Positive | Negative | Not much either way | |
Race & ethnicity | |||
African American | 42 | 13 | 44 |
White | 25 | 40 | 35 |
Hispanic | 33 | 29 | 39 |
Red v. blue | |||
Self-described liberal | 45 | 18 | 37 |
Self-described conservative | 20 | 51 | 29 |
Youth v. age | |||
18-29 years old | 45 | 24 | 32 |
55-64 years old | 20 | 46 | 34 |
PPI poll of Americans without college degrees, released November 2023
PPI’s two 2023 polls, done this past September and October by YouGov, offer in-depth insights on working-class opinion in the United Kingdom and the United States. Some headline findings from the 46-question U.S. version show respondents –
• Are pessimistic about long-term trends, with 66% saying “the working class” has lost ground in the last four decades as against 21% “better off” and 13% “about the same,” with illegal immigration and automation of worksites the most frequently chosen explanations.
• Consider inflation the “most significant challenge facing the U.S. economy,” with 36% citing “high cost of living” and 33% “inflation” per se.
• View e-commerce and tech sector employment (44%) as the top career choice for young people, with less for government and military (14%) manufacturing (13%), and service-sector work (8%).
• Support activist (though not overbearing) government, with especially high hopes for programs that can help non-college workers build careers and enhance wages, especially via short-term training (46%) and apprenticeship (23%).
The poll’s four trade questions ask in various ways about the effects of past trade agreements and about future options. Three findings, on overall views, divergences by political orientation and demographics, and future options:
1. No Overall Consensus: Asked how “trade agreements to lower tariffs and other barriers have affected you and people like you,” respondents split among three options with a slight negative tilt: 29% positive; 35% negative; and 36% (the highest share) as “not much effect either way.” A similarly-worded question about the effects of past trade agreements “on our country” as a whole, as opposed to the respondents as individuals, drew a somewhat different response: 28%, about the same share as in the more personal question, responded positively; a noticeably higher 44% viewing the effects as negative; and “not much effect either way” shrank to 28%. This suggests a substantial group viewed trade agreements as having little impact on themselves or their communities, but being overall negative for the country.
2. Axes of Divergence: PPI’s poll shows working-class Americans splitting over trade along the same ideological, ethnic, and generational axes earlier trade polls (Pew, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, major news organizations) have found over the last decade for the population as a whole. That is, the working class’ center-left contingent is on balance positive about trade agreements, and its right more negative. To wit:
• Race and Ethnicity: African American respondents, among the most upbeat groups in the survey in this area, viewed the effects of past trade agreements as positive for themselves by 42%-13%. Hispanic respondents agreed, though by a less emphatic 33%-29%, while “other” ethnicities split 43%-34%. White respondents were the exception (though a big one, as they made up 70% of the respondents), splitting the opposite way with only 25% “positive” and 40% “negative.”
• Red v. Blue: Self-identified liberals and Democrats viewed the effects of past trade agreements “on yourself and people like you” as positive by 45%-18% and 39%-22% respectively. By contrast, 51% of conservatives and 49% of Republicans viewed past agreements as affecting themselves and people like them negatively.
• Youth v. Age: Young people view trade agreements quite favorably, with 18-29-year-olds on the “positive” side by 45%-24% and 30-44 year-olds by 32%-24%. Their Gen-X parents aged 55-64 were the survey’s least happy age group — 20% positive and 46% negative — and the over-65 boomers weren’t much warmer at 26%-41%.
Perspective from other surveys: These ideological and demographic divisions resemble those appearing in other surveys done for the population as a whole over the past two decades by Pew, the Chicago Council for Global Affairs, and the major news outlets. (PPI’s poll also echoes these in not finding big differences by gender.) While the positive/negative splits in the earlier polls can vary based on the wording of questions, the patterns have been consistent throughout the century: young, ethnically diverse, and liberal America is generally positive about trade and trade agreements, and older, white, and conservative America is less so. As an additional perspective on PPI’s results, the earlier surveys also often include breakouts by education level, and typically found more support for trade and trade agreements among college-educated Americans than non-college.
3. Toward 2024: Finally, the poll suggests that the policy option put forward by the Trump campaign this fall — a 10% global tariff and a sharp break in economic relations with China — is not popular. (The question does not mention Trump’s name or associate the option with his campaign, to avoid skewing the answers.) Asked to choose among three policies — this protectionist approach, a non-trade option in which future policy would focus on other issues such as energy and anti-corruption, and a renewed effort to reduce tariffs through agreements with allies and friendly countries — only 23% selected the Trump-like option. Especially unpopular among young people (14%), liberals and Democrats (9% and 11%), and African Americans (16%), this option didn’t elicit much enthusiasm elsewhere either, as the favored choice of only 26% of white voters, 19% of political independents, 20% of respondents in union households, and 38% of conservatives.
4. And where to from here? As earlier trade polls found for the American population as a whole, PPI’s poll of working America yields mixed views; a plurality of the electorate’s ‘blue’ side upbeat about trade agreements and the opposite on its ‘red’ side; and little support for new tariffs, while other sections of the poll underline this by showing high sensitivity to inflation. The answers don’t yield any simple ‘here’s what to do’ conclusion.
But another section of PPI’s poll may, indirectly, suggest a response. One way to view trade policy is as a branch of economics that creates complex choices which carry both benefits and stresses: export opportunities and competitive challenges, lower inflation but sometimes accelerated change in the job mix. The poll’s questions on labor policy does seem to find strong and in fact near-consensus views on how best to manage the stress. That is, rather than traditional ‘adjustment’ programs for competition or automation on one hand, or long-term college commitments on the other (or for minimal-government ideologies), the respondents express strong hope for a third activist approach which doesn’t now exist on a large scale: direct support for workers trying to build careers and raise their wages through easily available short-term training, certification, and apprenticeship programs. If workers have confidence they will receive support as the economy changes, and that it will be the kind of support they want, solutions to divisions – not only in trade policy but in other complex fields – may be easier to find.
Big picture:
Claire Ainsley, U.K.-based Director of PPI’s Project on Center-Left Renewal, on British working-class opinion and the matching U.K. poll.
And the full U.S. poll, with the 46 questions and PPI President Will Marshall’s accompanying assessment of its insights on working Americans’ career hopes and assessments of recent history, views on immigration and education, trade and industrial strategy, climate change, gender identity and book bans, anti-trust, tax and budget, and views on presidents and political parties. Some top-tier findings:
An unhappy mood: “Working Americans believe the last 40 years have not been kind to people like them. Two-thirds say they are worse off and only 21% say their lives have improved.”
High concern over inflation and strong view that it is related to government budgeting: “These voters overwhelmingly (69%) name the high cost of living as their top worry. In distant but still significant second place (11%) is the concern that government deficits and debt are too high. In fact, the need for fiscal restraint and controlling government spending is a recurrent theme in this survey.”
But the belief that good policies and activist government can make life better: “Democrats can find more support among working-class voters for public policies aimed at fostering more inclusive economic growth, so long as they don’t confuse support for a more active government with support for a bigger government.”
And a political direction: “On all these issues, our poll found space for Democrats to offer pragmatic, common-sense alternatives to the stridently ideological views of right and left-wing populists.”
Elsewhere in trade polling:
For comparisons and population-wide polling, a 2022 Trade Fact looks at major surveys from 2015 through 2021 covering views of trade generally, Trump tariffs, NAFTA renegotiation, the China relationship, and more.
And an update: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ October 2023 release on broader U.S. public views of trade shows a very positive view (referring to “trade” as such, rather than to agreements); is also consistent with PPI’s poll showing some enthusiasm among Democrats; and finds support for semiconductor subsidies and concern about economic relations with China. Their summary graph:
“Council polling shows bipartisan support for international trade, as Americans across the board widely recognize its benefits for themselves, the economy, and American workers. Even so, Americans support some restrictions, especially on goods such as semiconductors.”
Trade summary, from the Chicago Council’s full-scale international affairs poll.
Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.
Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.
Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.
Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.