Over at Democracy Arsenal, Michael Cohen — with whom I spent an interesting, accidental 48 hours in Dubai trying to get to Afghanistan as election monitors — attempts to place American foreign policy in context:
Sometimes it’s worth putting American foreign policy — and the military decisions we have made and continue to make since 9/11 — in a proper and sobering context.
Eight years and two months since America was attacked on September 11th, and 3,000 Americans were killed, the United States has approximately 168,000 soldiers stationed in two Muslim counties. In neither of these countries is there any al Qaeda presence — and there has not been any such presence since 2002. Indeed, since the fall of 2001, al Qaeda has not launched a single major attack on U.S. targets or the U.S. mainland.
Yet, instead of having a national debate on how we got ourselves into such a bizarre and pointless predicament — and squandered so many lives and so many billions of dollars in the process — the current debate in Washington is focused on how many more troops we will send into harm’s way to pursue an enemy that is down to about 200 core operatives.
Do you ever get the queasy feeling sometimes that somewhere in a cave in Pakistan, Osama bin Laden is having a bit of a chuckle about this?
But Michael’s “proper…context” leaves out too much. And the irony is that I have to engage Michael on the topic he wants to debate – “how we got ourselves into such a bizarre and pointless predicament” – in order to explain why he’s missing the point.
Michael seems preoccupied with wanting to debate the past, but it’s the past – the Bush administration’s extraordinary mismanagement and poor decision-making – that compels the Obama White House to revisit discussion of strategy and resources in the first place.
Michael and I had a heated discussion about all this in a cab in Dubai, and here’s the point we’ve differed on: Al Qaeda has not attacked the U.S. since 2001 due to a variety of factors, but al Qaeda’s current weakness is, I contend, temporary, and if the Obama administration fails to choose the most effective strategy (and match it with the sufficient military and civilian resources), the group could rejuvenate itself in the Afghan hinterland.
So, when the time comes and we feel confident that the large-scale terrorist threat to the U.S. is definitively a thing of the past, then we can have the debate Michael wants. In the meantime, a debate over troops and strategy in Afghanistan seems exactly the kind of discussion we should be having.
