With the news that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was linked to, and possibly directed by, a group called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), there’s much apprehension and confusion about this offshoot of Osama Bin Laden’s network.
Though I’m usually not one to lead the charge against “the media,” I’ve been most disappointed by the lack of description about the differences in organizations, targets, intentions, and capabilities between the group based in Yemen and its distant cousins along the Af-Pak border.
Consider this post an effort to explain those nuances.
Let’s get the obvious but oft-unstated out of the way: Though AQAP may trace a share of its origins to the Bin Laden-directed 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, today AQAP is a distinct, separate entity from Bin Laden’s al Qaeda (commonly referred to throughout the intelligence community as Al Qaeda Senior Leadership, or AQSL). AQAP may share a general ideological affiliation with AQSL, but its specific targeting intentions and attack capabilities vary significantly. Furthermore, AQAP’s leadership is largely independent to do as it pleases: Though it may receive occasional communications and guidance from Osama Bin Laden’s cadre, AQAP is essentially free to follow or ignore as it sees fit.
So what are AQAP’s intents and capabilities? The group certainly shares an obvious anti-American/anti-Western bent, along with its Af-Pak based brethren. Indeed, since 2003, AQAP has launched several attacks against employees of Western petroleum countries, tourists, and the American embassy and consulate. But whereas AQSL is focused on large-scale attacks on U.S. soil, the Arabian Peninsula group is primarily motivated by toppling the Saudi and Yemeni governing regimes, and likely views American/Western targets significant if not quite as important.
“But what about the Christmas Day plot?” you ask. “That seems like a pretty serious attempt to kill Americans on American soil.” True, it does. However, note that the plot failed. It’s an important point. Successful terrorism plots are the marriage of a group’s intention to hit a particular target plus its capability to do so. On that score, AQAP has a long way to go before it would attempt anything as logistically complex as 9/11. It is quite easy for a lone operative like Abdulmutallab volunteer to conduct an attack and the groups’ leadership agree to provide him the basic training and materiel to execute it. But the fact that the bomber and explosives were incompetent and/or faulty speaks volumes about AQAP’s lack of capability to conduct anything close to a 9/11-style attack from a Yemeni safe haven. That said, by displaying an intention to target Americans in America, the group should merit close attention from U.S. intelligence for any improvements in operational capability.
Finally, the best move AQAP made is adopting the “al Qaeda” brand. Franchising AQ is a no-brainer: the group in Yemen and Saudi can entice finances and recruits to its organization on the al Qaeda name. And by trading on the al Qaeda name, a failed operation now — remarkably — strikes fear into hearts worldwide as pundits, hosts, and articles flippantly repeat “al Qaeda” as if the group were under direct orders from and possessed similar strike capabilities as Al Qaeda Senior Leadership did back in 2001.
And such thin analysis is, in a word, amazing because it only fuels partisanship that drives reactionary and often ineffective security policy. If we continue to let political bickering drive policy, then fledgling groups like AQAP continue to win as they gain fame and notoriety. It’s even more incredible that Republicans have the audacity to politically exploit nearly uncloseable gaps in America’s defensive net if you bear in mind that George W. Bush constructed that architecture in the first place.