You no doubt remember the now-infamous flotilla incident of May 31, when Israeli soldiers raided a ship off Israel’s coast and killed some nine Turkish—including one Turkish-American—citizens as they attempted to deliver supplies to Gaza Strip. The issue is of course highly complex and the point of this post is not to pass judgment on who’s to blame. Rather, I’d like to focus on a serious consequence of the flotilla, regardless of culpability: the severely negative impact on Israeli-Turkish relations. It’s critical that these countries get along.
Historically, the Middle East’s only semblance of a Muslim democracy has had stable if not excellent relations with Israel. But in the aftermath of the flotilla, Turkey recalled its ambassador to Israel and canceled scheduled joint military exercises with the Israelis. Turkey sought an official apology from Israel and insisted that Tel Aviv pay compensation to the victims’ families. Avigdor Lieberman, Israel’s far-right foreign minister, who was in no mood to play nice, flatly refused and then personally insulted the Turkish ambassador in a meeting.
(And for those who really want to get into the weeds of Israeli politics, I’d encourage you to read up on the internal political maneuvering between Lieberman, Israeli PM Netanyahu, and Trade and Labor Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, who had a secret meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, probably in an attempt to skirt the caustic Lieberman and smooth things over.)
Suffice it to say that the relationship is in trouble, a point that was reinforced several times over as I traveled in Israel last week and spoke with Israeli academics, government officials, and military members. The vast majority of some of Israel’s leading strategic thinkers found that the degradation of Turkish-Israeli relations was top of the list of immediate problems. More striking, most seemed to believe the problems started well before the ill-fated flotilla, and implied the very nature of Turkish PM Erdogan’s election and his ruling AK Party’s “Islamist” bent was the driving force behind the threat.
That’s not to give Turkey a pass, of course. Its overtures to Iran and exploitation of the flotilla issue for domestic political purposes prompted Philip Gordon, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, to rightly signal that Washington’s troubles with Turkey’s recent actions:
We think Turkey remains committed to NATO, Europe and the United States, but that needs to be demonstrated. There are people asking questions about it in a way that is new, and that in itself is a bad thing that makes it harder for the United States to support some of the things that Turkey would like to see us support.
However, the nearly uniform analysis among Israel’s experts remains troubling. To me, it suggested that Israel is deeply bothered by the inclusion of any Islamic strain within a democratically elected government in a Muslim-majority country. Even a democratic government, as Alex Taurel and Shadi Hamid have written, that is lead by “the most moderate, pro-democratic Islamist party in the region today.” Giving up on Turkey and the AKP could come at a price, as Taurel and Hamid argue, and “strengthen those Islamists who see violence and confrontation as a surer means to influence political power.”
This creates an opening for the Obama administration. It’s clear that Israel needs a friend in Turkey, as a military interlocutor, as a potential peace-broker with Syria, and as a Muslim ally and NATO member that stands between Iran and the West. And Turkey needs Israel, to be perceived as an honest mediator in world affairs, and as a source of tourist revenue. And the Obama administration needs them to cooperate for regional stability and solidarity against Iran.
The subject of Israel-Turkish relations was reportedly addressed during PM Netanyahu’s meeting with President Obama last week in Washington. Repairing this damaged relationship should be a particular point of emphasis from the White House to both parties in the months ahead.
