The Democratic Party has lost its way. A party whose very purpose has been to fight for working families has forfeited their trust and confidence. The losses are most obvious among white working-class voters. In 1960, John F. Kennedy won white working-class (noncollege) voters but lost white college graduates by two to one. In 2024, Kamala Harris lost white working-class voters by over two to one (67 percent to 31 percent) while winning white college graduates solidly
The self-flattering story Democrats have told themselves is that rising white racism explains the defection of white working-class voters. But that simple story was always undercut by data showing white racism has declined, not increased, in recent decades. And the fable was further undermined in the 2024 election by the defection of many Hispanic, Asian, and black working-class voters as well. The Democratic advantage among nonwhite working-class voters has declined sharply by 37 points since 2012. In 2024, the only net increase for Democrats compared to 2020 was among whites.
The party has sunk so low that it cannot beat the man who infamously inspired his followers to attack the U.S. Capitol, sat by while they created mayhem, and would, once back in office, pardon the attackers. Republicans have had a higher identification rate among voters than Democrats for the last three years, something that hasn’t been true for almost a century. Only 29 percent of Americans view the Democrats favorably according to CNN, the lowest rate since CNN began asking the question more than thirty years ago.
What went wrong for the Democrats, and what can be done about it? There are many answers to the first question, but fundamentally, much of it boils down to this: at a time when the life prospects of Americans are increasingly shaped by economic class, not skin color or gender, Democrats have moved in the opposite direction and time and time again prioritized racial and gender identity. Restoring the primacy of working-class priorities, on issues of culture as well as economics, provides the central path forward for a Democratic Party that wants to build a durable majority and restore its identity as the party of working people.
Recent coverage regarding smoke-free nicotine products is more than just unfair – it’s irresponsible and damaging to public health. A recent story in the New York Post should be cheered by tobacco companies: its distortion of the facts will keep adult smokers using the most harmful nicotine delivery method – combustible cigarettes.
Unfortunately, this is par for the course when it comes to how the media covers cigarette alternatives such as nicotine pouches and heated tobacco products, which offer adults better options than continuing to smoke.
Critics of nicotine pouches often contend that they are not authorized by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This is false. The most popular nicotine pouch in the U.S., ZYN, recently received marketing authorization for all 20 of its products, including flavored varieties. In its January decision, the FDA noted that “these products offer greater benefits to population health” and “meet that bar by benefiting adults who use cigarettes and/or smokeless tobacco products and completely switch to these products.”
Another common misperception is that nicotine pouches are increasingly used by young people. But according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s latest National Youth Tobacco Survey, “youth nicotine pouch use did not show a statistically significant change from 2023” and remains low, at just 1.8 percent.
Heated tobacco products are another promising innovation that offer adults a better alternative to cigarettes. To be clear, IQOS is the only FDA-authorized heated tobacco product on the market in the U.S., and the agency acknowledges it significantly reduces the production of harmful chemicals compared to cigarette smoke.
Personally, I was a smoker with the lung capacity of someone 165 years old. I switched to heat-not-burn and now have the lung capacity of someone 50. Many other adult smokers have similar success stories – stories the media should cheer instead of sneer at.
The media has a responsibility to report the facts so the American public is fully informed about the realities of FDA-authorized smoke-free products, including their health benefits compared to smoking.
When the media fails to get the facts right, adult smokers pay the price. We can – and must – do better.
From President John F. Kennedy’s iconic call to “go to the Moon, not because it is easy” to President Barack Obama’s forward-looking directive to use commercial rides to orbit for cargo and crew, Democrats have historically been strong supporters of the space program.
Unfortunately, in the years since Obama left office, Democrats have dropped the ball on the matter. Republicans have used it to rile up their base with calls to showcase American superiority, and beat China on the off-world stage.
It’s not that Democratic members are silent on space. We still see lawmakers on the left celebrating major milestones in the space program, and vocally supporting the traditionally Democratic positions of promoting science funding and workforce development.
These are important things to support. But they’re a small subset of space-related topics that require attention as the space industry rapidly transforms.
America’s K-12 teachers have experienced a notable upswing in morale but have serious concerns about K-12 schools. That’s the central message about what teachers are thinking from two polls of public school teachers from Education Week and the Pew Research Center and one poll of public and private school teachers from EdChoice/Morning Consult.
These one-point-in-time snapshots help us understand teachers’ views of their profession and K-12 education. As the school year draws to a close and we observe National Teacher Appreciation Week, it’s valuable to hear the voices of teachers, as challenging and unsettling as some of their perspectives may be.
WASHINGTON — Today, Ben Ritz, Vice President of Policy Development at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) and Director of PPI’s Center for Funding America’s Future, issued the following statement on Moody’s decision to downgrade the U.S. credit rating from AAA:
“Even as all the other major ratings agencies downgraded U.S. credit over the past 15 years, Moody’s held firm in maintaining our government’s AAA credit rating. That today even Moody’s has lost its once-unshakable confidence in the sustainability of U.S. fiscal policy is more than a canary in the coal mine: America cannot afford a ‘big beautiful bill’ with policies that would add more than $5 trillion to our national credit card over the next decade if permanently enacted. No lawmaker who supports this budget-busting boondoggle or anything like it moving forward can call themselves a ‘deficit hawk’ ever again.”
Read more PPI analysis of the “Big Beautiful Bill” and its grave fiscal consequences:
Launched in 2018, the Progressive Policy Institute’s Center for Funding America’s Future works to promote a fiscally responsible public investment agenda that fosters robust and inclusive economic growth. To that end, the Center develops fiscally responsible policy proposals to strengthen public investments in the foundation of our economy, modernize health and retirement programs to reflect an aging society, transform our tax code to reward work over wealth, and put the national debt on a downward trajectory.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org. Find an expert at PPI and follow us on Twitter.
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Media Contact: Ian O’Keefe – iokeefe@ppionline.org
In a recent blog item, we estimated that in 2025, the five big tech companies — Amazon, Alphabet, Apple, Meta, and Microsoft — are projected to invest $240 billion in the U.S. in capital expenditures, primarily in AI-related data centers and equipment. Other large tech companies and investors are pouring huge amounts of money into new data centers as well.
This tech and AI investment surge dramatically overshadows domestic investment from major manufacturing industries. For example, in 2023, the motor vehicle industry invested just $29 billion in U.S. structures and equipment, while the primary metals industry, including steel and aluminum, invested only $15 billion.
Indeed, data center construction is providing a much-needed boost to state economies. Consider Virginia, one of the leading locations for data centers. The 2024 report on “Data Centers in Virginia,” from the state’s Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, found that “the data center industry provides approximately 74,000 jobs, $5.5 billion in labor income, and $9.1 billion in Virginia GDP overall to the state economy annually.” That estimate was based on average spending by the industry between FY21 and FY23, prior to the AI boom.
The Virginia report noted that data center revenue has allowed localities to lower real estate tax rates, construct new schools, and establish revenue stabilization or reserve funds. Moreover, “data centers are an attractive industry because they impose minimal direct costs on the provision of government services,” including local roads, and school systems.
In recognition of the economic benefits of data centers, most states offer an exemption from sales tax for the equipment going into data centers. That’s analogous to the sales tax exemption most states offer for the purchase of manufacturing machinery to go into a factory. Texas, for example, exempts “certain items necessary to the operation of qualifying large data centers,” while also exempting “several types of items used in manufacturing products for sale, including materials that become part of the manufactured product” and equipment “necessary or essential to the manufacturing operation if it causes a physical or chemical change in the product being manufactured.”
Oddly enough, if more factories are built in a state where manufacturing machinery was exempt from sales tax, the nominal revenue loss from the sales tax exemption would rise, even as politicians would cheer. The same would be true if more data centers are built.
This quirk in the accounting for tax expenditures can produce misleading headlines. For example, one recent report focused on the revenue loss from sales tax exemptions for data center purchases, highlighting Texas: “For example, in the space of just 23 months, Texas revised its FY 2025 cost projection from $130 million to $1 billion.” The report added: “We know of no other form of state spending that is so out of control.”
But that’s an odd interpretation of good news. Clearly, the increase in the Texas projections was due to the AI boom, which added tens of billions of dollars in genuinely new data center construction in the state. This construction represents a true gain to the Texas economy, not a loss. For comparison, it should also be noted that the size of the sales tax exemption for machinery, equipment, and materials used in Texas manufacturing is projected to be $11.5 billion in FY25, and rising to $15 billion in FY30, reflecting the strength of manufacturing in Texas.
To summarize: A state sales tax exemption for data center equipment, like the one for manufacturing machinery, is designed to boost investment and jobs. Without the exemption, the investment in the state — and the contribution to the state economy — would be lower.
From our Budget Breakdown series highlighting problems in fiscal policy to inform the 2025 tax and budget debate.
PPI warned last week that Republicans’ “Big Beautiful Bill” was shaping up to repeat and compound many of the problems that doomed Joe Biden’s “Build Back Better” plan in 2021, such as bloating the legislation with a partisan wishlist and relying on budget gimmicks to mask its outrageous costs. But as House Republicans unveiled and began marking up legislative text this week, the details proved to be even worse than anticipated.
They also relied on even more budget gimmicks than expected to hide the legislation’s true cost. It was widely anticipated that Trump’s many campaign proposals, such as exempting auto loan interest payments, overtime income, and tips from income taxes, would be made temporary to lower the bill’s sticker price. But the bill included several additional tax cuts, such as an enhanced Child Tax Credit (for everyone but low-income families) and a larger standard deduction, which are also set to expire after only a few years.
In reality, Republicans don’t intend to allow any of these provisions to ever expire. They used the same tactic to reduce the scored cost of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in 2017, only to now argue that preventing the scheduled expiration of that bill’s tax cuts should cost nothing at all because they are not creating “new” tax cuts. As a result, the debt impact of Republicans’ BBB would be substantially higher than they claim. While the “official” cost of the bill’s tax cuts is roughly $3.8 trillion over 10 years, they would actually cost around $5.3 trillion — plus as much as $900 billion in interest costs — if enacted permanently.
These problems are only likely to grow worse as Republicans make changes needed to win over uncommitted votes. Blue-state Republicans in the House are demanding a far greater increase to the $10,000 cap on State and Local Tax (SALT) deductions than the $30,000 level included in the bill, which they called an “insulting” offer. A critical mass of members in both the House and Senate have opposed the bill’s rollback of clean-energy tax credits from the Inflation Reduction Act, which they say will kill emerging technologies and cost their constituents jobs. Many oppose the bill’s deep Medicaid cuts that would leave 7.6 million more Americans uninsured — with one senator referring to them as “morally wrong and politically suicidal.” Meanwhile, Conservative hardliners in both the House and Senate are still demanding deeper spending cuts that might be more fiscally responsible but could make the bill even more difficult for swing-district Republicans to support.
Ironically, Republicans are repeating the same mistakes that helped sink President Biden’s BBB plan in 2021. That bill also relied on arbitrary expiration dates to cram in a disjointed wishlist of policy priorities, even if they risked exacerbating budget deficits and inflation. As a result, the version that passed the House in 2021 lacked a clear strategy and made it easier for critical lawmakers to walk away when inflation continued to worsen. Yet Republicans have taken this playbook to an even greater extreme by proposing a bill that would add roughly three times as much to the annual budget deficit in its worst year as Biden’s BBB would have — despite the fact that inflation remains a pressing concern for voters.
If Republicans continue down this road, their BBB could very well fall apart entirely as Biden’s did. However, if they do successfully manage to jam their partisan megabill through Congress, the fallout would be substantially worse: stuffing the tax code with a myriad of giveaways, cutting critical social services for working families, and risking another round of inflation by blowing up the budget deficit – leaving Americans to pay the price for years to come.
Uncapping the SALT deduction would provide nearly three-quarters of the benefits to households making over $430,000, with an average annual tax cut of roughly $140,000 for the top 0.1% of households.
In an exchange with Rep. Brendan Boyle (D-Pa.) at an April House Ways and Means Committee hearing (2:20:43), U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer defines “success” for the Trump administration’s tariff decrees as follows:
“The deficit [i.e. trade balance] needs to go in the right direction. Manufacturing as a share of GDP needs to go in the right direction.”
Economics and daily life offer lots of reasons to object to this. “Manufacturing as a share of GDP,” for example, would fall during a factory boom if (say) homebuilding, digital tech firms, and retail sales grew even faster. Likewise, in a recession, the manufacturing share of GDP could rise even if Americans made many fewer cars, dental drills, harvesters, semiconductor chips, etc., so long as housing and finance crashed harder. Trade balances, meanwhile, can provide insights on the economy, but their relationship to economic trends is often perverse: deficits tend to rise during good years and fall in recessions. And most people likely see a lower cost of living, strong growth, and job opportunities as the main indications of successful policy, whether in trade specifically or economics in general.
But shelving these high-minded arguments for a minute, how do Ambassador Greer’s two indexes look so far?
We don’t yet know about the “manufacturing share of GDP” and won’t for a while. The Bureau of Economic Analysis does these estimates every three months. Their first 2025 “GDP by Industry” release doesn’t come out until June 26th, and it covers January to March; the first data for trends since the April 2 won’t be out until late September. For the trade balance, though, the initial numbers are drifting in, and they’re pretty unappealing.
Trade-balance numbers originate in data on cargo manifests, pipeline computers, air cargo package arrivals, etc. Customs and Border Protection officers dutifully convey them to Census statisticians who collate and analyze the raw data, add in estimates of service flows, and publish the numbers every month. Their most recent release — last Thursday’s “FT-900”, covering trade flows in March — suggests that the prospect of rising tariff rates, then the February/March tariff decrees, and the prospect of more in April, induced a rapid and massive deficit spike.
This release reports an overall U.S. March ‘trade deficit’ of $140.5 billion (for goods and services combined) — nearly double the $78.7 billion deficit of October 2024, and more than double the $68.5 billion in March 2024. Some monthly comparisons across “sectors”:
March 2024
October 2024
March 2025
Change 3/24-3/25
All goods and services trade
-$68.5 billion
-$73.7 billion
-$140.5 billion
+105%
All goods trade
-$93.5 billion
-$98.8 billion
-$163.5 billion
+65%
Manufacturing trade only
-$84.8 billion
-$118.8 billion
-$151.5 billion
+79%
Agricultural trade only
-$3.0 billion
-$2.5 billion
-$4.6 billion
+53%
Alternatively, the broader goods-and-services figures drawn from BEA’s GDP estimates (and still subject to some revision) show quarterly “deficits” in a $200 to $250 billion range last year, or just under 3% of GDP. The first quarter of 2025 brought a sudden escalation to nearly $400 billion, or 4.2% of GDP. This is the highest GDP ratio BEA has found in 17 years, since the pre-crisis autumn of 2008.
The obvious questions: Why is this happening? How much credit do the administration’s tariff decrees get for it? Is the spike permanent? And if it is, what would the administration then do? A few thoughts:
1. Why? “Trade balance” is not an independent thing, but an arithmetical calculation: exports minus imports. The January-March deficit spike is entirely because the ‘import’ side of this calculation got a lot bigger while exports stayed about the same. The likely cause is that over these months, U.S.-based manufacturers, farmers, and construction firms were stockpiling as much metal, tools, fertilizer, paint, wiring, semiconductor chips, and other inputs as they could to save money before tariffs raised their costs, and retailers were doing the same for spring and summer inventory. So in an immediate sense, the Trump administration’s tariff decrees pretty certainly caused the spike.
2. Is it permanent?Census’ next report will likely still show some import-booming, but over the summer, imports will probably drop back. So all else equal, the deficit would be smaller later in the year. But by then two new factors will probably come into play, one pushing deficits down and the other pushing them up. They are:
(a) A recession would cut trade deficits: If the U.S. is in recession by July, Americans will buy fewer cars, houses, and consumer goods. Factory slowdowns and canceled construction projects will likewise cut imports of industrial goods. As in past recessions — 1991, 2001, 2008 — trade deficits would then likely drop. The administration might take solace in that, though the public probably wouldn’t.
(b) Deteriorating savings/investment balance will raise them: Meanwhile, though, the Trump administration’s domestic goals, if met, will lead to higher long-term trade deficits. The fundamental nature of trade balances is not ‘the incremental results of trade policy here and abroad’, in which balances by country are separate and unconnected data points. Rather, the trade balance is a core GDP ‘identity’: whether surplus or deficit, it will always equal any gap between national savings and national investment. If Congress’ potential tax cut is larger than the administration’s tariff increases, government “dissaving” — i.e. the fiscal deficit — will rise. Unless this is offset by some unexpected surge in family savings, or a collapse in business investment, the trade deficit will then grow rather than shrink. This is exactly what happened after the first Trump term’s combination of tariffs on steel, aluminum, and most Chinese-made goods with an income tax cut.
3. And so?The early data look awkward for the trade-balance measurement of success the administration’s senior officials favor. This is probably temporary, but the mix of tariffs and tax policy makes higher long-term deficits more likely than smaller ones. As to the “manufacturing share of GDP,” no particular reason for optimism there either. Since the first Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese goods, steel, and aluminum in 2018, this share has fallen from 10.9% to 9.9% — either regardless of the tariffs, or in part because of them, given that they raised U.S. manufacturing costs. More of this is probably coming, given the Commerce Department’s apparent plans to make factory managers pay 25% more for basic manufacturing inputs including metals, semiconductor chips, and critical minerals, and the April 2 decree’s 10% tariffs on raw materials, wiring, paint, glass, light-bulbs, ceramics, etc. So there’s a high chance that the administration’s policy will drive both of its chosen “success” indicators — as well as better indicators such as the cost of living — in the “wrong” direction, not the “right” one. What does it then do?
FURTHER READING
PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:
Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
Offer a positive alternative.
Ambassador Greer at the hearing, with prepared text and full video. An exchange with Rep. Boyle on “success” as defined by trade balance and manufacturing GDP share at 2:20:43.
Data:
Census’ most recent monthly FT-900 trade release, with exports, imports, and balances generally, by product type, and by country.
… the FT-900 archives back to 1991.
… and a one-page summary of U.S. imports, exports, and trade balances from 1960 to 2024.
Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.
Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.
Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.
Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.
It was Donald Trump’s idea, but there appeared to be a consensus—the U.S., Ukraine, Europe, and even quasi-neutral Turkey agreeing that Ukraine and Russia should stop shooting and sign on to a comprehensive ceasefire before peace talks began. But as Vladimir Putin has proven again and again, he doesn’t want to stop fighting. He believes he has the battlefield advantage and wants to grab as much of Ukraine as possible before the guns go silent.
Trump responded to Putin’s ceasefire refusal by urging Kyiv to talk anyway and send what everyone assumed would be an exploratory delegation to meet with the Russians in Istanbul. Then, over the weekend, Volodymyr Zelensky upped the ante, committing to appear in person in Turkey and meet with Putin face to face.
It’s classic Zelensky—when in doubt, roll the dice. He’s a gambler who takes big risks, hoping for big rewards. But this could be one of his boldest gambits yet. Terrifyingly, the outcome depends on Trump.
WASHINGTON — Credit card interest rates have skyrocketed over the past few years, increasing borrowing and debt. Congress has attempted to mitigate credit card debt for Americans by introducing legislation to cap credit card interest rates at ten percent. However, this legislation would do more harm than good.
To inform the debate around new legislation proposing a 10% interest rate cap, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) today released “Cutting Credit: How Rate Caps Undermine Access for Working Americans.” Authored by Andrew Fung, Senior Economic & Technology Policy Analyst; Alex Kilander, Policy Analyst at PPI’s Center for Funding America’s Future; and Sophia Lu, PPI Public Policy Fellow, the report argues that while rising interest rates reflect inflation and increased lending risk, a blunt rate cap would strip issuers of a key tool for managing that risk — ultimately reducing access to credit for working-class borrowers.
“A 10% interest rate cap may sound like relief, but it could end up closing the door on credit for millions of Americans,” said Fung. “When lenders can’t price for risk, they stop serving lower-income borrowers.”
The authors suggest three ways that would strengthen consumer protections without cutting off access to credit:
Enhancing Transparency in Credit Terms and Disclosures: When consumers can clearly find and understand how much they will pay over the life of a loan or credit card balance, they can better evaluate their credit and spending decisions.
Expanding Financial Education in Schools and Communities: Most young Americans struggle with managing their finances, and the implementation of financial education will help them make better monetary decisions.
Investing in Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) to Provide Responsible Credit Access for Working Americans: CDFIs play an essential role in the financial ecosystem by giving those who cannot afford rising interest rates at banks a safer alternative to predatory loans.
“Rather than imposing blanket rate caps, targeted reforms expand access to responsible credit and empower consumers through transparency and education, said Kilander.”
Founded in 1989, PPI is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visitingprogressivepolicy.org.Find an expert at PPI andfollow us on X.
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Media Contact: Ian O’Keefe – iokeefe@ppionline.org
As the inflation rate surged throughout 2021 and 2022 and put pressure on consumers’ wallets, another important trend was underway: credit card interest rates were rising. With the Federal Reserve raising the federal funds rate substantially to combat inflation, credit card interest rates climbed sharply in 2022 and 2023 as a result of the increased costs of lending, rising from an average of 14.51% in Q4 2021 to 21.19% just two years later. However, even as inflation subsided and prices stabilized, credit card interest rates remained elevated.
Why is this the case? Ultimately, credit card interest rates reflect the state of the broader consumer credit market. In recent years, that market has started showing signs of stress, particularly among less creditworthy borrowers, who have higher credit card debt and more frequent delinquencies. Higher market-wide risk — alongside a still high federal funds rate — has caused banks that issue credit cards to raise interest rates and keep them high.
Consumer discontent with these high rates has spurred a bipartisan effort to address the issue. In February 2025, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) introduced legislation that would cap credit card interest rates at 10% for five years, claiming that the bill would provide “working families with desperately needed financial relief.” A 10% cap was also floated by Donald Trump on the campaign trail, to provide relief “while working Americans catch up.”
However, limiting credit card interest rates to an arbitrary 10% effectively deprives credit card issuers of their most powerful tool to manage risk. As a result, a rate cap would dramatically reduce access to credit for the very people it aims to protect, just as the economy teeters on the precipice of a recession. By significantly limiting their ability to qualify for and use credit, it would even cause many consumers to turn to predatory alternatives such as payday lenders.
The following sections of this paper dive into the consumer credit market and evaluate the different options policymakers can use to make it function better for working Americans. First, it reviews the current state of the market, highlighting the important role that consumer credit plays in the economy, how credit card issuers decide upon interest rates, and breaking down why interest rates have risen in recent years. Second, it explains the economics of rate caps, and how workingclass Americans would bear the brunt of a cap’s consequences. Lastly, the paper explores some better policy alternatives to protect consumers, including greater transparency, better financial capability for households, and alternatives to traditional credit.
In the case that reached the Supreme Court, Kahlenberg, a frequent contributor to the Washington Monthly, testified as an expert witness in opposition to race-based admissions at UNC. At first blush, the move was incongruous. Kahlenberg is a “liberal maverick.” He idealizes Martin Luther King Jr., Robert Kennedy, and William O. Douglas, the longest-serving Supreme Court justice and New Dealer, still loathed on the right. A graduate of Harvard College and law school, Kahlenberg directs the American Identity Project at the Progressive Policy Institute, a centrist Democratic think tank.
His book is a compelling and provocative examination of the places of race, privilege, and money in college admissions—an issue with stark political implications, for both parties, but Democrats in particular. Kahlenberg prizes racial diversity on campus but is alarmed by racially conscious means to attain that goal. He is mindful of slavery and its legacy, but is aware of the growing divide within the U.S. between the economic “haves” and “have-nots”. The resulting read is nuanced, sober, and granular. \
Race-based affirmative action no longer has a place in college admissions after the Supreme Court in 2023 eliminated what had been an attempt by universities to create multiracial campuses. In Class Matters: The Fight To Get Beyond Race Preferences, Reduce Inequality, and Build Real Diversity at America’s Colleges , Richard D. Kahlenberg, a liberal who testified for the conservatives who brought those cases against Harvard University and the University of North Carolina, lays out his decades-long push for university admissions, and Democrats, to focus on class rather than race. Kahlenberg is director of the American Identity Project at the Progressive Policy Institute and teaches at George Washington University.
Antitrust has not escaped the chaos rendered by the 2024 presidential election. The Neo-Brandeisian “anti-monopolists” that led the Biden antitrust agencies are out and the “MAGA antitrusters” are in. While it is not yet clear how this toggle from far-left to far-right populist ideology will redefine antitrust, Democrats who recognize its intrinsic value in promoting consumer, worker, and entrepreneurial freedom in a market economy have an important task. That is, to shape an antitrust agenda for combatting high prices that drive up the cost of living and expanding access to essential goods and services.
Antitrust enforcement is famously agnostic in promoting competition across the economy. But as working voters who broke for the GOP in 2024 made clear, they care most about where the bulk of their consumer dollars go: food, healthcare, housing, insurance and retirement, and transportation. Many of the markets that make up these massive sectors, however, lack robust competition while antitrust enforcement lags behind. They are also particularly hard-hit by Trump tariff polices. Moreover, price increases have exceeded average rates of inflation, further driving up the cost of living.
As revelations about the failure of Biden economic policy continue to unfurl, new issues are moving to the center of the radar. The so-called “abundance” agenda in one. Abundance focuses on improving access to essential goods and services. This includes lowering administrative hurdles to creating infrastructure to support expanded housing, transportation, and energy resources. Abundance also seeks to reduce burdens on the innovation system that constrain research & development, financing, and commercialization for new technologies and products.
