President Trump has been caught on tape committing what would be considered a crime if you or I did it: pressuring public officials in Georgia to falsify the results of the 2020 presidential election. He urged Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to “find” 11,780 votes — the exact number Trump needs to exceed Joe Biden’s winning margin.
I followed Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal and impeachment proceedings intently as a college student. Trump’s push to nullify a democratic election and disenfranchise millions of U.S. voters is far more damaging to our country. Like Nixon, he must be held accountable so that his attempted putsch doesn’t set a precedent for future presidential losers.
President-elect Joe Biden has got plenty on his plate to worry about. Covid, recession, uniting a divided country, rebuilding relationships with our allies. But if he wants a strong job recovery, he might want to make sure that someone on his staff is keeping an eye on the new draft legislation that the European Union just announced, the Digital Markets Act (DMA). If it goes into effect as written, it would create a new category of “gatekeepers” that targets the largest U.S. tech firms with extensive new regulations and the potential for huge fines, up to 10% of global revenues.
It will take a year or more before these draft regulations go into effect. But when they do, the new EU regulations may hold back the U.S. economic recovery that Biden and his team are counting on. The problem: Jobs generated by the tech/ecommerce sectors were a key part of the positive US labor market story before the pandemic. Many of those jobs are “export-oriented,” in the sense of being tied to the global leadership of the big tech companies. So when the EU imposes tighter controls on tech firms in Europe, that’s likely to slow the job recovery at home as well.
How important is the tech/ecommerce sector for job growth? Our analysis of U.S. job data shows that tech/ecommerce sector jobs grew by almost 19 percent from 2016 to 2019, almost four times the 5 percent growth of overall private sector jobs. That means the tech/ecommerce industries directly accounted for 791,000 net new jobs from 2016 to 2019, without even accounting for spillover effects. This total includes App Economy jobs, ecommerce fulfillment jobs, cloud computing jobs, database jobs, and customer tech support jobs.
During the pandemic, the tech/ecommerce sector has continued to hire while the rest of the economy has contracted. From October 2019 to October 2020, the tech/ecommerce sector gained 200,000 jobs while the rest of the private sector lost 8 million jobs. Historically, the pattern is that the particular industries which continue to grow during a recession are also the ones that lead the subsequent recovery. This is an unusual sort of recession, but if the pattern holds, the tech/ecommerce industries will be a key force propelling the Covid rebound.
But here’s the issue with the EU regulations. Many of the tech/ecommerce jobs in the U.S. are export-based, in that they are strongly tied to overseas sales. The big tech companies make huge people-intensive investments in research and product development at home which help support their overseas operations. To the degree that the EU regulations reduce the profitability of overseas operations of big U.S. tech firms, that will reduce employment at home, just like any restrictions on exports.
We will not go into detail on the new EU regulations here. It’s important to note, however, that if they are implemented in their current form, they would impose a long list of new obligations on “gatekeepers.” The definition of “gatekeepers” appears to be broad:
Providers of core platform providers can be deemed to be gatekeepers if they: (i) have a significant impact on the internal market, (ii) operate one or more important gateways to customers and (iii) enjoy or are expected to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in their operations.
However, because of the particular thresholds that are being proposed, it appears that the “gatekeeper” designation is only going to apply to American firms.
As we consider the domestic implications of the EU regulation, it’s worthwhile to say a bit about the political impact of tech/ecommerce jobs in the aftermath of the presidential election. Our calculations show that jobs in the tech/ecommerce sector grew at roughly the same rate in the states that Biden won (19% from 2016 to 2019) versus the states that Trump won (18.7% over the same stretch) (Figure 1). In other words, both Biden states and Trump states have been benefiting from the global presence of the tech/ecommerce sector, with tech/ecommerce job growth far faster than that of the private sector in both cases.
From another perspective, the contribution of the tech/ecommerce sector to overall job growth has been rising in both the Biden and Trump states. For example, in the Trump states, the share of net private sector job creation coming from tech/ecommerce rose from 8% in the 2013-2016 period to 10.4% in the 2016-2019 period. The Biden states show a similar trend. In both cases that upward arc would likely be interrupted by the EU’s implementation of the DMA, undercutting a key industry needed for recovery from the Covid downturn.
Colin Mortimer, the Director of the Center for New Liberalism, is joined by two special guests. First is Adam Hartke, the co-owner of a music venue in Wichita, Kansas, and the co-chair of the advocacy committee at the National Independent Venues Association. We talk about what it has been like to be a music venue owner during this pandemic, suffering the brunt of the economic fallout. Second, PPI’s Chief Economic Strategist Michael Mandel comes on to talk about how an obscure tax cut that expires in December might make the recovery for music venues, bars, restaurants, brewers, and others even more difficult than it was already expected to be.
The nearly 5600-page omnibus government funding and covid relief bill passed by Congress yesterday was an undeniable win for the American people, providing much-needed relief for those most affected by the pandemic. In addition to preventing a government shutdown, the bill extended and expanded unemployment insurance; provided aid to restaurants, airlines, and other businesses heavily impacted by the pandemic; and provided robust funding for vaccine distribution to help end the pandemic sooner and get people back to work. It also included other important policy developments, such as a long-stalled proposal to limit surprise medical billing and investments to combat climate change. But an arbitrary demand from Republicans that the bill not exceed $1 trillion, combined with their monomaniacal focus on business tax cuts, resulted in some bizarre and unfortunate tradeoffs.
There’s no getting around it: 2020 has been an annus horribilis for America. We’ve had to endure a deadly pandemic, a frozen economy, a corrupt president’s bid to void an election he lost, and deep racial and civil discord.
And yet our national fortunes seem to be changing. Coronavirus vaccines – developed in record time by U.S. drug companies – will soon be widely available. Next month, America gets a real president in Joe Biden, who will restore honesty and decency in the White House, along with a commitment to bring our country together rather than tear it apart.
I’m also happy to report that the Progressive Policy Institute is ending the year on a high note. We have roughly doubled in size, adding new policy analysts and projects that also have brought youth and diversity to our team. We are poised to play a more forceful role in advocating for the kind of radically pragmatic solutions Americans voted for in 2020 and to help the new administration deliver them.
Let me touch on just a few of 2020’s highlights.
Throughout the primaries, PPI worked to illuminate the critical choices before U.S. voters. This included analysis and comparisons of the Democratic presidential candidates’ positions, as well as intensive surveys of public opinion in the key battleground states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. Our team also critiqued utopian demands from the sectarian left that repel swing voters in competitive districts and states.
In March, as the coronavirus hit America, we turned swiftly to confront the crisis, which both revealed and exacerbated the nation’s deep racial and social inequities. For example, PPI began work on its ongoing Covid-19 chronology, which offers a definitive, step-by-step record of President Trump’s disastrous handling of the pandemic.
Working remotely, PPI policy analysts have generated a prodigious output of policy reports, articles, op eds and blogs, podcasts and webinars, featuring creative ideas for containing the pandemic and mitigating the economic pain it’s caused. In late August, we published Building American Resilience, a compendium of bold ideas for spurring economic recovery and for making the private sector and government more resilient against future national emergencies. Our Reinventing America’s Schools team also produced a major report on the urgent challenge of keeping our children learning, remotely if necessary, during the pandemic.
Also notable are three new projects PPI launched in 2020:
Center for New Liberalism. The center is an outgrowth of the Neoliberal Project, a virtual network of tens of thousands of young political activists and thinkers. With more than 60 chapters (including 12 overseas), the network provides a political home for young Americans who favor liberal rather than socialist solutions to the nation’s problems.
Innovation Frontier Project. Building on PPI’s traditional strengths in innovation and entrepreneurship, this project aims at keeping America in the vanguard of scientific and technological progress. It’s run by two rising young economists, Alec Stapp and Caleb Watney, as well as PPI chief economic strategist Michael Mandel. The project plans to commission at least 20 research reports on public policies to encourage progress in such emerging fields as biotech, 5G and 6G networks, artificial intelligence, digitally enabled manufacturing and a 21st Century competition policy.
The Mosaic Project. The mission of the Mosaic Project is to raise the profile of women, including women of color, in national debates over economic and technology policy. It recruits classes of highly accomplished women to interaction with seasoned professionals in legislation, communications and dealing with new and old media.
Meanwhile, we are beefing up our communications and outreach capacities to work more closely with our elected friends and allies on Capitol Hill, in local and state government, and in the incoming Biden administration. Over 30-plus years, in fact, PPI has never been in a stronger position to craft innovation ideas and solutions for pragmatic progressives determined to make American democracy work again.
As we celebrate our good fortune after a difficult year of loss and sacrifice, we’re mindful of the crucial part that great friends and supporters like you have played in our success. We thank you and wish you and your families a very happy holiday!
Bloomberg recently ran an article about the impact of Amazon fulfillment centers on warehouse wages. The story’s point was simple: “A Bloomberg analysis of government labor statistics reveals that in community after community where Amazon sets up shop, warehouse wages tend to fall.”
A bit of background here: The once-sleepy warehousing industry, which was nobody’s idea of a growth sector, used to be the equivalent of serviceable shoes. Companies would put up warehouses to store parts that were heading to domestic factories, and to store finished products that were on their way from domestic manufacturers to retailers and business purchasers. Later, as U.S. factories closed, warehouses held mountains of imports from China and other countries.
Prior to the ecommerce era, the whole notion of a governor or mayor proclaiming “We need another warehouse as a source of good jobs!” was laughable. Indeed, warehousing in most counties was a tiny source of jobs, often too small to be measured and reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
But the ecommerce boom has supercharged the warehousing industry. Most eCommerce fulfillment centers are counted as warehouses by the BLS, but as I wrote in my 2017 report, these fulfillment centers “bear the same relationship to ordinary warehouses as jet planes bear to bicycles. Whereas an ordinary retail warehouse is a stopping place for bulk shipments on the way to stores, a fulfillment center dynamically responds to orders from individual customers, integrating many different vendors.”
Thus, the Bloomberg story is covering an important topic, as I told the reporter. And given my long history as chief economist and economics writer at BusinessWeek (in its pre-Bloomberg days), I strongly support journalistic organizations doing data-driven reporting. It’s the right way to go.
But based on my own analysis, I strongly disagree with the conclusions in the story. More broadly, I’m concerned with the need to put data into context.
Let’s start by taking a closer look at BLS data for wages for production and nonsupervisory workers in the warehousing industry, which are the floor workers that we actually care about. Rather than falling, as the story implies, hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers in the warehousing industry, adjusted for inflation, have risen by 11.5% in the “e-commerce era” (2013-2019). (details available on request). That’s a far bigger gain than other major sectors, including retail, manufacturing and healthcare (Figure 1).
To put this in context, this increase in real wages for production and nonsupervisory workers—who make up almost 90 percent of the employees in the “warehousing and storage” industry (NAICS 493)—comes after many years of declining real wages in an industry that was moribund and stagnant before it was transformed by the coming of ecommerce (Figure 2)
Why do these figures paint a very different picture than the Bloomberg article? One key difference comes from the limitations of the particular wage measure that Bloomberg used, average weekly wages from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). I will discuss here some of the strengths and weakness of the QCEW wage measure that the Bloomberg article uses.
Second, the Bloomberg piece misses the broader context of the ongoing transformation of consumer distribution, which has integrated retail, warehousing, and delivery in a way that was never possible before. Ecommerce uses technology to create jobs, boost productivity, and raise pay by shifting workers from low-paid brick-and-mortar retail jobs to much better paid ecommerce fulfillment jobs. I will discuss this broader point as well.
We start with a description of the wage measure used by the Bloomberg article. The QCEW collects data on employment and wage payments on a detailed industry and county basis. It enables economists to say, for example, that there were 898 employees in the warehousing industry in Mercer County (NJ) in 2013, rising to 6115 employees in 2019. (Mercer County is the location of the Robbinsville (NJ) Amazon facility featured in the Bloomberg story). The QCEW data also reports that wage payments to warehousing workers in Mercer County rose from $46,223,000 in 2013 to $222,356,000 in 2019, and that average weekly wage fell from $990 to $699 per week.
What do we make of this decline in average weekly wages? The QCEW data are very useful, if handled with care. But the QCEW has limitations. First, there is no information on hours of work on a county and industry level, so average weekly wages can rise or fall as workers work more or fewer hours per week. If there are more part-time workers, average weekly wages can fall, even if hourly wages stay the same.
Second, the lack of QCEW data on hours of work by industry and county means that hourly earnings cannot be calculated from the QCEW data without making additional assumptions. (For example, the Bloomberg article appears to report hourly earnings for warehousing workers in Mercer County, saying that “Six years ago, before the company opened a giant fulfillment center in Robbinsville, New Jersey, warehouse workers made $24 an hour on average, according to BLS data. Last year the average hourly wage slipped to $17.50.” I could be wrong, but it appears to me that this calculation was done by assuming that average hours worked per week in the warehousing industry in Mercer County did not change after Amazon opened its facility. If so, the Bloomberg piece should have reported that assumption.).
Third, QCEW weekly wages can change as the composition of the workforce changes. For example, if the composition of warehouses shift towards relatively fewer high-paid managers and relatively more nonsupervisory workers, that could lower average weekly wages even if the wages for the nonsupervisory workers was actually rising.
A simple example will make that point. Suppose that we start off with a sleepy little warehouse with 1 manager earning $1200 per week and 1 “picker and packer” earning $600 per week. Then the average weekly pay for the entire operations is $900 per week. Now suppose that the operation expands to hire 7 more “picker and packer” and in order to attract the new workers their pay is raised to $660 per week. Then the average weekly pay falls to $720 per week, even though pay for individual workers has increased (Calculations available upon request).
A related point is that average weekly wages in the QCEW data can rise if younger and lower-paid workers are laid off. So in the example above, if the single picker and packer was laid off, leaving only the manager, the weekly wage at the “warehouse” would go from $900 to $1200. My analysis of the BLS county-level data (details available on request) shows a negative correlation between job growth and weekly wage growth in warehousing over the time period 2007 to 2019.. Indeed, many of the counties with the biggest wage growth in warehousing also have shrinking warehouse employment. Meanwhile, fast-growth counties, whether they have an Amazon facility or not, show relatively slow warehousing wage growth on average.
Fourth, the QCEW is sensitive to the form of compensation. Employer payments for benefits such as health care and retirement contributions are not generally counted as part of QCEW wages (though some states do count 401k contributions). So if there is a shift towards employers who pay better benefits, that does not show up in the QCEW wages.
In addition, most stock options are generally not counted as part of QCEW pay until they are exercised and become taxable income. Similarly, restricted stock units (RSU) are generally not counted as part of QCEW pay until they vest and become taxable.
This last point, while wonky, is relevant for analyzing Amazon pay in particular. According to press reports, many Amazon fulfillment center workers received restricted stock units during the years covered by the Bloomberg study. According to one source, Amazon RSUs vest at 5% after one year, another 15% after two years, another 40% after three years, and the final 40% after four years. For example, a big chunk of compensation paid to an Amazon fulfillment center worker in 2014 would not show up in the QCEW data until 2017 and 2018. That would artificially depress the initial reported wages when a new fulfillment center opens, especially given the rise in Amazon stock prices.
To further complicate matters, when Amazon raised its minimum wage to $15 in 2018, it also changed the form of its compensation package for fulfillment center workers, including phasing out RSUs. These changes make it very difficult to interpret the recent QCEW wage figures. My best guess is reported weekly wages in warehousing are significantly underestimated, but coming up with a quantitative figure would require an in-depth analysis of the Amazon pay package, which I have not done, as well as an estimate of worker churn.
The BLS offers alternative sources of pay data. The Current Employment Statistics program asks a sample of businesses to report wages and hours by industry, with an additional category of production and nonsupervisory employees. These figures, which do *not* include annual bonuses, were reported in Figures 1 and 2. As noted, they show strong growth in real hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers in the warehousing industry. The caveat is that they do not reflect changes in the annual bonus structure of the industry.
Another source of pay data is the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program, which offers detailed data on pay for occupations in different industries and locations. The OES enables us to compare “apples to apples,” matching up the same occupations in different industries. In particular , laborers and material movers, who make up about 45% of the warehousing workforce, average $16.19 per hour in the warehousing industry. That’s more than workers in the same occupation make in manufacturing ($15.78) or the private sector as a whole ($14.64), as shown in Figure 3.
Taking these numbers on face value suggests that laborers and material movers can do better in the warehousing industry than in the rest of the economy, which is probably the right comparison to make. Note, interestingly enough, that the overall wage in warehousing is lower than manufacturing or private, pulled down by a lower white-collar wage. However, as before, the key caveat is that these figures do not include annual bonuses, exercised stock options or tuition repayments. So the lower wages for white-collar workers should be taken with a grain of salt.
Figure 3. 2019 average hourly pay, dollars per hour (OES)
Warehousing
Manufacturing
Private sector
All occupations
19.77
26.09
25.20
Management Occupations
52.65
65.11
60.26
Business and financial operations
31.99
36.92
37.92
Computer and mathematical occupations
33.56
49.38
45.88
Office and Administrative Support
19.62
20.91
19.46
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair
24.82
25.98
23.95
Transportation and material moving occupations
17.96
17.58
18.01
Laborers and material movers
16.19
15.78
14.64
Packers and Packagers, Hand
15.01
13.94
13.30
Data: BLS (OES)
But that’s enough about the wonky dive into the data. Now let’s consider the broader question about how to best measure the impact on the labor market of the ongoing transformation of the retail, warehousing, and delivery industries.
Conventional retailing—especially big box retailing—turned the store into the warehouse, and consumers into pickers and packers. Clothes, electronics, and building materials were stacked to the ceiling, as buyers roamed the “miles of aisles.” Households had to drive to stores and effectively be their own delivery services. In return, they could get everything they needed in one place.
E-commerce flips the equation. The picking and packing function is done by ecommerce fulfillment workers, saving household time and creating jobs. These jobs are clearly better paid than the typical jobs in the brick-and-mortar retail sector, by about 30 percent.
Even during the pandemic, the jobs generated in electronic shopping, ecommerce fulfillment and delivery either more than or almost compensates for the jobs lost in brick-and-mortar retail, depending on the month. For example, if we compare October 2019 to October 2020, brick-and-mortar lost 269,000 full-time-equivalent (FTE) jobs while ecommerce industries (NAICS 4541, 492, and 493) gained 295,000 FTE jobs, for a net plus.
Even as the new consumer distribution sector—retail, warehousing, and delivery–uses technology to improve productivity, it’s generating new higher-paying jobs. From October 2019 to October 2020, average hourly earnings in the combined retail, warehousing, and delivery sector rose by 5.2 percent, far above the rate of inflation and beating the average private sector wage growth of 4.4 percent (by this time I don’t need to remind you of the multiple caveats).
What about the labor market in Mercer County, home of the Robbinsville (NJ) fulfillment center featured in the Bloomberg story? It turns out that looking at the broader consumer distribution sector–compromising retail, warehousing and couriers and messengers (local delivery)–gives a very different picture than simply focusing on warehousing (Figure 4).
Over the 2013-2019 period Mercer County employment in the consumer distribution sector—comprising retail, warehousing and couriers and messengers (local delivery) expanded by 25%, almost double the rate in the rest of the private sector (Figure 4). That’s all coming from warehousing, and it’s unalloyed good news for Mercer County workers, because they have access to many more job opportunities.
Similarly, total wage payments in the consumer distribution sector expanded by 42%, also much faster than the rest of the labor market. That’s good news for the local economy, and tax revenues.
And wage growth in the consumer distribution sector was somewhat faster than the rest of the labor market, as workers were hired in warehousing jobs that paid significantly more than brick-and-mortar retail in the county. These figures suggest that Mercer County’s workers and local economy benefited from the transformation of the consumer distribution sector (once again, all caveats apply).
Figure 4. Mercer County (NJ), percentage change, 2013-2019
Consumer distribution*
private sector minus consumer distribution
Jobs
25.1%
13.0%
Total wage payments
42.4%
27.5%
Average weekly wages
13.8%
12.8%
*Retail, warehousing, couriers and messengers
Data: BLS QCEW
I’m going to stop this overly-long blog post here. The bottom line is that the Bloomberg story tackled an interesting and important question, but if reporters do data-driven stories, they need to be more sensitive to the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying data. Interrogate the data as they would interrogate a source, rather than taking it for granted. Let the readers know where the assumptions are and the problems are. Give them alternative perspectives and context.
In gas-producing counties in Pennsylvania, Joe Biden gained enough votes over Hillary Clinton alone to wrest the state from Donald Trump. He improved on Clinton’s margin in these counties by three points (Biden -15 / Clinton -18), counties that represent 40% of the state.
In our pre-election polling in these Pennsylvania extraction counties, even as Trump held an eleven-point lead in them, voters wanted Biden’s “middle ground” energy policy.
Our September poll showed that:
These voters take climate change seriously and want to transition to renewable energy, just like Joe Biden.
Most (69%) voters in these gas-producing counties believe that climate change is a very serious or somewhat serious problem.
People see fossil fuels as a bridge to renewable energy, not a permanent solution. Which of these comes closer to your view?
The United States should use some fossil fuels as a bridge to renewable energy sources but work to eliminate it: 55%
The United States should continue to use fossil fuels for the foreseeable future: 29%
The United States should immediately transition to 100 percent renewable energy: 11%
They don’t want to immediately move away from natural gas.
80% support an energy plan that includes a role for both gas and renewable energy,
They strongly oppose “an immediate ban on all natural-gas extraction in the United States” (19% support / 77% oppose) and “an immediate ban on all fracking in the United States” (32% support / 64% oppose).
83% call natural gas a “big jobs provider in Pennsylvania”
These voters mostly didn’t buy Trump’s argument that Biden was “anti-energy”.
Only 48% of voters agreed that “Joe Biden is just like the liberal socialists in his party who want to pass the job-killing Green New Deal, kill the energy industry in our state, and drive up energy costs”.
After hearing Joe Biden’s actual energy policy—that he wants to “continue to use natural gas, he does not support an immediate ban on natural gas or fracking, and that he will pass a law to guarantee that we only use energy sources that do not contribute to climate change by the year 2050”— voters said they support it on balance (50% support / 46% oppose).
Progressive Policy Institute commissioned ALG Research to conduct this poll to assess the electoral landscape in Pennsylvania and understand voters’ attitudes towards energy policy and climate change. The survey consisted of N=500 likely 2020 general election voters in Pennsylvania, and it included an oversample in gas-producing counties which meant we interviewed 317 people in those counties. The overall margin of error is + 4.4% and in gas-producing counties is +5.5%.
It was perhaps the most fitting end for a presidency plagued by crisis and mismanagement: the federal government spent the weekend racing to prevent one final shutdown under the administration of President Donald Trump. Fortunately, it seems unlikely that we will face another government shutdown for the next two years with Democrats retaining control of the House of Representatives and competent dealmaker Joe Biden ascending to the presidency in January. Simply keeping the lights on is the lowest of low bars for our elected leaders to clear, but the transition to an administration that will have no trouble doing so is a welcome one.
Refusing to accept that the election is over, President Trump is moving forward with one of the most desperate gambits from his campaign: raiding Medicare to give 39 million seniors a $200 prescription drug card. Fortunately, Trump’s plan to bypass Congress and act by executive order did not come to fruition before the election. But this week, it cleared a regulatory roadblock and the administration says it will start sending the cards before the end of the month.
The idea is probably illegal, because the Constitution gives Congress alone the power to spend money. It is certainly bad policy, because it cuts into Medicare’s finances to pay for a blatant vote-buying scheme. That makes no sense now that the election is behind us, but then, little that Donald Trump has done or said since he lost decisively on Nov. 3 makes sense.
Before it finishes its work, the lame-duck Congress should act to protect Medicare by killing Trump’s effort to usurp its power of the purse. For Republicans in the Senate, the opportunity to reject this political maneuver will test whether they recognize the election is over, and with it the reckless rule-breaking of the Trump administration.
Trump’s proposal would send 39 million seniors $200 cards, similar in appearance to credit cards, that they could use to buy prescription drugs. Like many things Trump does, this plan may be illegal. The Constitution gives Congress alone the power to spend money, but Congress has not authorized this program or appropriated any money towards it. Congressional Democrats have rightfully asked the Government Accountability Office to investigate whether the program is legal.
Administration officials claim the President can authorize the cards without Congress through an existing “testing” program meant to find more efficient ways to administer Medicare. The program will supposedly “test” whether the cards make seniors more likely to take their medicine on time, but it will not establish a control group or any other practices typical of an experiment. While tests of this kind are normally small in scale and cost-neutral, Trump’s plan would involve tens of millions of seniors and cost billions of dollars.
The much more likely explanation for Trump’s card plan is that it was a political effort to ingratiate himself with seniors. Trump’s own officials say he only added mention of the cards to his speech a few hours before he gave it because he felt the need to cram health care successes in before the election. The general counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services sent an internal memo warning that the plan could draw legal challenges related to election law and advised the administration to get guidance from the Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section, which handles elections-related offenses.
The plan’s political motivations are so glaring that they gummed up Trump’s initial attempts to accomplish it. A week before Trump’s announcement, pharmaceutical executives abandoned a deal between the Trump Administration and the industry that would have included similar cards because the executives believed the cards would make the deal look political.
President Trump has said he intends to get the $7.9 billion he will need for the cards from the Supplemental Medical Insurance Trust Fund, one of the two Medicare trust funds that pay for senior citizens’ health care. But Medicare does not have money to spare. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the net cost of Medicare will grow from 3.5 percent of gross domestic product this year year to 6 percent in just 30 years because the population is growing older and health care is becoming more expensive, drawing money away from other vital spending priorities. Medicare’s other trust fund is projected to run out of money by 2024 thanks to this budget crunch, which would automatically prompt payment cuts. Elected officials need to control Medicare spending growth, not add to it without addressing its driving forces.
Until this week, the program appeared unlikely to materialize before Trump left office. Administrators had to pull the plan together in very little time, and the effort to get guidance from the Department of Justice slowed the process down. More recently, the Special Interest Group for Inventory Information Approval System Standards (SIGIS), an industry organization that helps the Internal Revenue Service set standards for federal benefit cards, has said for weeks that limiting the cards’ use to prescription drugs was inconsistent with the standards it sets for other benefit cards. Health officials told Politico that without the group’s approval, the administration cannot mass produce working cards.
Yet after appeals from the Trump administration, SIGIS dropped its objections on Monday, for unclear reasons. Thanks to this surprising reversal, the administration plans start sending the cards to seniors by the end of this month.
Voters care about drug prices for good reason. Prices are higher in the United States than in other developed countries, and the costs of the most popular prescription drugs are growing by nearly 10 percent per year. But one-time payments from the government cannot solve a systemic problem such as the rising cost of lifesaving and life-improving drugs — they can only paper over it. Congress should keep fighting Trump on this plan so neither he nor any other President thinks they can finance political gifts by raiding Medicare’s coffers.
Watching Joe Biden prepare to take over the Presidency and Donald Trump try to overturn the election, it’s instructive to read two new books about politicians who represent the best of America: Jimmy Carter and John McCain.
They are two great men of great talents and, yes, great flaws. One a former President and one a two-time unsuccessful candidate for President. Both Navy men, graduates of Annapolis. Both veterans of the highs and lows of politics.
Their lives and legacies offer lessons about where we are today in America, how we got here and how we go forward.
“His Very Best: Jimmy Carter, a Life,” by Jonathan Alter, Simon & Schuster.
Alter’s book, like most accounts, praises the good works Jimmy Carter has done and the modest life he has led in the 40 years since he left the Presidency. Alter is far more positive than most writers, though, in assessing Carter’s four years in the White House – and why they’re overlooked:
“Carter’s farsighted domestic and foreign policy achievements would be largely forgotten when he shrank in the job and lost the 1980 election.”
What achievements? Alter’s list: “the nation’s first comprehensive energy policy,” “historic accomplishments on the environment,” consumer protection, ethics laws, civil service reform, two new Cabinet departments (Energy and Education), appointing Blacks and women to key positions, ending inflation, cutting the deficit and the growth of the federal workforce, requiring banks to invest in low-income communities, legalizing craft breweries (!), deregulating airlines and trucking, increasing the defense budget, championing human rights and challenging the Soviet Union on dissidents, aiding Afghan rebels, ratifying the Panama Canal Treaty, establishing full diplomatic relations with China and persuading Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin to sign the Camp David Accords (“The Israelis and Egyptians have not fired a shot in anger in more than forty years.”)
And Carter appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the federal appeals court. She later said he “literally changed the complexion of the federal judiciary.”
Yet Carter is remembered more for his failures and shortcomings. Alter, a journalist himself, says “the aggressive post-Watergate press tended to assume the worst about him.”
Democrats controlled Congress those four years, but Carter often was at odds with them. Ted Kennedy challenged him on health care and for the nomination in 1980, crippling Carter’s reelection. In those days, too, Washington Democrats had a pronounced bias against Southern Democrats; I saw it while working for Governor Jim Hunt.
Carter hurt himself. For all the political skill he and his Georgia Mafia showed in coming from nowhere (literally, 0% in the polls) to win the 1976 election, Carter was far better at deciding what was the right thing to do than at persuading the public and other politicians it was right.
(A sidelight: The first U.S. Senator to endorse Carter in the 1976 primaries was a 33-year-old first-termer named Joe Biden. Forty-four years later, Carter’s Georgia helped put Biden in the White House.)
Alter offers a not-so-positive picture of Carter’s early record on race: “While a quiet progressive since his experience in the integrated Navy in the late 1940s, he failed to oppose racial discrimination in public until sworn in as governor of Georgia in 1971.”
Carter was from one of the most racist parts of rural Georgia. He clearly was uncomfortable with the violent and virulent segregation of that place and time, but he didn’t speak out forcefully against it.
Former Governor and Senator Terry Sanford, who fought racism and segregation in North Carolina in the 1960s, never forgave Carter for his 1970 campaign against Carl Sanders. Carter’s campaign attacked Sanders, an owner of the NBA’s Atlanta Hawks, with a picture of a Black player dousing Sanders with champagne in a post-game locker room celebration.
But Carter changed, and he changed America. He was dragged down by an economic crisis and the Iran hostage crisis. He, like Donald Trump, suffered the ignominy of being a one-term President.
Yet Carter – in his four years as President and in the four decades since – set a standard for decency, integrity and service to his country, a standard that all Presidents, and all Americans, can admire and emulate.
“The Luckiest Man: Life With John McCain,” by Mark Salter, Simon & Schuster.
Carter’s biography was written by a journalist, a trained skeptic and critic. McCain’s was written by a more sympathetic observer; Mark Salter was for 30 years McCain’s aide, advisor and confidante, as well as coauthor of seven books. But Salter has written a book that is both insightful and balanced.
We know the highlights of McCain’s life – POW, congressman, senator, maverick, unsuccessful presidential candidate, cancer victim and, in a role McCain both rued and relished at the end of his life, foil to Donald Trump.
Salter fills in the story – the hard-partying Navy flier, son and grandson of admirals, who finished near the bottom of his class at Annapolis, leading only in demerits.
Shot down on his sixth combat mission over Vietnam, McCain endured more than five years of imprisonment, marked by mistreatment, solitary confinement and torture. He was one of the most resistant and resilient of the POWs.
You can’t read about what he endured without wondering about the character of a man running for Commander-in-Chief who said: “He’s not a war hero. He was a war hero because he was captured. I like people who weren’t captured.”
Maybe there was a higher justice at work when Arizona flipped dramatically this year and, with Georgia, helped elect Biden, one of McCain’s close friends in the Senate. His widow Cindy endorsed Biden.
Where Jimmy Carter was a son of Georgia, McCain had no ties to Arizona. Salter, who has the novelist’s eye for telling detail, writes that on one day – March 27, 1981 – McCain buried his father, retired from the Navy after 22 years and moved to Arizona, where he went to work for his father-in-law’s lucrative beer distributorship and began running for Congress.
During a campaign debate, an opponent called him a carpetbagger. McCain delivered one of the most political devastating counterpunches ever. “Listen, pal,” McCain began. He talked about growing up as a Navy brat, then serving around the world and then: “As a matter of fact, when I think about it now, the place I lived longest in my life was Hanoi.”
McCain won that election. In years to come, friends and foes alike would come to dread his acid tongue.
Throughout his career – he served two terms in the House and was elected to the Senate six times – McCain had an openness and candor that won him good press. But that did him no good in two ill-starred campaigns for President. In 2000, he got run over by the Bush machine. In 2008, he had the bad luck to run against charismatic, historic Barack Obama.
McCain brought no credit to himself with his confused and confounding response to the financial collapse of 2008. Even worse, he gave us Sarah Palin.
He redeemed himself in a gracious concession speech to Obama on Election Night. It’s worth watching on YouTube.
It was as a Senator that McCain made his mark on America. He was a relentless champion of campaign finance reform. He cast the decisive vote to save the Affordable Care Act.
Democrats fond of McCain forget he was a rock-ribbed Ronald Reagan conservative and a searing critic of what he believed to be President Obama’s shaky and uncertain record on defense and foreign policy.
Above all, McCain believed in “regular order,” the traditional operating rules of the Senate that emphasized compromise over confrontation. He bemoaned that the Senate was becoming like the House, a gladiators’ arena of winner-take-all partisan power plays and score-settling.
After Trump’s election in 2016, McCain inevitably became viewed as the anti-Trump. Salter held Trump in contempt, but he writes that “McCain seemed largely indifferent” to Trump’s Twitter attacks. He chastised Salter: “I don’t know why you let him get you so worked up. That’s not how you beat him.”
Salter says McCain “preferred instead to take on Trumpism…opposing Trump’s most noxious views, mainly his nativism and affinity for autocrats, and making the case for the international order founded on the values of free people and free markets.”
McCain once said that he and Trump were “very different people,” with different backgrounds and upbringing: “He was in the business of making money.” McCain added, “I was raised in a military family. I was raised in the concept and belief that duty, honor and country is the lodestar for the behavior that we have to exhibit every single day.”
Our Best
Jimmy Carter and John McCain, both Navy men and politicians, were otherwise very different: from different parts of the country, different backgrounds, different political parties and different philosophies.
But both were men of duty, honor and country. Both represented the best of America. Both gave their best to America.
Their stories remind us how truly great America can be.
The bipartisan covid relief bill working its way through Congress appears to have worsened thanks to demands by the Congressional Progressive Caucus, along with Sens. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Josh Hawley (R-MO), that the package include a second round of stimulus checks. Because Senate Republicans have refused to support a package that costs more than $1 trillion, the inclusion of checks is likely coming at the expense of other provisions that would better target assistance where it is most needed. As Sens. Mark Warner (D-VA) and Joe Manchin (D-WV) have argued, there is nothing progressive about taking money from people directly affected by the covid pandemic to finance a poorly targeted stimulus check.
Dr. James X. Sullivan, a professor at the University of Notre Dame, was shocked when he and his colleagues discovered that poverty did not rise when the pandemic began, despite much of the economy freezing to a halt. He told the New York Times that “when we initially saw our results, we thought, ‘How could this be true?’… But when you look at the size of the government response, it makes sense.”
Normally, rising unemployment would increase the number of people living beneath the federal poverty line, which is $21,720 for a family of three. Unemployment certainly surged last spring as the pandemic shutdowns began, from just 3.5 percent in February to 14.7 percent in April. However, Sullivan and his partners at Notre Dame and the University of Chicago say the poverty rate actually fell from 11.0 percent before the pandemic to 9.3 percent in June, thanks to a massive infusion of federal aid.
About $560 billion of the $2.2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act that Congress passed in March went towards stimulus checks for most Americans and for states to expand Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits. The law expanded the size of all benefits by $600/week, created a new program that offered benefits for self-employed workers who do not typically qualify, and extended the duration of benefits from 26 weeks in most states to 39 weeks. The University of Chicago and Notre Dame researchers found those stimulus checks and unemployment benefits can explain the entire decline in poverty between March and June.
But the researchers also find the poverty rate began rising in July, reaching 11.7 percent in November, and is still rising. This is below the 15 percent high it reached during the Great Recession, in part because the economy was strong before the pandemic. But the figure may not capture the entire picture: the researchers’ poverty measurement understates the impact of sudden changes to a person’s income, so the rise in poverty might be more severe than their numbers show.
Meanwhile, researchers at Columbia University, whose method of measuring poverty responds more to short-term changes, found that poverty is only rising because federal aid is waning. Without stimulus checks and the unemployment expansions, poverty would have peaked at 20 percent in April, when unemployment was highest, and would have fallen by 2 percentage points by September. But that improvement was more than offset by a 4.3 percentage point decline in the impact of federal aid.
The CARES Act is not making as big of an impact as it used to because Congress let some of the law’s anti-poverty provisions expire. People only received stimulus checks once, and the CARES Act’s enhanced pandemic unemployment benefit of $600/week expired in July. Republicans refused to extend it over concerns, which have proven to be premature, that recipients would not go back to work if their UI benefits were larger than their potential wage.
The last of the CARES Act’s major anti-poverty interventions, the expansions of unemployment insurance eligibility and duration, will expire on the day after Christmas. Nine million Americans will lose their benefits, with 3 million more soon to follow, and the Columbia researchers estimate 4.8 million people will fall into poverty. Even if Congress extends the programs, it will take states so long to update their archaic information technology that many will not pay the benefits on time. The Center for Disease Control’s protections for tenants facing eviction – limited though they were– will also expire at the end of this month, when Moody’s Analytics estimates nearly 12 million Americans will owe an average of $5,850 in back rent and utilities.
Fortunately, congressional leaders are now finalizing a new aid deal built around a framework crafted by a bipartisan group of moderate members of Congress. As it stands, that bill would keep those vital unemployment expansions from expiring for 10 more weeks, boost the size of benefits by $300/week for 10 weeks as well, send most Americans a $600 stimulus check, and maintain the eviction ban along with $25 billion for rental assistance.
The bill Congress will vote on will likely do less to reduce poverty than the initial bipartisan framework would have. Republicans insist the bill must be smaller than $1 trillion, so negotiators are considering cutting the duration of the unemployment insurance provisions by 6 weeks to pay for the addition of stimulus checks. That trade would effectively take benefits from unemployed people who need the money to support themselves and give them to people who are just as well off as they were before the pandemic. Negotiators may also drop $160 billion in aid to state and local governments because Republicans fear it would be a “blue state bailout,” even though that aid would also go to red states and would prevent cuts to social services that low-income people rely on.
While those revisions would seriously undermine the bill’s protections for at-risk Americans, the deal would still offer a vital lifeline for people in or near poverty. A strong post-vaccine recovery that creates opportunities for economically vulnerable people is within sight, but elected officials should take this deal to ensure Americans can keep paying their bills as the world pushes across the pandemic’s finish line.
President-elect Joe Biden has set an ambitious goal for achieving zero carbon emissions from the nation’s power sector by 2035. The U.S. electric grid therefore faces a dual challenge: meeting growing demand for power while also decarbonizing the energy it supplies, which is essential to avert catastrophic climate change. At the same time, the challenge of maintaining an affordable and reliable grid is becoming more complicated, because of the increased frequency of extreme weather and the rapid growth of distributed renewable power – especially wind and solar – that is variable and unpredictable. It’s imperative that U.S. policymakers keep the nation’s environmental and energy needs in balance as the shift to renewables accelerates.
Natural gas can play an indispensable role in managing the risk that a precipitous leap to renewables will make electricity more expensive and potentially less reliable. Gas already supports the expansion of renewable energy by providing an instantly dispatchable source of electricity. Unlike coal and nuclear plants, natural gas power plants turn on and off within minutes, allowing the grid to quickly match supply and demand even when the wind isn’t blowing and the sun isn’t shining. As the National Renewable Energy Laboratory points out, this unique flexibility of natural gas generation thereby facilitates the steady expansion of renewables. As we move toward decarbonization, retaining sufficient natural gas generation to backstop wind and solar power would reduce costs and increase reliability compared to a grid that relies entirely on renewables. Given these realities, demands to “ban fracking” or keep shale gas “in the ground” are not consistent with a balanced approach to decarbonizing the electric grid.
In the decades ahead, natural gas generation must move toward zero carbon emissions to be part of America’s clean energy transition. To this end, U.S. policy makers and the natural gas industry should join forces to (1) invest more heavily in carbon, capture, and storage (CCS) technologies to quickly move gas-fired plants toward zero carbon emissions; and, (2) adopt and enforce ambitious goals for dramatically reducing methane emissions – which are many times more injurious to the climate than carbon dioxide emissions – from the natural gas lifecycle. This includes methane originating from abandoned wells that are no longer in use and have not been properly decommissioned.
Neither of these changes will be easy. Despite recent progress, the development of CCS technology is generally nascent and has yet to be specifically applied to a natural gas power plant in the United States. At the same time, methane emissions from the natural gas sector are underregulated at the federal level, a problem made worse by the Trump administration’s rollback of methane regulations proposed by the Obama administration. Yet America’s ability to use our abundant gas resources to backstop and expand renewable energy on the electric grid requires swift progress on both fronts.
There also are other ways in which natural gas can contribute to a decarbonized electricity grid—including but not limited to fuel substitution with renewable natural gas, blending of hydrogen into gas pipelines, creation of “blue” hydrogen, and the potential of new generation technologies such as Allam Cycle plants—that are important and beyond the scope of this report.
Yet the political debate around energy and climate policy often presents Americans with a false choice between natural gas and renewable energy. Today the two are intertwined. America needs natural gas now to enable and backstop the rapid deployment of renewable energy on the grid (not to mention supplying power to U.S. industries and homes, which lies beyond the scope of this report).
Rather than trying to ban fossil fuel production, progressives should keep their eyes on the real prize: achieving net zero carbon emissions. Because of the uncertainties surrounding the success of any of the technologies and methods mentioned above, no one can precisely predict how long it will take America to decarbonize its economy. If decarbonization techniques applied to fossil fuels fail, a successful clean energy transition will require phasing them out. If they succeed in driving greenhouse gas emissions toward zero, natural gas could play a role in the U.S. energy mix into the foreseeable future.
Therefore, this report urges President-elect Biden to strike a new bargain between the federal government and natural gas companies for decarbonizing the natural gas sector. Washington would acknowledge and support the role gas plays in enabling rapid deployment of renewable energy in exchange for industry’s commitment to make consistent progress toward zero carbon emissions, achieved through the rapid development of CCS technology and dramatic reduction of methane emissions throughout the natural gas lifecycle.
Crucially, this approach also could help to depolarize the debate over what to do about climate change. By rejecting unrealistic demands to abolish fossil fuels now, and speeding the technological advances necessary to decarbonize them, the incoming Biden administration could build a broader base of political support for a clean energy transition that meets America’s climate and economic needs.
The Urgent Case for Climate Action
Climate change poses a dire threat to our planetary health. Biden’s victory will end a shameful four years in which the United States has been absent from the fight to slow down climate change. Biden pledged to resume U.S. international climate leadership by rejoining the Paris climate accords immediately upon taking office.
The Paris Agreement envisions limiting global average temperature increases to two degrees Celsius through a balancing of emissions sources and carbon sinks by midcentury. Over 75 countries representing approximately 11 percent of global emissions recently submitted to the United Nations strategies or pledges to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Meanwhile, China, which generates 29 percent of global emissions, making it the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, recently pledged to reach net zero emissions by 2060, although its near-term targets are far less ambitious than what Biden has proposed.
Unfortunately, experts expect that, even if they are kept, country-level commitments under the Paris Agreement still leave us on an unacceptably dangerous trajectory toward a 3.3 degrees Celsius global average temperature increase, revealing an alarming ambition gap. This degree of warming implies at least a 4 percent reduction in gross domestic product for the United States economy, with our poorest counties projected to lose between 2 and 20 percent of their income by the late 21st century.
Climate policies that channel the power of American ingenuity toward zero-carbon innovations are the key to avoiding catastrophic climate change. Thanks to innovations over the last decade, the costs of operating solar photovoltaics and onshore wind turbines in the United States has dropped dramatically, from $359 to $41 and $135 to $40 per megawatt-hour, respectively. Consequently, solar and wind energy have become booming economic sectors that employ over 350,000 workers.
Moreover, the United States Energy Information Administration predicts that generation from renewables will provide at least 38 percent of our electricity by 2050. The Biden administration is likely to press for a more ambitious target, possibly even approaching 100 percent. At high rates of deployment, however, the intermittency of renewables requires the installation of much more capacity than is necessary to meet demand, thereby resulting in high costs., To avoid this dilemma, we need a comprehensive federal policy that achieves the dual objectives of high renewable energy deployment and low electricity prices. President-elect Biden’s climate plan envisions achieving a carbon pollution-free electric grid that is then used to electrify the transportation and industrial sectors. That’s not likely to happen, however, if electricity prices spike.
That’s why we need backup power generation that moves toward zero carbon emissions. Potential sources of zero-carbon power generation include natural gas power plants with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies, geothermal, hydropower, nuclear power, and bioenergy. Natural gas is important because we already rely on it to generate about one-third of our electricity.
In a zero-carbon electric grid, the role of natural gas power plants with CCS technologies would shift from producing bulk energy to supporting renewables with zero-carbon dispatchable backstop capacity. In this way, the pitfalls of a hasty rush to 100 percent renewable energy – high prices and low reliability – can be avoided. Instead, natural gas power plants with CCS technology can work in partnership with renewable energy to rapidly achieve a decarbonized electric grid.
Unfortunately, the politics of energy and climate are deeply polarized. On the left, activists demand fracking bans and insist that shale gas and oil be left “in the ground.” On the right, climate deniers want continued U.S. reliance on fossil fuels. Although their voices are the loudest, a poll commissioned by the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) for the 2020 election suggests that neither of these camps represent majority opinion.
The poll delved into public attitudes in two presidential battleground states, Pennsylvania and Ohio, that also happen to be among America’s top five gas-producing states. The poll found that voters – including those in the “shale belt” counties where gas is produced — overwhelming see climate change as a serious problem and want the government to take vigorous action against it. At the same time, voters also overwhelming oppose (by 74-21 percent) a ban on natural gas extraction. Even among liberal and younger voters, there’s little appetite for a ban on gas production. That shouldn’t come as a big surprise, considering how important shale gas is to jobs and the economies of both states.
But the PPI poll shows that most voters have a pragmatic streak when it comes to energy and climate policy. Seventy-seven percent of voters in Pennsylvania and Ohio support using natural gas and nuclear power to support the expansion of renewable wind and solar power. They understand that gas plays many roles – generating electricity, fueling U.S. industries, and heating and cooling homes. Perhaps they also understand the role that gas plays in improving local pollution by displacing coal in the East Coast and Midwest States.
The bargain proposed in this report is grounded in that spirit of pragmatism. It would hold a seat at the clean energy table for natural gas generators in exchange for assurances that U.S. lawmakers and the natural gas industry join forces to achieve zero carbon emissions through CCS technologies and dramatic reductions in methane leaks and emissions.
How to Decarbonize the U.S. Energy Grid
Natural gas is pervasive in the American economy as a fuel and a feedstock. Ample supply and low gas prices also have powerfully stimulated growth in the U.S. chemical industry, yielding a host of useful applications and creating a substantial number of jobs. Recently, the United States also has become a significant exporter of natural gas. In the context of the electric grid, as illustrated by Figure 1, natural gas powers our electric grid about one-third of the time.
Figure 1 Projected Electric Generation from Natural Gas in the United States, Source: US EIA (2020)
Nearly all models that simulate what it would take for America to achieve deep decarbonization identify early action in the electricity sector as the linchpin to success. Models assume that a grid powered increasingly by renewable energy would then be used to electrify much of the transportation and industrial sectors, producing dramatic reductions in carbon emissions. For example, a study by Lawrence Berkeley and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories predicts a 60 to 110 percent increase in electricity demand by mid-century.
In their comprehensive review of modeling efforts to date, Jenkins et al. (2018) identify two main paths to decarbonizing the electricity sector. The first path achieves a 100 percent renewable electric grid, primarily by relying on solar and wind. But there’s a big problem: the intermittency of renewables requires overbuilding total installed capacity to produce sufficient energy during periods when available short-term wind or solar output is well below average. One finding from the literature is that total installed renewable capacity should be three to eight times larger than peak demand.
Such overcapacity directly increases electricity costs. When the amount of available wind or solar power is above average, utilities are forced to reduce energy output because they can’t store the excess energy. When the amount of available wind or solar power is below average, then models rely on long-term expensive battery storage to keep the grid running. Finally, a 100 percent renewable grid tends to require optimistic modeling assumptions including continent-scale transmission lines and extremely flexible demand response.
The second, more pragmatic path envisions a strategic backstop to wind and solar power by employing dispatchable forms of electricity. Most of the challenges associated with overreliance on renewables can be avoided by adopting a generation portfolio with some level of generation capable of fast ramp rates, low capital costs, and high variable costs. In this context, natural gas generators pair especially well with high buildouts of solar and wind.
Adding a backstop like natural gas leads to total installed capacity that is much more closely sized to peak loads. This results in a reliable grid that delivers lower electricity prices. Moreover, the need for seasonal storage is completely avoided and grid reliability thereby is strengthened. Consequently, firm low-carbon resources are a consistent feature of the most affordable and reliable pathways to deeply decarbonizing the United States electricity grid.
For example, a recent comprehensive exercise that models deep carbonization of the U.S. electrical grid finds that the availability of backstop power, such as natural gas generation with CCS, reduces electricity costs 10 to 62 percent compared to scenarios that rely exclusively on variable sources paired with energy storage. Cheap prices and reliable electricity are critical to achieving a decarbonized economy via mid-century, as envisioned in President-elect Biden’s climate plan.
As illustrated in Figure 2, a renewable-only approach is cheaper in the short-term but becomes exponentially expensive in the long-term the closer we get to a 100 percent renewable grid. Maintaining a role for natural gas with CCS technology can avoid the portion of the renewables only curve where costs grow exponentially and thereby lead to large cost savings. There’s no doubt that renewable energy can and should form the backbone of our zero-carbon electricity grid. But natural gas power plants with CCS technology would enable more rapid and strategic development of renewable energy by serving as an emissions-free backstop that secures lower electricity prices and ensures grid reliability.
Figure 2 Electricity Costs and Renewable Penetrations for Different Decarbonization Strategies, Source: Spokas et al. (2020)
Generating Zero-Carbon Natural Gas
Models that simulate decarbonization of the electric sector typically include natural gas generation with CCS technologies. For example, a recent study by the University of California Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy assessed the feasibility of a 90 percent clean United States electricity grid by 2035 and relied on natural gas with CCS to provide dispatchable power. To achieve a 100 percent clean electricity grid, the authors highlighted two options: (1) further investments in CCS for natural gas, or, (2) further reliance on expensive alternatives—such as hydrogen or storage—that doubled marginal abatement costs into the range of 100 to 125 dollars per ton.
Unfortunately, the use of CCS lags far behind what is required to meet America’s carbon-reduction targets under the Paris Agreement. The Petra Nova coal plant in Texas is the only U.S fossil-fuel powered plant capable of generating and capturing carbon in large quantities, but its operations were suspended earlier this year amid low oil prices and falling demand for energy as a result of the pandemic. Outside of the electricity sector, the U.S. has 10 of the world’s 19 large- scale CCS projects. Most operate in natural gas processing plants, fertilizer production, synthetic natural gas production, or ethanol production. There are no CCS projects operating on natural gas generators in the United States.
“Given the challenges now facing available firm low-carbon resources, it is tempting for policymakers, socially conscious businesses, and research efforts to bet exclusively on today’s apparent winners: solar photovoltaics, wind, and battery energy storage. That would be a mistake,” says Jenkins et al. (2020). Instead, the authors call for investing in a more technically diverse approach, which includes natural gas generation with CCS among other technologies, to secure low prices for zero-carbon electricity.
Despite unfavorable economics today, the value of natural gas with CCS technology grows as renewable penetration or marginal costs of renewables become quite high. Therefore, Spokas et al. (2020) argue that excluding CCS technologies from our decarbonization toolkit based on present-day economics is likely shortsighted and fails to “recognize CCS may have significant value in the future and risks stunting CCS technology advancement.”
A federal tax rule (45Q) provides an incentive for company investments in carbon sequestration. It is calculated by multiplying the metric tons of qualified carbon sequestered by a predetermined value. Depending on the type of project, the incentive ranges from $11.70 to $28.74 and rises annually accounting for inflation. The incentive requires secure geological storage of carbon emissions in deep saline formations, oil and gas reservoirs, or un-minable coal seams. The claimer of the credit must capture at least 500,000 metric tons of carbon annually. If the carbon captured somehow leaks out, the incentive must be repaid to the Treasury.
At the state level, California has a low-carbon fuel standard that uses market trading to price credits for carbon savings. Credits recently have traded around $200 per ton. This also creates a strong incentive for producers to invest in CCS technologies, including direct air capture, CCS at oil and gas production facilities, and CCS at refineries.
This patchwork of policies has led to an encouraging pipeline of new CCS projects across a broad range of geographies and technologies. The Clean Air Task Force’s CCUS Project Tracker reports 32 projects announced since 2018 that have the potential to sequester 40 million metric tons of carbon dioxide annually. Eight of these projects leverage financing through California’s low-carbon fuel standard in addition to using the federal 45Q incentive. Six of these projects aim to apply CCS technologies to natural gas power plants. Spokas et al. (2020) argue that CCS technology on natural gas plants is technically feasible and could break even from an economic perspective if they combine 45Q with enhanced oil recovery, which is the use of captured carbon to extract oil that could not have otherwise been extracted.
Ultimately, natural gas generators with CCS must be deployed at scale to achieve an effective zero-carbon backstop for renewables. The policy and technical inertia surrounding CCS development must be expedited to ensure that CCS technologies develop quickly enough to be applied successfully to a natural gas generator as soon as possible. Therefore, the federal and state policies that have spurred new CCS projects should be strengthened. For example, the Clean Air Task Force has proposed a modification of the 45Q incentive to expand the effective window of eligibility for new CCS projects.
Dramatically Reducing Methane Emissions from the Natural Gas Lifecycle
Natural gas emits about half as much carbon dioxide as coal when combusted. That is a primary reason why switching from coal to gas generation led to big reductions in carbon emissions from the electricity sector after the shale gas revolution started. However, natural gas producers emit significant amounts of gas by venting, inefficient flaring, and “fugitive” emissions through leaks in wells and equipment. These emissions have a disproportionately large impact on the climate because the primary component of natural gas, methane, warms the globe 86 times more effectively than carbon dioxide over a 20-year time frame. Therefore, if not controlled, fugitive methane emissions could more than offset the climate gains of switching to gas from coal.
Studies show that gas is more climate friendly than coal so long as methane emissions are kept below 2.7 percent of gas production., As illustrated in Figure 3, methane emissions are generated in four natural gas “subsectors”: production, processing, transmission and distribution. A recent study estimates that national methane emissions were 2.3 percent of total gas production in 2015, suggesting only a slight advantage to using natural gas over coal in that year. Another recent study estimates that methane emissions from the Permian Basis, a major producing region in Texas, were 3.7 percent of production in 2018 and 2019, suggesting a significant disadvantage from using natural gas from this regional over coal. Moreover, comparisons to coal are less relevant as coal-fired generation decreases and renewable generation increases. In short, methane emissions must be reduced dramatically if natural gas is to play its crucial role as a zero-carbon firm resource to backstop renewables.
Figure 3 Recent Estimates of Methane Emissions from United States Natural Gas Subsectors,
Source: Adapted from World Resources Institute (2019)
The Trump administration, unfortunately, moved in the opposite direction. It rolled back one of the last Obama-era climate regulations that would have reduced methane emissions from oil and gas wells constructed after 2016 and prompted regulations on existing oil and gas wells. Major oil and gas players including BP, Exxon, and Shell supported the regulation. The main opposition came from smaller oil and gas players.
The Clean Air Task Force estimates that Trump’s collective rollback of methane regulations will increase emissions 4.3 million metrics tons in 2035 and warm the climate as much as the carbon emissions of nearly 100 coal-fired power plants. Beyond climatic costs, the Trump administration’s rollbacks threaten public health and safety. For example, methane leaks lead to ozone formation and often include emission of volatile organic compounds that are known to aggravate respiratory problems and can be carcinogenic.
Several states have stepped into the leadership vacuum. Led by former Governor and now U.S. Senator John Hickenlooper, Colorado imposed several types of regulations, most notably a leak detection and repair program that began in early 2010s. My own 2017 study, with Alan Krupnick from Resources for the Future, reports that the number of estimated leaks in Colorado has fallen by 75 percent since these rules went into effect. California, Massachusetts, and New Mexico have followed Colorado’s lead with their own forms of regulation, but by and large methane emissions remain largely under-regulated by state governments.
Some industry players are voluntarily reducing their emissions. ONE Future, for example, is a coalition of 30 natural gas companies working together to voluntarily reduce their methane emissions across the natural gas life cycle to 1 percent or less of produced natural gas by 2025. ONE Future reports that their methane emissions were well below one percent for 2017 and 2018. More recently, the American Gas Association and Edison Electric Institute launched the Natural Gas Sustainability Initiative which aims to measure methane emissions intensity across the natural gas lifecycle. As a final example, The Environmental Partnership is a newly formed group of companies voluntarily implementing best practices and installing certain equipment to reduce their methane emissions. Many of these efforts build upon EPA’s Methane Challenge Program, a voluntary program aimed at sharing information that facilitates methane emissions reduction.
In addition, a host of non-profits and start-ups also are measuring, labeling, and trading “green” or “climate differentiated” natural gas with low methane emissions. My own 2020 study, with Alan Krupnick of Resources for the Future, surveys these efforts, which started with a “sustainable” gas transition between Southwestern Energy and New Jersey Resources in 2018. A similar trade for “carbon-neutral” liquified natural gas occurred in 2019 between Shell and Tokyo Gas.
The Rocky Mountain Institute has recently launched a digital platform that will offer emissions data from satellites, aircrafts, and monitoring stations to help companies assess methane emission against performance benchmarks. While these efforts are encouraging, we argue that further federal government involvement in these voluntary markets is necessary to increase participation, enhance ambition, and improve both the accuracy and credibility of these efforts.
Federal action is imperative because methane emissions from the natural gas sector are still too high and may even be trending in the wrong direction. Based on EPA data, which likely underestimates methane emissions on average, methane emissions from the natural gas system have slightly increased since 2016, from 135.8 to 140.0 MMTCO2-eq. Some methods for measuring methane emission carry high levels of uncertainty, which indicates a need for uniform standards. None of the voluntary efforts to date have achieved widespread industry participation that federal regulations could mandate. Nor have they set the type of ambitious targets that federal regulations could mandate, instead tending to identify modest reductions that ensure natural gas maintains its climate advantage over coal and gasoline, rather than prioritizing maximum abatement.
Federal methane regulation should be designed both to cut methane emissions and to equate the private and social costs of methane, which amount to over 1,100 USD per ton. Any methane regulation must address the downward bias and large uncertainties associated with the methane inventory maintained by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
For starters, Washington lawmakers should aim at replicating Colorado’s leak detection and repair programs, given that these programs can quickly remedy major leaks and potentially lead to improved inventories. My 2017 study, with Alan Krupnick of Resources for the Future, explores a variety of additional policies to reduce methane emissions that are compatible with other possible federal climate policies, such as carbon taxes or clean energy standards. For example, a nationwide carbon tax could be modified for methane by imposing an assumed default rate of emissions per ton of natural gas produced.
This default rate is necessary because of uncertainties regarding the quantification of methane emissions and the rate itself could be challenged by polluters via a pre-defined regulatory process. In this way, the default rate ensures that estimated methane emissions are not lower than actual ones, while the challenge process allows companies that beat the default rate to make their case. Similarly, a tradable performance standard could be constructed to achieve a certain leakage rate in the natural gas sector, an approach that could pair well with a broader clean energy standard as envisioned in President-elect Biden’s climate plan.
Other proposals contemplate requiring the reporting of financial liabilities associated with methane and carbon emission on a company’s financials, which would create a powerful incentive to maximize emission reductions. Tougher federal regulation, combining the approaches outlined here, is an essential component of a comprehensive and credible strategy for reducing U.S. methane emissions.
Plugging Old Gas Wells
I managed a small team of researchers at Resources for the Future in 2015 and 2016 that focused on estimating the economic and environmental impacts of end-of-life wells. We estimated that there are up to 2.67 million inactive oil and gas wells in the United States. Left unplugged, we found that these wells can emit methane, contribute to poor air quality, and contaminate surface water. Moreover, our research uncovered that bonds posted by gas drillers, although intended to cover the cost of properly plugging wells, are not nearly enough to cover plugging costs in most states. The result is a large pool of inactive wells that are improperly plugged. Methane emissions from abandoned wells are estimated to have the same climate impact as greenhouse gases emissions from 2.1 million passenger vehicles.
Properly plugging abandoned wells is a prerequisite to achieve near-elimination of methane emissions from the entire natural gas lifecycle. For starters, regulators should increase bonding requirements at the state and federal levels. Another approach would be the creation of a federal agency with dedicated funding to plug abandoned wells. Raimi et al. (2020) suggest that the Covid-19 pandemic in conjunction with low employment rates in the oil and gas industry justify such a federal program. The authors estimate that a significant federal program to plug abandoned wells could create tens of thousands of jobs.
Near-elimination of methane emissions would also create lucrative new opportunities for U.S. natural gas exporters. For example, a recent strategy from the European Union on methane emissions suggests an imminent surge in demand for “green” natural gas exports with low methane emissions. Indeed, natural gas exports with anything more than low methane emissions may not be permitted to trade internationally. Concerns over methane emissions led the French government to recently block a liquified natural gas deal between a Texas company called NextDecade and a French company called Engie. As methane emissions are controlled, exports of U.S. gas could help other countries reduce their carbon emissions.
Managing Risk and Uncertainty in Energy Policy
The evolution of America’s zero-carbon energy transition is fraught with uncertainty. It is contingent on the evolution of technologies in various stages of development. Policymakers should therefore approach the subject with a degree of humility. After all, no one predicted 20 years ago that new drilling technologies would create a shale boom that has propelled the United States back to the forefront of world’s leading oil and gas producers. Likewise, no one today can foresee the innovations and technological breakthroughs that could upend today’s prevailing assumptions about the best way to decarbonize our economy.
Uncertainty implies risk and the prudent way to manage risk is through diversification. Putting all our eggs in a single basket – through policies based on a narrow vision of a zero-carbon grid powered by 100 percent renewables – is unwise. Unfortunately, some climate activists seem willing to bet everything on this single path to decarbonization.
The risk in taking this single path is that it will expose Americans to high electricity prices and potentially periodic energy shortages on the way to our destination. It may also, of course, lead to premature or unnecessary destruction of good jobs in the natural gas sector. The resulting political fallout could slow or even block American’s clean energy transition. That is why President-elect Biden has made clear that, despite President Trump’s claims to the contrary, he opposes fracking bans.
The pragmatic and progressive course forward is to pursue multiple avenues to decarbonization. Government and private industry should invest in a broad portfolio of energy sources and technologies that can lead us to zero-carbon energy generation and craft policies to ensure consistent and rapid progress. These energy sources and technologies include CCS and many other options including advancements in geothermal, hydrogen, and nuclear.
A bill introduced by Representative Diana DeGette, the Clean Energy Innovation and Deployment Act (CEIDA), embodies many of the principles discussed in this report. CEIDA would create a standard that transitions the electricity sector to 100 percent clean energy. As part of that standard, zero and low emitting technologies will be rewarded by receiving credits that can be sold to dirtier technologies. Natural gas would receive partial credit, although associated methane emissions would be accounted for. Consequently, CEIDA strikes a balance between wind, solar, and gas that displays awareness about the risks of America’s clean energy transition. In part because of this awareness, CEIDA received positive reviews from a wide array of environmental, industry, and labor groups. Therefore, CEIDA provides a useful starting point for the Biden administration and Congress.
Conclusion
Natural gas generators can play an indispensable role in decarbonizing the electricity sector by providing dispatchable energy that backstops rapid deployment of renewable energy. A bargain that invests in CCS technologies while requiring that industry dramatically reduce methane emissions would facilitate the deployment of zero-carbon natural gas generation. Such a bargain would accelerate high penetrations of renewables while achieving low electricity prices and ensuring grid reliability. These conditions are tailored for achieving widespread decarbonization because cheap electricity prices in a zero-carbon electric grid can then be leveraged to electrify the entire economy, including industry and transport. Natural gas generators with CCS technologies paired with low methane emissions from the natural gas life cycle represents a strong path forward for achieving President-elect Biden’s goal of a carbon pollution-free electric sector by 2035 and a net-zero emissions economy by 2050.
Gas Currently Supports Solar and Wind Expansion But Must Reduce Emissions Further in Coming Decades to Meet U.S. Climate Goals
Contact: media@ppionline.org
WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Progressive Policy Institute released its latest “Memo to the President-elect” report on the urgent need for U.S. policymakers to both regulate and increase technologies incentives to reduce emissions from natural gas so that gas can continue to play an important role in long-term U.S. economic growth and decarbonization.
“In meeting his ambitious electricity decarbonization goals, President-elect Biden should both regulate methane reductions and increase incentives for carbon capture, enabling gas to achieve deeper emission reductions and continuing its complementary role in the expansion of renewable energy,” said PPI President Will Marshal.
The report finds that to achieve Biden’s goal of net zero electricity emissions by 2035, the U.S. should use natural gas to both enable and backstop the rapid deployment of renewable energy on the grid. Despite the role of natural gas in meeting climate goals to date, the political debate around energy and climate policy often presents Americans with a false choice between natural gas and renewable energy. The report details the way in which natural gas can make the clean energy transition, including the expansion of renewable energy, possible without making electricity more expensive and potentially less reliable, and therefore less politically feasible.
“The U.S. electric grid faces a dual challenge: meeting growing demand for power while also decarbonizing the energy it supplies, which is essential to avert catastrophic climate change,” said report author Clayton Munnings. “If the report recommendations are adopted, natural gas can continue to play an important role in meeting these challenges, and achieving President-elect Biden’s zero carbon emissions goal for the nation’s power sector by 2035.”
The report’s key highlights include:
Natural gas can play an indispensable role in the expansion of renewable energy.Natural gas today already supports the expansion of renewable energy by providing an instantly dispatchable source of electricity. The unique flexibility of natural gas power plants to turn on and off within minutes, which coal and nuclear plants cannot offer, means gas quickly matches supply and demand even when the wind isn’t blowing and the sun isn’t shining.
Rather than trying to ban fossil fuel production, progressives should keep their eyes on the real prize: achieving net zero emissions.Uncertainties abound when it comes to nascent renewable and storage technologies and no one can precisely predict how long it will take America to decarbonize its economy. The U.S. should rely on natural gas to provide dispatchable energy to increase the chances of a successful clean energy transition.
Federal policy should encourage the natural gas sector to make consistent progress toward zero carbon emissions.Washington should acknowledge and support the critical role of natural gas in exchange for industry’s commitment to make consistent progress toward zero carbon emissions. Such progress will require the rapid development of CCS technology and dramatic reduction of methane emissions throughout the natural gas lifecycle. Federal policy should invest more heavily in CCS and adopt and enforce ambitious goals for dramatically reducing methane emissions.
American voters are pragmatic and support a balanced approach to energy. With some activists demanding fracking bans and climate deniers desiring continued U.S. reliance on fossil fuels, a 2020 poll commissioned by the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) suggests that neither of these camps represent majority opinion. For example, seventy-seven percent of voters in Pennsylvania and Ohio support using natural gas and nuclear power to support the expansion of renewable wind and solar power, representing a pragmatic approach to energy and climate policy.
Federal policy should aim at the dual objectives of high renewable energy deployment and low electricity prices. If not properly balanced, a transition to a grid powered by renewable energy will expose Americans to high electricity prices, create potential periodic energy shortages, and lead to premature or unnecessary destruction of good jobs in the natural gas sector. In particular, low electricity prices would enable further electrification of the transport and industrial sectors. Federal policy should take care that energy goals don’t create adverse consequences for consumers.
“Rather than trying to ban natural gas production, which is politically fraught, progressives should keep their eyes on the real prize: achieving net zero emissions,” said Munnings.
President-elect Joe Biden campaigned on a sweeping agenda to expand access to college — provide free tuition at public colleges and universities for all families with incomes below $125,000, double the maximum value of Pell Grants, and make community college free for up to two years. However, much of this agenda may be difficult to achieve unless Democrats, against formidable odds, can win both upcoming runoffs for the two Senate seats in Georgia. Fortunately, a President Biden could use his executive authority to expand access to college (and more affordable) by making the process for earning college credit through Advanced Placement (AP), International Baccalaureate (IB) programs, and college courses taken in high school at community colleges, more transparent and accessible.
During his campaign, President-elect Biden proposed creating a more seamless process for earning credit for college-level work completed prior to enrolling as an undergraduate (dual enrollment). A Biden-Harris administration could fast track this effort in two steps.
As our public education system continues to experience unprecedented challenges related to the pandemic, the Progressive Policy Institute’s David Osborne and Tressa Pankovits thought now would be a good time to offer a how-to guide on creating innovation schools.
In this 74 Interview, Osborne acknowledges that many districts are barely managing to operate — never mind innovate — during a crisis that also involves a collapsing economy and a national reckoning on race. But the author of 2017’s Reinventing America’s Schools sees a not-too-distant future when a vaccine is widely available, the system has begun to return to some level of normalcy and education leaders will have to consider fresh solutions to the fallout.