| Total | 25.3 million tons |
| Canada | 7.9 million tons |
| Russia | 3.3 million tons |
| Saudi Arabia | 0.8 million tons |
| Qatar | 0.7 million tons |
| All other | 12.7 million tons |
* U.S. International Trade Commission Dataweb
Secretary of State Marco Rubio used a September 23 NBC appearance to term it “absurd” that some EU countries are still buying Russian energy. As the EU develops a new set of sanctions on Russian use of cryptocurrency, “shadow fleet” oil transport, and banking, the Trump administration has cited these purchases to avoid new sanctions on Russia itself. A day before Rubio’s appearance, though, Politico trade reporter Doug Palmer published a startling find about the United States’ trade with Russia:
“Russia’s fertilizer exports to the United States are rebounding in 2025 after falling in 2023 and 2024, according to Commerce Department data. The data also shows that U.S. imports of Russian enriched uranium and platinum are on their way to higher levels this year. In total, imports from Russia are up nearly 30 percent from 2024, and could reach close to $5 billion by the end of the year.”
Not only have U.S. imports from Russia jumped, but the Russian fertilizer and specialty metals — mainly platinum-group metals palladium and rhodium, used in catalytic converters, along with the uranium — still arrive duty-free despite the tariffs the Trump administration has imposed on similar goods from allies and other suppliers. Here’s the background:
Before the war in 2021, American purchases from Russia looked like this:
| Total | $29.7 billion |
| Energy | $16.9 billion |
| Rhodium | $0.7 billion |
| Palladium | $1.6 billion |
| Uranium | $0.7 billion |
| Fertilizer | $1.2 billion |
| Seafood | $1.1 billion |
| Diamonds | $0.3 billion |
| All else | $7.1 billion |
Two weeks after Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Biden administration banned Russian energy, diamonds, seafood (mainly Arctic crab), and luxury goods. As they fell to zero, American imports of Russian goods accordingly dropped by 90%, from the $29.7 billion of 2021 to $3.0 billion in 2024. Biden’s team left a couple of holes, though, as it didn’t ban fertilizer or specialty metals. The EU’s Russian imports are down from $174 billion in 2021 to $36 billion.
A week later, Congress withdrew Russia’s ‘Most Favored Nation’ tariff status. Legally, this shifts tariff rates from the generally low ones of the normal, Congressionally authorized tariff schedule to those set in the 1930 “Smoot-Hawley” tariff bill. For most countries, this would be a very big hit, shriveling up the trade that the Biden administration hadn’t already banned. But as we noted at the time, Russia was an unusual exception. The Congressional tariff-writers in 1930 wanted high rates on finished manufactured goods and farm products, but low ones or zero on natural resources and other factory and farm inputs. In practice, that’s mostly what Russia was selling: the ‘non-MFN’ tariffs on fertilizer (see Column 2 here) are all zero, as are those on uranium, palladium, and rhodium. So withdrawal of MFN status didn’t matter for these things.
The Trump administration’s April tariff decrees, meanwhile, exempted Russian goods on the unconvincing grounds that the U.S. already sanctions Russia in other ways. In practice, that means leaving Russian fertilizer and metals duty-free. Mr. Trump’s July 31 decree then taxed identical stuff from other sources at 10% and up: 10% on fertilizer from Saudi Arabia or Qatar, and 15% if it’s from Nigeria, Israel, or Trinidad; 30% on South African palladium and rhodium. (Canadian fertilizer and potash remain duty-free for now under the bruised-but-still-in-force “U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement”.) So Russia is now picking up market share at their expense. In sum, as Palmer notes, imports from Russia are up about 30% this year and are likely accelerating.
Across the Atlantic, meanwhile, the EU — after some strong persuasion of the populist semidemocrats in Hungary and Slovakia, the main European buyers of Russian oil and gas — is supposed to stop buying Russian energy altogether by the end of 2027. Mr. Rubio isn’t wrong to urge them to stop sooner, though it’s hard to see why that means the U.S. should hold back on financial and shipping sanctions. And with U.S. imports of Russian fertilizer and metals jumping this year, Europeans aren’t alone in earning adjectives like “absurd.”
PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on new EU sanctions proposals.
On NBC last month, Sec. Rubio’s strong words for European buyers of Russian energy.
… and a day earlier, Palmer reports for Politico Pro (subs. req.) on rising U.S. fertilizer and metal imports from Russia.
Policy:
The Biden administration’s bans on energy, seafood, diamonds, and luxuries.
The EU’s current schedule for ending Russian energy buying.
Data:
Census’ topline summary of U.S.-Russia trade by month.
Finland-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air tracks purchasing of Russian energy by country; also see their aggregate totals.
The U.S. Energy Information Agency on U.S. energy production, importing, exporting, and use.
And the U.S. Geological Survey on platinum-group metal uses, reserves, production, and trade.
PPI perspectives:
PPI’s New Ukraine Project, led by Kyiv-based Tamar Jacoby, reports on Ukrainian economic reform, the mood at the front, military industry growth, and more.
Energy and Climate Policy Director Elan Sykes (2023) on American liquefied natural gas as a replacement for European purchases of Russian energy.
And our Trade Fact reminder: Isolationism and appeasement are dangerous.
Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.
Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.
Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.
Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.
