows what happens in them, are they necessary?
The problem, however, is delving into why physical size is symptomatic of the problem. Here, the article falls short — lost is that some of these mysterious, large building have contributed to our national security. Raw size isn’t the intelligence community’s problem.
For example, former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair released the IC’s budget for the first time. At $75 billion, it’s almost twice the State Department’s, but only ten percent of DoD’s (however, though the Pentagon’s intel spending is counted in Defense’s budget). If increased oversight improves efficiency by — oh, pick a number — 15 percent, the IC’s budget is still $64 billion and the vast majority of those new buildings out in suburban Maryland are still being built.
Or take the National Security Agency’s budget, the agency that controls our satellite spies that listen in to bad people (when not embroiled in Bush-era domestic eavesdropping cases). It’s budget has doubled. Based on the “big = bad” frame, you might think this is inherently negative. I’d argue that there’s more to the story, and that the increase in signals intelligence collection has kept the country safer by forcing Al Qaeda to use arcane and slow means of communicating.
Buried are two important reasons why size matters, a link that should be made more explicitly. First:
The overload of hourly, daily, weekly, monthly and annual reports is actually counterproductive, say people who receive them. Some policymakers and senior officials don’t dare delve into the backup clogging their computers.
IC bean-counters value quantity over quality, the latter being more difficult to judge. I can’t tell you how many times we were told to “produce more,” irrespective of whether that production had any mission impact. A lot of dog shit is more valuable that one diamond. That’s because budgets are justified by numbers.
And second:
[S]ecrecy can undermine the normal chain of command when senior officials use it to cut out rivals or when subordinates are ordered to keep secrets from their commanders. One military officer involved in one such program said he was ordered to sign a document prohibiting him from disclosing it to his four-star commander, with whom he worked closely every day, because the commander was not authorized to know about it.
Almost four years ago, I was in a meeting with the new intelligence chief for a certain country I was working on. He was briefed by my boss’s boss on a variety of secret operations my organization had going in the area. When the chief asked for further information about a specific operation, my boss’s boss continued on for several minutes about all the amazing intelligence we’re getting from it.
It was highly inconvenient that I knew better: in truth, that operation had been shut down for over a year, and continued to exist on paper only. My boss’s boss was giving the new chief a complete snow job, only to give the appearance of competence and justify more money. I decided to quit that afternoon.
In sum, there’s been no question that the intelligence community was ill-equipped to deal with the new security threats facing the country that grew in complexity and immediacy between the end of the Cold War and 9/11. An overhaul was necessary, and the community continues to face growing pains in the aftermath of that reorganization and the increased budgets that come along with it.
The central tension in intelligence spending is striking a balance between dollars and security. Much of the post-9/11 intel money has effectively contributed to the country’s security, an inconvenient truism that’s glossed over in the Post’s new series. In the remaining articles, I hope the focus is on the marginal rate of increased security for every dollar spent. And in cases where we’re not getting enough bang for our buck, I hope there’s a better explanation of what drives those inefficiencies. Raw size is an occasional indicator of a deeper problem, not the problem itself.
Photo Credit: Orin Zebest