There may be no method in North Korea’s madness, but the world’s response to its episodic outrages has settled into a familiar pattern. It’s a dangerous pattern, and one likely to recur as long as China keeps enabling Pyongyang’s belligerent behavior.
First comes an utterly unprovoked attack on South Korea. Seoul reacts angrily and threatens unspecified consequences. Washington firmly backs its ally, and solicits global censure of North Korean aggression. The Chinese, however, decline to assign blame and instead urge resumption of direct talks with Pyongyang. South Korea eventually backs away from confrontation, on the perfectly rational premise that living with the North’s occasional spasms of violence is preferable to an all-out war that would devastate both countries.
The latest crisis began last week when the North shelled a South Korean island. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak called the attack, which killed two civilians and wounded 16, a “crime against humanity” and warned that Seoul would not tolerate a direct attack on its soil. The United States dispatched an aircraft carrier, the George Washington, while China called, irrelevantly, for a resumption of the long defunct six-party talks aimed at dismantling the North’s nuclear weapons program. And yesterday, Seoul moved to dampen war fever by canceling live-fire artillery drills on the stricken island.
Essentially the same cycle played out last spring, when North Korea sunk a South Korean patrol boat, the Cheonan, killing all 46 sailors aboard. Pyongyang paid no price for this act of war, either.
Pyongyang’s behavior may look like a classic case of winning through intimidation, except that it’s not clear what it gains from such brutal tactics. The North is as isolated and poverty-stricken as ever, and, with dictator Kim Jong il preparing to hand off power to his son, no relief is in sight for its thoroughly regimented society.
One explanation is that the regime from time to time must manufacture external threats to justify the extreme sacrifices it demands of its people. Another is that its assaults are part of an elaborate shake-down racket meant to get the world’s attention – along with bribes for good behavior. Except that it seems to be having the opposite effect. Last week’s shelling, along with the Cheonan incident, have driven the final nail in the coffin of the South’s “sunshine policy” of economic and humanitarian aid to the North. Nor is Washington eager to reward Pyongyang’s bellicose conduct by rushing back into the six-party talks.
This latest outrage throws a spotlight on China’s role as North Korea’s enabler. Not only does Beijing shield Pyongyang from the consequences of its disruptive behavior, it also helps to keep the regime afloat by supplying fuel and other economic assistance. Perhaps it’s too facile to assume – as Republicans like John McCain and Lindsay Graham do – that China can bring the mercurial Kim regime to heal just by threatening to shut down oil shipments or cross-border trade. But is it really too much to ask of China that it at least not cover up the North’s crimes and collude in its ludicrous lies?
Beijing wants very badly to be accorded the respect that its growing wealth and power implies. It wants a seat at the table where global decisions are made. Yet on issue after issue, China is proving to be a free rider. Beijing takes maximum advantage of an open world economy while contributing little to strengthening the system that has made it rich. Instead, it pursues a mercantilist policy that creates enormous imbalances in world trade and investment flows, while keeping its currency artificially high to make discourage imports from the U.S. and elsewhere. Instead of trying to tamp down tensions on the Korea peninsula, it feeds them by shielding its delinquent ward in Pyongyang from accountability. Instead of throwing its weight behind international efforts to restrain rogue regimes from Khartoum to Tehran, it seeks commercial advantage while hiding behind the supposedly sacrosanct principle of non-interference in other nation’s internal affairs.
China’s amoral and selfish behavior increasingly engenders doubt and fear, not respect. Its failure to accept the responsibilities that accompany its growing power undermines global cooperation and stability. It’s time for the Obama administration to move China’s free-riding to the center of its engagement with Beijing.
No sooner had Congress convened this week for a post-election, lame duck session than a partisan squabble erupted in the Senate that threatens to scuttle a major nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia.
The contretemps began when Jon Kyl, the Senate Republican Whip, said he doubted the Senate could take up ratification of the NEW START arms accord until next year. This may seem like an innocuous comment on scheduling, but delay could well spell death for the treaty. This year, President Obama needs eight GOP Senators to meet the 67-vote threshold for ratifying treaties; next year, he would need 14.
Kyl’s remarks were especially galling to treaty backers since he had earlier called New START “relatively benign” so long as the United States also takes steps to assure the reliability of its nuclear arsenal. Obama duly committed enormous sums to upgrade national weapons laboratories and modernize again nuclear warheads, including budgeting an additional $4 billion specifically to placate Kyl. In his statement, however, Kyl referred cryptically to “complex and unresolved issues” that still need to be worked out.
The administration nonetheless has said it will press for a vote this year. Failure to ratify the pact would be a major embarrassment for Obama, who promised the Russians the deal would be concluded this year. But even more, it would be a triumph of blind partisan animus over America’s national security interests, and our government’s to carry out a coherent and effective diplomacy with the rest of the world.
More is at stake than the rather modest arms reductions (under the treaty, both sides would cap their nuclear warheads at 1,550, down from the previous ceiling of 2,200). Senate rejection of the treaty could unravel the administration’s efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to disruptive states, as well as its “reset” of relations with Russia, which it believes has begun to pay dividends on Afghanistan, Iran, and other important fronts.
It’s one thing for Washington partisans to squabble over domestic issues, like extending the Bush tax cuts. It’s quite another to let their fights spill over in the international arena, and undermine America’s ability to lead abroad. In the not-so-distant past – namely, the presidency of George H.W. Bush – arms accords passed the Senate on nearly unanimous votes. If Senate Republicans kill NEW START, it will be another dismal sign that our deeply polarized politics no longer stops at the water’s edge.
Fully half – $100 billion – of Deficit Commission Chairmen Erskine Bowles’ and Alan Simpson’s reduction proposals target that infamous five-sided building on the Potomac. In a paper containing at least something for everyone to hate, you can almost hear the battle lines being drawn from parochial quarters: weapons makers, veterans groups, and personnel contractors will all howl as their respective cash cows linger in the cross hairs for uncomfortably long periods.
When parsing Bowles’ and Simpson’s suggestions, it’s worth bearing in mind the authors’ guiding principle: “America cannot be great if we go broke.” In essence, the proposal channels the White House’s own National Security Strategy, “Our economy… serves as the wellspring of American power.”
That’s the bad news: both the Deficit Commission and administration are right, and the country is in a bad spot. Here’s the worse news, as told in the introduction of the Deficit Commission’s Report: The Problem Is Real; the Solution Is Painful; There’s No Easy Way Out; Everything Must Be On the Table, and Washington Must Lead.
The Bowles/Simpson proposals do deserve serious consideration. They also must be placed in context — first, they are “illustrative” cuts, ones that are on the table and illustrate how the Commission might save $100 million in defense over five years. These cuts are on top of Secretary of Defense Bob Gates plan, announced over the summer, to wring $100 billion out of the Pentagon’s $700+ billion budget over five years, by reducing contractors, saving on personnel costs, and riding herd on and/or canceling over-budget and delayed programs. While many of Gates’ plans coincide with Bowles/Simpson (contractors and V-22 Osprey, for example), reconciling what to do with the savings is sure to cause a fight. More on that below…
It’s most useful to evaluate the Bowles/Simpson illustrative cuts against three core criteria:
Does a proposal fundamentally weaken the country’s ability to defend itself?
If not, does a proposal fundamentally weaken the country’s core non-military national interests?
If not, does the savings benefit to the country outweigh the parochial interest of the proposed cut?
With that in mind, on balance, most of the Commission’s proposals on Defense spending are quite sensible. For readability’s sake, I’ll lump several of the proposals into larger categories.
First, a starting point:
A simple way to enforce budgetary discipline at the Pentagon starts with one basic policy adjustment: end the practice of supplemental budgeting. DoD has three budgets, not one: a baseline appropriation, plus two “supplemental” appropriations that are supposed to pay for the war, but do oh-so-much-more. I’ve written about the problem for Forbes.com, and you can see an excerpt here:
Having three budgets is like having three strikes in a baseball at-bat — you have the luxury to swing and miss twice. Projects that don’t make the baseline DoD budget (strike one!) can be considered in either of the additional supplementals (strike two! strike three!) before they’re “out.” Ending the supplementals would be like giving the batter just one strike. By combining all defense spending into one (larger) appropriation each year, the batter has just one swing — miss the first time, that’s it. The practice would force Congress to make hard choices that prioritize the war-fighter.
If we have just one budget, it would be much easier to implement many practices recommended in the Bowles/Simpson plan, such as “reducing procurement by 15 percent” and “reduce ‘other procurement’”. Procurement is bloated with multiple, supplemental budgets. Having just one a year forces appropriators to make hard choices.
Savings over five years: $28.5 billion, per Commission estimates.
Next, the low hanging fruit amongst the “illustrative” cuts:
Salary freezes for civilians and military, doubling cuts to contracting personnel and replacing some with civilians. These check all categories without question. The commission could perhaps go even further by advocating a freeze in combat pay as well — Yes, our military has performed heroically in difficult circumstances, but we’re talking about not increasing warzone pay, we’re not talking about eliminating it. Reducing contractors is a no-brainer.
Troop reductions in Europe and Asia. Europe is the easier sell: Twenty years after the Cold War and with staging needs for Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, the American military does not need as extensive a footprint on the European continent. The Commission proposes reducing American forces in Korea by 17,000 troops, which leave 11,500 by my math. That’s hardly a comforting thought, with an unstable and nuclear-minded North Korean regime in the midst of a power transition. We would continue to maintain 32,000 in Japan, and it perhaps makes more sense to split reductions between the two countries, even though removing troops from Japan has been a local political hot potato of late.
Modernize TriCare: Let’s be honest: this isn’t a move to “modernize” defense health care, it’s an effort to bring the military’s health system’s co-pays and deductables in line with cost-structures of private insurers. Does it seem like we’re giving our servicemembers the shaft? Yes. But are military health care costs, “are eating the Defense Department alive,” according to Secretary Gates. It’s unfortunate, but servicemembers’ premiums must rise to correct this problem.
Reduce base support, facilities maintenance, retail activities, and DoD schooling: With the exception of closing unused DoD schools, there’s no question these cuts will hurt. But is reducing the deficit more important? In these times, yes.
Savings over five years: $45.1 billion, per Commission estimates.
Slightly tougher to swallow:
Weapons Cuts: Not all platforms are created equal: certain are needed for modernization, others for replacement, and yet others to fill niche capabilities.
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) takes a beating from Bowles/Simpson, something followers of the program probably suspected. After all, when procurement of the F-22 was ended last year at 187 planes, DoD proclaimed itself ready to buy 2,443 F-35 JSFs instead. At the time, 2,443 JSFs seemed a preposterously and unrealistically large number. It still does, which is why a revised purchase plan, mixing in refurbishments of cheaper F-16s and F-18s while cancelling the USMC’s version of the JSF outright, falls within my comfort level.
We’ve already purchased 288 V-22 Osprey, which is two-thirds of the planned buy, and enough to meet the lion’s share of mission requirements. Along those lines, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle’s (EFV) capabilities are ably substituted by other technologies under development, allowing for EFV’s cancellation.
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Ground Combat Vehicle, and Joint Tactical Radio would be delayed, not canceled, under the Bowles/Simpson plan, which seems reasonable as the Army’s tactical vehicle fleet received an unexpected influx of cash to procure IED-hardened MRAP vehicles for Iraq.
Reduce R&D: This might seem unwise (“Why do we want to cut R&D while we’re dropping weapons? Shouldn’t we invest in developing weapons even if we don’t end up producing them?”), but it’s not as big a deal as it originally seems. Fact is, by combining the defense budgets and reducing certain weapons buys, R&D organically decreases as a natural function of those actions.
Knowing how Congress works, it’s highly unlikely that these planned weapons buys will be fully endorsed. But they will likely be negotiated reductions, in order to maintain capability while sending a strong signal that there’s a changing culture of fiscal discipline.
Savings over five years: up to, but probably less than $30.45 billion, per Commission estimates.
Up in the Air:
Secretary of DefenseBob Gates came out with his own plan to trim $100billion from the Pentagon’s budget, which he intended to reinvest in DoD modernization plans. He was coyly getting out in front of Bowles-Simpson, who want to take Gates’ savings and apply them not to modernization, but rather to deficit reduction.
The trick is convincing the Secretary to follow through with these plans, knowing that the Pentagon won’t get to keep all the planned savings. The good news is this fight probably won’t happen, as Gates will likely leave his post before final decisions are made. Savings reinvestments is just one of the reasons the new Secretary’s views on deficit reduction will have to align with Obama’s.
You Can’t Touch This:
The only illustrative cut in the Bowles-Simpson plan that I whole-heartedly disagree with is the notion of canceling the Navy’s Future Maritime Prepositioning Force. These plans are currently under study, and if executed correctly, could end up saving money while allowing the Navy to project force more efficiently in an era of restrained budgets. There’s still work to be done here, and at $2.7 billion in potential savings, isn’t exactly a budget buster.
George W. Bush, in the absence of broadly agreed-upon guidelines for fighting and meting out justice to terrorists, stumbled badly in attempting to write his own rules for the “war on terror.” Barack Obama has done better, but his administration is just as bollixed up over the right way to detain and try suspected terrorists.
Nine years after 9/11, let’s get it right once and for all. Obama should lead an international effort to clear up confusion and ambiguities surrounding terrorism, war, and the “right” to resistance invoked by groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to justify attacking civilians and using them as human shields.
Specifically, Obama should call for a new Geneva Convention — the fifth — to provide a common legal framework for combating terrorism. This would help the world resolve the “neither soldier nor criminal” quandary that has bedeviled two successive U.S. administrations. More importantly, it would stigmatize the routine use of violence against civilians in fragile or disordered countries around the world.
A tough new anti-terrorism convention would give the international community new weapons in the struggle to discredit violent extremism. By designating mass casualty and suicide terrorism as crimes against humanity, it would take some of the glamour out of violence. It would also provide the legal basis for international tribunals to indict those who recruit the killers and plan the attacks. Finally, leading the charge for a new Geneva Convention would reinforce a core theme of Obama’s foreign policy: restoring U.S. moral leadership within a framework of international cooperation for mutual security.
Because terrorism is a global scourge, it makes no sense for every country to write its own rules for combating and punishing terrorists. It’s time to arm the civilized world with the legal tools it needs to fight and defeat terrorists — in a civilized way.
It goes without saying that National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command are playing a significant role in defending military and government computer networks. It appears they’re now playing a role defending domestic U.S. civilian computer networks as well. In past statements, General Keith Alexander – head of NSA and Cyber Command – said that the DoD entities would not be involved in the protection of domestic civilian networks because it is the purview of the Department of Homeland Security. Despite those statements, a memorandum of agreement released on October 13 announced that the DoD and DHS would coordinate their cybersecurity efforts, collocating personnel.
While the NSA and Cyber Command both fall under the purview of the DoD, their missions are different. The NSA is a hybrid civilian/military entity whose main function is to gather signals intelligence from foreign communications and provide information assurance to prevent foreign adversaries from accessing classified materials. Cyber Command is a new, purely military entity that is responsible for providing the U.S. military with both offensive and defensive capabilities in cyberspace.
Because the NSA was at the center of the Bush administration’s domestic wiretapping scandal in the years just after 9/11, its involvement with protecting domestic computer networks makes privacy advocates uneasy. They’re worried that the NSA might use its new role to monitor U.S citizens. However, it’s worth noting that the NSA’s participation with U.S. domestic computer networks is not unprecedented. In February, the NSA assisted Google in investigating an attack against the company in which it is believed that Chinese hackers stole large amounts of intellectual property as well as information about Chinese human rights activists. More recently, the NSA was tasked with executing “Perfect Citizen,” a program that gives NSA access to U.S. critical infrastructure networks in order to detect cyberspace threats. This means NSA would deploy sensors on many large privately owned networks.
Meanwhile, General Alexander stated in September that he did not believe Cyber Command should operate in the civilian sphere. However, that statement contradicts the memorandum of agreement, which specifically directs Cyber Command to locate personnel at a DHS facility to provide support and “operational synchronization.” It also instructs Cyber Command to coordinate operational and mission planning with DHS and NSA. Moreover, Cyber Command’s involvement with civilian networks was presaged by the June 2009 DoD memorandum announcing its formation which specifically states that part of its mission would be to protect civilian networks.
The question now is: how much of a role will DoD play? How much of a role should it play? In 2003, a presidential directive established DHS as the agency in charge of coordinating the overall effort of securing civilian networks. The agency has since written a strategy and will to hire large numbers of cybersecurity professionals over the next few years, indicating the agency will maintain a large role in protecting civilian networks.
But critical cyber experience and technical expertise lies with the military, which would be foolish to ignore. Furthermore, DHS wants to work with the military, admitting that it has at least contemplated leveraging NSA assets in its efforts to put together a comprehensive plan to protect critical cyberspace assets. Even so, it’s not that straight forward: as the NSA wiretapping scandal shows, DoD’s involvement in civilian networks would stir civil liberties controversy.
Currently, no overarching cybersecurity strategy exists that clarifies agencies’ responsibilities. Despite sweeping cybersecurity legislation being proposed in Congress – particularly by Senators Lieberman, Carper, and Collins – the White House must step in to clarify these roles.
Just a few years ago, Lebanon appeared to be a foreign policy success for the United States. Outraged by the brutal assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (likely at the hands of Syria and its allies), the Lebanese people, bolstered by international support, succeeded in expelling Syrian military forces and asserting Lebanese sovereignty in 2005 for the first time in decades. And again in 2009, the Lebanese affirmed their support for the pro-Western ruling coalition, awarding them a solid majority of seats in Parliament during the May general elections.
These days, however, the country looks headed for a frightening crisis. The March 14 coalition, as the ruling group is known, has been unable to capitalize on its popular mandate. This is due in large part to the overwhelming force wielded by Hezbollah – which is funded, trained, and armed by Iran and Syria. But it’s also because U.S. policy toward Lebanon has been unwilling to back up bold words with actions. Far from protecting America’s allies, consecutive U.S. administrations have not only failed the pro-Western government but also empowered its worst enemies.
The slow-burning confrontation is about to reach a boiling point over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, charged with bringing Hariri’s killers to justice. The court, established by agreement between the U.N. Security Council and the Lebanese government, is expected to issue indictments against members of Hezbollah in the coming months. As the Wall Street Journal reported Monday, up to six members are slated to be indicted by the end of the year, including Mustafa Badreddine, a senior Hezbollah military commander and brother-in-law of the infamous Hezbollah mastermind Imad Mugniyah.
In an effort to preempt what would surely be a massive blow, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has launched a war against the tribunal, and U.S. officials believe that Hezbollah will stop at nothing to prevent indictments from being handed down. The risk of war is palpable, and if Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons — and their Syrian puppets — unseat the elected government and take control over Lebanon, it will be a grave blow to U.S. security and credibility around the world.
It would also bolster the reach and credibility of Iran. Fred Hof, deputy to U.S. Special Middle East envoy George Mitchell and point man on U.S.-Syria policy once put it bluntly: “Whether most of his organization’s members know it or not, and whether most Lebanese Shiites know it or not, [Nasrallah] and his inner circle do what they do first and foremost to defend and project the existence and power of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” (He was speaking to the Middle East Institute in the midst of the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.)
The rise of Iranian influence in Lebanon is particularly dangerous at the present moment, when moderate Arab countries are desperately looking for the United States to contain Iran. From the perspective of the United States’ Arab allies, if the world’s superpower can’t contain the mullahs before they have a nuclear weapon, how could they be expected to contain them if they have the bomb?
Given the disturbing drift in American policy since the 2005 Cedar revolution, what is at stake, and the choices we must make to support those seeking our help, Hezbollah’s crimes against us bear repeating.
Accused of terrorism on virtually every continent, Hezbollah has killed more Americans than any terrorist group except Al Qaeda, and today they posses weapons of state.
They murdered 63 people, including 17 Americans and eight CIA officers in our Beirut embassy in 1982. They slaughtered 241 American marines in the Marine barracks’ bombing in 1983, and a year later killed another 18 American servicemen near the U.S. Air Force Base in Torrejon, Spain. Robert Stethem, a US Navy diver, was beaten to death and thrown on the tarmac when Hezbollah terrorists hijacked TWA flight 847. And of course the brutal kidnapping, heinous torture, and eventual murder of the CIA’s Beirut station chief Bill Buckley and Col. William ‘Rich’ Higgins were carried out by Hezbollah terrorists.
Fred Hof was a close friend of Col. Higgins and, at the time, part of a small team that worked every possible angle to free Higgins before his death. “I am one of a small handful of Americans who knows the exact manner of Rich’s death,” he explained years ago. “If I were to describe it to you now – which I will not – I can guarantee that a significant number of people in this room would become physically ill. When [former Deputy Secretary of State] Rich Armitage described Hezbollah a few years ago as the “A-Team” of international terrorism and suggested that there was a “blood debt” to be paid, he was referring to a leadership cadre that is steeped in blood and brutality.”
It is that ‘leadership cadre’ of Iranian backed terrorists, who have been killing our allies and us for over 30 years, that is today working for Tehran, “maneuvering furiously”, according to the New York Times, to derail the tribunal, and destroy the native forces inside Lebanon seeking to restore self-determination for the Lebanese people.
Lebanon is again at a cross roads, and so is American policy.
How did the situation become so dire, so soon after the West finally helped the Lebanese people shake off the foreign forces driving thirty years of civil war and violence? Is it now too late to stop Iran from successfully exporting their revolution into a country as culturally diverse and multi-confessional Lebanon?
It’s difficult not to lay the blame at the feet of former President George W. Bush and his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. The Bush administration was eager to hold up Lebanon as an example of its successful Middle East policy: “We took great joy in seeing the Cedar Revolution. We understand that the hundreds of thousands of people who took to the street to express their desire to be free required courage, and we support the desire of the people to have a government responsive to their needs and a government that is free, truly free,” Bush said at the time. However, when push came to shove, the president did little to help our Lebanese allies when they needed him most.
Judgment day came May 7, 2008. An emboldened Hezbollah, alarmed that the government was moving to control the group’s illicit private communications network, invaded the streets of Beirut and the Chouf Mountains to the south, forcing Lebanon’s democratically-elected leaders to accede to a power-sharing agreement at the point of a gun. The result was yet another capitulation by the Bush administration, which signaled its acquiescence to the Doha Agreement, signed on May 21 of that year, formalizing Hezbollah’s veto over any government decision, including its own disarmament.
But if the Bush administration opened the door to Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon, Barack Obama’s administration is holding that door ajar, doing little to support America’s erstwhile allies in the March 14 coalition out of fear that such a move would damage any chance of engaging with Syria.
In an October 18 letter, Congressmen Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and Dan Burton (R-IN), chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East,protested the administration’s lack of support for moderate elements in Lebanon: “We remain concerned that your strategy of offering diplomatic overtures to hostile regimes has done little to provoke Middle East peace, and has only taken away leverage from our democratic friends and allies.”
For its part, the Administration continues to put the emphasis on reaching out to Damascus, and has gone only so far as to indicate there are limits to America’s patience. “Syria and the United States have taken some modest steps to see if we can improve the bilateral relationship, but this cannot go very far as long as Syria’s friends are undermining stability in Lebanon,“ explained Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman, on a visit to Syria earlier this month.
It is vital that the United States reverse these years of drift and act decisively to help the Lebanese people reassert their right to self-determination — because it is in America’s national interest. The alternative is to give in to the foreign agenda of the Mullahs in Tehran and their terrorist proxy at time when containing Iran’s expansionist ambition is the paramount necessity in the region. So what do we do?
The Obama administration must decide to resist the “resistance,” and lead the West in a program to further empower Lebanese civil society and aid the dormant democratic forces in the country. It is these courageous actors, with the proven ability to lead successful political and media campaigns and expose the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis, who were specifically targeted by Hezbollah in May 2008 — exactly because they are effective. The Lebanese people need to know that the president of the United States supports their pursuit of freedom and democracy, especially as Hezbollah’s role in attacking the state is on the verge of being exposed.
President Obama should immediately look to Lebanon’s pro-democracy media, which has largely been silenced over the last year, intimidated not only by pro-Syrian, pro-Iranian, and Hezbollah foes, but hobbled by Saudi patrons who mistakenly thought they could pull Syria away from Iran’s influence. That strategy, like our own outreach to Syria, has proven a disastrous failure, for Lebanon, the region and US national interests. The Obama administration can help take the muzzle off of these Lebanese patriots—like Prime Minister Saad Hariri and head of the Lebanese Forces party Samir Geagea—whose courageous voices are the first defense against Hezbollah’s “resistance.” Let Lebanon speak.
And, the Obama administration must ensure that the Special Tribunal goes forward, prosecuting those it indicts. America’s $10 million contribution last week is commendable, but it is not enough. No problem, other than stopping Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, calls as urgently for international focus as does the effort to stop Iran from expanding its sphere of influence and overpowering another people.
The United States must be willing to work with its allies in Europe and the Middle East to support those democratic elements who want to save their country. This policy will not be easy. It may require making the tough decision to give up on forces and programs that have failed to serve as a bulwark against Hezbollah, or it may require a deep reform of the same, but tough choices are what we face.
It was Harry Truman who said “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Those words are as true today under President Obama as when they were uttered in 1947 by a young former Senator thrust suddenly into power, forced to make some of this nation’s most fateful, difficult and ultimately, successful decisions. America is no less the leader of the free world today than we were then, unless we act otherwise.
If the Obama administration takes a bold stand in favor of Lebanon’s independence and starts pressing the Saudis to support Lebanese civil society, it will find that many figures in Beirut, and other countries with a stake in Lebanon’s stability will enthusiastically follow its lead.
But whatever methods it chooses, the administration must make a clear public signal that the United States will not sit on the sidelines while Iran, through its satraps Syria and Hezbollah, successfully exports the Iranian revolution to Lebanon. President Obama has spoken eloquently about the need to support democracy and tolerance in the Middle East. The time of decision has come. The President must now put America’s words into action.
President Obama is in Seoul today for what promises to be a contentious meeting of the world’s leading economic powers. He probably won’t mollify China, Germany and other critics of the Federal Reserve’s plan to pump more money into the U.S. economy. But the President does have a chance to further his goal of doubling U.S. exports by bringing home an improved trade agreement with South Korea.
In addition to attending the G-20 summit, Obama is slated to meet with South Korean officials to finalize a bilateral free trade pact negotiated by President Bush. Congress has not ratified the treaty, which is snagged by concerns about U.S. auto exports to South Korea, as well as lawmakers’ eroding faith in the benefits of free trade. The president said in June that he had instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to have all the outstanding issues “lined up properly” before he arrived for this week’s visit, so he could close the deal with Korea and present the agreement to Congress again in the coming months.
South Korea isn’t just a major trade partner, it’s also a key strategic ally and a counterweight to China’s growing heft in the Asia-Pacific. Since its tariffs traditionally have been much higher than ours, there’s little doubt that the agreement would spur U.S. exports and help offset weak economic demand at home. It requires South Korea to lower its high taxes on U.S. farm goods and open markets for insurance and other services to American firms. As the treaty has languished in Congress, however, Seoul has been busy on other fronts, deepening economic ties with China and finalizing an important trade pact with the EU last month.
Although President Obama sounded an ambivalent note at best on trade during the 2008 presidential campaign, he understands that expanding U.S. exports is crucial both to creating jobs and shrinking America’s outsized trade deficits. Now that he’s made the Korean deal a top priority, we’ll find out if the newly Tea Party-infused GOP will be more amenable to passing the treaty than Congressional Democrats were.
The agreement would lower tariffs on auto imports on both sides. South Korea’s are higher — 8 percent compared to 2.5 percent here. (The United States also would gradually lower a 25 percent tariff on imported pickup trucks.) Nonetheless, U.S. auto makers, especially Ford, have argued that the treaty would not bring down cultural and non-tariff barriers that have confined their sales to a sliver of South Korea’s lucrative auto market.
They have a point. Seoul exports more than 400,000 vehicles (mostly Hyundais and Kias) to the United States each year, while manufacturing an additional 200,000 cars at U.S. plants. According the U.S. Commerce Department, U.S. auto makers sent a paltry 5,878 vehicles to South Korea in 2009. Ford’s Stephen Biegun notes that more than 70 percent of the cars made in South Korea are exported, while imports account for less than 10 percent of sales, well below the average of 40 percent in other economically advanced countries.
As an auto industry representative explained in testimony before Congress, Korea has an extensive web of non-tariff barriers that make it harder for foreign car makers to penetrate the Korean market. Some of these are technical regulations like emissions standards and even license plate size. Establishing a clear link between such policies and the small U.S. market share in Korea isn’t always easy. But there’s no doubt that some of Korea’s policies reflect a well-entrenched hostility toward imports. For example, until recently anyone in Korea who bought a foreign car would automatically have their income taxes audited—a policy that chilled demand even after it was officially ended.
Ford, America’s healthiest car maker, sees itself as the chief victim of South Korea’s import-unfriendly policies. That’s because General Motors, through its Daewoo subsidy, makes cars in South Korea, selling more than 100,000 locally and exporting hundreds of thousands more elsewhere (including to the United States).
What can President Obama do to resolve the impasse over autos and get the U.S.-South Korea agreement through the Senate? He can’t reopen negotiations, but he can use the presidential jawbone to win binding side agreements with Seoul to remove non-tariff barriers to U.S. auto exports. He could, in short, bring pressure on South Korea to fully liberalize its auto markets and embrace the reciprocal obligations that come with free trade. Much like his powerful message in New Delhi that “India has emerged,” the president needs to make the case that South Korea has also fully emerged as a mature economy, and it can no longer justify the kind of protectionist and mercantilist trade policies that are more typical of poorer developing countries.
A more aggressive stance would show that the President is serious about doubling U.S. exports. But there’s a complicating factor: the global spread of auto production, design and supply chains. That makes it hard to say just how “American” any given car really is, or how many U.S. jobs are engaged in making cars.
Nonetheless, as long as the answer is “greater than zero,” the President has an obligation to ensure that major U.S. trade partners offer as much access to their domestic markets as we do to ours. And the Korean pact presents him with an opportunity both to restore U.S. global leadership on trade liberalization and to integrate America more deeply into the world’s fastest-growing markets in East Asia.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu flew to the States this week to try to break an impasse to the stalled peace talks. The visit, with VP Joe Biden in New Orleans, seems to have provoked the latest round of public bickering over the construction of settlements in Jerusalem.
This time, an international exchange between Bibi, Obama, and Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erakat makes it look like the sides remain miles apart.
Netanyahu: “Jerusalem is not a settlement. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.”
Obama: “This kind of activity [settlement construction] is never helpful when it comes to peace negotiations.”
Erakat: “The international community must respond to Israel’s unilateral measures by instantly recognizing a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders.”
You know it’s bad if the three main players are barely talking about the same issue. I’ve argued that litigating these cases in the press is counter-productive, and in general I stand by that. If you’re going public, it’s because you’ve lost the private battle. In previous cases, it has proved particularlycounter-productive when there’s public daylight between Obama and Netanyahu, necessitating a come-together meeting in July.
However, is it possible that the current round of public fighting is a coordinated attempt to provide the Israelis and Palestinians with room to compromise?
After all, Netanyahu’s rightist coalition partners will never permit a full suspension of settlement building. But the Palestinians have essentially made a suspension of settlements a litmus test for further talks. Is it possible then that Obama’s public push against settlement construction is designed as a foil for Netanyahu? Will standing up to Obama in public on the settlement issue create enough goodwill within the more conservative caucus of Netanyahu’s coalition?
If the two sides sit down soon, the answer might be yes.
Here’s how Bill Kristol, Fox News contributor and editor of the conservative Weekly Standard, summed up a panel discussion I attended at the conservative American Enterprise Institute:
This is a truly distinguished panel, and one I’m happy to say that’s fair and balanced. We have (former Republican Senator from Missouri) Jim Talent, a responsible, respectable hawk. We have a slightly crazed militarist in Tom Donnelly, and a really insane hegemonic imperialist… me. It’s the correct spectrum of opinion.
The crowd chuckled its DC chuckle, and Wild Bill began. As it turned out, he was ironically prophetic – these people are batshit crazy. That tens of newly-elected Tea Partiers – folks who have never had much to say on national security and foreign policy issues – are now taking their cues from these jokers is downright terrifying.
But before diving into the political angles, here’s what makes these nutcases tick:
My suspicions were first aroused when former Senator Jim Talent (MO) blamed Bill Clinton for Iraq. Would that I were joking! Indeed, Talent bemoaned Clinton’s decision to scale down the size of the military in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. He correctly claimed that we were “fully deployed” during Iraq and Afghanistan, meaning that we simply didn’t have the numbers of troops necessary to properly resource both conflicts. It’s painfully and unfortunately obvious that Talent learned exactly the wrong lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan:
How much money and how many lives would it have saved if we’d have had 14 divisions instead of 10 and had been able to do in Afghanistan at the same time as we were (doing) in Iraq? … The blood, the lives, the people who were dying… we could have been years ahead of that schedule!
In other words, not only was invading Iraq the right call, we should have gone bigger and harder. It’s just too bad that all those people had to die and we had to waste all that money there because Bill Clinton decided to cut the size of the military after the Cold War.
Is Jim Talent a co-author on Decision Points or something? And here I was thinking that the decision to go to war without fully understanding what we were getting ourselves into caused all the slow progress.
Then there was Kristol’s fundamentally misguided view of defense spending. And that’s odd because he starts out with a correct general premise: “We should cut what should be cut and shouldn’t cut what shouldn’t.” That’s all well and good, provided you think that there are things to be cut. So over to you, Bill:
The best possible spending you can have is defense spending! We got out of the Great Depression by having a big defense build up…. The Pentagon has plenty of shovel ready projects!
F-22? No way! Foreign aid? Why not? It was deliciously ironic that while Kristol supported the idea of foreign assistance, he was open to restructuring its $45 billion budget; at the same time, Kristol lauded Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI), incoming House Appropriations chairman, saying Ryan “knows how little can be saved in the defense budget — maybe $20 billion.” Pssst: Bill, that’s almost half of the foreign aid budget you think is big enough to reexamine. It’s also half of State’s.
It all seems so obvious to Talent: The defense budget “is affordable. To argue that it’s not affordable just isn’t right.” It’s especially affordable if we keep cutting taxes, right Jim?
Talent wrapped it all up in a nice big Fox News bow by tying alleged American declinism to Obama’s nefarious plan to nominate Joseph Stalin’s ghost as Tim Geithner’s replacement: “A socialized economy will not let America remain a great power.” But hold on there –- does a socialist want to “position our nation for success in the global marketplace” via a “strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity”? Then Talent has some explaining to do, because that’s what the president says in this year’s National Security Strategy.
Thankfully, there was one area these mental dwarfs didn’t completely screw up: New START. Let’s be clear: Their partisan glasses won’t let them whole-heartedly endorse a very sensible treaty. Instead, they’re holding it hostage to more missile defense spending. But they’ll vote for it… hopefully.
Now, this all gets incredibly fascinating when you put it in a political context. The major take-away from this session is that the conservative establishment is pissing down their collective leg at the Tea Party’s soon-to-be dominant position on the Hill. Their plan is to co-opt the Tea Party by supplying it with mainstream conservative positions in an area the Tea Party doesn’t spend much time thinking about.
Kristol liquored up new Tea Partiers in hopes of bringing her home after the prom:
I think the Tea Party gets a bum wrap. They don’t believe we should lose wars, they don’t believe we should weaken the military, they do believe the world would be safer if Iran didn’t have nuclear weapons.
Jim Talent poured a few shots into Kristol’s punchbowl by hitting the “DC Republican establishment” (note to Talent: you’re a member.)
People who sat around and didn’t do what had to be done in 2001-2004 (specifically: Don Rumsfeld)… it’s a little much for them to be all up in arms because one Tea Party candidate said something that sounded vaguely not quite correct from the point of view of a strong U.S. foreign policy.
They’re pandering, and hard. Rand Paul doesn’t know it yet, but the Tea Party’s biggest spending hawk is about to vote for an ever-increasing defense budgets soon enough.
It was a mind-blowing Friday morning for yours truly, but was very reassuring in a way: The conservative establishment is as out of touch and irresponsible as always on national security, and they’re trying to take advantage of the strongest but most impressionable subset of their caucus. That’s why now more than ever, progressives have to offer strong, smart, rational approaches to U.S. national security, military, and foreign policy challenges.
Picture the seventh grader who just brought home a report card full of Cs and Ds. After getting chewed to pieces by his parents, he points to the lone bright spot:
“C’mon… It’s not all bad.. I did get a B+ in art!”
“Art? ART?!?!” the overbearing and despondent father retorts, “Tell me how you’re getting into college with a B+ in art!”
That’s where national security stands as a political issue after this election: A bright spot that the electorate doesn’t much care about. The message from this election on national security is therefore somewhat simple: National security is not on most voters’ radar screen right now, and will stay out of sight until national security is threatened.
In the broad range of national security topics, only Afghanistan so much as registered as an issue this cycle, and barely so: a paltry 8 percent of respondents to a CNN exit poll indicated that the war was their chief concern. Of those, 57 percent voted Democratic, which hints at a (very) quiet confidence in the president’s handling of the war.
Even as it’s not at the top of the issues list, the electorate still supports the president on national security, according to a mid-September Democracy Corps poll. Since there have been no major national security issues in the ensuing six weeks, we have to assume the president’s 53 percent approval rating (42 percent against) stands. In a way, it’s a remarkable achievement for a president whose party has historically suffered in the polls when it comes to national security, something we call the “national security confidence gap” around here.
Despite the positive polls, the Democratic base (possibly in bed with spending hawks in the Tea Party) will likely turn its focus again to Afghanistan. Following Obama’s kept-promise on Iraq, the left will still expect a draw-down begun by mid-2011 in order to come out in force for the re-elect. The drawdown won’t begin in earnest until 2012, but a mid-2011 announcement will at least adhere to the letter of the president’s promise. There’s some wiggle room for progress, but not much.
As for the new Congress, if their performance to date is any indication, Republicans will feel empowered in the wake of this election to pick a few fights. To date, they’ve gone out of their way to hit Obama politically on every attempted terrorist attack. Those attacks have largely wasted their breath to this point, failing to shake public confidence.
But long-standing conservative bugaboos of Gitmo, missile defense, foreign assistance and potentially DADT loom large. (I’ve heard rumors that DADT will definitely be addressed in the coming lame-duck period, however.) Buck McKeon (R-FL) is the incoming HASC chairman and a big proponent of missile defense, so watch that in particular.
This opens an interesting gambit on Pentagon spending: Some sort of defense budget restraint is coming, and there’s probably at least bipartisan acknowledgment of that general principle, but I’d be shocked if this loose consensus included HASC Republicans. News today suggests the military’s $50 billion intelligence budget will be stripped from the Pentagon’s topline and moved under the DNI’s control. Is this just a sleight-of-hand that will substitute $50b more of weapons spending?
These fights will be a painful distraction for the administration, but should not dilute the White House’s core competency: keeping the country safe. Various forces will continue to make progress in Afghanistan frustrating, but the White House should continue to tout its successful record of taking the fight to al Qaeda in Af/Pak, scoring important diplomatic victories against Iran, and defending Americans against terrorist attacks. Continue to do this, and progressives will continue to make strides against the national security confidence gap.
The Obama administration won an important foreign policy victory yesterday as Iran skulked back to the negotiating table. In other words, the latest rounds of sanctions imposed by the UN, United States, and European Union have worked.
To be clear, sanctions’ aim was never to “bring Iran to its knees,” as Supreme Leader Khamenei claimed in 2008. Further, it’s easy to doubt their effectiveness when we we hear accounts that Tehran is skirting sanctions with fake bank accounts and false flags on ships’ registries. This narrative essentially implies that because Iran is evading sanctions, then they must not be working.
It’s exactly the opposite: Sanctions are imposed to make life difficult for Tehran, and stories about evasion are actually clear indications of their effectiveness. Every second an Iranian official has had to spend time figuring out a way around a sanction is time he should be doing his regular job.
Sanctions have coincided with a significant economic reforms inside Iran, aimed at ending over $100b in government subsidies on everything from bread to energy. Opaque attempts at economic reform appear to have been painful for average Iranians. And while I am not enough of Iran expert to steadfastly link sanctions, a weakening domestic macro-economic situation, and Iran’s inclination to head back to the negotiating table, I’m happy to point out the not-so-odd coincidence.
Before we get too excited, it should be obvious that the outcome of new negotiations is far from certain. Iran will likely play its tired game of engaging diplomatically while attempting to refuse meaningful compromise. That’s why it’s crucial that the Obama administration, European Union, and UN not reward Iran just for talking. To keep Iran from getting the bomb, the international community has to keep its boot on Tehran’s neck until the day it agrees to unfettered access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities.
When officials stress that the public was never in danger, you should take them at their word. Why? Because it’s very likely the DC “metro plot” was never real. It was, in short, nothing more than an entrapment exercise. Here’s an excerpt from the Washington Post:
Officials stressed that the public was never in danger. Still, Neil H. MacBride, U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, said it was “chilling that a man from Ashburn is accused of casing rail stations with the goal of killing as many Metro riders as possible through simultaneous bomb attacks.”
Here’s what likely happened: Someone (a friend, relative… whomever) had a vague conversation with Farooque Ahmed about attacking the DC metro system. This person became concerned enough to alert law enforcement, who sent in an undercover agent, posing as an al Qaeda member, to meet and evaluate Ahmed.
The undercover agent and Ahmed then probably developed plans to case various metro stations. That’s because in order to prosecute him, the law enforcement would need demonstrable evidence that Ahmed took action to execute an attack plot. It’s tough to get a conviction by testifying that Ahmed really, really wanted to do something, but never did anything beyond that.
If (a big if) this is what happened, it opens serious issues: Would Ahmed have surveyed the attack locations had he not come in contact with the undercover agent? To put it another way — did law enforcement “create” a terrorist out of someone who was otherwise just talking a big game? And, as evidenced by the District Attorney’s comments, is law enforcement content to reap the benefits of the positive press coverage?
Much of this is informed speculation on my part, but if the public was allegedly never in danger, why did we need to hear about it in the first place?
At last, some good news from Afghanistan: The New York Times reported last week that U.S. and Afghan forces are “routing” the Taliban in Kandahar province. In the northwest, Special Operations forces and air strikes have taken a heavy toll on insurgent commanders and “shadow governors,” according to The Washington Post.
These tactical gains are impressive. But they also spotlight the weakest link in our strategic chain, and no, it’s not Afghanistan’s mercurial leader, Hamid Karzai, or the corrupt and feckless central government. It’s Pakistan.
President Obama’s surge seems to be taking hold, but coalition forces can’t break the insurgency’s back as long as Pakistan continues to provide a sanctuary for the Taliban and allied terrorist groups.
Aided by better intelligence and a highly accurate new mobile rocket, in addition to more troops, coalition forces have successfully targeted Taliban leaders and driven insurgents from strongholds they have long held in Kandahar. The onslaught apparently has demoralized some Taliban foot soldiers, who are said to resent their high command for urging them to stand and fight from the relative safety of Pakistan.
U.S. officials say they are under no illusion of crushing the insurgency altogether, but they hope that, by inflicting heavy losses, they can turn the tide and induce top Taliban leaders to enter into peace negotiations with the Afghan government.
But there’s a problem: insurgent leaders are slipping over the border to Pakistan, where they can regroup for new attacks, or simply wait for NATO forces to leave. Says Gen. David Petraeus, “There is quite relentless pressure. It forces them on the run. But again, if you don’t take away the safe haven, it doesn’t have a lasting effect.”
And the Quetta Shura, whose leader, Mullah Omar, was so hospitable to al Qaeda when the Taliban ran Afghanistation, continues to orchestrate and finance the insurgency from Pakistan with impunity. If the United States and NATO are to permanently weaken the Taliban and force them to the negotiating table, that has to change.
Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, argues that Pakistan’s double game threatens to prolong America’s costly intervention. On the one hand, Pakistan is an indispensible partner: it supplies the main supply routes for coalition forces, and tacitly colludes with drone strikes against al Qaeda and Taliban targets. On the other, Pakistan gives sanctuary not only to the Quetta Shura and but also the notorious Haqqani terrorist network, whose ties with Pakistani intelligence go back to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s military leaders, he says, “believe that our current surge will be the last push before we begin a face-saving troop drawdown next July. They are confident that if they continue to frustrate our military and political strategy – even actively impede reconciliation between Kabul and Taliban groups willing to make peace – pro-Pakistani forces will have the upper hand in Afghanistan after the United States departs.”
Khalilzad is right: the United States can’t allow our supposed ally to subvert our strategic goals in Afghanistan. Yet just last week, the administration announced a new $2 billion military aid package to Pakistan. This comes on top of a five-year, $7.5 billion civilian aid package for Pakistan approved last year.
This is the kind of thing that gives engagement a bad name. We need a more challenging approach: The United States should demand that Pakistan break decisively with Islamist terrorist groups and not allow its territory to be used as a staging point for attacks on its neighbor. If Pakistan refuses, we should target insurgent havens anyway and freeze aid. If it complies, we should make a long-term commitment to strengthening Pakistan’s economic and governing institutions, and to mediating regional conflicts.
U.S. officials have been reluctant to put too much pressure on Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban leadership. They don’t want to undermine the democratically elected government of President Asi Ali Zardari, or risk alienating Pakistan’s military and intelligence services, which are cooperating in the U.S. campaign against al Qaeda. But Pakistan already has demonstrated the military ability to reclaim tribal areas when it suited its purpose. Up until now, Pakistan has tried to have it both ways: help America fight al Qaeda, while retaining ties to terrorist groups to influence future events in Afghanistan (and to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir). Such ambivalence collides with America’s strategic interest, and it’s time for Pakistan to choose.
You’d think this morning’s Washington Post article by Greg Miller should throw some cold water on the relatively upbeat assessment I made yesterday: I said Petraeus is “trying to hit the Taliban leadership hard, driving it to the negotiating table from a position of weakness,” which “might be speeding up a potential resolution to the conflict.”
The headline appears to play me the fool: “Taliban unscathed by U.S. strikes”. Ouch, right? It would appear, based on the first few paragraphs of Miller’s piece, that the Taliban is doing fine:
Escalated airstrikes and special operations raids have disrupted Taliban movements and damaged local cells. But officials said that insurgents have been adept at absorbing the blows and that they appear confident that they can outlast an American troop buildup set to subside beginning next July.
It ultimately assesses that “there is little indication that the direction of the war has changed.”
But wait just a minute. Disrupting the Taliban isn’t the goal of the recent increase in op-tempo. The article fails to dis-aggregate the Taliban writ-large from its relatively small cadre of leaders.
While the organization plods on in a holistic sense, Petraeus’ raids and airstrikes are designed to telegraph a message to the leadership: “You can keep fighting, but you, Mr. Senior Taliban Leader, might be next.” With that life and death calculation staring them in the face, Petraeus rightly calculates that the Taliban’s leadership will be more interested in talking — a negotiation that will tip the leverage in NATO’s favor.
This is the same fundamental misunderstanding of international sanctions against Iran. No one believes they’ll put a fundamental break on the Iranian economy. But they will make life tougher on the mullahs, who now have to work hard to skirt them. The calculation is that one day, Tehran will say, “Man, I’m sick and tired of all this running around. Maybe we should sit down and negotiate with the West and we can get back to life as normal.”
Neither calculation may end up as an unqualified success, but the instincts behind them are right.
Let’s say you’re jonesing for a smoothie at your favorite hipster juice bar. Not content with the strawberry, papaya, and kiwi in your standard Mangosteen Madness™, you pony up for a little something extra. Let’s go crazy – say you drop the extra 78 cents on the counter and tell the Smoothie King to throw in a “Caffeine Charge” just to make sure the day keeps on sailing by.
That’s kind of what’s happening in Afghanistan these days. The “clear, hold, and build” of counterinsurgency doctrine may be the Mangosteen strategy, but it’s becoming increasingly clear that General Petraeus is doubling down with a “Caffeine Charge” of his own. He’s trying to hit the Taliban leadership hard, driving it to the negotiating table from a position of weakness.
As Dexter Filkins detailed in the NYT a few weeks ago, NATO military operations in Afghanistan have aggressively targeted Taliban militants with airstrikes and Special Forces operations. Well-reputed columnists like David Ignatius, Joe Klein, and Fred Kaplan all write that this marks a shift away from the counterinsurgency strategy that Petraeus literally wrote the book on. However, Paula Broadwell, a guest-author on Tom Ricks’ blog, disagrees, noting that the recent increase in counter-terrorism operations is an important subset of an across-the-board op-tempo increase in all COIN disciplines.
Despite disagreements over the shift, the important point is that it might be speeding up a potential resolution to the conflict. General Petraeus has long said that we’re not going to kill or capture our way out of Aghanistan, and he told Katie Couric over the summer that negotiations are “historically the way counterinsurgency efforts ultimately have been concluded.”
The issue is ensuring that negotiations, quietly underway, take place on the most favorable grounds possible to America. And if that goal is achieved, then semantics about COIN vs. CT won’t matter in the end.
The Israeli-Palestinian peace talks effectively died this week. That’s what happens when you take your case to the press.
Though the hard left no doubt cheers a Palestinian effort to seek unilateral recognition from everyone from the UN Security Council to the Poughkeepsie Dog Catchers Society, it’s simply neither a serious nor well-considered effort.
The move is bad for everyone, including peace-seeking Palestinians. A UNSC resolution will be vetoed by the Americans and will split the Europeans; its failure will then cause regional Arab powers to blame everyone but themselves at a time when Arab engagement is crucial to success.
The PA went public with this ill-conceived demand as a response to Bibi Netanyahu’s impossible pre-condition offer of extending a moratorium on settlement construction only in return for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Doing so is a non-starter for the PA – it would essentially prevent ex-patriot Palestinian refugees from staking a claim to property and/or cash from the Israeli government.
Bibi’s demands were the beginning of the end, and should have spurred the Obama administration’s negotiators to keep the talks quiet at all cost. Of course, maybe they tried, and tried hard, but the two parties were never on the same page from the beginning.
A resolution to this conflict will only be achieved through painstaking negotiations behind closed doors. When the parties begin to litigate their case in the court of international public opinion, it is nothing more than a desperation Hail Mary on 4th-and-a-million with no time on the clock.
If talks aren’t dead, they’re in a coma and on life support. The White House needs to get both sides to shut up, and find a face-saving way for Bibi to extend the settlement moratorium that somehow addresses – or agrees to delay – the question of Israel’s Jewishness/Palestinian refugees.
Failing that, we’ll look to start these talks up again under the next Israeli government.
There may be no method in North Korea’s madness, but the world’s response to its episodic outrages has settled into a familiar pattern. It’s a dangerous pattern, and one likely to recur as long as China keeps enabling Pyongyang’s belligerent behavior.
No sooner had Congress convened this week for a post-election, lame duck session than a partisan squabble erupted in the Senate that threatens to scuttle a major nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia.
It goes without saying that National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command are playing a significant role in defending military and government computer networks. It appears they’re now playing a role defending domestic U.S. civilian computer networks as well. In past statements, General Keith Alexander – head of NSA and Cyber Command – said that the DoD entities would not be involved in the protection of domestic civilian networks because it is the purview of the Department of Homeland Security. Despite those statements, a 
Just a few years ago, Lebanon appeared to be a foreign policy success for the United States. Outraged by the brutal assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (likely at the hands of Syria and its allies), the Lebanese people, bolstered by international support, succeeded in expelling Syrian military forces and asserting Lebanese sovereignty in 2005 for the first time in decades. And again in 2009, the Lebanese affirmed their support for the pro-Western ruling coalition, awarding them a solid majority of seats in Parliament during the May general elections.
Here’s how Bill Kristol, Fox News contributor and editor of the conservative Weekly Standard, summed up 
