Alongside the Hudson Institute, PPI’s Tamar Jacoby co-led a bipartisan conversation on C-SPAN with Representatives Don Bacon (R) and Chrissy Houlahan (D). The panelists discussed the uncertain future of US aid to Ukraine and gave their perspectives on the path ahead for funding the ongoing war.
ft. Tamar Jacoby
What is the future of the global App Economy? The average person already spends hours each day on mobile applications, connecting with friends and relatives, watching news and entertainment, playing games, and doing daily tasks such as shopping and banking. People will use apps to interact with their cars, to connect with their health care. Artificial intelligence, low latency and high bandwidth 5G connections, virtual/mixed reality, intensive data processing and on-device machine learning will give rise to entire new categories of mobile applications. Individuals and businesses will become ever-more dependent on mobile apps for their daily lives.
Australia is a key player in the evolving global App Economy. Australian-based app developers with a strong global presence include Sydneybased Canva, the online design and visual communication platform with more than 130 million monthly users across 190 countries. In 2022, Tasmania-based Savage Interactive won an Apple Design Award for its art app Procreate, and Melbourne-based Studio Drydock won for its game Wylde Flowers. Gold Coast-based Desygner, known for its graphic design apps and brand management software, has more than 20 million users worldwide. And Melbourne-based fintech app Afterpay, acquired by Block, the parent company of Square, in January 2022, is still hiring extensively in Australia, based on its job postings.
Looking forward, the Australian App Economy is a potent source of future jobs, since developing, updating, maintaining and securing mobile apps is becoming even more important. None of these jobs existed 15 years ago, when Apple first opened the App Store on July 10, 2008, in the middle of the global financial crisis. Android Market (which later became Google Play) was announced by Google shortly after. These app stores created a new route through which software developers could write programs for smartphones. These mobile applications —called “apps” — could then be distributed to the rapidly growing number of smartphone users around the world.
The jobs generated by the app stores became an important part of the recovery from the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the subsequent economic expansion and the response to the pandemic. More than that, app development and the app stores became a key route by which young people can develop tech skills and became an integral part of the global digital economy.
In this paper we estimate 182,000 App Economy jobs for Australia, as of August 2023, and compare it to previous PPI estimates. We estimate the size of the iOS and Android ecosystems. We compare Australia’s App Intensity with other industrialized countries, where App Intensity is defined as the number of App Economy jobs as a share of total employment. Finally, we also give some examples of App Economy jobs, with special attention to export-oriented jobs.
| Positive | Negative | Not much either way | |
| Race & ethnicity | |||
| African American | 42 | 13 | 44 |
| White | 25 | 40 | 35 |
| Hispanic | 33 | 29 | 39 |
| Red v. blue | |||
| Self-described liberal | 45 | 18 | 37 |
| Self-described conservative | 20 | 51 | 29 |
| Youth v. age | |||
| 18-29 years old | 45 | 24 | 32 |
| 55-64 years old | 20 | 46 | 34 |
PPI poll of Americans without college degrees, released November 2023
PPI’s two 2023 polls, done this past September and October by YouGov, offer in-depth insights on working-class opinion in the United Kingdom and the United States. Some headline findings from the 46-question U.S. version show respondents –
• Are pessimistic about long-term trends, with 66% saying “the working class” has lost ground in the last four decades as against 21% “better off” and 13% “about the same,” with illegal immigration and automation of worksites the most frequently chosen explanations.
• Consider inflation the “most significant challenge facing the U.S. economy,” with 36% citing “high cost of living” and 33% “inflation” per se.
• View e-commerce and tech sector employment (44%) as the top career choice for young people, with less for government and military (14%) manufacturing (13%), and service-sector work (8%).
• Support activist (though not overbearing) government, with especially high hopes for programs that can help non-college workers build careers and enhance wages, especially via short-term training (46%) and apprenticeship (23%).
The poll’s four trade questions ask in various ways about the effects of past trade agreements and about future options. Three findings, on overall views, divergences by political orientation and demographics, and future options:
1. No Overall Consensus: Asked how “trade agreements to lower tariffs and other barriers have affected you and people like you,” respondents split among three options with a slight negative tilt: 29% positive; 35% negative; and 36% (the highest share) as “not much effect either way.” A similarly-worded question about the effects of past trade agreements “on our country” as a whole, as opposed to the respondents as individuals, drew a somewhat different response: 28%, about the same share as in the more personal question, responded positively; a noticeably higher 44% viewing the effects as negative; and “not much effect either way” shrank to 28%. This suggests a substantial group viewed trade agreements as having little impact on themselves or their communities, but being overall negative for the country.
2. Axes of Divergence: PPI’s poll shows working-class Americans splitting over trade along the same ideological, ethnic, and generational axes earlier trade polls (Pew, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, major news organizations) have found over the last decade for the population as a whole. That is, the working class’ center-left contingent is on balance positive about trade agreements, and its right more negative. To wit:
• Race and Ethnicity: African American respondents, among the most upbeat groups in the survey in this area, viewed the effects of past trade agreements as positive for themselves by 42%-13%. Hispanic respondents agreed, though by a less emphatic 33%-29%, while “other” ethnicities split 43%-34%. White respondents were the exception (though a big one, as they made up 70% of the respondents), splitting the opposite way with only 25% “positive” and 40% “negative.”
• Red v. Blue: Self-identified liberals and Democrats viewed the effects of past trade agreements “on yourself and people like you” as positive by 45%-18% and 39%-22% respectively. By contrast, 51% of conservatives and 49% of Republicans viewed past agreements as affecting themselves and people like them negatively.
• Youth v. Age: Young people view trade agreements quite favorably, with 18-29-year-olds on the “positive” side by 45%-24% and 30-44 year-olds by 32%-24%. Their Gen-X parents aged 55-64 were the survey’s least happy age group — 20% positive and 46% negative — and the over-65 boomers weren’t much warmer at 26%-41%.
Perspective from other surveys: These ideological and demographic divisions resemble those appearing in other surveys done for the population as a whole over the past two decades by Pew, the Chicago Council for Global Affairs, and the major news outlets. (PPI’s poll also echoes these in not finding big differences by gender.) While the positive/negative splits in the earlier polls can vary based on the wording of questions, the patterns have been consistent throughout the century: young, ethnically diverse, and liberal America is generally positive about trade and trade agreements, and older, white, and conservative America is less so. As an additional perspective on PPI’s results, the earlier surveys also often include breakouts by education level, and typically found more support for trade and trade agreements among college-educated Americans than non-college.
3. Toward 2024: Finally, the poll suggests that the policy option put forward by the Trump campaign this fall — a 10% global tariff and a sharp break in economic relations with China — is not popular. (The question does not mention Trump’s name or associate the option with his campaign, to avoid skewing the answers.) Asked to choose among three policies — this protectionist approach, a non-trade option in which future policy would focus on other issues such as energy and anti-corruption, and a renewed effort to reduce tariffs through agreements with allies and friendly countries — only 23% selected the Trump-like option. Especially unpopular among young people (14%), liberals and Democrats (9% and 11%), and African Americans (16%), this option didn’t elicit much enthusiasm elsewhere either, as the favored choice of only 26% of white voters, 19% of political independents, 20% of respondents in union households, and 38% of conservatives.
4. And where to from here? As earlier trade polls found for the American population as a whole, PPI’s poll of working America yields mixed views; a plurality of the electorate’s ‘blue’ side upbeat about trade agreements and the opposite on its ‘red’ side; and little support for new tariffs, while other sections of the poll underline this by showing high sensitivity to inflation. The answers don’t yield any simple ‘here’s what to do’ conclusion.
But another section of PPI’s poll may, indirectly, suggest a response. One way to view trade policy is as a branch of economics that creates complex choices which carry both benefits and stresses: export opportunities and competitive challenges, lower inflation but sometimes accelerated change in the job mix. The poll’s questions on labor policy does seem to find strong and in fact near-consensus views on how best to manage the stress. That is, rather than traditional ‘adjustment’ programs for competition or automation on one hand, or long-term college commitments on the other (or for minimal-government ideologies), the respondents express strong hope for a third activist approach which doesn’t now exist on a large scale: direct support for workers trying to build careers and raise their wages through easily available short-term training, certification, and apprenticeship programs. If workers have confidence they will receive support as the economy changes, and that it will be the kind of support they want, solutions to divisions – not only in trade policy but in other complex fields – may be easier to find.
Big picture:
Claire Ainsley, U.K.-based Director of PPI’s Project on Center-Left Renewal, on British working-class opinion and the matching U.K. poll.
And the full U.S. poll, with the 46 questions and PPI President Will Marshall’s accompanying assessment of its insights on working Americans’ career hopes and assessments of recent history, views on immigration and education, trade and industrial strategy, climate change, gender identity and book bans, anti-trust, tax and budget, and views on presidents and political parties. Some top-tier findings:
An unhappy mood: “Working Americans believe the last 40 years have not been kind to people like them. Two-thirds say they are worse off and only 21% say their lives have improved.”
High concern over inflation and strong view that it is related to government budgeting: “These voters overwhelmingly (69%) name the high cost of living as their top worry. In distant but still significant second place (11%) is the concern that government deficits and debt are too high. In fact, the need for fiscal restraint and controlling government spending is a recurrent theme in this survey.”
But the belief that good policies and activist government can make life better: “Democrats can find more support among working-class voters for public policies aimed at fostering more inclusive economic growth, so long as they don’t confuse support for a more active government with support for a bigger government.”
And a political direction: “On all these issues, our poll found space for Democrats to offer pragmatic, common-sense alternatives to the stridently ideological views of right and left-wing populists.”
Elsewhere in trade polling:
For comparisons and population-wide polling, a 2022 Trade Fact looks at major surveys from 2015 through 2021 covering views of trade generally, Trump tariffs, NAFTA renegotiation, the China relationship, and more.
And an update: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ October 2023 release on broader U.S. public views of trade shows a very positive view (referring to “trade” as such, rather than to agreements); is also consistent with PPI’s poll showing some enthusiasm among Democrats; and finds support for semiconductor subsidies and concern about economic relations with China. Their summary graph:
“Council polling shows bipartisan support for international trade, as Americans across the board widely recognize its benefits for themselves, the economy, and American workers. Even so, Americans support some restrictions, especially on goods such as semiconductors.”
Trade summary, from the Chicago Council’s full-scale international affairs poll.
Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.
Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.
Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.
Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.
The aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and the combination of advancing technology have brought about a major shift in the workplace. Between February 2020 and August 2023, the number of employed Americans with disabilities soared by 33% or 1.9 million. By comparison, the number of employed Americans without disabilities rose by only 1%, or 1.5 million. In other words, workers with disabilities account for 57% of the increase in employment since the beginning of the pandemic.
Today, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) released a new report “Disability and Changes in the Workplace,” analyzing available data and discussing how the changing environments from the pandemic allowed workers with disabilities to find job opportunities that are a good match for their needs.
Report author Dr. Michael Mandel, Vice President and Chief Economist of PPI, describes how the rapid adaptation of businesses to “work from home” during the pandemic allowed workers with disabilities to operate from a more congenial or accommodating environment. At the same time, advancing technology has also lowered the barriers for Americans to access forms of independent, flexible work, like gig-economy delivery and ride-sharing platforms, that can be better suited to workers with unpredictable challenges such as those related to fatigue, chronic pain, or mental health issues.
“The United States is experiencing a major change in the workplace — leading to increased opportunities and careers for Americans with disabilities,” said Dr. Michael Mandel. “Policymakers and employers alike have an important role to play to ensure that work can remain flexible and accessible for all Americans, and continue to find novel ways to approach working.”
Read and download the full report here and read more about how remote work has fueled the surge in jobs for workers with disabilities in The Messenger.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org. Find an expert at PPI and follow us on Twitter.
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Media Contact: Amelia Fox – afox@ppionline.org
In this episode of the Liberal Europe Podcast, Ricardo Silvestre (Movimento Liberal Social) welcomes Tamar Jacoby, from the Progressive Policy Institute, former journalist and author, and now living in Ukraine where she reports on the war and the work done by the government and civil society to modernize and make Ukraine a more liberal democratic country.
This podcast is produced by the European Liberal Forum in collaboration with Movimento Liberal Social and Fundacja Liberté!, with the financial support of the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Liberal Forum are responsible for the content or for any use that be made of.
The aftermath of the acute phase of the pandemic has brought two important disability-related trends to the workplace. First, cognitive difficulties, debilitating fatigue, and other challenging conditions have become increasingly prevalent as long-term consequences of infection with COVID-19. Partly as a result, the number of adults reporting disabilities has surged in recent years. From February 2020 to August 2023, the number of adults with disabilities rose 3.1 million, or 10% (Table 1 and Figure 1). By comparison, the number of adults with no disability rose by only 2% over the same stretch.
This upward spike breaks a long-term trend. From 2009 to 2019, the number of adults with disabilities grew at only 1% per year, roughly the same pace as the number of people without disabilities. These figures are based on the monthly Current Population Survey (the same survey used to track the unemployment rate) which tracks disability by asking respondents whether they have one of six conditions, including “serious difficulty concentrating, remembering, or making decisions.”
The second and more empowering trend: The combination of advancing technology and pandemic-related pressures have made it easier for Americans with disabilities to find working situations that are a good match to their needs. The rapid adaptation of businesses to “work from home” during the pandemic allowed workers with disabilities to operate from a more congenial or accommodating environment, including being able to take breaks when necessary and not have to struggle with commuting and mobility issues. At the same time, advancing technology has also lowered the barriers for Americans to access forms of independent, flexible work, like gig-economy delivery and ride-sharing platforms, that can be better suited to workers with unpredictable challenges such as those related to fatigue, chronic pain, or mental health issues.
These two trends together have produced a startling shift in the workforce: Between the beginning of the pandemic in February 2020 and the latest data in August 2023, the number of employed Americans with disabilities soared by 33% or 1.9 million (Table 1 and Figure 2). By comparison, the number of employed Americans without disabilities rose by only 1%, or 1.5 million (these figures include self-employed). In other words, workers with disabilities account for 57% of the increase in employment since the beginning of the pandemic. That’s compared to less than 5% of overall employment.
These results highlight the central role of Americans with disabilities in the post-pandemic workforce. Debates over key workplace issues, such as the pressure to shift from “working from home” back to “working at the office,” and attempts to regulate flexible platform work, must be seen through the lens of how they affect Americans with disabilities. As employers and policymakers debate the shape of the post-pandemic workplace, they should preserve the changes to the workplace that made it more hospitable to people with disabilities.
North America: Squash, pumpkins, blueberries, cranberries
Central America: Tomatoes, chocolate, vanilla, peanuts, chili peppers
South America: Cashews, potatoes, vanilla, corn, chilies, etc.
The Thanksgiving holiday commemorates a specific event — a three-day autumn “entertainment and feast” held somewhere near Plymouth, a more conceptual reminder of mutual regard and common benefit among people of very different backgrounds, and also of western hemisphere food. Some examples of this 402nd observance week:
North America and Thanksgiving: Only two first-hand accounts describe the 1621 “First Thanksgiving,” and both are brief. Edward Winslow, Plymouth Governor several times in the 1630s, notes codfish and bass, plus corn and the five deer Massasoit and his 90 Wampanoag sagamores brought to the event. William Bradford, the first Governor, mentions ducks, turkey, and “meal” as well. Both are silent on cranberries and pumpkin pie, though that doesn’t mean they didn’t have any. Here’s Winslow’s report (via Pilgrim Hall Museum):
“Our harvest being gotten in, our governour sent foure men on fowling, that so we might after a speciall manner rejoyce together, after we had gathered the fruits of our labours ; they foure in one day killed as much fowle, as with a little helpe beside, served the Company almost a weeke, at which time amongst other Recreations, we exercised our Armes, many of the Indians coming amongst us, and amongst the rest their greatest king Massasoyt, with some ninetie men, whom for three dayes we entertained and feasted, and they went out and killed five Deere, which they brought to the Plantation and bestowed on our Governour, and upon the Captaine and others. And although it be not always so plentifull, as it was at this time with us, yet by the goodness of God, we are so farre from want, that we often wish you partakers of our plentie.”
And Bradford’s:
“They begane now to gather in ye small harvest they had, and to fitte up their houses and dwellings against winter, being all well recovered in health & strenght, and had all things in good plenty; fFor as some were thus imployed in affairs abroad, others were excersised in fishing, aboute codd, & bass, & other fish, of which yey tooke good store, of which every family had their portion. All ye somer ther was no want. And now begane to come in store of foule, as winter approached, of which this place did abound when they came first (but afterward decreased by degrees). And besids water foule, ther was great store of wild Turkies, of which they tooke many, besids venison, &c. Besids, they had about a peck a meale a weeke to a person, or now since harvest, Indean corn to yt proportion. Which made many afterwards write so largly of their plenty hear to their freinds in England, which were not fained, but true reports.”
Forty-one decades later, the turkey, cranberries, and pumpkins traditionally served for Thanksgiving remain New England and North American specialties. Crops, fruits, and roots originating further south have often spread more widely. Some illustrative lists, with two glamor products:
Mexico & Central America: The middle swath of the western hemisphere is home to the peanuts used in West African groundnut stew, the tomatoes flavoring Italian pasta sauce, and chocolate, vanilla, and corn. Chile peppers are still more “globalized”: the ancestral ones grew in Mexico (though there’s a case for Brazil too), and their descendants now routinely provide the spike for som tam in Khon Kaen, goulash in Budapest, bean curd in Chongjing, momo (usually in oil) in Lhasa, vindaloo in Goa, berbere in Addis Ababa.
Those looking for more heat this weekend than Bradford, Winslow, and Massasoit had in 1621 can consult the “Scoville Heat Scale” which, named for an early 20th century Massachusetts pharmacist, attempts to organize all the chili pepper varieties by heat content. It runs from zero Scoville Heat Units to two million in the case of artificially amped-up “bear spray equivalent” peppers bred over the last decade. Assuming these — Carolina Reaper, Trinidad Scorpion, etc. — are basically inedible stunts, sample Scoville ratings* from the feeble bell to the mighty habanero look like this:
| Habanero | 150,000 |
| Thai prik kee nu | 75,000 |
| India byadgi | 75,000 |
| Ethiopian berbere | 40,000 |
| Ghanaian kpakpo | 35,000 |
| Peruvian Amarillo | 35,000 |
| Lhasa red pepper | 23,000 |
| Jalapeno | 10,000 |
| New Mexico “Hatch” | 2,000 |
| Paprika | 500 |
| Pepperoncini | 100 |
| Bell Pepper | 0 |
* Using averages rather than the more technically correct range; the generally accepted range for the habanero, for example, is 100,00-350,000 Scoville units.
South America: Cash crops like cashews, staples like cassava and quinoa, and fruits such as avocado and pineapple. A nominee for the “most globalized” South American crop is the potato. Often disrespected with terms like “humble” (BBC) and “lowly” (Smithsonian Magazine), potatoes are the world’s sixth-most-produced crop at 376 million tons a year and root up in at least 150 of the world’s 197 countries. The top seven producers account for two-thirds of annual potato tonnage:
| China | 94 million tons |
| India | 54 million tons |
| Ukraine | 21 million tons |
| United States | 19 million tons |
| Russia | 18 million tons |
| Germany | 11 million tons |
| Bangladesh | 9 million tons |
U.S. producers grow about 100 variants including russets, fingerlings, purple-blues, whites, and so forth. By comparison, farmers in the original Andean potato-cultivation areas manage 4,500. By volume, though, the U.S.’ 19 million tons are about three times the output of the 14th-largest producer Peru’s 5.7 million tons, and 39th-place Bolivia’s 1.2 million tons combined. Having been carried to Europe by Spanish entrepreneurs in the 1500s, the potato returned east across the Atlantic to be served boiled or mashed at Thanksgiving events that, though more complex than the impromptu 1621 event, still mean something similar.
The Pilgrim Hall Museum of Plymouth has two contemporary notes on the first Thanksgiving.
The Mashpee/Taunton Wampanoag Nation.
Native American agriculture today:
Per USDA, about 79,000 native American farmers and ranchers operate 59 million acres of crop and ranch land, producing about $3.5 billion worth of agricultural output annually. The Inter-tribal Agricultural Council, based in Billings Montana, promotes tribal farm and fishery exports.
And USDA’s statistical deep dive into 21st-century Native farm and ranch life, from the 2017 National Census of Agriculture.
And Mitsotam Café at the Museum of the American Indian has menus and material on contemporary Native American farming and products.
Chile peppers:
The National Institute of Standards and Technology explains the Scoville Heat Scale.
And the Chile Pepper Institute at New Mexico State University plans its 2024 conference.
Potatoes:
The International Potato Center in Peru.
And Washington’s Potato Commission explains Pacific Northwest potato farming.
Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.
Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.
Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.
Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.
Today, Dr. Diana Moss, Vice President and Director of Competition Policy at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), provided new analysis on the proposed merger of JetBlue and ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC) Spirit. The merger raises novel issues for airline competition in the United States and is the first time the U.S. Department of Justice has sought to block an airline merger because it will substantially reduce competition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The merger of U.S. airline carriers JetBlue and Spirit, if it succeeds, will be the seventh major U.S. airline merger in the last two decades. As of mid-2012, the four largest airlines controlled about 57% of the national market, increasing to 68% in mid-2022. This slow hemorrhage of domestic carriers has tightened the Big 4 airline oligopoly, with little meaningful entry of new carriers. Since the last major swath of mergers in the mid-2000s, the entry of new carriers has reverted to levels in the pre-deregulation era.
As with previous airline mergers, the prospect of reduced competition following a JetBlue-Spirit tie-up raises concerns about higher fares and lower quality. But it is also an important case of “first impression.” If the merger goes through, JetBlue will likely dismantle Spirit, cutting budget-conscious travelers’ national ULCC flying options in half. This is a far cry from European passenger airline markets that feature many more low-cost carriers.
“Consumer choice, an important dimension of competition, is highly visible in the airline sector. It is a practical application of the premise that a substantial loss of competition can hurt consumers by taking away their options. If the government prevails, JetBlue-Spirit could open up bandwidth for the idea that a loss of choice is as harmful to consumers as higher prices or lower quality,” said Diana Moss. “Taken together, these harmful effects make a powerful case for why denying the JetBlue-Spirit merger would maintain competition and protect consumers.”
Read PPI’s full analysis here.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.
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Media Contact: Amelia Fox – afox@ppionline.org
The merger of JetBlue and Spirit has surfaced novel issues for airline competition in U.S. passenger markets, where concentration is often high and smaller carriers face a high hurdle in getting a foothold. As with previous airline mergers, the prospect of reduced competition following a JetBlue-Spirit merger raises concerns about higher fares and lower quality. But it is also an important case of first impression. If the merger goes through, JetBlue will likely dismantle ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC) Spirit, cutting budget-conscious travelers’ national U.S. ULCC flying options in half. This is a far cry from European passenger markets that feature many more low-cost carriers. As an important dimension of competition, consumer choice is highly visible in the airline sector. The idea that less choice is bad for consumers does not require the complex fact-finding and analysis that is typical in contested merger proceedings. Rather, it is a practical application of the premise that a substantial loss of competition hurts consumers simply by taking away their options. Viewed through this lens of antitrust “pragmatism,” JetBlue-Spirit could open up bandwidth for new precedent that a loss of choice is as harmful to consumers as higher prices or lower quality. When taken together, these harmful effects make a powerful case for why denying the JetBlue-Spirit merger would maintain competition and protect consumers. To take a deeper dive into how PPI is thinking about consumer choice, antitrust pragmatism, and airline competition, please read on.
The merger of U.S. airline carriers JetBlue and ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC) Spirit, if it succeeds, will be the seventh major U.S. airline merger in the last two decades. Put another way, at this pace of consolidation, the U.S. will have lost a domestic airline carrier about every 33 months since the mid-2000s. A merger of JetBlue and Spirit would combine the sixth and seventh largest airlines by market share, leapfrogging Alaska to land in fifth place behind the top four: Delta, American, Southwest, and United.
Despite their positioning as smaller domestic airlines, a merger of JetBlue and Spirit highlights two recent shifts in U.S. airline merger enforcement. It is the first time the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has sought a full-stop injunction for an airline merger on the grounds that it will substantially reduce competition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act This stands in contrast to previous airline mergers where the government settled with remedies, such as slot or gate divestitures. The DOJ’s unwillingness to accept a fix in JetBlue-Spirit is another in a series of moves that reveal the Biden administration’s more aggressive stance on reining in consolidation.
The DOJ’s challenge of the JetBlue-Spirit merger is also notable for another reason. JetBlue intends to eliminate Spirit, reconfiguring the trademark yellow planes and raising fares. As one of only two national U.S. ULCCs, the merger eliminates about 50% of this market segment. This is a markedly different landscape than in Europe, which features many more low-cost carriers from which consumers can choose. ULCCs are disruptive players, providing a vital source of choice for budget-conscious travelers. These options will be dramatically scaled back when JetBlue retires the Spirit model. The DOJ’s case tees up consumer choice as an essential element of competition, extending traditional concerns that an airline merger can raise fares and degrade service quality.
The court could look askance at the DOJ’s claim that the loss of Spirit will hurt consumers by reducing consumer choice. Or it could widen the antitrust aperture by giving credence to how a loss of competition manifests harmfully in fewer options for consumers. The case for why a loss of choice is bad for consumers does not require voluminous data and complex economic models. As such, it is by far the most practical application of the premise that mergers that substantially reduce competition are illegal. Viewed through the lens of antitrust “pragmatism,” a positive judicial finding for the government in JetBlue-Spirit on the issue of consumer choice could free up bandwidth for advancing stronger merger enforcement.
By Neel Brown
There is wisdom in the words of legendary boxer Mike Tyson, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”
The ultra-green activists have been punched in the mouth, so to speak. Their plan to keep all fossil fuels in the ground has been bested by a tough opponent: reality.
As a result, their efforts to limit U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) production and exports in the name of abolishing all fossil fuel use are bringing us closer to a climate disaster.
There is no question that we are in a climate emergency that must be addressed with a determined push for a clean energy transition. That push should be pursued with speed and resolve — but without losing sight of the goal, which is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This is vital to the health and prosperity of current and future generations.
Storm clouds are gathering around the world. In Europe, Asia and the Middle East, tyrants and terrorists are on the march, while the country most able to stand up to them — the United States — is rancorously disunited.
Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre of 1,200 Israelis was a harrowing display of barbarism cracking through civilization’s fragile veneer. In Europe, Russian “dictator” Vladimir Putin is doubling down on his criminal war to compel Ukraine’s subservience to Moscow.
Today marks the end of National Apprenticeship Week (NAW). Acknowledged nationally, NAW is a time when apprenticeship partners and providers showcase the success and value of these programs. And it’s no wonder we celebrate these opportunities, apprenticeships are instrumental in building pipelines to good jobs for individuals while also ensuring employers have the talent, they need to remain competitive.
While NAW started nine years ago, apprenticeship has been around for much, much longer. These earn-and-learn models are engrained in America’s history — three of our Founding Fathers started their careers as apprentices. George Washington, for example, apprenticed as a land surveyor. Yet even with this 250-year runway, apprenticeships have not taken off in the United States as they have in other advanced nations.
Today, our country has almost 600,000 registered apprenticeships, mostly in traditional sectors such as building trades and heavy industry. As a share of their labor force, Great Britain, Australia, and Germany have roughly 10 times more opportunities. It is puzzling that the U.S. hasn’t followed its peers in scaling up apprenticeship, a training model that is also a job, allowing people to work and earn while they are learning the critical skills necessary for good jobs and careers. It’s an especially relevant model now, when most U.S. jobs require at least some postsecondary education and training, and when employers, even in our tight labor market, report a serious shortage of skilled workers in their fields.
While many progressives believe a four-year degree is the solution, the reality is that 62% of American adults don’t have one. Additionally, the college earnings premium appears to be declining for the first time in decades, because of soaring college tuition costs, low completion rates, and heavy debt burdens — further pushing the American public to rethink the value proposition of traditional higher education. This change in public opinion was reinforced by a recent PPI poll, which surveyed ~5,000 workers without four-year degrees. 74% believed that public investment in apprenticeship and career pathways to help individuals acquire better skills is the most likely way to help workers get ahead in today’s economy.
Not only is it clear America needs alternatives that are affordable, trusted by employers, and help people learn the technical and digital skills that today’s jobs require but apprenticeships also have strong economic impacts. Individuals who complete an apprenticeship program earn an average annual salary of $77,000, compared to an average national salary of $55,000. Those who complete an apprenticeship program also earn an average of $300,000 more than those who don’t over the course of their career.
On the employer side, apprenticeships help businesses boost recruitment; increase the diversity of their workforce; improve retention (94% of apprentices stay with their company after the apprenticeship wrap); preserve institutional knowledge; and leverage skilled, experienced workers close to retirement to serve as mentors and instructors. For roughly every dollar spent on apprenticeship, employers get an average of $1.47 back in increased productivity, reduced waste of time and cost, and greater front-line innovation.
To ensure more American workers and businesses benefit from these opportunities and keep pace with other partner nations, our country must dramatically scale up apprenticeship. To do this, it will require not only a major boost in public investment, but also a new policy architecture in which public, nonprofit, and private intermediaries play a catalytic role in training and placing apprenticeships in companies.
This week as we recognize the promise of these opportunities, PPI is re-elevating our recent report “Strengthening America’s Workforce: The Path to 4 Million Apprenticeships” which offers a fresh take on Apprenticeships for America’s pay-per-apprenticeship proposal. This proposal would create one million apprenticeships a year through: increased federal investment, funding tied to performance, a shift from lottery-style grants to formula funding, and for resources to be drawn down by all types of intermediaries, from nonprofits like CareerWise, to for-profit apprenticeship service providers like Multiverse, to sell employers on apprenticeship and help them organize programs.
If the federal government were to adopt this proposal, a $4 billion investment would create 1 million new apprenticeships a year. And while $4 billion sounds expensive, compare it to what the government spends annually on higher education. In Ryan Craig’s recent book “Apprenticeship Nation: How the Earn and Learn Alternative to Higher Education Will Create a Stronger and Fairer America.” He finds that federal, state, and local governments continue to pour over $400 billion each year into college while total spending on apprenticeship is under $400 million – that’s a ratio of 1,000:1. And that spending is done willingly without the same job guarantee
As the U.S. wraps up National Apprenticeship Week, PPI wants to remind today’s policymakers to take a page from our history books and, like our Founding Fathers, commit to apprenticeship. But rather than go back in time, PPI encourages U.S. policymakers to adopt this novel approach, so we achieve a roughly 10-fold increase in American apprentices. With such an effort, the U.S. will follow other countries and remain competitive through gains in workforce quality and improved productivity while simultaneously increasing earnings, widening access to rewarding careers, and expanding the middle class for workers. Now that is something worth celebrating.
By Ben Ritz
In the past two presidential elections, working-class voters have proven to be a decisive swing vote in the pivotal states that determine the winner. A new comprehensive survey of working-class voters from the Progressive Policy Institute reveals how and why these voters, who once formed the backbone of the Democratic Party, have become estranged from it. The poll also points to the serious reorientation of both policy and messaging that will be necessary to build durable majorities.
In partnership with YouGov, PPI surveyed a representative national sample of voters without a four-year college degree and oversampled in seven key battleground states. The poll found these voters see the Democratic Party as out of sync with not only their cultural values but also their economic priorities.
When asked what the greatest economic challenge is facing the United States today, a whopping 69% of respondents said the high cost of living and inflation outpacing economic growth. Among these voters, 55% believe recent inflation is primarily driven by excessive stimulus spending rather than the COVID pandemic or supply chain bottlenecks. Notably, another 11% said high deficits and debt are the greatest challenge, while all other potential challenges registered single digits.
Washington, D.C. — Working Americans believe the last 40 years have not been kind to them. When surveyed in a new poll, a majority of working-class voters believe they are worse off. When asked which President from the past 30 years has done the most for average working families, voters choose Donald Trump by a wide margin (44% to Biden’s 12%). While the result is mainly driven by partisan divides, 51% of independents chose Trump.
Working-class voters are a crucial demographic in competitive districts across the country and Democrats must make further inroads with working-class voters in order to build on recent election victories and assemble a winning coalition for 2024.
Today, the Progressive Policy Institute’s (PPI) Project on Center-Left Renewal released a new poll commissioned by YouGov to help Democrats understand and frame more effective appeals to working-class voters. PPI President Will Marshall provides a summary and analysis of the results in the report “Winning Back Working America: A PPI/YouGov Survey of Working Class Attitudes.”
“In the last century, we’ve seen a populist revolt against dominant political parties rooted in working-class voters’ discontent with sweeping economic and cultural changes. Working Americans believe the last 40 years have been hard for them and do not believe that either party will handle the issues they care most about. Ahead of 2024, Democrats must reconnect with their historical working-class base,” said Will Marshall. “The recent PPI/YouGov poll on working-class Americans can give Democrats a blueprint for winning back working America and offering pragmatic, common-sense solutions to our country’s biggest problems.”
The poll contains two parts: a national survey of 860 non-college voters and oversamples of working-class opinions in seven 2024 presidential or Senate battleground states: Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Arizona, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Nevada. The poll surveyed registered voters without a four-year degree (voters with a two-year degree, high school diploma, or less). Results from swing state polls are available upon request.
Key findings from the national poll:
• Two-thirds of voters say they are worse off and only 21% believe their lives have improved. White non-college voters are especially likely to say things have gotten worse (70%). Pessimism is even higher in many swing states: Arizona (74%), Michigan (74%), and Pennsylvania (75%).
• When presented with a list of reasons why life is harder today, respondents put illegal immigration and automation at the top.
• When it comes to the economy, voters polled overwhelmingly (69%) name the high cost of living as their top worry. In distant but still significant second place (11%) is the concern that government deficits and debt are too high.
• When asked why prices have risen so much, 55% of working-class voters picked “government went overboard with stimulus spending, overheating the economy” over the impact of the COVID recession and supply chain bottlenecks as the economy recovered. More than half of voters in each of the swing states agreed.
• When asked where they think their children will find the best jobs and careers, most voters (44%) chose the communications/digital economy over manufacturing (13%).
• When asked about student loan forgiveness, 56% of voters (including 59% of Independents) say “paying off this debt is not fair to the majority of Americans who don’t get college degrees…” Democrats were outliers, with only 28% calling loan forgiveness unfair.
• What the voters do support, enthusiastically and across political fault lines, is “more public investment in apprenticeships and career pathways to help non-college workers acquire better skills” (74%) as well as “affordable, short-term training programs that combine work and learning.”
• Overall, 41% of voters say climate change is an “existential” problem that demands action, while 34% expressed skepticism. 42% think clean energy incentives will create good jobs and boost the economy, while 37% fear they will raise energy bills and the costs of goods.
• When asked about education and whom public schools served most, they said political activists (31%), unions (30%) and students (29%), with only 10% choosing parents.
• When asked on views of the Federal Trade Commission’s lawsuit against Amazon and whether or not voters support ending Amazon Prime’s two-day prime shipping, 47% of voters strongly oppose.
• And when asked about protecting consumer’s personal data, 80% prefer the government to pass a privacy and data security bill and ensure all companies abide by these regulations instead of the 20% of voters who think the government should break up big tech companies.
Read the full poll and analysis here.
In October, PPI released the companion poll in a report from Claire Ainsley, Director of the Center-Left Renewal Project at PPI, titled “Roadmap to Hope: How to Bring Back Hope to Working-Class Voters in an Age of Insecurity” on opinions of the working class in the U.K.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org. Find an expert at PPI and follow us on Twitter.
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Media Contact: Amelia Fox – afox@ppionline.org
PPI’s Ben Ritz joins C-SPAN’s Washington Journal to discuss the upcoming government funding deadline, the Speaker’s proposed solution, and the need for a fiscal commission to address the nation’s ballooning debt while taking questions from callers on their fiscal policy concerns.
ft. Ben Ritz
| Energy | 176% |
| Information & “potentially digitally-enabled” services: | 59% |
| All goods and services: | 34% |
| Agriculture | 34% |
| Manufactured goods: | 19% |
| Other (non-digitally deliverable) services | -10% |
*Sources: WTO for all goods and apparel; UN Food and Agricultural Organization for fish; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for arms sales. SIPRI data covers known transfers of “major conventional weapons.”
A cryptic late-October comment from the American delegation to the World Trade Organization in Geneva quietly withdraws a set of long-held U.S. “digital trade” policy goals — and in doing so raises questions about whether the U.S.’ traditional “open internet,” “pro-consumer,” “internet freedom,” and “public-interest regulation” approach has changed. The brief and impressively opaque comment:
“Many countries, including the United States, are examining their approaches to data and source code, and the impact of trade rules in these areas. In order to provide enough policy space for those debates to unfold, the United States has removed its support for proposals that might prejudice or hinder those domestic policy considerations. The JSI [“Joint Statement Initiative”, the WTO’s name for the relevant discussion] continues to be an important initiative and the United States intends to remain an active participant in those talks.”
How to interpret this? Background first on the big picture, then the “data and source code” in trade policy more specifically; and finally, lacking anything more to go on than the three-sentence comment above, some questions about what this actually means:
1. Larger context: “Digital trade” issues are part of a larger U.S. policy pretty consistently pursued since the launch of the World Wide Web, meant to encourage the preservation and future development of an open, universal Internet, with a foundation in user rights and liberty, impartial public-interest regulation, and due process. Several digital trade issues get mentioned, for example, in the “Declaration for the Future of the Internet,” posted in August 2022 by the U.S. and 64 other Internet- and speech-friendly countries in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific and still up on the White House and State Department websites. This is a 3-page set of principles and goals for next-generation Internet governance, which along with promoting universal access, privacy, consumer protection, common programs to fight electoral disinformation and online bigotry, and other valuable ideas involves commitments to “ensure that government and relevant authorities’ access to personal data is based in law”, “promote our work to realize the benefits of data free flows with trust,” and “refrain from blocking or degrading access to lawful content, services, and applications.” These are, incidentally, contested ideas which have opponents: other governments, inter alia and perhaps most prominently China’s, envision a quite different future with more rights for surveillance and service interruption, less multistakeholder-ism, and fewer limits on government rights to limit access, data transfers, and privacy.
2. Nature of issues: The now-‘paused’ “data and source code” proposals refers to four topics, which the U.S. until last month had been discussing with 76 other WTO members in a venue called the “Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce.” They include (a) cross-border flows of digital data in the course of business, shopping, gaming, email, etc.; (b) guidelines for the circumstances in which governments can require local storage of data and when they shouldn’t; (c) cases when governments can direct businesses to disclose their software codes; and (d) ensuring that trade rules don’t discriminate against digital products.
If one were to look for an analogy in “trade policies for goods” like cars or wine, a useful though not exact comparison would be to “trade facilitation” and agreements on Customs procedures. Typical U.S. trade agreements require Customs agencies to provide online access to import and export forms, accommodate express delivery shipments, and ensure that other governments don’t use different inspection procedures for containers carried by different shipping lines or cars delivered to different ports. These sorts of rules reduce costs and delays, help toys and flowers move through airports and seaports rapidly and easily, encourage the countries and businesses that make or grow them to compete on quality and price as opposed to hidden policy favoritism, and help port officers focus on law enforcement and public health inspections. In the same way, rules encouraging free flows of data, or discouraging mandatory in-country storage and server construction, help make legitimate services trade — say, email connections, exchange of architectural planning, news and entertainment streams, etc. — easier and cheaper while helping government officials focus their work on cyber-security violations, spam prevention, and other threats.
3. Economics and trade flows: Digitally delivered services arriving via submarine cable or satellite — software, entertainment, computer technologies, professional stuff such as architecture, new earners like telemedicine and distance education — have a plausible claim to be the fastest-growing form of trade. In the U.S. case, they totaled $720 billion in 2022. By various metrics this was (a) up about 60% in the past decade, roughly twice the growth rate of overall U.S. exports; (b) a quarter of the $3 trillion in total U.S. exports in 2022, and a few hundred billion dollars more than the $380 billion for energy and $195 billion for agriculture, (c) easily the largest digital export figure for any country in the world, and (d) a thirtieth of the U.S.’ $26 trillion GDP. More subtly, digital data flows underpin lots of high-end manufacturing sales. Examples include cars that notify owners of the need for brake repair or oil change; medical devices providing diagnoses and filling prescriptions for rural clinics, agricultural machinery planting rice when the weather is right, etc. So by whatever measurement, digital trade flows support a large and highly remunerative part of the American economy and it’s quite logical for the government to care about them.
4. Current Agreements and Rules: The U.S. “digital trade” ideas are not actually experimental, but are live parts of several currently active U.S. agreements as well as the WTO’s incomplete “Joint Statement” discussions. These are Chapter 15 of the U.S.-Korea FTA, which “entered into force” as the jargon puts it in 2012; Chapter 19 of the “U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement” which revised the North American Free Trade Agreement in 2020; and a 19-page U.S.-Japan digital trade agreement signed in 2019. Their substance:
(a) People and businesses in participating countries have the right to move data across borders freely (e.g. for an online shopper ordering a set of toothbrushes, or an auto manufacturer whose car corresponds digitally with the home office to request software updates or notify police about an accident), with an exception for any government action “necessary to achieve a legitimate public policy objective” (e.g. anti-spam, cyber-security, protection against disinformation campaigns, etc.).
(b) Government power to require companies to turn over software code to agencies (or, often more the point, to local competing firms) is limited to public-policy regulation and good-faith investigations as opposed to arbitrary and/or discriminatory rules.
(c) Governments can’t be required to store data and build servers within a country, so as to reduce costs (and along with this, the power consumption and consequent carbon emissions) of constructing redundant servers and data centers in numerous countries.
5. What’s going on? What, finally, does the withdrawal of these ideas at the WTO mean? The three-sentence statement quoted above doesn’t explain. So rather than speculating, we offer a few questions that pretty badly need an answer:
* Does the administration want “policy space,” so as to be able to limit Americans’ data flows or require exposure of source codes for reasons that go beyond “measure[s] needed to achieve a legitimate public policy objective.” If so, what sort of things are they thinking about, and what law would authorize it?
* If the data and source code ideas are out of favor at the WTO, are the USMCA, Korea-FTA, and U.S.-Japan Digital Agreement provisions now insufficient? If so, is the administration thinking about changes to them?
* Or is the concern more about foreign governments’ “policy space”? If so, what are these governments hoping to do that Mexico and Canada (and Japan and Korea) are managing to do without?
* And how do any of these concerns relate to the larger hopes for the next-generation digital world — access and technical interoperability, innovation and economic growth arising from future rises in data flow, public-interest regulation, user privacy, and liberty — set out in the Declaration for the Future of the Internet?
Answers awaited, here and in lots of other places.
The Declaration for the Future of the Internet.
The WTO’s Joint Statement Initiative on e-commerce.
The U.S. Trade Representative Office’s brief statement.
Highly displeased response from Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore. and Finance Committee Chair).
And similar reaction from Digital Trade Caucus Chairs Suzanne DelBene (D-Wash.) and Darin LaHood (R-Ill.).
Current agreements:
USMCA text (see Chapter 19, “Digital Trade”).
U.S.-Japan digital trade agreement text.
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, see Chapter 15 on “Electronic Commerce.”
And some PPI background on Internet and digital trade policy:
Gresser on digital trade policy.
Chief Economist Mandel on regulation of digital platforms.
And Technology Policy Analyst Malena Dailey on transatlantic data flows.
Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.
Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.
Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.
Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.
