Is the Obama Administration Really Serious About Nuclear Power?

Constellation Energy announced last weekend that it is pulling out of negotiations with the Obama administration over its pending application for Department of Energy loan guarantees to build a new reactor unit at its existing Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant in Maryland. This means that for now, Constellation has scrapped all plans to expand the plant, which would have brought 1600 megawatts of low-carbon power to the market and thousands of jobs to the local economy.

What drove Constellation to walk away from further negotiations is the position taken by the White House Office of Management and Budget over the cost of the “credit subsidy fee” Constellation must pay for the guarantee. OMB set the fee at  $880 million, or 11.6 percent of the total guarantee. OMB says this fee accurately reflects the risk to taxpayers of default by Constellation, which may or may not be accurate, even presuming that shielding taxpayers from 100% of the default risk is an appropriate goal.  The problem is that no one ever expected the loan guarantee program to be priced so high, most notably the energy companies that have spent years now tied up in the application process. Constellation had argued for a fee closer to 1-2 percent, and DOE had previously made statements that indicated it was basically in agreement with that fee level, before the Obama White House got involved in the program and indicated it needed greater protections against the risk that the company won’t repay its loans. OMB has demanded a price for those protections that is basically what private lenders would charge (which is high considering the regulatory and cost risks associated with a nuclear power plant–hence the need for the loan guarantee program in the first place).

If you are an opponent of expanding nuclear power, this is great news. It means that after years of hard-fought legislative and regulatory battles in which the nuclear industry made significant headway toward getting the federal government to clear the way for a “nuclear renaissance” in the U.S., yet another battleground has been found to effectively scuttle the entire program for nuclear loan guarantees for the time being. Apparently that new battleground is the arcane world of credit scoring within the federal budget bureaucracy, most notably OMB.

By throwing sand in the gears of this final stage of the bureaucratic approval process, the White House has let the Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program grind to a halt after years of promises of support to the industry for badly needed new projects. By all accounts, this controversy appears to be simply a fight between budget bureaucrats that needs to be hashed out publicly and resolved. But a less benign interpretation might suggest a deliberate bias among those in the administration in favor of spending loan guarantee dollars on renewable energy at the expense of nuclear projects. In either case, it is a problem that President Obama could easily fix with leadership from the White House, by making it clear that nuclear power is a national priority that is too important to lose new projects over bureaucratic delays.

Instead of leadership, the White House has responded with unfortunate lack of credible commitment to addressing this issue. According to Bloomberg news, OMB’s spokesperson said administration officials were surprised that Constellation gave up on negotiations.  It’s hard to believe they could really be that clueless. Everyone following the nuclear loan guarantee process knew this was a potential deal-killing problem for Constellation and other applicants, especially anyone who read Constellation’s executives say so specifically in the New York Times almost a year ago. This issue was raised in Jack Lew’s recent confirmation hearing to take over OMB, and Senate Energy Chairman Jeff Bingaman openly criticized the administration in a hearing on September 23 for holding up these loan guarantees. These complaints have been heard coming from several different corners in Washington and the energy industry for months. If I knew enough not to be shocked by Constellation’s move, how did OMB and the White House did not see this coming?

The administration’s handling of the Constellation loan application raises an important question that needs to be answered: just how committed is President Obama and his administration to expanding nuclear power? The president has said nuclear energy is part of his vision of America’s energy future (most notably in a speech ironically delivered in Maryland announcing a nuclear loan guarantee approval), but we have not seen many tangible results that the members of his administration are fully committed to making that vision a reality. After all, the Constellation announcement comes during the same week when the president was stumping for more infrastructure spending and his own economists released a report arguing that now is an ideal time to build large capital projects, both in terms of economic stimulus and low project costs for financing and labor. In the last week, the administration also cleared the way for two new solar energy projects on federal land and, even more notably, announced a $1.3 billion DOE loan guarantee approval for a massive new wind power project. All of these other initiatives this week are important and deserving of the president’s leadership in making them a national priority. But with the news from Constellation coming amidst all this other administration support for new energy and infrastructure projects, the overall picture is too easily misconstrued as the administration coordinating to put a thumb on the scale in favor of everything but nuclear energy.

Given the energy realities we are facing and the president’s own acknowledgments that nuclear energy needs to be part of a low-carbon response to meeting growing demand, President Obama can not afford to let a bureaucratic bean-counting snafu tie up billions of dollars in new investment and tens of thousands of jobs. Hopefully, this issue is essentially a policy glitch in the administration’s energy agenda, rather than something more problematic. But regardless of the cause, if President Obama is serious about including nuclear in our energy mix, then he needs to use the power of his office to take a hard look at these problems–and fix the glitch.

Photo credit: Let idea Compete

When National Security Means Energy Independence

This post is the fourth in a series about the Progressive Military

The smell that will always take me and many other vets back to the old Army days is diesel exhaust fumes.  When you spend many years of your life rolling around the muddy trails of military training areas in 5-ton trucks or the bumpy roads of Iraq and Afghanistan in armored Humvees, the smell brings on instant nostalgia.  It is my hope, and the hope of many senior military leaders, that our next generation of servicemembers won’t know that smell because they won’t be using oil.

There is widespread agreement by institutions on all sides of the political spectrum that energy independence, security, and planning for the repercussions of climate change must be addressed.  Former CIA director James Woolsey has called this “the first war since the Civil War that America has funded both sides.”  However there is still opposition, mostly from the GOP Congressional minority, to taking real comprehensive steps.  Their opposition to a comprehensive energy and climate bill, such as the American Power Act, has stifled momentum on the issue.  Too many in Congress want to ensure nothing get done on the issue for quite a while.

Despite Congressional impasse, the military is looking at the issue from top to bottom and pushing forward.  The Army is investigating using the safflower as a biofuel and began its Fuel Efficiency Demonstrator (FED) program to develop new vehicle technologies in response to battlefield calls for the need to reduce the number of dangerous convoys that use and transport fuel.  The effort doesn’t extend solely to vehicles and equipment; it also extends to the power grids on it installations at home and downrange.

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, strongly committed to the issue, has promised that the Navy and Marine Corps will get less than half of its power from fossil fuels within ten years.  As far as new energy and combat power are concerned, the electric hybrid ship USS Makin Island and the hybrid-fueled FA-18 “Green Hornet” fighter jet have already made their maiden voyages.  The Navy is also committed to making all of their installations energy self-sufficient by 2020.

Not to be outdone, the Air Force has developed an A-10 “Thunderbolt”, a ground attack aircraft, that also runs on a biofuels mixture and plans to test at least three other aircraft models this year.  This is a significant development as the Air Force is the military’s top energy consumer.  On the ground, Langley Air Force Base has installed a geothermal energy system as part of the Air Force goal to reduce its energy consumption 20% by 2020.

The Pentagon has begun to “wargame” the consequences of climate change that the military may be called upon to address.  As resources become scarce, it may lead to conflicts on several continents.  U.S. bases may be threatened by rising sea levels.  It may also lead to conflict between allies and destabilize stable states and further ruin already shaky ones.  It is also no secret that American dependence on oil from unstable regions leaves us vulnerable every time there is a hiccup in the supply caused by unrest or terror attacks.

There may be continued debate as whether we have already or will reach “peak oil”, whether the alarms raised about “foreign” oil are an overreaction, or, most of all, whether climate change is actually happening at all.  The U.S. military doesn’t seem to be willing to take the chance that these things aren’t or won’t happen.  In the words of energy security advocate and retired Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan, “We never have 100 percent certainty. If you wait until you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is going to happen on the battlefield.”

If Congress and the American people trust the military to keep them safe, hopefully they will trust the military on energy independence and climate change.  General Anthony C. Zinni, retired U.S. CENTCOM commander, has said, “We will pay for this one way or another.  We will pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions today . . . or we will pay the price later in military terms and that will involve human lives.”

Photo credit: US Army Africa

Retooling the American Economy for Jobs, Innovation, and Competitiveness

America is adrift and needs leadership to modernize and build a foundation for 21st century competitiveness. And while it’s a long hard to travel, there are at least a few signs of optimism.

Such were the key takeaway points from Friday morning’s panel on the question of “Retooling the American Economy,” which was part of the Progressive Policy Institute’s Second Annual North American Strategic Leadership Infrastructure Leadership Forum in Washington, DC.

The panelists were : Tom Friedman, New York Times Columnist, Pulitzer-Prize Winning Author; Jason Furman, Deputy Director, National Economic Council, White House; Roderick Bennett, Advisor to the General President of the Laborers’ International Union of North America; and John Woolard, CEO, Brightsource Energy. David Wessel, economics editor of the Wall Street Journal moderated.

In general, the panelists agreed that we’re in a difficult spot. We’re falling behind China on infrastructure, on energy, on basic research and development –  just about every measure of investing in a 21st century economy. As Friedman put it, “We can only go so long with a philosophy of dumb as we want to be.”

Part of that dumb-as-we-want-to-be philosophy is an unwillingness on the part of many to admit that government has a key role to play in creating an environment where innovation can thrive, both by making big investments and putting the right incentives in place. The solution to this, of course, is leadership.

“We have an epic lack of faith in government with a capital G, but we have an unchanging love for government at the local level when it means bridge projects and energy projects and broadband projects,” said Furman. “And that’s something you see at the bipartisan level. Some of this means we have a messaging problem, and some of that is bottom-up, pointing out what it all tangibly means.”

“But how you get the snake through the python is a big challenge,” Furman added. “You have to pass the thing through Congress, and the debate will be framed in big government terms.”

Friedman, who was openly critical of the administration’s salesmanship efforts, argued that what was needed was big-picture leadership.

“We need to make it aspirational,” said Friedman.  “That’s what the moon shot was all about. People want nation-building at home. You fly from Shanghai to JFK, and you go from the Jetsons to the Flinstones. People sense that. And the President has never made that the lodestar. He’s never leveraged all that energy.”

Woolard, who heads a large solar energy company, offered a dose of optimism. “We have a lot more projects here in the U.S. than abroad,” he said. “There are good projects, and there’s a lot moving forward.”

“But,” he added, “The thing that scares me most is the longer-term issue. Not enough students are going into engineering. We need to encourage people to go into those disciplines.”

Woolard also described the challenge at hand: In order to stabilize carbon emissions at 450 parts per million by 2050 (a commonly-agreed on target to stem global warming), “we’ve gotta build between 12,000 and 20,000 gigawatts of carbon-free power. That’s a power plant per day. We’ve built gigawatts a week before, but we don’t have the rules yet to get to this objective. We need policy.”

The consensus was that there would need to be a price on carbon. “Capital works itself out with the right rules,” Woolard said. But given the politics of energy, would the political will ever exist?

Here Friedman was an optimist: “We’re absolutely going to have a gas tax and a carbon tax,” he told the audience. “Because we’re going to run out of money, and we will need revenue and when we run into that wall, people will look around and say, what’s the best source? The sad thing is there are 535 members of Congress, and not one will propose this when it is so manifestly in the strategic and economic interest of the country.”

Bennett, whose union represents construction workers, also registered support for a gasoline tax, which he called “the elephant in the room.”

Friedman also offered a “killer app” for economic competitiveness: “An ecosystem of a national renewable standard, a price on carbon, a gasoline tax, higher building efficiency standards,” he said. “Put that ecoystem in place and you get 10,000 green garages trying 10,000 different things. Two of those will be the next green Google and Microsoft. The killer app is the enabling system.”

The Eastern European Energy Void: A Case For American Leadership

Parts of Hungary may well still conjure drab images of the Cold War: bleak and desolate wheat fields, maybe a blue-gray sky, skeletons of Soviet-era construction.

Stereotypes, of course, often contain a grain of truth. The New York Times’ recent profile of Oroszlany, some fifty miles east of Budapest, harks back to that bygone era.  Some 3,000 of the town’s 20,000 residents work in industries related to coal; with that many directly tied to the industry, it’s not hard to imagine how deep into the economy coal’s tentacles stretch.

But that’s changing — authorities announced that Oroszlany’s coal mine would close within three years.  The mine’s closure is well-intended, as the European Union — of which Hungary became a member in 2004 — seeks to end government subsidies for carbon-producing sources of energy.  Dirty coal is, of course, a chief protagonist.

This noble clean-energy goal has created a painful short-term “bridging” problem: The coal-fired power is disappearing too fast, and Hungary is left with an energy shortfall. It simply doesn’t produce enough domestic power right now to keep up with demand.  Figuring out any role that the U.S. or EU might play as Eastern Europe makes this transition is becoming ever more important.

This energy transition is an issue Gabor Rajnai, Oroszlany’s mayor, understands all too well. He wonders how his town is going to keep warm in the winter.  He frets Russian natural gas will fill the gap.  Rajnai probably remembers New Year’s Day 2006, when Vladimir Putin, then Russia’s president, sent a shockwave across Europe when he directed Gazprom, the state energy company, to shut off the flow of gas to the Continent.  Thanks to a price dispute with Ukraine, Europe froze, as it did again when Russia slowed down gas supply again in March 2008.  To make up for this year’s drop in coal-fueled power, Hungary will again import Russia gas.

This is the latest in a deepening dependency.  In March 2008, Putin and Ferenc Gyurcsany, his then- Hungarian counterpart, signed a contract that deepened cooperation on natural gas projects, including Hungarian financing of a Russian pipeline through the country.  In other words, as NATO-member Hungary transitions to a cleaner fuel sources, it is lashing itself ever tighter to the world’s coldest petro-dictator.

Let’s hope this deal doesn’t end up putting Hungary on par with its Eastern European neighbor, the Czech Republic.  As detailed in a stunning mid-September article in The New Republic, Russia and Gazprom camouflaged a network of Czech shell companies to obfuscate the money trail that leads directly from Prague’s hand to Moscow’s mouth.

The Czech Republic faces the same bridging problem as Hungary, too: As coal plants are phased out, how will the country power itself before domestic, self-sustaining energy sources are brought online?  Nuclear power, as regularly championed by PPI, is an option, but as TNR chronicles, even the Russians are likely to win that bid too.

However, that doesn’t mean Hungary and the Czech Republic are doomed to fall in some sort of Cold War-style Soviet sphere of influence.  According to one industry expert, the region’s long-term prospects of creating secure domestic energy sources are more solid: Alex Cranberg of Aspect Energy thinks Hungary has solid reserves of its own gas yet to come online.

He told me he was first drawn to Hungary because its geological fingerprint reminded him of the southern US, and thinks the country’s natural gas industry — where Aspect has invested — is well-run and could produce a stable supply of clean natural gas over the long-haul.  The trick, he says, is getting to the tough-to-reach underground gas fields, which make up some 90 percent of the domestic supply.  That appears to be happening: in the last four years, Cranberg claims that his joint venture has gone from producing none of Hungary’s natural gas to 20 percent, and that slice of the pie should only grow.

But growing takes time, and ensuring that Hungary — and Eastern Europe — has access to a diverse supply of energy in the interim is an important policy initiative that Brussels, not to mention Washington, seems to have glossed over.  Vice President Biden was in Prague to lobby for Westinghouse’s nuclear bid, but local experts believe it might be too little too late. Helping develop domestic clean power sectors could be a productive initiative for both capitals, from economic, energy, and security perspectives.

Photo credit: Wally Gobets

Did Enviros Overreach in Ecuador?

The plot is generic Hollywood, straight out of an airport potboiler:

U.S. oil company drills in Amazon, leaves behind contaminated pools of sludge. Activists sue on behalf of rainforest Indians ravaged by disease. Environmentalists and rock stars rush in to show solidarity with the victims. Not hard to tell how this story ends; we’ve seen this movie before.

Except that in this drama, the actors don’t quite play to type. It turns out that the “good guys” cheat, manipulating an Andean countries’ weak and corrupt judicial system in a bid to extract a king’s ransom — $27.3 billion -– from the U.S. oil company. Meanwhile, that company’s claims to be a victim of a political shakedown is getting a sympathetic hearing in U.S. courts.

So maybe this murky saga is not Hollywood material after all. In any case, here’s the real story, courtesy of Roger Parloff on CNNMoney.com:

Ecuador ended its long-time oil exploration partnership with Texaco in 1990. Texaco worked out an agreement to help clean up sites in the Amazon, and was formally absolved of further liability by Ecuador’s then-government in 1998. Nonetheless, a lawsuit was filed subsequently on behalf of Indians who said they had suffered higher rates of cancer and other diseases as a result of exposure to toxic waste. A new Ecuadoran government led by Rafael Correa, a socialist and fiery champion of impoverished indigenous peoples, strongly backs the suit.

According to Parloff, there’s strong evidence that lawyers for the plaintiffs helped to write the report of an allegedly impartial “expert” appointed by an Ecuadoran court that found Texaco – since acquired by Chevron – liable for further damages. A U.S. magistrate recently issued a scathing ruling that said the plaintiffs’ apparent collusion with Ecuador’s judicial system “would be considered fraud by any court. If such conduct does not amount to fraud in a particular country, then that country has larger problems than an oil spill.”

The plaintiff’s misconduct has overshadowed the important questions: how badly did the Indians suffer from exposure to toxic waste, and who is responsible for cleaning up the sites? It’s alleged that Texaco’s remediation efforts were inadequate, even if a compliant Ecuadoran government approved them. Yet Ecuador’s state-owned oil company has continued to drill in the area since Texaco pulled out 20 years ago.

This episode yields at least three morals. First, oil exploration is hazardous, and its full environmental and health costs must always be accounted for. Second, the end doesn’t justify the means, even if the end is to bring justice to people harmed by the effects of oil drilling. And third, it pays to greet overly familiar plot lines, with stock villains and heroes, with an extra measure of skepticism.

photo credit: Rain Forest Action Network

A Conservative Case for Public Transit

Over at the American Conservative Magazine, William S. Lind makes a powerful conservative case for renewed investment in public transit: “For cities, conservatives’ banner should be read, ‘Bring Back the Streetcars!’”

A couple of points are worth highlighting:

1)    The current car-dependent culture we have now is not a free market outcome. Lind notes that: “it is the produce of almost a century of government intervention in the transportation market.” Highways, according to Lind, only “cover 58 percent of their costs from user fees, including the gasoline tax.”

2)    Public transit is a real driver of economic development or redevelopment. (Lind cites Portland, OR and Kenosha, WI as cities that got a real boost from putting in a streetcar line)

3)    Public transit helps advance energy independence.

4)    And if the first conservative political virtue is prudence, as Russell Kirk advised, “there is nothing prudent about leaving most people immobile should events beyond the pale cut off our oil supply, as happened in 1973 and 1979)

Lind’s piece is one of several in a symposium on transit over at the American Conservative. And in fact, “The American Conservative’s nonprofit parent, The American Ideas Institute, will launch a new center on transportation made possible by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The center will work to showcase conservative arguments for a balanced transportation system in which rail and roads complement one another.

Lind has also written a book with conservative stalwart Paul Weyrich on this subject: Moving Minds: Conservatives and Public Transportation.

This suggests real promise on a left-right consensus on the need for meaningful investments in public transit. Progressives ought to pay attention.

Photo credit: Oran Virincy’s photostream

The McClellan Principle

It’s a familiar argument: we know that putting a price on carbon will impose economic costs, but we can’t be absolutely sure that major climate change will happen. Therefore, we shouldn’t impose a carbon price, or at least we should avoid doing so in a recession, and be very reticent to do so at any point. The argument strikes many as logical and wise.

It is neither. And it won’t help make good policy or make progress towards consensus on what good climate policy should be.

At its core, the argument claims that any uncertainty about climate change means we should either give up, or at least wait indefinitely for better evidence. I call it the “McClellan principle.” Like the Civil War general, proponents of the argument counsel doing nothing until absolutely certain of success. The principle is frequently stated or assumed to be true in climate policy debates, often but not always by professed climate skeptics. To give a few recent examples, Stephen Calabresi states the principle explicitly in a Politico debate last week, while Steve Everley of Newt Gingrich’s American Solutions outfit uses the stealth version of the principle by listing costs of a carbon price while failing to mention climate change at all. But perhaps the most common form of the principle is simply as a concluding statement, thrown in as if its implications were obvious and unworthy of debate. The Wall Street Journal does this when criticizing California’s AB32 cap-and-trade policy in an April editorial:

While almost all of AB32’s benefits are speculative and uncertain, its costs are hitting businesses and residents now. This is one more blow to jobs and growth that California doesn’t need.

The appeal of the McClellan principle may come from the fact that it is cloaked in rational language, but it isn’t a rational approach to policy at all. In fact, it’s the inverse of the familiar “precautionary principle” advanced by many Greens (at least in the precautionary principle’s strong form). The strong precautionary principle would require a policy response even if uncertainty is large. The McClellan principle requires inaction even if uncertainty is small. Both principles are simplistic, and neither leads to good policy decisions.

The reason for this is that there are both costs and uncertainty about those costs associated with climate policy and with doing nothing. Both are real choices with consequences, even if we can’t say with complete precision what those consequences are.

The McClellan principle stresses that the economic costs of climate policy—primarily higher energy prices—are certain, while there is at least some chance that all the climate science models are wrong and that there will be no costs associated with doing nothing. Holding out hope that the Earth will not warm (or that we can do nothing about it) strikes me as absurdly Panglossian, but the basic premise that we can be more confident in estimates of the economic costs of policy—particularly that they will not be zero—is probably right.

The McClellan principle’s conclusion does not follow from this premise, however. Making policy based only on which kind of costs we think are more or less likely to be zero doesn’t make sense. We should instead do the best we can in estimating the two costs, both their magnitude and precision, and make the policy we can based on those estimates. That is of course incredibly difficult in practice. It raises questions about discounting of future costs and benefits, the tensions between national policy and global risks, and distributional impacts, among others. But it has to be the basic framework for making a decision. Both the McClellan and (strong) precautionary principles try to offer shortcuts, but in doing so they obfuscate rather than clarify.

I illustrating this is hard because conversations about climate policy are, unfortunately, so loaded with politics and preconceived ideas. Instead, let’s look at another issue loaded with different politics and preconceived ideas: crime. Imagine you are on a parole board considering release of a prisoner. There is a cost to releasing the felon (he might commit another crime) and a cost to keeping him in prison (prisons are crowded and expensive, and he might contribute to society if released). You know the cost of prison is not zero. The cost of release might be zero, or it might be big. But that doesn’t mean you should release the felon— or even that you should be any more likely to. Setting moral/ethical considerations about the prisoner aside, all we should care about is balancing our best guess about the costs of both options.

Of course, the way that parole boards work in practice—or at least the way most people demand that they work—is that any real chance of repeat offense is regarded as a reason for denying parole. So why is there such a dissonance between the way many people view parole decisions and the way so many view the climate policy debate? Why does the mainstream view on releasing felons appear to be a form of the precautionary principle, while the McClellan principle, if not the mainstream view on climate, is at least a major and usually uncriticized one? Surely a big factor is that the risks of crime are viewed as more personal and visceral, even if the chances of actually being a victim of a re-offender are low. It might be as simple as saying that most of us fear criminals more than we fear the more emotionally and temporally, if not probabilistically distant risks of climate change—and that mainstream positions are defined by what we most fear. That’s unavoidable to some extent, but it’s not a rational approach to making good policy.

Others, most notably Richard Posner, have made a similar analogy between major climate change and asteroid impacts—for which uncertainty is similarly paired with catastrophic downside risk. This analogy is useful because asteroid impacts are completely politically irrelevant—there’s no party line, and little fear—and as a result few people seem to have either a precautionary or McClellan principle-style reaction. A rational approach is the most appealing, though the same lack of fear may cause us to ignore the risk entirely and do nothing.

As these analogies hopefully illustrate, precision is important, but lack of it shouldn’t keep us from acting—on climate or on other problems of risk. Precision is just another factor in estimation of risks and costs. And whether the costs of action or inaction might have a chance of being zero doesn’t provide a shortcut out of the difficult task of balancing the two and making policy. Uncertainty matters, but it does not and cannot do the work alone.

I suspect that many people who advance the McClellan principle as their argument against pricing carbon would still oppose a price even if there were much less uncertainty about climate change risks (or would simply disbelieve claims of certainty). In their case, the McClellan principle may provide cover for less politically-acceptable positions, like an economic or political interest in fossil fuels or a very large discount rate. But many people who state the principle are not being disingenuous just to score rhetorical points. You don’t even have to reject climate science to advance the McClellan principle—you just need to point to the uncertainty within it.

But even for the intellectually honest, the wellspring of the principle’s appeal is, again, fear. Especially in a recession, the downside of pricing carbon sparks greater concern than climate change does, at least for many people. To them, the economic costs of a carbon price are very real, immediate, and personal, while the costs of climate change are distant and abstract. This is to some extent true for everyone, though if you are unemployed and live in a coal state, economic costs are certainly more apparent: a recent study suggests that unemployment and some measures of concern about climate change are negatively correlated. In a democracy, these perspectives cannot and should not be dismissed. They are valuable and should be listened to when considering climate policy, and in particular its distributional impacts.

But the fact that costs are tangible—that they are feared—doesn’t mean the McClellan principle is any more logically sound. Lack of certainty about climate change risks doesn’t justify inaction any more in Ohio than it does in California—or places at great risk from warming, like Bangladesh. The McClellan principle is ultimately based on fear, not reason. Stripping the principle of its thin cloak of rationality might therefore make a difference, however small, in the politics of climate policy. As I mentioned above, I’m certainly not the first person to try to do this, but the principle remains a resilient meme. It’s worth having the counterargument in your pocket.  Next time you hear it, ask its proponent what they would do on a parole board.

Public Power Goes Nuclear

Opposition to nuclear energy seems to be melting fast, especially in the South. The Tennessee Valley Authority voted last week to complete a nuclear reactor in Alabama it stopped working on in 1988.

Earlier this year, the Obama administration awarded loan guarantees to Southern Company and two partners to build two new nuclear reactors in Georgia – the first new generating plants to be approved since the 1970s. Others are in the works for South Carolina, southern Maryland, and Texas.

TVA’s decision to revive its long-shelved reactor at the Bellefonte site was the latest sign that a “nuclear renaissance” in America isn’t just hype. Work began on the plant in 1974 but was stopped in 1988 because of falling energy demand, as well rising anti-nuclear sentiment following the 1979 Three Mile Island incident.

The $4.3 billion project is part of the venerable public power company’s strategic plan for meeting future energy demand in the seven states it serves: Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, George, North Carolina, and Virginia. It envisions reducing carbon and sulfur dioxide emissions, by switching from coal-burning units to natural gas and nuclear energy. “We want to be one of the nation’s leading providers of low-cost and clean energy by 2020,” TVA CEO Tom Kilgore told the Associated Press.

Will other regions emulate the South and learn to love nuclear power again? It’s hard to say. The South is not as well endowed in wind, hydro and even solar energy as other regions, though it could become a major biofuels producer. But other regions, notably the Midwest and Mountain West, are even more dependent on coal than the South. They may also turn to nuclear energy, along with natural gas and, if it pans out, clean coal technology as attractive alternatives for meeting rising energy demand with low-carbon fuels.

And since President Obama isn’t getting much love these days, it’s worth pointing out that his administration has given the nuclear revival a big boost by dramatically increasing nuclear loan guarantees. He’s absolutely right: at a time when America’s ability to generate good jobs is in question, we cannot afford to cede global leadership in the fast-growing market for nuclear energy to France and China.

Photo credit: Scrunchleface’s photostream

Myths and Realities of Regulatory Uncertainty

Ezra Klein joined others this week in mocking the “uncertainty” rhetoric that Republicans and some business leaders have been parroting to argue for lower taxes and lighter regulation.  As Stan Collander, Brad DeLong, and Ezra himself have all done an excellent job of arguing, there is plenty of reason for ridicule.  Most of the talk about businesses being paralyzed by uncertainty over taxes and regulations is little more than politically-driven spin.

The problem I have with Ezra’s post this week is that he chose the wrong example to pick on.  He points to Derek Thompson’s  interview with Eric Spiegel, CEO of Siemens USA, who complains about the uncertainty his company faces in the wake of the failure to pass an energy bill in Congress.  Thompson and Klein both equate this position with the less policy-specific confusion and outrage Republicans are attributing to the business community at large.   Thompson sums it up with this broad conclusion:

It’s another piece of evidence that “government should remove uncertainty” is a euphemism for “government should enact the laws that make me profitable.” For some companies, “make me profitable” might mean simply slashing taxes on income and capital gains, cutting public spending and getting out of the way. For other companies like Siemens, it means government getting in the way. It means putting a new tax on carbon, giving tax money to companies building wind blades, and adding new regulations for renewables.

In this case, there is more to it than that.  The kind of uncertainty problems that Spiegel describes are actually legitimate, at least in part.  The energy industry has been holding its breath for years waiting for the EPA and Congress to decide what they are going to do about regulating carbon emissions.  With the energy bill now faded into legislative limbo, it looks like the industry will not get the resolution it needs anytime soon, which means billions of dollars worth of investment will be trapped in limbo as well.  The uncertainty is so real that several people in the industry have privately told me that they almost don’t care what Congress chooses to do with carbon pricing, as long as it does something, so they can stop waiting and start building.   Or as another energy CEO put it recently, “There’s a lot of capital sitting on the sidelines just waiting for more regulatory clarity.”

It’s worth differentiating the energy industry’s need for long-term clarity in climate policy from the standard fear and loathing Republicans are promoting.  Here’s why.  A lot of the decisions energy companies need to make are binary choices that change dramatically depending on the policy assumptions: whether a new plant should be coal or natural gas, whether a new wind farm is viable without tax incentives, whether a new nuclear plant could be approved and running within ten years.  It’s hard to make economically rational decisions when the outcomes are so dependent on unresolved political questions.  This is fundamentally different from arguments that companies are afraid to hire new workers this quarter due to taxes or health care regulations.

There is no shortage of unsupportable statements about uncertainty that belong to the realm of political fiction.  Rep. Boehner’s latest call for a moratorium on new regulations certainly qualifies, blaming the “uncertainty that’s being created by the Democrats’ agenda” for leaving every employer and investor in America “frozen” with fear.   That kind of rhetoric is obviously exaggerated, and it should either be refuted or ignored altogether.

However, we should not allow Republicans crying wolf to drown out the voices that have legitimate gripes about regulatory uncertainties that Congress needs to address.  And we should be careful not to confuse the two for each other when we hear them pleading their case.

How the Military is Leading the Way on Energy Security

As a U.S. Army veteran I am used to dealing with the military, an organization that, by necessity, takes swift and decisive action when necessary, despite the fact that many see it as a conservative organization that is resistant and slow to change. In Washington, I am becoming used to dealing with another organization that is much more conservative and even more resistant and slower: the United States Senate. I am proud to say that the U.S. military is once again taking decisive action on energy independence and security, as well as addressing the military repercussions of climate change. The military is taking action where the United States Congress will not.

On July 27 I attended the White House Forum on Energy Security along with a group of veterans from Operation Free, a nationwide coalition of military veterans from all eras and ranging from Privates and Airmen to Generals and Admirals – all of whom support the goal of energy independence, security, and addressing the national security repercussions of climate change.

We have collectively been touring and speaking throughout the country and in Washington, D.C. in support of breaking our dependence on largely foreign oil and pushing Congress to take real steps toward a comprehensive clean energy climate plan. We have come to support the American Power Act developed through a bipartisan effort by Senators John Kerry and Lindsey Graham with Senator Joseph Lieberman and cooperation from the White House.

July 27 was supposed to be the day that the Senate finally took real action on the issue we have all been working hard for over the past year. It didn’t happen. As we all got on airplanes throughout the country in high spirits, something was happening on Capitol Hill: nothing.

By the time we hit ground in Washington, D.C. we learned that everything had changed. The Senate didn’t have the sixty votes needed to proceed to an up-or-down vote on the bill. We went to the Hill again to meet with fence-sitting Senators and their staff. The opinion we encountered there was disappointing, but not surprising: we need to do something about the issues of energy security, energy independence, and climate change, but we’re not going to do anything now.

Some, echoing Republican sentiment, said the issue hadn’t been discussed enough yet, that the Senate process of debate and hearings needs to be completed, that it would force them to choose ‘winners and losers’ and they are not ready to do that.

Hadn’t been discussed enough? We’ve been talking about energy security and independence since the 1970s. Other countries are taking action while we are being left behind. The CIA includes repercussions of climate change and our dependence on foreign fossil energy in its assessments. The State Department does as well.

Now the U.S. military is taking serious steps to address the issue. It devoted an entire section of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (p. 84) to responding to climate change issues.  Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus has expressed a clear vision of a force independent of fossil fuels. The military is taking action by reducing the use of fossil fuels, researching the use of alternative sources, and increasing the efficiency of its energy use, whether on battlefield outposts in Afghanistan or home installations in Texas. Speakers from each branch of the U.S. military have discussed similar opinions, expressing that action on this issue shouldn’t be taken for political reasons, but for security reasons. The money we pay for oil goes to regimes opposed to our interests. The cost of procuring, transporting, and securing that fuel is extreme, in dollars and to the lives of our troops.

This contrasts greatly with the attitude of too many Senators, who continue to choose politics over security. The U.S. Congress trusts the military and veterans on other security issues. Energy independence, energy security, and planning for the possible consequences of climate change are national security issues. The military is taking action, even if Congress won’t. If they’ll listen on other national security issues, let’s hope they’ll trust the military when it comes to a comprehensive clean energy climate plan that makes us energy independent.

Photo Credit: DVIDSHUB’s Photostream

Stop Playing Favorites in the Biofuels Market!

In discussions of the energy bill this summer, talk focused on a price for carbon. This is a vital component in any legislation that would force companies to reduce emissions, either by becoming more efficient or substituting cleaner fuels. But that’s only realistic if cleaner alternatives, like biofuels, are available to replace dirty fossil fuels. Whether or not cap-and-trade passes this year, biofuels should play a key role in our new energy economy, but we need to reassess federal support to allow for more diverse and higher performing biofuels.

The biofuels industry today continues to rely on significant federal assistance to encourage investment and innovation. In the recent past, federal support has focused on pre-approved types of fuel, most prominently corn ethanol. This policy has aided the boom and bust cycle in today’s biofuels market. The government paid all its subsidies and tax credits to corn ethanol, causing the industry to expand at a faster rate than the market could accommodate. Choosing corn as the favorite resulted in a crash in ethanol prices once it became clear that supply had been propped up by federal support (rather than realistic market demand). These government policies that focus solely on corn ethanol have created both a bias in the market and a situation where investors are not willing to support alternative fuels because of federal support in favor of corn ethanol.

The biofuels market began with alternative fuel mandates in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, but these were mostly filled by conventional biofuels (ethanol derived from cornstarch). Since they were the most developed form of biofuel at the time, they received the bulk of individual tax credits (like the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax). Since then, Congress has adopted mandates for advanced biofuels (fuels other than cornstarch ethanol, derived from renewable biomass) and tax credits for cellulosic biofuels (a type of advanced biofuel derived from grasses, woodchips and other non-food sources). But other potential advanced biofuels (such as algae biofuel) still receive no support beyond general R&D funding. Corn ethanol’s stranglehold of the market through congressional subsidies can be seen in what would happen if current tax credits were extended through 2014: ethanol would receive more than 75 percent of the credits, while cellulosic biofuels would get less than 11 percent.

Corn ethanol production in the United States has more than tripled in the last five years, a boom that has caused other problems: diversion of corn away from food production, increased erosion, higher inputs of chemicals and water, and changes in cropping patterns and land use. Worse, these have serious repercussions, including the exhaustion of groundwater supplies, the destruction of native prairies, and the expansion of the Dead Zone in the Gulf of Mexico.

Some advocates for clean energy have pointed to these problems as reasons to stop supporting biofuel development. However, these negative consequences and the recent public backlash against ethanol mean we need a second generation of biofuels that is more diverse and market-based. Business Insights found that biofuels are estimated to account for 5-10 percent of global fuel production by 2017. It is unrealistic to think that our reliance on fuels for combustion engines will decrease anytime soon. Even if electric cars become economically feasible in the near future, it will take time to phase out existing cars. Concerns about energy security, rising oil prices and climate change will increasingly force us to change the energy mix to rely on cleaner fuels. For biofuels, this translates into a very real and growing market demand for at least the next several decades.

That’s why instead of continuing to use biofuel credits to help political constituencies like corn farmers, Congress needs to focus on forms of support that will increase performance and long-term viability for all types of biofuels. A good step toward diversifying the biofuels market is the Advanced Biofuel Investment Act of 2010, proposed by Representative Stephanie Herseth Sandlin (D-SD), which would create a new 30 percent Investment Tax Credit for investing in advanced biorefineries. This would build on existing tax credits, continuing America’s commitment to the biofuels industry.

Futhermore, if we really want to move beyond a market dominated by ethanol, Congress should approve a tax credit like the Biofuels Performance Tax Credit proposed by the Union of Concerned Scientists. All types of biofuels would be eligible for this tax credit and would receive support in proportion to their emissions reduction, rewarding performance, and fostering competition and innovation. The maximum tax credit would be $1.15 for every gallon of gasoline replaced, but to qualify for the full credit, the biofuel must have zero emissions over its lifetime. Thus, the tax credit incentivizes performance both for replacing oil and reducing global warming pollution. It would build on the current Renewable Fuel Standard by supporting producers that go beyond the Standard’s requirement of emissions reductions of at least 20 percent. This would keep incentives technology and feedstock neutral, so we wouldn’t fall into the same trap of placing overwhelming support on one fuel. It is also critical that any tax credit encourage innovation by setting a high standard for emissions reductions and allowing all companies to compete. This should lead to greater innovation and ultimately cleaner fuels.

Adopting the tax credit would be an important step towards a more even distribution of federal subsidies in the biofuels market. This would allow advanced biofuels to receive significantly more than the paltry 11 percent of tax credits that they are currently getting, which would be crucial in building a new energy economy.

The federal government has played a role in creating the ethanol market and it now it must play a stronger role in convincing investors of the potential of the biofuels market. Considerable federal support is needed to get the biofuels industry off the ground. It is essential to create policies that do not limit the market but instead allow for new developments and innovations.

Photo Credit: Kiwi Shooter’s Photostream

Congress and Climate: The Long View

As you know by now, no climate bill will emerge from this Congress. Most have picked up Lindsey Graham’s metaphor — “cap and trade is dead” — though I prefer to think of a bill as “mathematically eliminated”. In other words, the right reaction is not permanent loss of hope but “wait til next year.” That hope is faint, however, given the likely makeup of the next Congress.

It has not taken long for the process of taking stock and assigning blame to begin. Will Marshall here at Progressive Fix has written on Congress’ failure (and I agree with everything he writes). The New York Times op-ed page has been dominated by pieces on why the bill failed, and who is to blame. Grist  summarizes reactions. I don’t have much to add to what has already been said. I’m disappointed, but not surprised, and I think there is plenty of blame to go around. That said, I’m still very optimistic about the prospects for action on climate – and by that I mean specifically a national, comprehensive carbon price – in the relatively near future. I think failure in 2010 is a setback, but will be viewed in retrospect as a minor one. This is little different from the way I felt weeks or months ago, but events of last week seem to have suddenly made me a contrarian. Climate pessimism is the new zeitgeist. So why the optimism? Because changes are coming that make climate action inevitable. The world is moving, with or without the Senate.

Some of these changes are structural. Above all, climate policy has to face physical reality, not just social and political preferences. The science of climate change is clear on the big issues, is constantly improving its predictions, and is deepening our understanding of the climate system. The longer we wait, the more we will know — and the warmer the planet will get. Those skeptical of climate science have played almost no role in the failure of climate legislation this year; they were marginal from the beginning. Better knowledge, and tangible evidence of the consequences of climate change, will make the case for action steadily stronger. Physics, as much as politics, will move the “centrist” position on climate towards action. I hope this will be by way of clear but remote physical evidence, such as melting icecaps, rather than by way of weather disasters or droughts. Demographics point in the right direction as well. Young people tend to be more strongly in favor of limiting carbon emissions (though not all polls agree). As today’s youth start to vote and gain power and influence, legislators will have to respond or choose another career.

Another more or less structural change on the way is pressing need for deficit reduction. As both Tyler Cowen and Nate Silver have pointed out in the last couple of days, this, too, will increase the chances of a price on carbon. Higher taxes are almost a certainty given our debt burden and the plausible range of spending cuts. As Cowen puts it, a price on carbon is the “least bad tax” in the sense that it discourages harmful actions (emitting carbon) rather than productive activity.

Other changes come from policies already in the pipeline. Existing state and federal laws provide some authority for regulating carbon emissions, though results will be more modest and costs higher than they would be with a uniform national carbon price. This is my area of expertise, and we’ve written a lot on the issue at Resources for the Future. The summary is this – the EPA can get modest but meaningful carbon reductions with the tools it has, likely at modest cost. EPA regulations on “traditional” pollutants like sulfur dioxide, which are emitted primarily by fossil fuel (and above all coal) plants will also have co-benefits for carbon emissions. These incidental reductions in carbon emissions will make the goals we need to reach with an eventual carbon price more modest. In the past, health benefits from reduction in pollution from coal has been cited as a secondary reason to price carbon. Now, the tables are turned – moves to reduce these pollutants using existing Clean Air Act authority will have climate benefits. Put it this way – in the long or even medium-term, climate action isn’t dead, but coal is, at least unless carbon capture and storage technology becomes available at modest cost. David Roberts at Grist makes this point, with the added irony that coal will likely be begging for cap-and-trade before long, since it would probably give the industry a handout in the form of allowances that could be sold as plants are shut down.

Finally, there’s the economy. Whether out of opportunism or genuine fear, concerns over the economic impact of climate policy fueled opposition this year. If 2010 politics could be matched with the 2007 economy, I have no doubt that a climate bill (of some kind) would have passed the Senate. The politics will get rosier for climate action, for the reasons I explained above. The economy will strengthen as well, and “jobs” will not dominate politics to the extent that they are the only acceptable justification for policy, and the rhetorical foundation of all opposition to policy. Those that agree with Ross Douthat that “sometimes it makes sense to wait, get richer, and then try to muddle through” will be more prepared to muddle through as we get richer. If the economy does not improve, we have bigger problems – though the one small benefit of our economic troubles is that it has likely bought us a little time on climate. Carbon emissions are down sharply over the last few years. In fact it will be an interesting question to look back once we have some perspective and ask whether the economic crisis was beneficial or harmful in climate terms.

These changes are all inevitable or at least very likely. Together, they will make a carbon price ever more politically possible, and eventually politically necessary. As most people who have considered the climate problem seriously have known for a long time, pricing carbon is the only workable solution. Eventually, it will come.

Of course, whether climate action will happen is easier to predict than how long it will take. I don’t have an solid answer for the latter question. Some of the shifts I mention will take longer than others. Structural changes, like global warming itself and demographic shifts, may take a long time to affect politics. Policies in the pipeline are more well-understood, but many are in the planning stage and could be held up, possibly by litigation. Meaningful EPA regulations on carbon could be in place by late 2011, or might not be effective until near the end of the decade. Economic improvement should, I hope, come more quickly – but there are of course no guarantees, and the “joblessness” of the recovery to date may mean the economy will dominate politics for longer than growth figures would indicate. So I don’t  know when we’ll have real climate legislation. My best guess would be 2013 –  another presidential & congressional election, presumably a stronger economy, fossil industries under pressure from the EPA and states, and, plausibly, palpable evidence of climate change could all converge to make a comprehensive climate bill politically possible. But that’s only a guess.

A critical look at last week’s events and, indeed, the last few years of congressional inertia is warranted. Pushing for action on climate – whether at the grassroots or in the Capitol – is still desperately needed. The longer we wait, the greater the risk and the higher the cost. But these events are just minor scenes in a story whose end we already know. Climate action may come sooner, or it may come later, but it will come.

Photo Credit: Casino Jones’ Photostream

Senate Punts Carbon Price

After much self-congratulation over passing a massive financial regulatory bill, the U.S. Senate has punted on pricing carbon. That decision is likely to have a bigger long-term impact on the U.S. economy, and not in a good way.

Senate leaders yesterday conceded they don’t have the votes to put a price on carbon. Instead, they’ll try to pass a pallid energy bill that raises liability caps on oil companies and makes modest gestures toward energy efficiency. Even the catastrophic BP oil spill, it seems, was not enough to overcome lawmakers’ fear of being accused of raising taxes on energy as the economy struggles, even though a carbon price wouldn’t have gone into effect for several years.

Well, there’s always next year — except that the midterm election will likely bring in more Republicans wedded to climate denial and cheap fossil fuels. So the Senate’s failure to act is a costly setback from an economic, security and environmental perspective. It will prolong America’s dependence on oil and fossil fuels, worsen our trade deficit, retard investment in clean technology and low-carbon fuels, and forfeit leadership in energy innovation to other countries. And it means the United States won’t do its part to lower carbon emissions and thereby stop overheating the planet.

All this suggests progressives will have to rethink their approach to achieving a low-carbon economy. Not only is “cap and trade” dead, Majority Leader Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV) said those words are no longer in his vocabulary.

PPI has long considered pricing carbon the sine qua non of progressive energy policy, although we have been agnostic as to how. We helped to design the cap and trade architecture in several pathbreaking legislative proposals (the Lieberman-McCain and Lieberman-Warner bills, as well as Senator Tom Carper’s “4P” bill), and proposed a “tailpipe trading” system to cover auto emissions. We continue to believe that cap and trade offers the twin advantages of environmental certainty — a quantifiable limit on the amount of carbon Americans emit – and strong incentives for companies to invest in energy efficiency and innovation.

At the same time, however, we’ve endorsed a straight up carbon tax, as well as setting a “floor” under oil prices to prevent their volatility from inhibiting investments in clean fuels. The key is to price carbon realistically, by taking into account the “externalities” not included in the price of gas at the pump (or coal for that matter): the hundreds of billions we spend each year to assure access to fossil fuels, as well as the environmental damage done by concentrating greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

To free market fundamentalists, ending such implicit subsidies to fossil fuels is tantamount to raising taxes on energy. So be it. We need to raise the cost of burning fossil fuels and lower the cost of low-carbon alternative fuels. This is a matter of urgent national interest, and President Obama will need to propose a new clean energy strategy to the next Congress.

Photo Credit: Americaspower’s Photostream

Increasing the Powers of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

We’re the good guys, right? The U.S. would never help other countries gain access to potentially dangerous nuclear technologies, would it? In general, that’s true. The United States has stringent export controls, and regularly sanctions companies that try to thwart these laws. Export control regulations, however, only cover technologies that have already been commercialized and are being sold for use in other countries. But what about new technologies for enriching uranium or separating plutonium? Should we be concerned about them even before they get built, especially if new technologies are smaller, more efficient, and could make it harder to detect cheating or covert plants?

I think so. After all, as Georgetown University physics professor Francis Slakey notes, “There’s been a number of different technologies to enrich uranium. Every single one of them — despite best efforts to keep secrets — every single one of them has proliferated.” The world’s most famous proliferator, AQ Khan, worked for the European company URENCO, a leading provider of nuclear fuel, in the 1970s. It is widely believed that he simply copied the blueprints for the enrichment technology — like gas centrifuges — that the company used at the time, and smuggled them out the front door, bit by bit. Later, in his native Pakistan, he led efforts to build centrifuges based on those designs and to improve them. Once he had mastered this technology, he offered both enrichment services and centrifuge designs to nearly anyone. Indeed, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that Iran’s centrifuges are based on the stolen URENCO designs.

So is there anything that we can do to prevent the next AQ Khan from stealing the latest and greatest new gadgets? One of our gatekeepers is the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Created as an independent agency in 1974 by Congress to license the commercial nuclear power plants, the NRC also has oversight responsibility for all civilian uses of nuclear materials. Much of its jurisdiction predates the independent agency and is derived from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (when the NRC was part of the Atomic Energy Commission) and requires that the NRC evaluate whether the issuance of a license “would be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.”

The Commission has a rigorous process in place to ensure that new nuclear power plants, enrichment facilities and storage depots — such as the now-in-limbo Yucca Mountain — all meet rigorous standards for safety and security. The NRC has not yet decided what role it can and should play in nonproliferation. Six members of the U.S. House of Representatives — both Democrats and Republicans — think that nonproliferation is already part of the NRC’s jurisdiction, and they’re recently written a letter to the NRC “expressing support for including a nonproliferation assessment as part of the process for evaluating license applications.”

The American Physical Society (APS), an organization I’m involved with, wants to go a step further. Based on information assembled in our recent report, Technical Steps to Support Nuclear Arsenal Downsizing, we noted that one way to ensure the peaceful use of fissile materials was to “elevate the priority of non-proliferation in the NRC licensing process.” Because of this, APS has filed a formal petition for an NRC rule change. If changes are made, nonproliferation would be an official part of the Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility – Final Report (NUREG 1520 Revision 1).

What can NRC do? As part of the license application review process, NRC experts can determine if any of the technology is inherently dual-use or if technology is single-purpose. Single purpose technology — items that would only be used in this particular application — can be placed on export control lists and tightly constrained. For dual-use technologies, some may be placed on export controls lists as well. In addition, the NRC can require that no one — or at most, a very few highly trusted individuals — has access to the complete blueprints for these facilities. In other words, the NRC, in conjunction with other parts of the U.S. Government, can work to ensure that the particular components and ideas needed to make these facilities function properly don’t fall into the wrong hands.

So far, the U.S. has a stellar nonproliferation record. By including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in nonproliferation efforts, we can better secure the country.

Photo Credit: Davi Sommerfeld’s Photostream

Death of Cap-and-Trade?

When Sen. Lindsey Graham (R- S.C.) recently declared cap-and-trade “dead,” he may have been more right than he realized. Graham was referring to the political prospects for carbon pricing in this Congress, but cap-and-trade has been the tool of choice for limiting emissions of other pollutants — like sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides — for almost 20 years. The EPA proposed a rule yesterday that could sharply limit the role of trading in markets for those pollutants.

The proposed “transport rule” would replace the existing Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). Both are aimed at reducing emissions that affect air quality not locally, but in downwind areas (hence the “transport” and “interstate” in their names). CAIR was issued under the Bush administration but comprehensively rejected by the D.C. Circuit Court in North Carolina v. EPA. CAIR has been in effect since the ruling, but as a zombie regulation. The EPA needs to replace it with a new rule that fits the court’s view of the agency’s powers under the Clean Air Act. The transport rule released yesterday is the agency’s attempt to do this. The rule is massive — 1,300 pages — and reads like a long-form response to the court’s opinion.

So what does this have to do with cap-and-trade? Among the court’s major objections to CAIR was the inability of the EPA to guarantee each state would reduce its emissions sufficiently to prevent interference with air quality downwind. The emissions trading systems set up by CAIR was to reduce emissions overall, and prevent problematic transport of pollution generally, but the EPA couldn’t promise, as the court read the statute to require, that each and every state would reduce emissions sufficiently. The reason for this is interstate trading. CAIR would have allowed emissions sources in different states to trade with each other. This has obvious benefits, as a bigger market is generally more efficient, but it is impossible to know in advance where the emissions reductions will occur. If it is unexpectedly cheap to reduce NOx emissions in Ohio and unexpectedly expensive in Kentucky, trading will happen and Ohio will make deeper cuts. Knowing in advance where reductions will be cheaper is hard (this lack of information is the reason for having a market in the first place). Generally, this lack of foreknowledge is not a problem, since the overall cost of emissions reductions is lower. Under the court’s reading of the Clean Air Act, however, the agency has to know the outcome in advance, at least at the state level.

The transport rule addresses this by largely eliminating interstate trading. Intrastate trading is still allowed, but the rule would only allow interstate trading at the margin, within relatively narrow “variability limits.” The EPA seems to be doubtful that even this small amount of interstate trading will be permitted by the courts. The new rule lists alternative options that do not include interstate trading at all.

It looks like we’ll be lucky if the final version of the new rule includes any interstate trading. Without interstate trading, the emissions reductions achieved by the new rule will be more expensive than they otherwise would be — possibly a lot more (I look forward to analysis from economists on exactly how much). Since the transport rule would replace both of the major cap-and-trade programs currently in operation in the U.S., this would mean an end to interstate emissions trading, at least for the 31 states affected by the new rule. It’s only a slight overstatement to say that cap-and-trade as we now know it would end.

It’s hard to accuse the EPA of timidity or error here. The agency attempted in CAIR to create an interstate market and was (somewhat surprisingly) kicked in the teeth for it by the D.C. Circuit. Though I and many other lawyers disagree with the D.C. Circuit’s reading of the Clean Air Act that led it to reject CAIR, the reading isn’t unreasonable, so it’s hard to place all of the blame on the courts either. Congress ultimately has responsibility for either creating markets for pollution reduction, or giving the EPA sufficient tools to create them itself. The transport rule released yesterday makes it clear that the EPA does not have the tools it needs.

At least some in Congress are aware of this problem, however. The three-pollutant or “3P” bill written by Sens. Carper (D-DE) and Alexander (R-TN) would create new national cap-and-trade markets for SO2, NOx and mercury (a new EPA mercury rule was also rejected by courts). If this bill were passed, it would hopefully include a fourth “P,” carbon, but even without it, the EPA would have the tools it needs. Without it, the transport rule appears to be the best the agency can do. Twenty years after the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, that should be embarrassing.

This item is cross-posted at Weathervane.

Photo credit: Mhaithaca’s Photostream

A Nation of Pilot Projects?

More news this weekend that the Obama administration continues to pursue its unheralded campaign to reverse retrograde Bush-era policies and put the nation on a more sustainable footing. The president announced that the Department of Energy will award $2 billion in conditional commitments from the Recovery Act to two solar companies for plants in Arizona, Colorado, and Indiana, which together will create over 5,000 jobs.

The president’s heart is clearly in this cause. In his address, he said, “Already, I’ve seen the payoff from these investments. I’ve seen once-shuttered factories humming with new workers who are building solar panels and wind turbines; rolling up their sleeves to help America win the race for the clean energy economy.”

However, as good as it is, the announcement leaves a lingering question: On cutting-edge infrastructure issues such as solar, will we continue to be a nation of pilot projects? Or will we take any quantum leaps and achieve actual national policy?

There’s nothing to quarrel with in the announcements themselves. Abengoa Solar will build the plant in Arizona, which, when complete, will provide enough clean energy to power 70,000 homes. Over 70 percent of the components and products used in construction will be manufactured here in the U.S.

Abound Solar Manufacturing is building the Colorado and Indiana plants, which will produce millions of state-of-the-art solar panels each year—in Indiana’s case, using an empty Chrysler factory.

In announcing the plants on July 4th weekend, the president said, “But what this weekend reminds us, more than any other, is that we are a nation that has always risen to the challenges before it. We are a nation that, 234 years ago, declared our independence from one of the greatest empires the world had ever known. We are a nation that mustered a sense of common purpose to overcome Depression and fear itself. . . I know America will write our own destiny once more.”

But the question is whether the scale, scope, and ambition of our solar policy rises to the level of the president’s language. The Recovery Act monies, and the policies underlying them, have been attacked left and right for failing to deliver on a set of clear national priorities. The stimulus dollars have been spread so wide and thin that they’ve been vulnerable to attacks both on pork and policy grounds.

That two solar plants are heralded as helping America “win the race for a clean economy” is the same pattern we’ve seen elsewhere in the collision between the clean economy campaign and today’s toxic budgetary and political environment. We saw the pattern in high-speed rail. As PPI’s Mark Reutter has noted, the administration announced $8 billion in stimulus funds that would go to a handful of projects. But without additional administration pressure, those funds are only being followed by $1 billion of congressional authorization. As 100 members of Congress wrote the president recently, “[G]iven budget constraints, we cannot continue to rely on general authorizations and appropriations to finance high-speed rail. We need to identify a dedicated revenue source for high-speed rail, and we need your help to do that.”

We have also seen the pattern in nuclear energy, where the administration took the bold step of announcing loan guarantees for two new nuclear plants in Georgia, the first built in a generation. However, the president’s language again made the actual commitment pale in comparison to the challenge. In announcing the guarantees, he cited the fact that there are, today, 56 nuclear reactors under construction around the world: 21 in China; six in South Korea, and five in India. He said, “Whether it’s nuclear energy or solar or wind energy, if we fail to invest in the technologies of tomorrow, then we’re going to be importing those technologies instead of exporting them.  We will fall behind. Jobs will be produced overseas instead of here in the United States of America. And that’s not a future that I accept.”

The ambitions are noble and the rhetoric stirring, but the question is whether we really are shaping a future here—or just a set of ambitious but singular pilot projects.

Yes, there is too little money in annual authorizations for serious infrastructure. But as infrastructure expert Norm Anderson has recently written for PPI, “The financing issue — not a surprise for anyone in the infrastructure business — is the number one problem facing the industry.”

This is all the more reason the administration should follow the stirring rhetoric about competitiveness and “writing our destiny” by creating a new institution, such as an infrastructure bank of the type proposed by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and supported by the president in the past, that would create a long-term funding source and the energy for true national policy.

Photo credit: Bilfinger Berger Group