issue: Foreign Policy & Defense

Dispatch From Copenhagen: Obama, Kyoto, and the Prospects for a Deal

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

The following is a guest column from PPI friend and sometime contributor Robert Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government at Harvard and director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program. He is attending the U.N. climate change negotiations in Copenhagen.

Copenhagen

First things first: Let’s start with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s announcement today regarding U.S. funding for developing countries.  The developing countries are asking for truly huge sums in Copenhagen — more than $100 billion to $200 billion annually to pay for their carbon mitigation and climate change adaptation through 2050. The U.S. can play an important role, and it could do so in a way that will not add to U.S. debt and ought not antagonize more conservative elements in the U.S. Congress, but it will not be through direct payments from the U.S. government to governments of developing countries. Let me explain.

Although it is inconceivable that the governments of the industrialized world, including the U.S. government, will come up with sufficient, sustainable foreign aid to satisfy the demands for financial transfers by the developing countries, they can — through sensible domestic and international policy arrangements — provide key incentives for the private sector to provide the needed financing through foreign direct investments.

For example, if the cap-and-trade systems that are emerging throughout the industrialized world as the favored domestic approach to reducing CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions are linked together through the existing, common emission-reduction-credit system, namely the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), then powerful incentives can be created for carbon-friendly private investment in the developing world. That would not add to U.S. debt; indeed, it would be good for U.S. private industry.

Clearly the CDM, as it currently stands, cannot live up to this promise, but with appropriate reforms there is significant potential. Of course, problems of limited additionality will inevitably remain. Therefore, what is needed is for the key emerging economies — China, India, Brazil, South Korea, South Africa, and Mexico — to take on meaningful emission targets themselves (even if equivalent to business-as-usual in the short term), and then participate directly in international cap-and-trade, not government-government trading as envisioned in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (which won’t work), but firm-firm trading through linked national and multinational cap-and-trade systems.

Importantly, the private finance approach stands a much greater chance than government aid of being efficiently employed — that is, targeted to reducing emissions, rather than spent by poor nations on other (possibly meritorious) purposes. So, the job can be done, and governments have an important role, but as facilitators, not providers, of finance. Unfortunately that has not been the focus of the Copenhagen discussions.

Moving Past Kyoto

More broadly, the developing countries have insisted that the Kyoto protocol must be the basis for a new agreement. This is a real problem, because the Kyoto Protocol, in particular its dichotomous distinction between the small set of Annex I countries with quantitative emission-reduction commitments and the majority of countries in the world with no responsibilities, is the “QWERTY keyboard” (that is, unproductive path dependence) of international climate policy — the major stumbling block in negotiations here in Copenhagen.

The world has changed dramatically since the 1997 Protocol divided the world in two. More than 50 non-Annex I countries (with no legally binding commitments) now have greater per capita income than the poorest of the Annex I countries (with commitments). So, even if this distinction was appropriate in 1997, it surely no longer is. But updating the list is impossible. Mexico and South Korea, for example, joined the OECD just six months after Kyoto, but they are unwilling to join the set of Annex I parties. Furthermore, updating the list would be insufficient. It is the very notion of a dichotomous distinction between countries with stringent targets and countries with no targets whatsoever that is at the heart of the problem. A more subtle, more sophisticated interpretation of “common but differentiated responsibilities” is needed. More about this below.

The industrialized (Annex I) countries have emitted most of the stock of manmade carbon dioxide in our atmosphere, so shouldn’t they reduce emissions before developing countries are asked to contribute? While this may seem to make sense, here are four reasons why a new climate agreement must engage all major emitting countries — both industrialized and developing:

  1. Emissions from developing countries are significant and growing rapidly. China surpassed the U.S. as the world’s largest CO2 emitter in 2006, and developing countries may account for more than half of global emissions within the next decade.
  2. Developing countries provide the best opportunities for low-cost emissions reduction; their participation could dramatically reduce total costs.
  3. The U.S. and several other industrialized countries may not commit to significant emissions reductions without developing country participation.
  4. If developing countries are excluded, up to one-third of carbon emissions reductions by participating countries may migrate to non-participating economies through international trade, reducing environmental gains and pushing developing nations onto more carbon-intensive growth paths (so-called “carbon leakage’’).

How can developing countries participate in an international effort to reduce emissions without incurring costs that derail their economic development? Their emissions targets could start at business-as-usual levels, becoming more stringent over time as countries become wealthier. If such “growth targets’’ were combined with an international emission trading program, developing countries could fully participate without incurring prohibitive costs (or even any costs in the short term). This approach — described in a recent Discussion Paper by Harvard Professor Jeffrey Frankel and Valentina Bosetti of the University of Venice for the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements — could provide a progressive route forward, breaking the logjam between developed and developing countries, if only the two sides would begin to talk to each other, rather than past each other.

Obama in Denmark

Now that President Obama is on his way to Copenhagen, will his presence and that of so many heads of state provide the needed push for success? Unquestionably the presence of some 100 heads of state and government increases the likelihood that a climate change deal will be reached by the close of business on Friday, but the key question is whether it increases the likelihood that a “meaningful climate change deal” will be achieved. I am of mixed views on this.

On the one hand, the presence of the leaders surely provide impetus to the process in the sense that many of the key countries — including the U.S. — will not want their leaders to fly home without a “success” in hand. For President Obama, two flights home from Copenhagen within a few weeks without success in either would be a substantial political embarrassment. (The international press and Republicans in Congress have not forgotten the failed Chicago bid for the Olympics). Furthermore, as I explained in a Financial Times blog post last week, the very fact that the White House decided to shift President Obama’s trip to Copenhagen from the first week of the conference to its final day suggests that they had good reason to anticipate a successful outcome.

On the other hand, the political incentive that is provided for achieving “success” by the leaders’ presence may be to accept a deal that is less than meaningful (if a meaningful deal cannot be achieved), but one that has the appearance of success.  So, with the heads of state and government present, the incentives could be strong to agree to a climate change deal that is less than meaningful. The key, outstanding question is whether the outcome will be one that provides a sound foundation for meaningful, long-term global action, as opposed to some notion of immediate, albeit highly visible triumph.

It would be unfortunate if the outcome were no more than a signed international agreement per se, glowing press releases, and related photo opportunities for national leaders, because such an agreement would most likely be the Kyoto Protocol on steroids:  more stringent targets for the industrialized countries and the absence of real commitments by the key, rapidly growing emerging economies of China, India, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and South Africa (let alone by the numerous developing countries of the world). With the promise of $100 billion now on the table in Copenhagen, such an agreement could — in principle — be signed, but it would not reduce global emissions and it would not be ratified by the U.S. Senate (just like Kyoto). Hence, there would be no real progress on climate change.

The Need for a New Mindset

At the heart of the matter is the reality that eventually the negotiations must get beyond what has become the “QWERTY keyboard” of international climate policy: the distinction in the Kyoto Protocol between the small set of Annex I countries with quantitative targets, and the majority of countries in the world with no responsibilities. Various meaningful policy architectures could begin to bridge the massive political divide that exists between the industrialized and the developing world, as we’ve found in the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements.

For example, it remains possible that a midterm agreement could be reached on an approach involving an international portfolio of domestic commitments, whereby each nation would commit and register to abide by its domestic climate commitments, whether those are in the form of laws and regulations or multi-year development plans. Support for such an approach has been voiced by a remarkably diverse set of countries, including Australia, India, and the U.S.  And comments yesterday from the Chinese delegation suggest that support is increasing for this approach.

Consistent with this portfolio approach, President Obama recently announced that the U.S. would put a target on the table in Copenhagen to reduce emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 (in line with climate legislation in the U.S. Congress). In response, China announced that it would reduce its carbon intensity (emissions per unit of economic activity) 40 percent below 2005 levels over the same period of time. Subsequently, India announced similar targets. Given these countries rapid rates of economic growth, the announced targets won’t cut emissions in absolute terms, but they are promising starting points for negotiations.  The key question is not what this approach would accomplish in the short term, but whether it would put the world in a better position two, five, and ten years from now in regard to a long-term path of more aggressive action.

Until we see the final outcome in Copenhagen, I will remain cautiously optimistic, because at least some of the key nations, including the U.S., appear to be more interested in real progress than in symbolic action.

Progressive Values in National Security, Take Two

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David Brooks, oh how you are a dying breed: the rational, thoughtful conservative who holds true to his core values while having the humility to actually grant the other guy a point.

He also may have a man-crush on the president. Which is why it’s perhaps not so surprising that Brooks’ most recent column follows up on a point I made a few days ago: that Barack Obama’s foreign policy is grounded in thoroughly progressive values. Here’s an excerpt:

In 2002, Obama spoke against the Iraq war, but from the vantage point of a cold war liberal. He said he was not against war per se, just this one, and he was booed by the crowd. In 2007, he spoke about the way Niebuhr formed his thinking: “I take away the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world and hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction.”

His speeches at West Point and Oslo this year are pitch-perfect explications of the liberal internationalist approach. Other Democrats talk tough in a secular way, but Obama’s speeches were thoroughly theological. He talked about the “core struggle of human nature” between love and evil.

More than usual, he talked about the high ideals of the human rights activists and America’s history as a vehicle for democracy, prosperity and human rights. He talked about America’s “strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct.” Most of all, he talked about the paradox at the core of cold war liberalism, of the need to balance “two seemingly irreconcilable truths” — that war is both folly and necessary.

Brooks used the term “liberal internationalism” to describe Obama’s approach, something not dissimilar from what we at PPI prefer to call “progressive internationalism.” Here’s what PPI said back in 2003:

Progressive internationalism stresses the responsibilities that come with our enormous power: to use force with restraint but not to hesitate to use it when necessary, to show what the Declaration of Independence called “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” to exercise leadership primarily through persuasion rather than coercion, to reduce human suffering where we can, and to create alliances and international institutions committed to upholding a decent world order.

The Obama administration has taken a lot of heat for being “too realist” in its approach to foreign policy. Certainly there’s evidence to support that claim: Brooks says the White House “misjudged the emotional moment when Iranians were marching in Tehran.” And there was the uncomfortable incident when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sidestepped the issue of human rights in China because they “couldn’t interfere with the global economic crisis” (which she recently tried to rectify in a speech at Georgetown). True enough, at least for now.

However, when books are written on the Obama administration’s foreign policy, I’d bet the prevailing narrative will be that of an administration that sought to identify and resolve discrete national security challenges while guided by keen attention to America’s values. Closing Guantanamo is perhaps the best example thus far.

Dick Durbin Deserves Credit for Leadership on GTMO

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Gitmo guard towerThree cheers for Dick Durbin, the senior senator from Illinois.

Rather than offering shrill, partisan talking points at the prospect of closing the Guantanamo prison—equal parts Islamic extremist recruiting tool and human rights stain on our national psyche—Senator Durbin has consistently offered a pragmatic, progressive voice that is steadfast in its resolve to close Gitmo while ensuring the security of the country. The result is today’s announcement that the administration will likely open the detention facility in Thompson, Illinois as the destination for many of Guantanamo’s detainees.

When conservatives were doing their best Chicken Little impersonation about the alleged perils of bringing hardened terrorists to American soil, Durbin rebuffed Dick Cheney and Newt Gingrich, calmly telling NBC’s David Gregory on Meet the Press that:

Continuing Guantanamo, unfortunately, makes our troops less safe.  The bottom line as I see it is Guantanamo should close in an orderly way. … The fact is that closing Guantanamo, that announcement by the president, as well as abandoning torture techniques and so-called enhanced interrogation, finally said to the rest of the world that it’s a new day.  Join us in a new approach to keeping this world and America safe.  I think it was a break from the past we desperately needed. …

[W]hen we checked with the director of FBI, Mr. Mueller, he said there’s no question that supermax facilities, not a single escape, we limit the communication of these detainees and prisoners, and we can continue to do that. …

I’d be OK with them in a supermax facility, because we’ve never had an escape from one.  And as I said, we have over 340 convicted terrorists now being held safely in our prisons.  I just don’t hear anyone suggesting releasing them or sending them to another country.  That isn’t part of the prospect that we have before us. …

With this stance, Durbin shows how rational solutions are hardly mutually exclusive from either American values or safety: closing Guantanamo is a moral and security imperative, and the idea that America’s well-being is threatened by terrorists in supermax facilities is nothing more than a political scare tactic.

And as a result of Durbin’s sensible position, it looks like job-starved Illinois will be rewarded in the process. The state will retro-fit the empty Thompson prison to meet the new security standards, and then have to staff the facility once open.  Thompson sits in Carroll County, IL, where unemployment rests at 11.1 percent; a refurbished facility could bring as many as 3,000 jobs.

And though this is anecdotal evidence, I asked Mike Satlak—my college buddy, an Oswego, IL resident, and in the interest of full disclosure, a Dick Durbin fan—about the prospect of moving prisoners to rural Illinois.  “I’m not scared at all of any security threat, I live 120 miles from Thompson and it could really use the jobs.”

A Bridge Too Far in the Drone War

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Word hit the street over the weekend that senior CIA officials have been pushing the Obama administration to expand unmanned aerial drone attacks against targets in Quetta, Pakistan. In the spies’ cross hairs are top Taliban commanders based in that city, a massive regional population center.

If counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations aren’t your cup of tea, you may have missed the ever-expanding role that unmanned drones have played in Pakistan. While it’s true that President Obama has recently signed off on the program’s expanded use to now include more of Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, the issue of targeting Quetta seems to have given the White House some pause:

A former senior CIA official said he and others were repeatedly rebuffed when proposing operations in Baluchistan or pushing Pakistan to target the Taliban in Quetta. “It wasn’t easy to talk about,” the official said. “The conversations didn’t last a long time.”

That sounds about right — attacking Quetta is a bridge too far in the drone war. Here’s why.

Many question whether we should have an unmanned drone program in the first place. There are strong and reasoned arguments from intelligent analysts who believe the costs of a drone program outweigh its benefits. The strongest argument is that by unintentionally causing civilian casualties with off-target or ill-timed strikes, the program agitates and alienates the population that the counter-insurgents are supposed to be protecting and winning over.

After this story first broke, I agreed with the basic premise of that argument, but said that drone attacks should be “extraordinarily limited, not stopped” because they were a “valuable tool in certain rare circumstances,” like when corroborated evidence places a senior Al Qaeda figure in a relatively remote location. Further, I developed five criteria as guidelines to determine when those might be. My fourth criterion is that it’s “unrealistic to say that drones won’t fire on population centers because then the targets would just hide in plain sight. However, the U.S. must carefully weigh the chance of civilian casualties and seek to avoid them — by using smaller missiles, modifying times of the strikes, etc. — at all costs.”

Quetta is a city of 850,000 people, and it is difficult to imagine that innocent civilians could be reasonably avoided in any single strike — no matter how good the intelligence is. Therefore, the administration is right to endorse the general practice while opposing its application in this specific instance.

Stephen Hadley’s Revisionism on Afghanistan

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Bush administration National Security Adviser Stephen HadleyStephen Hadley, George W. Bush’s national security advisor, has set forth some rather appalling revisionist history in this morning’s Washington Post. Though he supports President Obama’s surge, he effectively tries to wash his hands of any culpability for the entire Afghanistan mess.

Sorry Mr. Hadley, but that just won’t fly.

Hadley believes that everything was going just swimmingly until mid-2006, when those darned Pakistanis went and screwed the whole thing up:

As to security, the U.N. Security Council authorized an international military force in December 2001, put it under NATO command in August 2003 and expanded its writ to all of Afghanistan in October 2003. Afghan army and police forces were being recruited, trained and equipped. Most of the country was free of violence.

But in 2006, the situation deteriorated. Suicide bombings and attacks using improvised explosive devices spiked. Corruption and poppy production grew dramatically, and the central government failed to establish an effective presence in the provinces. The planned Afghan security force was simply too small to handle the escalating violence.

In September 2006, Afghanistan’s neighbor Pakistan embarked on a series of well-intentioned but ill-fated deals intended to entice local tribes to support the government in Kabul. The tribes were supposed to expel al-Qaeda and end Taliban attacks in exchange for economic assistance and the withdrawal of Pakistani troops. Instead, these badly executed agreements strengthened the terrorist havens.

Then, Hadley explains, Bush’s buddy Pervez Musharraf went and had himself a little constitutional crisis, which really put the well-meaning and allegedly competent Bush administration behind the eight ball:

Then Pakistan plunged into an 18-month political crisis, beginning in March 2007 when President Pervez Musharraf fired the country’s chief justice and ending with Musharraf’s resignation in August 2008. Consumed by political chaos, Pakistan could only watch as al-Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban allies launched attacks not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan — including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Some argue that America could not respond to the deteriorating situation because its attention and its troops were all focused on Iraq. Yet despite troop demands for Iraq, President George W. Bush and our coalition allies launched a “quiet surge” in Afghanistan to meet the new challenge.

See? Isn’t it amazing how well the Bush administration handled everything and we just never knew about it?

Spare me. What Hadley chooses to selectively ignore is his administration’s failure to capitalize on Afghanistan’s relative calm in the 2001-2006 time frame. True, the initial Afghanistan war plan was successfully executed, and violence was significantly down (compared to, say, 2009 levels) across the country.

But instead of building on that initial military success by focusing on enduring security, infrastructure, and civil service capacities, Hadley shares responsibility for diverting America’s attention to a war of choice in Iraq launched under thin pretexts. In the process, billions of dollars and countless man-hours at the Pentagon, State Department, and White House (including Mr. Hadley’s NSC) that should have been spent stabilizing Afghanistan in 2003 were shifted westward.

The 10,000 additional troops that Hadley crows about later in the article are an embarrassingly weak and tardy prescription for an aggressive viral problem that was getting out of hand.

Too little, too late, Mr. Hadley. You should be ashamed.

Obama’s Nobel Speech and the Lesson for Progressives

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I was struck by the unexpected tone of President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize speech — instead of spending the entire address laying out a vision to achieve world peace, he spent the first half addressing the odd position in which he finds himself: receiving the prize while serving as commander-in-chief of a nation involved in two wars.

In the process, he laid out the most compelling ideological foundation for a progressive view on national security I have ever heard him give:

We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.

I make this statement mindful of what Martin Luther King said in this same ceremony years ago — “Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones.” As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King’s life’s work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there is nothing weak — nothing passive — nothing naïve — in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King.

But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism — it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.

I raise this point because in many countries there is a deep ambivalence about military action today, no matter the cause. At times, this is joined by a reflexive suspicion of America, the world’s sole military superpower.

Yet the world must remember that it was not simply international institutions — not just treaties and declarations — that brought stability to a post-World War II world. Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest — because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.

This is where progressives should stand on national security: we must acknowledge that there is evil in the world and show a resolve to make tough choices when America’s vital national security interests are at stake. Our preference is to not use force, but when all other options have been exhausted and our security remains directly threatened, force may be the last resort.

Europe, We Love You, But Please Shut Up

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Over the course of the past week, the Swedish government, which currently holds the EU’s soon-to-be-extinguished rotating presidency, suggested that the European Union’s foreign ministries declare Jerusalem a divided city and the future capital of a Palestinian state. The draft statement also implied that the EU would recognize a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood.

The Israelis reacted harshly, and lobbied the Europeans to change the statement, which now reads, “If there is to be a genuine peace, a way must be found (through negotiations) to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states.”

Even the milder declaration hasn’t exactly received much enthusiasm from the Israelis, while garnering divided support between the Arab League and Palestinian Authority.

Skeptics say that Sweden’s stab at forging European unity was a cynical attempt to leave a legacy from its last crack at the EU presidency (with the advent of Herman Von Rompuy’s more permanent ascent to that post) to either show symbolic solidarity with Palestine or to forge a joint European position on an important issue.

And though the Palestinians are, of course, content to receive international backing, let’s be honest: This effort at joint European diplomacy looks like amateur hour and risks further destabilizing an already fragile process.

A few months ago, I had lunch with a friend involved in European social-democratic circles. He said (and I’m paraphrasing), “Europe can’t do anything on the diplomatic front with Israel/Palestine, but if America can broker a deal, we are ready and anxious to pay for the whole thing: security, development, trade… you name it.”

My friend was right — Europe hasn’t invested much diplomatic capital in the Middle East peace process. Issuing public and controversial statements of questionable utility could only upset – and, in the worst case, undo — the hard, delicate, behind-the-scenes work of the American administration.

We’d love for Europe to pay; but for now, we’d also love for it to shut up.

Vets for Energy Security

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As the Copenhagen summit on climate change gets under way, we’re going to hear a lot from naysayers like Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck about the alleged hoax that is climate change. But Operation: Free, a group I’ve written about before, is cutting across ideological lines by using veterans to frame the issue of energy independence as one of national security. It’s a solid idea, and one that’s gaining momentum.

They just wrapped up a bus tour promoting their mission, and even got a shout-out from President Obama on live TV. Check out the video:

Weekend Papers Detail White House Afghanistan Review

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In the wake of President Obama’s West Point speech announcing the administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan, the White House must have been concerned that lingering charges of warmongering (on the left) or dithering (on the right) were going to dominate the public debate. Why would there be major weekend stories in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times to set the record straight?

Coming from sources as wide-ranging as National Security Advisor Jim Jones to “more than a dozen senior administration and military officials who took part in the strategy review,” these newspapers’ accounts of the strategy sessions show a president asking careful questions to redefine the mission in a way that protects the country while limiting open-ended commitment.

Last week, I was in the offices of a certain 24-hour cable news channel that’s nice enough to put my ugly mug on the air. I overheard one of its regular pundits exclaim breathlessly, “I just don’t understand why Obama just doesn’t do what his commanders on the ground tell him.” This weekend’s trio of articles paints the best picture I’ve seen of why not.

Here’s the short version of that answer from the NYT:

The decision represents a complicated evolution in Mr. Obama’s thinking. He began the process clearly skeptical of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s request for 40,000 more troops, but the more he learned about the consequences of failure, and the more he narrowed the mission, the more he gravitated toward a robust if temporary buildup, guided in particular by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. …

The group went over the McChrystal assessment and drilled in on what the core goal should be. Some thought that General McChrystal interpreted the March strategy more ambitiously than it was intended to be.

And the longer version from the WaPo:

In June, McChrystal noted, he had arrived in Afghanistan and set about fulfilling his assignment. His lean face, hovering on the screen at the end of the table, was replaced by a mission statement on a slide: “Defeat the Taliban. Secure the Population.”

“Is that really what you think your mission is?” one of those in the Situation Room asked. …

“I wouldn’t say there was quite a ‘whoa’ moment,” a senior defense official said of the reaction around the table. “It was just sort of a recognition that, ‘Duh, that’s what, in effect, the commander understands he’s been told to do.’ Everybody said, ‘He’s right.’ ”

 

“It was clear that Stan took a very literal interpretation of the intent” of the NSC document, said Jones, who had signed the orders himself. “I’m not sure that in his position I wouldn’t have done the same thing, as a military commander.” But what McChrystal created in his assessment “was obviously something much bigger and more longer-lasting…than we had intended.”

Whatever the administration might have said in March, officials explained to McChrystal, it now wanted something less absolute: to reverse the Taliban’s momentum, deter it and try to persuade a significant number of its members to switch sides. “We certainly want them not to be able to overthrow the government,” Jones said.

On Oct. 9, after awaking to the news that he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama listened to McChrystal’s presentation. The “mission” slide included the same words: “Defeat the Taliban.” But a red box had been added beside it saying that the mission was being redefined, Jones said. Another participant recalled that the word “degrade” had been proposed to replace “defeat.”

Already briefed on the previous day’s discussion, the president “looked at it and said: ‘To be fair, this is what we told the commander to do. Now, the question is, have we directed him to do more than what is realistic? Should there be a sharpening . . . a refinement?'” one participant recalled.

Said a senior White House adviser who took extensive notes of the meeting: “The big moment when the mission became a narrower one was when we realized we’re not going to kill every last member of the Taliban.” [emphases mine]

Separately, a few other nuggets, like on troop numbers (NYT):

On Oct. 9, Mr. Obama and his team reviewed General McChrystal’s troop proposals for the first time. Some in the White House were surprised by the numbers, assuming there would be a middle ground between 10,000 and 40,000.

“Why wasn’t there a 25 number?” one senior administration official asked in an interview. He then answered his own question: “It would have been too tempting.”

And from the LA Times‘ piece on the date of withdrawal:

Gates was also persuaded by Petraeus and others that announcing the date would help create an incentive for the Afghans to act, he said this week.

The proposed date also would make it such that the withdrawal of troops would begin just as the campaign for the 2012 presidential election was heating up.

Still, it was crucial to Gates and other military officials that Obama not announce a specific drawdown plan. Doing so could embolden militants, Defense officials said. Gates and others wanted to make sure that the pace of the drawdown would be based on the security situation — not a set timetable.

“Ultimately,” said a senior Defense official, Gates “wanted conditionality, and got it.”

All three articles are must-reads to anyone who wants to understand the complexity of the White House’s decision. In sum, it seems that the review sessions narrowed the goal, and resourced it as robustly and quickly as possible.

I understand that the administration needed to fix a date for beginning withdrawal as a political concession to the progressive base, and I still remain uncomfortable with that notion, even as these articles do a good job clarifying that the withdrawal’s pace is subject to the security situation.

Why a Key NATO Ally Will Likely Sit Out the Surge

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You win some, you lose some: This morning NATO announced it would add 7,000 troops to the alliance’s Afghanistan deployment, a coup for Secretary Clinton and a much-needed boost to President Obama’s surge strategy. But it’s becoming increasingly clear that Germany is unlikely to be part of that mix.

Berlin, which has the third-largest deployment in the country, is holding off from committing more troops until a multinational planning conference in January. A few weeks ago, during a swing through Washington, German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was still bullish, if vague, about the prospects for additional soldiers.

But what a difference a few weeks can make. Since then, the Kunduz truck-bombing scandal has claimed several heads, including those of the labor minister (formerly the defense minister) and the country’s top uniformed officer. It has also forced an embarrassing about-face from zu Guttenberg, who initially said the attack was justified but now says it was “militarily inappropriate.”

The scandal has sent public support for the war, already tenuous, into a tail spin. According to a new poll by ARD-Deutschlandtrend, 69 percent want Germany to withdraw immediately, a dramatic rise since the last survey, in September. The primary reason, according to 75 percent of respondents, is a loss of trust in the government’s ability to be “full and honest” about Afghanistan. The war is also fueling left-wing violence in Berlin and Hamburg, including a recent firebombing of a federal police station in the capital.

Merkel and zu Guttenberg remain steadfast behind the mission, but their coalition partners, the Free Democrats, are using the scandal to push for reduced combat roles and an accelerated withdrawal timetable. Their leader, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, has said the January conference is not a “donor conference for troops” and declared in “a clear statement from the government” that Berlin will begin moving its soldiers to training and civil-affairs operations, rather than combat.

Even in the news reports surrounding NATO’s additional commitment, analysts expressed hope that Germany would commit more than 1,000 additional troops to Afghanistan come January. Unless the political dynamic inside the country changes dramatically in the next few weeks, those hopes will be dashed.

The Neoconservative Pere et Fils

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PPI Senior Fellow Mike Signer has written a piece in Dissent magazine on Irving Kristol, his son, Bill, and the morphing of neoconservatism from an ideology of skepticism to one of hubris. An excerpt:

NEOCONSERVATISM, AS formulated by Irving Kristol, originated in privation, intellectual combat, and a reckoning with the harsh practical consequences of dangerous ideas. Irving Kristol’s parents were Eastern Europeans who arrived in America in the 1890s.  His father was a garment worker and later a clothing subcontractor; his mother gave birth to Irving in Brooklyn in 1920. When he was sixteen years old, he enrolled at the City College of New York (CCNY). Instead of paying much attention to classes, however, he dove into the extempore debate among the students.

The 1930s were a fervent time to be a student at CCNY. Fascism was taking hold in Italy, and communism was surging in the Soviet Union. The sometimes cheerful, sometimes angry clashes among students who were trying to decide where the world should go at this momentous period helped to launch an intellectual movement that was skeptical about the applications of pure theory.

Though it took decades for it to become “neoconservatism,” the roots of the movement lay in the young intellectuals’ effort to steer America away from the shoals of Stalinism, the horrible outgrowth of what had begun, decades earlier, as an ambitious political theory. This may help explain why Irving Kristol’s own political theory, for all its lushness and bombast, often counseled caution and modesty.  In a lecture he gave in 1970, he pronounced that “moral earnestness and intellectual sobriety” were the “elements . . . most wanted in a democracy.” Strikingly, he applied this ethic of restraint to democracy itself. In 1978, he wrote, “It is the fundamental fallacy of American foreign policy to believe, in face of the evidence, that all peoples, everywhere, are immediately ‘entitled’ to a liberal constitutional government—and a thoroughly democratic one at that.”

By contrast, in the years to come his son fixed neoconservative foreign policy on abstractions and evils—on metaphysics rather than physics—particularly when it came to democracy. As a result, the striking feature of Bill Kristol’s political theory is not the ideas but the extravagance surrounding them.  In a now-famous 1996 Foreign Affairsarticle co-authored with Robert Kagan, Bill Kristol wrote that Republicans should endorse a policy of “benevolent hegemony” that was “good for conservatives, good for America, and good for the world.” “America,” he added, “has the capacity to contain or destroy many of the world’s monsters, most of which can be found without much searching.”

Read the whole thing here.

Code Pink Goes Back to Its Normal Self

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

On December 1st and 2nd, Code Pink sponsored 18 anti-Afghanistan-escalation rallies across the country. Says Code Pink co-founder Jodie Evans in the press release:

Adding troops will lead to more civilian casualties which will lead to more recruits for the Taliban [sic] — and a protracted war that the American people don’t support. This is not the “hope” so many voted for.

But that rhetoric doesn’t jive with what Ms. Evans and Code Pink co-founder Medea Benjamin said following their week-long trip to Afghanistan this fall (which I wrote about here). While she said Code Pink would go on opposing additional troops, Ms. Benjamin made a surprising shift at the end of her fact-finding mission:

We would leave with the same parameters of an exit strategy but we might perhaps be more flexible about a timeline.  That’s where we have opened ourselves, being here, to some other possibilities. We have been feeling a sense of fear of the people of the return of the Taliban. So many people are saying that, ‘If the US troops left, the country would collapse. We’d go into civil war.’ A palpable sense of fear that is making us start to reconsider that.

So even though Code Pink has been on the ground in Afghanistan and heard from Afghans themselves of the U.S. military’s tangible benefit to Afghan civil society, it chose to intensify its opposition against the U.S. military presence with a series of rallies.

Well, you can’t have it both ways — either you think U.S. troops are protecting the population (as the McChrystal counter-insurgency strategy is designed to do, and which Code Pink acknowledged was the case at the end of their fact-finding mission) or you think U.S. troops will cause more casualties (which they claim in this week’s press release). Of course, if Code Pink endorsed so much as an extended timeline for troop withdrawal, it would drive its core constituency into a meltdown.

At the very least, it might have shown some restraint and not convened 18 protests. This could have been an opportunity for Code Pink to use its high profile and the knowledge its founders gained during their time on the ground in Afghanistan to educate its supporters on America’s mission there. But that’s not Code Pink. Instead, Jodie Evans and Medea Benjamin passed on that chance and stuck their heads in the sand.

Progressive Security Groups Show Support for New Afghanistan Strategy

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

NEWS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
December 2, 2009

CONTACT:
Steven Chlapecka – schlapecka@ppionline.org, T: 202.525.3931
or Frankie Strum – frankie@trumanproject.org, T: 309.222.5788

WASHINGTON, DC—In a conference call on December 2, six leading progressive organizations came together to offer support for and commentary on President Obama’s newly announced Afghanistan strategy. Representatives from the Truman National Security Project, the Center for American Progress, the Progressive Policy Institute, the National Security Network, Third Way, and the New Strategic Security Initiative spoke on the call, offering thoughts and answering questions.

Points highlighted in the call include:

  • The Obama administration’s review produced a smarter, stronger strategy that stated clear objectives and is based on American security interests, namely preventing terrorist attacks.
  • The administration’s review process honored America’s commitment to maintaining civilian control of the military in a democratic society. General McChrystal’s plan was war-gamed, challenged, and debated by military and civilian officials alike. Only then did the commander in chief sign on.
  • Counterintuitively, sending more troops will allow us to get out more quickly. A build up of troops now will enable us to train Afghan forces more quickly, and thereby disengage U.S. forces sooner.
  • Only Afghans can win this war – the U.S. can help, largely through training. Afghanistan had no army when the U.S. arrived eight years ago. Now the Afghan National Army numbers nearly 100,000 troops, partners on 90 percent of NATO’s missions and undertakes 60 percent of their missions solo. But they cannot be trained without trainers and cannot “partner” without partners.
  • Progressives who care about the humanitarian cost of war should be relieved; the alternative to this strategy is a “counter-terror” approach that will use more drone attacks and claim more civilian lives.
  • U.S. commitment to Afghanistan is broader than military resources. We also need to take advantage of this unique moment to talk about security as a comprehensive effort — one that must be led by civilians and will require an Afghan political solution.
  • Afghanistan is not Iraq and it is not Vietnam. There are lessons we can draw from those conflicts, but the shape and purpose of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is of a wholly different nature.
  • If there was a missed opportunity in President Obama’s speech, it’s that he didn’t fully express a way forward in America’s relationship with Pakistan.
  • Afghanistan is far from a nation-building or an empire-building exercise, as indicated by the timeline the President set out for beginning to bring troops home.

For further questions or inquiries, please contact Steven Chlapecka at schlapecka@ppionline.org, 202.525.3931 (office), 202.556.1752 (cell).

# # #

Obama’s Afghanistan Speech

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

President Obama’s speech last night was — to state the obvious — a tough one to give. Just think of the many constituencies the president had to address: not only the American public, but the military who have been in need of some direction, the Democratic base, terminally cranky Republicans, the Karzai government, the Pakistani government, and Bozo the Clown to boot. No one constituency would be fully pleased.

We all know that President Obama gives a wonderfully inspiring speech. I had a hunch that this address would not fall into that category. Rather than inspiring the public to work towards a distant American nirvana (as he did in the March 2008 Philadelphia race speech), West Point was more of a sales job.

With all that in mind, I was looking for the president to discuss five major topics:

1. Make a case for why we were in Afghanistan.

2. Explain our forces’ mission.

3. Address how he would work with the Karzai government.

4. Clearly outline the strategy for Pakistan.

5. State his interpretation of an exit strategy.

To put a “grade” on it, I’d give the president 3.5/5. Here’s why.

First, I thought he made a compelling case reminding Americans of why we’re there. He spent the first several paragraphs going over the history of what led us to this point. That’s been the toughest issue for much of hard left to grapple with — America has clear national security interests in Afghanistan, and it is unfortunate, but necessary, to enact a robust strategy to ensure the country’s safety.

It’s a rationale that has been so difficult for some to accept. Writing in the New York Review of Books, Garry Wills says:

[Obama] said that he would not oppose war in general, but dumb wars. On that basis, we went for him. And now he betrays us. Although he talked of a larger commitment to Afghanistan during his campaign, he has now officially adopted his very own war, one with all the disqualifications that he attacked in the Iraq engagement. This war too is a dumb one.

But it’s not a dumb war. It’s a necessary one, and I struggle to understand why Mr. Wills has become so disenchanted with President Obama over this decision when even he acknowledges that the president campaigned pledging a “larger commitment” to Afghanistan. This shouldn’t have come as a surprise.

Second, I didn’t think the president went far enough in explaining the counter-insurgency strategy that American forces would be undertaking. To me, he missed an opportunity to explain that our forces are there to promote peace by protecting the Afghan population from the Taliban. So only half a point there.

Third, I was impressed with the president’s emphasis on working with and around the Karzai government. His particular emphasis on “Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders” indicated the White House’s recognition that bypassing Kabul is an effective part to regional development across the whole country. A full point from me.

Fourth, the Pakistan strategy was certainly mentioned, if not emphasized, as one of the pathways to a successful disengagement. Sure, as the president said, we will “strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.” Yes, we know it’s necessary, but I have a nagging sense that the “how” hasn’t been worked out yet. The White House’s overture on a comprehensive partnership deal with Pakistan is encouraging, but only part of the solution – a half-point.

Ah, and finally, that exit strategy. I would have preferred that our exit from Afghanistan be measured in terms of progress, not calendar dates, which merits a half-point deduction. I think David Ignatius came very close to summing up my feelings:

Obama thinks that setting deadlines will force the Afghans to get their act together at last. That strikes me as the most dubious premise of his strategy. He is telling his adversary that he will start leaving on a certain date, and telling his ally to be ready to take over then, or else. That’s the weak link in an otherwise admirable decision — the idea that we strengthen our hand by announcing in advance that we plan to fold it.

For a speech that was sure to please no one entirely, I thought it was a brave attempt at explaining a tough, unpopular, but ultimately correct decision.

Time for Strategic Stamina

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

Not even Michael Moore can accuse President Obama of rushing into war. He has taken two months to make a decision that seems dictated by the inescapable logic of his assessment of Afghanistan as a “war of necessity.”

To Dick Cheney, such deliberation is — surprise — a sign of weakness. After eight years of war, however, most Americans are probably relieved to have to a president who thinks long and hard before sending more U.S. troops into battle. That’s doubtless true as well of our NATO allies, who also will be asked to commit more troops despite widespread skepticism of the war in Europe.

Had Cheney and President Bush kept their sights on Afghanistan, Obama wouldn’t be in this fix. Perhaps the former vice president is carping because he doesn’t care to explain this week’s report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It recounts how the Bush-Cheney administration refused to commit the forces necessary to prevent Osama bin Laden and his henchmen, then bottled up in the Tora Bora mountains, from escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001.

In any case, having thoroughly analyzed the multilayered complexities of the Af-Pak situation, President Obama now has a difficult sales job to perform. He must persuade war-weary Americans to back a second round of escalation — 34,000 more troops on top of the 30,000 he already has dispatched to Afghanistan. In essence, his message will be: we need to get in deeper to get out sooner.

He’s right. U.S. military commanders say more troops are necessary to stop Taliban advances, especially in southeastern Afghanistan. We also need more troops to accelerate the training of Afghan security forces. In his speech tonight, Obama is expected to stress that the purpose of his surge is not to defeat the Taliban, but to buy time for building up Afghan security forces so that they can take over the fight. He will emphasize the conditional nature of America’s commitment — conditioned on the Afghan government’s ability to win popular backing and legitimacy by fighting corruption, offering services, and providing security.

At the same time, Obama must convey a sense of strategic stamina. He must convince our friends as well as our enemies in the region that the U.S. is not planning to walk away from the struggle against Islamist extremism.

It will take time to build up strong Afghan forces, to help the central government become more effective, to reconcile with local tribal leaders in Pashtun areas, to build roads, schools, and other basic infrastructure. So even as the U.S. hands off responsibility to Afghans and draws down its combat troops, we must signal our enduring commitment to help the country defend itself against our mutual enemies. The Taliban and their al Qaeda allies need to know they will not be able to simply wait for us to tire of the struggle and go home.

And Pakistan needs to know this, too. If it looks like the U.S. is once again abandoning Afghanistan, the Pakistani military and intelligence service will be tempted to go back to their old bad habit of using the Afghan Taliban and other radical groups as foreign policy tools. By turning up the pressure in southern Afghanistan, Washington will be in a stronger position to insist that Pakistan keep pressing the Taliban on their side of the border, and flush al Qaeda leaders out of their havens.

No one needs reminding that patience is a virtue more than the president’s own party. Already, some leading Congressional Democrats are demanding what no president can responsibly offer — clear exit strategies and precise timelines for withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan.

America has a vital interest in ensuring that Islamist extremists don’t seize power in Afghanistan — and, even more important, in Pakistan. No one knows when this struggle will end, but the stakes for our security are such that they call for the same constancy and resolve America displayed during the Cold War.

The Need for Progressives to Make Tough Choices on Security

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Michael Cohen at Democracy Arsenal responded to my post from last week on the strategic deliberations in Afghanistan. See here for his initial post and here for my response.

While there’s much in Michael’s post I disagree with on a substantive level (like his odd suggestion that “we want al Qaeda in Afghanistan.” Really?), my main beef is on a macro level, when he states that your friends here at the PPI continue “to reflect a perspective that has driven some dangerous foreign policy thinking in the Democratic Party in recent years…. Aren’t the days of ‘Democrats need to be as militaristic as the Republicans’ behind us?”

Michael is implying that I am mindlessly supporting President Obama’s reported escalation in Afghanistan out of a fear that Democrats will look weak on matters of national security.

Nothing could be further from the truth. In no way am I “as militaristic as the Republicans,” nor am I engaging in militarism for militarism’s sake. That’s ridiculous. My position boils down to what I think is essential to keeping the country safe. (On that note, Michael will no doubt re-raise the pre-invasion debate on Iraq, which I’m happy to deal with in a separate post.)

Here’s what it comes down to: Democrats can’t shirk the responsibility of making difficult choices on national security because of political expediency. It is easy to say, “We’re sick of being in Afghanistan, we’re sick of American soldiers dying, we have been al Qaeda-free since 2001, and all the poll numbers say Americans want out, so why don’t we just pack it in?”

But based on my analysis of the existing evidence, I firmly believe that America has ongoing national security interests in Af-Pak, and what the president will announce tonight offers the best possibility (of many imperfect choices) to permanently secure the country against a patient and resilient adversary. That might not be the popular or easy choice, but it’s the necessary one.

Michael would likely argue that he sees little compelling evidence to suggest an ongoing national security interest, or that there may be one, but it can be contained with a significantly smaller military footprint.

I’d disagree, of course, and so would President Obama, who has had far superior information on the subject than either of us, and whose campaign and governance to date hardly suggest a leader intent on duping the country into more unneeded military misadventures.