Gates Demands Open Seas in South Asia in Rebuff to Chinese Anti-Access Strategy

October 13, 2010
Jim Arkedis

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates used his turn at the podium at a conference of Asian defense ministers yesterday to insist on “freedom of navigation” in international waters, a sharp rebuke to Beijing’s creeping attempts to control the South and East China Seas. China’s recent clashes with Vietnam and Japan over shipping issues highlights Beijing’s intention to assert a sphere of maritime influence.

Regional dominance is a top priority on China’s long-term plate as a part of an “anti-access/area denial” strategy. Though it may not be able to compete with, say, the U.S. Navy in a straight-up force-on-force battle, by “owning” waters off its coasts, China can make Washington think twice about getting involved in, say, a conflict over Taiwan.

PPI has an in-depth look at China’s “anti-access/area denial” strategy thanks to Naval War College Professor Mike Chase. We released Chase’s paper on the topic just last week, which makes for timely reading following Gates’ trip. Click here to read it, and here’s a synopsis:

How and why did China’s approach shift in this new direction?
What are the most potent anti-access and area denial capabilities in Beijing’s arsenal?
And what are the implications for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region?

Chase concludes:

Beijing responded by increasing its defense budget, deploying conventional ballistic missiles across from Taiwan and working on a variety of capabilities intended to target American aircraft carriers. In short, Beijing embraced technologies designed to limit America’s access to critical battlefield areas.
[…]
An AA/AD strategy has limits. Though AA/AD raises the barrier on a decision to use force, once a decision to use force is made, China could not count on prevailing quickly or at low cost.

Then, he offers the following recommendations for U.S. policymakers:

Developing new military capabilities like long-range carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicles and new operational concepts like “Air Sea Battle”—an emerging concept that the military is studying to sustain power-projection in AA/AD environments.
Ongoing diplomatic attention to decreasing tensions within the U.S.-Sino relationship over the Taiwan and South China Sea issues.
Increased attention to the global commons of cyber and space. America must continue to develop defensive and offensive capabilities to ensure network continuity in case of an information offensive, and practice operating without the full range of cyber and space assets.
Sensitivity to China’s sensitivities. Perhaps most important, attempts to strengthen deterrence must be carefully calibrated so that they will not inadvertently fuel China’s worst fears about U.S. intentions, which would only risk further exacerbating the mutual strategic suspicion that is already threatening to make one of the most important bilateral in the world a rocky one.

Photo credit: U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison