issue: Energy & Environment

Cheat Sheet for Climate Policy: Part III — What’s Negotiable for a Good Climate Bill

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

How to tell a good climate bill from a bad one? This series will guide you through the main issues that are likely to arise in the coming weeks as the Senate takes on climate change. In previous posts, we looked at the crucial and the merely important issues that factor in the climate debate. In this post we highlight issues that matter for climate policy, but will not necessarily make or break it. (To read the other posts in the series, click here.)

So far, we’ve established the absolutely critical aspects needed to make credible climate policy and identified the important features that would make that policy effective. Now we will focus on issues that aren’t quite on the same level, negotiable elements that could still have a meaningful role in determining the long-term viability and effectiveness of a domestic emissions mitigation program. These issues — specifically, price controls and the international implications of U.S. legislation — could become a big part of the political discussion.

Category III Issues: Negotiable Elements of Climate Policy

#1: Price controls: offsets and collars

An uncontrollably rising carbon price is a nightmare scenario for regulated firms and consumers, so industry groups have made a priority of getting robust price controls into climate legislation. Price controls generally take three different forms: banking and borrowing, offsets and price collars. Because banking and borrowing has such a strong effect on the emissions reduction path, we included them in our last post. Here we’ll focus on the two other strong cost containment mechanisms.

a) Offsets

If you’ve been paying attention to the debate over the past two years, you’ve likely heard something about offsets. They are one of the most controversial aspects of climate legislation. Environmentalists are suspicious of them and industry can’t live without them.

What exactly are offsets? As we mentioned in a previous post, carbon is a stock pollutant, meaning that we only care about its total accumulation in the atmosphere. If you keep adding carbon to the system, but remove an equal amount at the same time, it is just as good as no longer adding carbon at all. This is the underlying principle of offsets — firms that pay to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere (or keep them from entering in the first place) can receive the same credit they would get if they reduced their own emissions.

For example, with offsets in a cap-and-trade system, a utility that needs to reduce its carbon emissions by 20 million tons need not do so only through emissions cuts from its operations. It could reduce its own emissions by 15 million tons, then receive offset credits through financing a reforestation project and an agricultural methane reduction project that combined would lead to emissions reductions of five million tons, allowing the company to meet its target.

Here is a quick list of different kinds of offsets that might count under climate legislation:

Forestry: Forests absorb CO2 through natural respiration processes and store it in plant tissue and soil. When deforestation occurs, that stored carbon is released into the atmosphere, contributing to emissions. Deforestation and forest degradation count for around 15 percent of global CO2 emissions. Projects that reforest — increasing carbon sequestration — or reduce deforestation and forest degradation are growing increasingly popular in voluntary carbon markets and may facilitate significant savings. Some models have speculated that international forest offsets can account for 25 percent of emissions mitigation by 2020.

Agriculture: The agricultural sector accounts for six percent of U.S. emissions, but agricultural emissions will probably not be covered by a carbon price due to the complexity of measuring emissions from agricultural practices and the power of the farm lobby in Washington. The important gases from agriculture are methane emissions from large-scale cattle operations and manure management, and nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer applications and soil management. Offset projects that capture renegade methane emissions or reduce nitrous oxide releases through better soil management will likely be the most widespread offsets available from the agriculture sector.

Renewable energy/energy efficiency: Projects that supplant dirty energy sources with cleaner sources or improve efficiency in energy production or end-use can also be eligible for offset credit. For example, a firm looking for cheap reductions could finance the development of a renewable energy project and receive credit for the emissions reduced when the renewable energy displaces conventional dirty energy. Additionally, projects that increase the efficiency of energy usage in buildings or facilities can count as offsets. These projects are a major component of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which was established by the Kyoto Protocol. Using the CDM, developed countries can sponsor projects in developing countries and receive emissions reduction credit.

Waste management: The decay of garbage in the nation’s thousands of landfills represents the second largest source of U.S. methane emissions behind cattle operations. Methane flaring, a process that captures and burns these emissions, converting methane into CO2, is considered an offset, as CO2 has a lower global warming potential than methane. Combusting methane for energy generation may also generate offset credits.

Fugitive mine emissions: As with landfills, capturing fugitive methane emissions from coal mines presents an opportunity for offsets and may also have benefits in terms of miner safety.

While all of these offsets options are currently available in voluntary offset markets and allowed by regional cap-and-trade schemes like RGGI, they may not all be eligible for credit under federal regulation. Waxman-Markey does not count renewable energy, energy efficiency, waste management and coal emissions as offsets. Cantwell-Collins does not allow offsets in its trading system, but it does permit such projects to be paid for from its Clean Energy Reinvestment Trust.

Many offsets will be cheaper than actual emissions reductions, making them an important means of price control. This is especially true for international forest offsets — the EPA analysis of Waxman-Markey contended that allowance prices would be 96 percent higher without them. That said, Greenpeace and other environmental groups have firmly planted their flag in the anti-offset camp, and there are a number of issues that would need some serious policy attention in order to make forest offsets credible in the U.S. market.

There are four major requirements to making offsets a robust tool. First, they must be additional — that is, projects should only be considered offsets if the specific practice would not have happened anyway. Second, offsets should have permanence — projects are only useful if they are not quickly undone (an offset for planting a tree is of little value if it is rapidly cut down). Third, offsets should be verifiable — there must be some way to confirm that projects are doing what they claim (for forests, this can be very difficult). Finally, offset programs should address leakage — they should not simply shift emission-generating activities somewhere else. These are all valid concerns, and all four will have to be addressed for offsets to be a credible part of climate policy.

Potential hang-ups for offsets will likely involve politicians’ hesitations to send large sums of money overseas, the reliability and veracity of offset credits, the number of offsets allowed for use by regulated firms and the type of offsets available from domestic sources. Despite the misgivings of some policymakers and commentators, offsets will figure prominently in domestic legislation. Waxman-Markey included two billion tons worth of offsets annually, a significant proportion of overall U.S. emissions, the same amount as in the Kerry-Boxer bill introduced in the Senate last fall. Instead of spending time and energy railing against them, policy discussions should instead focus on setting up institutions to fix the problems listed above.

b) Price collars

More than anything else, firms want some certainty when it comes to climate regulations. Planning capital investments over the long-term will be significantly affected by carbon prices, and the more predictable the changes over time, the better firms can plan ahead. Moreover, sudden system shocks in the form of extreme drops or increases in prices can be very expensive and detract from the efficacy of cap-and-trade markets.

To protect the system and reduce price uncertainty, policy-makers are looking to use a price collar in the allowance market. A price collar is a way to define a general price path by restricting how much the price can rise or fall. Price collars work by establishing a price floor — under which the allowance price can never drop — and a price ceiling — above which the price will not rise. It is a simple mechanism in concept, and can provide a lot of certainty for regulated parties and market participants. The price floor and ceiling should be spaced far enough apart to accommodate market dynamics and rise at some rate to match the general rise in allowance prices.

When allowance prices hit the floor, they simply remain at that price until trading forces the price to rise again. Things get more complicated when they hit the ceiling, however. There are two options to bring down the price, depending on if you employ a hard collar or a soft collar. A hard collar releases additional allowances into the system until the price drops, regardless of how many it takes to do so. By contrast, a soft collar uses a strategic reserve of set-aside allowances to reduce the price below the ceiling. The difference between the two is a matter of emissions certainty. A soft collar maintains the overall emissions cap by taking some out of the system at the beginning, much like a rainy day fund, whereas a hard collar just dumps allowances into the market until the price changes. Firms may favor a hard collar because it provides more price certainty, but people concerned about overall emissions will prefer a soft collar.

#2: International aspects

If and when Congress does pass climate legislation, its impact will reach far beyond our borders. The international implications of domestic climate policy are extensive, and while they do not play a huge role in the political discourse, they have sway over some notable policy choices.

a) International negotiations

The Conference of Parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen in December 2009 was advertised as a chance for the U.S. to reclaim its place at the world leader and innovator on environmental issues. The U.S. was able to do that only partially, and that was due largely to the extraordinary personal diplomacy of President Obama. U.S. negotiators had little to work with, bringing with them no official legislation to show other nations while trying to broker a deal that could pass Senate muster. Without a signed bill, the 2010 COP in Cancun this coming November will probably turn out similarly; nations will bicker and haggle and eventually end up not making any kind of serious commitment sans U.S. leadership. The EU does not have the sway to move a global climate deal forward, while other major emitters like China and India don’t have the incentive to act.

That’s not to say international negotiations will not have some influence on the shape of U.S. legislation. At Copenhagen, the U.S. committed to provide $30 billion from 2010 to 2012 to developing countries for mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and other assistance. Additionally, the conference agreed to establish an annual $100 billion fund — of which the U.S. is expected to give roughly $20 billion — for developing countries for the same uses. Some of this funding will likely be partitioned from current programs, but it will certainly not be enough. Revenues from carbon markets established by climate legislation — as well as allowance allocations — will likely provide the most reliable source of international funds. The tradeoff is that every dollar spent on helping other nations adjust to climate change is one that can’t be used domestically. Though it won’t dominate the debate over any climate bill, the use of carbon revenues for international financing could end up having a real impact.

b) Competitiveness and leakage

Certain industries with intrinsically large carbon footprints, such as cement, steel and paper pulp, are particularly sensitive to carbon prices. These industries are concerned that paying for their sizable emissions will reduce their overall output, leading to job cuts and smaller profit margins. Moreover, they worry that a U.S. carbon price will lead to a shift in production to other countries that do not have similar regulatory burdens. When firms leave for other countries that don’t have a climate policy, it could lead to higher overall global emissions, a phenomenon known as leakage.

There are a couple of solutions to these problems. First, to help protect industries at home, climate policy can include rebates to industries — either in the form of cash or extra tradeable allowances — based on their output to help them adjust to the new reality of a price on carbon. Second (and more controversial), the federal government can establish border adjustments, slapping taxes on imports competing with vulnerable domestic industries. Essentially tariffs, such levies would put goods from countries without a climate policy on the same level as those from the U.S. Border adjustments can make for tricky politics, though. When the Waxman-Markey bill passed the House in 2009, President Obama openly criticized the inclusion of such measures. When the debate picked up in the Senate, however, 10 Midwestern senators stated they would not back any climate legislation that did not support manufacturing interests with some kind of border provision. Even if some compromise allows border adjustment to find its way into climate legislation, there’s a chance it would not be allowed under WTO agreements.

The Bottom Line

Last post, we reviewed important aspects of climate policy. In this post, we surveyed two areas that have value in generating good policy, but are negotiable in terms of their importance:

  1. Is there a price collar? Are offsets allowed?
  2. What is the effect of the proposal on international climate issues? How will it affect negotiations and commitments? How does it attempt to protect trade-vulnerable industries?

In our next and final post, we will focus on the issues that make little contribution to good climate policy — or might even be counterproductive.

Postcard from Stockholm: Energy, Security and Social Democracy

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

For the last three days, I’ve been running around Stockholm giving what seems to be 27 lectures on energy security and/or President Obama’s foreign policy. I’ve spoken at think tanks, the American Embassy (twice!), with MPs, corporate executives, and the guy who wrote the definitive Swedish book about the Obama campaign (“Are you going to have it translated into English?” I asked naively. “Well, I looked on Amazon,” he responded, “and there are already 637 English language books on Obama’s campaign. So I think I’ll start with Danish instead.”) It has been a whirlwind tour thus far but should slow down a bit toward the weekend, which would allow me to enjoy a few days with some good friends in Stockholm.

My energy talks are designed to shed some light on the political framing of energy issues since Obama took office. Since only six out of 10 Americans believe there is solid scientific evidence that the earth is warming, I talk a lot about the $400 tank of gas in Afghanistan and energy independence from power thugs like Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chavez. As a matter of fact, if you’d like the basic gist of a good chunk of my talk, just read this post.

But beyond gasoline and warzones, I’m also banging the drum about nuclear power, a power source that PPI has long supported even as the left keeps it at arms-length, and that is a critical component of America’s drive towards energy independence. I’ve been telling the story of Barack Obama’s embrace of nuclear power in the State of the Union, which was closely followed by a trip down to Georgia to announce the first construction of a nuclear plant in the U.S. in about 25 years.

Why does all this matter to Sweden? Sweden is facing a general election this September. The Red-Green Coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party is currently in opposition but stands a good chance of beating the incumbent center-right coalition. And that, in a sense, would be a return to normalcy in this social-democratic mecca. I don’t have the numbers of the top of my head, but only about 15 of the last 90 years haven’t seen a Social Democrat in the PM’s office.

And while SD party leader Mona Salin may get there, it will be with significant help from the Greens. The Greens stand to rocket up from 5 percent last election to near 10-15 percent this year. And guess what? They hate nuclear power, falsely believing that it is unsafe and dangerous. Just yesterday, the coalition presented a plan that would tax “excessive profits” of energy companies, including nuclear.

Political insiders here think energy could be one of the more contentious issues within the Red-Green coalition. In the article I cite above, note how the Green Party spokeswoman says that her faction had to compromise, which implies that the Social Dems were resistant to higher energy taxes. But giving the Greens’ increasing appeal, their policy carried the day.

Penalizing nuclear power isn’t natural for the Social Dems — in the ‘60s and ‘70s, they led the charge to build Sweden’s 10 reactors that today produce nearly 50 percent of its power. Indeed, Sweden draws 90 percent of its power from hydro and nuclear, meaning that nearly all of its power is from non-carbon sources. It is an unfortunate about-face to propose taxing an energy source that is established, clean, and safe.

And that’s where I come in — an American progressive who can talk about creative ways to frame energy issues, and use Barack Obama’s nuclear story to give Swedish Social Dems a few reasons not to turn their backs on power sources that they once endorsed and that continue to make sense.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/tobin/ / CC BY-SA 2.0

Cape Wind a Win for the Clean Energy Economy

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

In recent months, we at PPI have been doing our level best to call the nation’s attention to a bright green section of the map in the northeast, where Massachusetts is leading the way on virtually every front of environmental regulation and the building of a clean economy. Yesterday, Massachusetts found itself leading the way yet again, as the Obama administration announced the approval of the Cape Wind project, an offshore wind farm off the coast of Cape Cod.

We at PPI weren’t surprised. We had heard the inside word on the progress of the Cape Wind project in a meeting we held several weeks ago with several dozen New England business leaders, energy entrepreneurs and activists, featuring Ian Bowles, Massachuetts’ pathbreaking secretary of energy and environment. As Bowles told the crowd in early March, Cape Wind had passed most of its regulatory and litigation hurdles, and the administration was likely to support it.

Bowles was an unqualified supporter of the project, which promises — over a quixotic range of objections from various local NIMBY opponents — to provide a highly promising clean source of energy for Massachusetts. Cape Wind is rated to produce up to 468 megawatts of wind power, with average production of be 170 megawatts — almost 75 percent of the 230 megawatt average demand for Cape Cod and the Islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket.

Now that it’s a go, Cape Wind will become a pilot project for the nation and for President Obama’s push for a clean energy economy, a broad, innovative agenda that encompasses (among others) wind power, nuclear energy and myriad efficiency projects that will gain us millions of “negawatts.” Interior Secretary Ken Salazar’s announcement of the administration’s support for Cape Wind is another chapter in this still-being-written book about the nation’s future — whose pages open, fittingly, where our history begins, in Massachusetts.

Confronting Iran: The Case for Targeted Sanctions

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

The following is a guest column from Pirooz Hamvatan, a pseudonym for a Washington, D.C.-based analyst focusing on Iranian domestic and security issues, and Ali K., currently a business student in the U.S. and a supporter of Iran’s Green Movement who was severely beaten by the Basij militia during a peaceful demonstration in Tehran last year.

Congress is on the verge of sending a petroleum sanctions bill to President Obama that has wide bipartisan support in Congress. But far from posing a serious challenge to the regime, the bill could in fact inadvertently undermine long-term U.S. interests by weakening the Iranian civil rights movement and strengthening President Ahmadinejad and his cronies.

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, currently in conference committee, will direct the president to impose sanctions on any entity providing Iran with “refined petroleum products” worth $200,000 or more per transaction, or $1 million per year. The bill defines refined petroleum products to include diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and aviation gasoline.

The new bill aims to cripple Iran’s economy in response to Iran’s refusal to halt its nuclear program. But the sanctions being proposed are not the right answer. Such a sweeping measure would end up only hurting ordinary Iranians, especially the middle class that the U.S. must shore up to improve Iran’s chances for reform.

Instead, our top priority should be helping to increase the space for the Iranian civil rights movement. That means moving beyond the limited focus on “solving” the nuclear issue. An Iranian government that is more accountable to — and representative of — its moderate majority would not pose a security threat to the U.S. and its allies. Rather than heavy-handed sanctions, the Obama administration should consider restrictions that are more targeted, which would hit the ruling regime where it hurts, and increase the possibility of change from within.

The Wrong Path

Introduced in the House by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and in the Senate by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), the sanctions bill currently in conference aims to limit Iran’s access to gasoline in the hopes that the suffering population will pressure the regime to give in to Western demands. But if the end goal is to induce Iran to be a more responsible regional actor that doesn’t threaten U.S. security interests, then petroleum sanctions are likely to achieve the opposite effect.

Just look at the experience of the last couple of decades. In 1995, in response to Iranian pursuit of nuclear technology and support of terrorism, President Clinton issued two executive orders prohibiting American investment in Iran’s energy sector and banning U.S. imports of most Iranian goods. The following year, Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (PDF), calling for sanctions on foreign firms investing more than $20 million per year in Iran’s energy sector. Although such measures have impeded the development of Iran’s economy, they have not caused the Islamic Republic to change course on its nuclear program or its funding of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. In fact, in order to achieve their foreign policy and domestic goals, Iran’s leaders have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to let the Iranian people suffer.

Just as important, history has shown that crippling sanctions undermine the middle class — the very people who are the backbone of civil society and the voices of moderation. International sanctions on Iraq weakened its population, making them more reliant on, and more vulnerable to, Saddam Hussein’s regime. Gasoline sanctions on Iran could have a similar effect, exacerbating inflation, lowering the quality of life for the middle class and pushing more people below the poverty line.

Gasoline sanctions would also distract Iranians from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s own mismanagement of the economy — an important issue mobilizing people around the Green Movement — and divert blame to the U.S. Iran is already facing a 20-percent inflation rate, a crippled domestic industry, unemployment of over 11 percent (with 24 percent of 15-to-24 year-olds unemployed), and one of the worst rates of brain drain in the world. Many Iranians are still seething over the fact that, since becoming president in 2005, Ahmadinejad squandered unprecedented oil revenues that the Islamic Republic accrued as a result of high world oil prices. Amid all of this, Ahmadinejad has backed a controversial measure that would phase out government subsidies on gasoline and is likely to increase inflation. The Iranian people are already facing enough hardship without the U.S. adding to their woes and diminishing the pro-American sentiments of a wide array of Iranians.

Nor will the sanctions loosen the regime’s grip on power. Ahmadinejad’s faction would, in fact, fare better than the majority of the populace. Masters of smuggling, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps members would still be able to bring in gasoline through Iran’s porous borders, perversely enriching themselves even more.

The Right Path

But if broad sanctions are a heavy-handed tool that could only risk the development of Iran’s civil rights movement, what options do U.S. policy makers have to challenge the regime?

A preferred approach would be something more targeted against those responsible for Iran’s actions: the members of the ruling regime. Congress should consider the following:

  • Pass a bill calling on the U.S. State Department to identify Iranian human rights abusers (primarily from within the Revolutionary Guards; the Basij, the regime’s volunteer militia; and the judiciary) and impose travel bans on them. The bill should also seek the cooperation of our allies in enforcing the ban as widely as possible and place pressure on key countries like Dubai to block entry to these individuals. The list of targeted offenders should be made public in order to show the Iranian people that the U.S. is on their side.
  • Pass a measure calling for human rights abusers’ assets to be frozen. Because Iranian officials have gone to great lengths to distance themselves from the U.S. financial system, the U.S. Treasury may not have much of a role to play here. Rather, such a measure would simply be a first step in convincing banks in Europe and the United Arab Emirates — where many regime insiders’ assets are squirreled away — to enforce restrictions.

What specific effect will travel bans have on hardline officials and their mid-ranking employees? Besides being a major inconvenience, it would hurt their pocketbooks. This is because a large number of these individuals have side-businesses in which they smuggle goods from places like Dubai, Thailand, Indonesia and Syria — buying, for example, electronic goods and bringing them back to Iran through Revolutionary Guard-controlled customs stations without having to pay import duties. They then sell these goods at highly marked-up prices in the isolated Iranian market. A strictly enforced travel ban — including on individuals working for these human rights abusers’ front companies — would close off a lucrative source of income.

To be clear, the overall intent of this plan is not necessarily to deal a significant economic blow to the entire hardline establishment — that would be next to impossible. Neither will it convince, in the short term, current Iranian leaders to change course on the nuclear program — no outside pressure will. Rather the strategy is to increase the disincentives for individuals to participate in or condone oppressive behavior, with the goal of helping the Green Movement flourish.

At the same time, it is important not to target certain high level officials who may have the capacity to play a role in moving Iran toward reform. For instance, while it may be justified to sanction Judiciary Chief Sadegh Larijani for allowing hardliners to abuse Iran’s legal system to persecute reformers, his brother Ali Larijani — the pragmatic conservative Speaker of Parliament and bitter Ahmadinejad rival — has not been complicit in human rights abuses, and thus should not be snared by the sanctions net. This nuanced targeting will send a signal to the regime’s officials that they will be left alone if they refrain from abusing their fellow citizens.

Moreover, certain Iranian leaders are sensitive to international accusations of human rights abuses. This is not for altruistic reasons, but because they want the Islamic Republic to be seen as a role model to the Islamic world, and not simply another run-of-the-mill Middle Eastern dictatorship.

To be sure, human rights sanctions alone may not alleviate the pressure currently being placed on Iran’s Green Movement. Regime hardliners could blame the U.S. for fomenting post-election unrest and paint Iran’s dissidents as Western spies. Republican Guard members and Basijis could continue their human rights abuses regardless of travel bans and asset freezes. But that is the status quo in Iran. There is little cost to the U.S. if human rights sanctions don’t work — and much to gain if they do.

A Broader, Pro-Reform Agenda

Human rights sanctions are not a silver bullet. They will not bring the regime to its knees. But neither will gasoline sanctions. Fortunately, it appears that the Obama administration is asking Congress to slow down its push for unilateral gasoline sanctions as the U.N. Security Council deliberates over its own sanctions during the next few months. Meanwhile, targeted sanctions against human rights abusers is being pushed by Sen. John McCain, though not as stand-alone legislation but as an amendment to the flawed gas sanctions bill.

A human rights sanctions package can be an effective part of a broader effort to help Iran’s Green Movement chart its own course toward a better future for Iranians. Other essential pieces to this strategy would include:

  • Rep. Jim Moran’s (D-VA) Iranian Digital Empowerment Act, which seeks to help get information-sharing software and filter-breaking technology into the hands of Iranian reformers.
  • Rep. Keith Ellison’s (D-MN) Stand With the Iranian People Act, which (in addition to calling for human rights abusers to be sanctioned) calls for suspension of U.S. government funding to entities that sell censorship and surveillance equipment to the regime, and seeks to ease restrictions on American charities that want to work in Iran.

Bills focusing on the Islamic Republic’s human rights abuses have an excellent chance of passing in Congress because they are politically appealing — they help legislators look tough on national security while promoting American values of freedom and democracy. Moreover, they avoid the danger that is inherent with sweeping economic sanctions: that of harming the people they were intended to help.

Moreover, U.S. passage of human rights sanctions could lead allies in Europe to follow suit. Although the U.N. Security Council is unlikely to do so — China and Russia are adamantly opposed to interfering in others’ domestic affairs — if the U.S. and European allies banded together to pressure countries like Dubai to enforce travel bans, sanctions would have a greater chance of success.

In the end, it is important to remember that the members of the Green Movement are fighting for reform within the Islamic Republic system. Their demands include an independent electoral commission, the release of all political prisoners and freedom of speech. Acknowledging that it is up to the Iranian people to chart their own course, the U.S. can best protect its own security interests by helping to level the playing field in Iran, allowing the moderate, peace-loving majority of Iranians to continue their journey toward a better future for their country and the broader Middle East.

 

The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

The News That Wasn’t: The Senate Climate Bill

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

This morning’s biggest story is about what’s not happening. This weekend, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) announced that he could not support the tripartisan climate bill in the Senate that he is co-sponsoring in the wake of reports that Democrats will be prioritizing immigration reform. Graham’s surprise move led to the scuttling of the bill’s long-anticipated rollout today — and grim predictions that the legislation may have breathed its last.

What ticked Graham off? Graham called the decision to move immigration to the top of the legislative agenda “nothing more than a cynical political ploy.” He expressed his belief that with immigration taking up badly needed bandwidth in the Senate, the chances for climate policy’s passage would be slim. “I’ve got some political courage, but I’m not stupid,” he said.

For their part, Democrats are continuing to push forward with both priorities. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid underscored his commitment to passing climate legislation this session, saying that “energy could be next if it’s ready.”

Iffy though its chances of passage may be, it would be a real shame if the climate bill were to not get a chance at all. For weeks, Graham, Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) and Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) have been working to put together a workable compromise that could get 60 votes. The bill they were to present today seemed promising, their efforts winning the support not just of progressives but of energy companies like Exelon, ConocoPhillips and Duke Energy. It’s a wobbly coalition that may not be easily put back together, especially if the Republicans reduce the Democrats’ margins in Congress (or take it back altogether) this November. If climate change legislation doesn’t move this year, it will be a while — a long while if Obama loses in 2012 — before it gets revisited.

As others have pointed out, Graham’s hissy fit over immigration seems mighty hypocritical given that he wrote about the urgency of passing immigration reform just over a month ago in the Washington Post. But that doesn’t make his criticism incorrect. He’s right that the decision to devote Senate attention to another, no less divisive priority is going to dim the prospects for the climate bill.

While the political calculus of fast-tracking immigration makes sense — it’s clearly intended to fire up the Hispanic base, which has felt neglected under Obama — it’s also a shortsighted decision. Both issues are important, of course, but momentum was already behind climate legislation. The House had already passed it, Kerry, Graham and Lieberman had lined up crucial industry support, and an environmental community that was growing disillusioned with the administration could at least rally behind a bill that would put a cap on carbon. If the administration fails to throw its full weight behind getting climate over this one last hump, then the disappointment of the environmental community will have been earned.

A Larger Failing

But the death of climate policy — and, yes, we shouldn’t shovel dirt on it quite yet — speaks to a larger failing. Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH), who considers the issue one of his top five priorities, told the Washington Post that when he’s back home talking to constituents, “nobody talks about this. I never hear about it.” His experience is borne out by polls, which show increasing public apathy about solving our energy and climate problems.

It’s understandable that an abstract threat like climate change would give way to more narrow concerns in a time of economic crisis. And to be sure, the media and our leadership — particularly on the right — bear some of the blame for the public disinterest. For their part, progressives perhaps haven’t done the best job of framing the issue and selling it to a skeptical public.

But the pattern of the past year has been worrisome. Despite the scale of our public problems, we shown little appetite for bold, collective action. We’ve seen it in our quivering in the face of health reform’s passage, in our refusal to accept the connection between taxation and benefits, in our willingness to be gulled by cynical entertainers.

When he came into office, President Obama promised to bring an end to the “smallness of our politics.” Despite some signal accomplishments, he hasn’t succeeded in reforming the mindset of our political class. But Washington isn’t the only problem. To overcome the smallness of our politics, it’s not just our politicians who need to think big — the American people do, too.

Cheat Sheet for Climate Policy: Part II – What’s Important for a Good Climate Bill

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

How to tell a good climate bill from a bad one? This series will guide you through the main issues that are likely to arise in the coming weeks as the Senate takes on climate change. In this post we highlight issues that are very important — but not quite essential — in climate policy. These ideas will likely play a key role in the eventual passage of legislation from the Senate. (To read the other posts in the series, click here.)

In our last post we identified the two absolutely critical issues for any climate policy: putting a price on carbon and targeting meaningful emissions reductions. Pricing carbon imposes costs on emitters, thereby changing behavior and encouraging innovation, but it will also generate revenues. Once they are generated, who receives them and how they are spent are important elements of climate policy.

Category II Issues: Key Elements of Climate Policy

#1: Public revenue or private giveaways?

If carbon is priced with a tax, it will generate new government revenues. If, as seems likely, carbon is priced with some form of cap-and-trade, things get a little more complicated. For cap-and-trade to work, emissions allowances must be allocated in some way. The two simplest ways to allocate allowances are to give them away for free, or to auction them to the highest bidder. Only the latter would generate any new public revenues. Allowances are assets with real value, so giving them away is no different from a government subsidy to the recipient.

Auctioning allowances is generally more efficient than giving them away — society as a whole is better off the more allowances are auctioned. Nevertheless, many groups of emitters or industries have made arguments (and will continue to do so) that they should be given free allowances. They argue the impact of climate policy on their industries will be too onerous or that they represent the interests of their consumers. Generally speaking, these claims are old-fashioned Washington handout-seeking behavior.

Fights over allowance allocation were predictably rampant when the House considered its bill, Waxman-Markey, last year. Comparatively few allowances would be auctioned under Waxman-Markey, especially before 2020, and substantial allowance handouts (35 percent of allowances) would be given to local gas and electricity distribution companies, ostensibly to protect consumers from increases in electricity prices. It is very likely that allocation will again be a central (possibly the central) political issue in the Senate debate.

A carbon price won’t affect every person, firm, or industry equally. In particular, low-income households will feel the effects of a carbon price far more than wealthy households, and an equitable climate policy should compensate the losers to offset that disparity. The best way to do so would be to compensate them with cash (through direct rebates or tax cuts) raised from auctions – yet another factor in their favor. Under a giveaway scenario, the government could hand out free allowances to utilities, hoping that they pass along savings in the form of lower energy prices. That may help consumers, but they would still be better off if they receive the savings directly out of auction or tax revenues and can make their own choices about how to spend that compensation—more on how these revenues could be spent in the next section. Besides, lower consumer energy prices can blunt the price signal a cap sends, leading to increased energy usage.

However attractive auctioning all allowances is, it’s probably not politically realistic. Handouts will probably have to be made to some industries to get votes for the bill (though there’s still hope, on both the right and left, that the general welfare can prevail over handouts to special interests ) In any case, auctions are the most desirable distribution mechanism, and should be a major component of any climate legislation.

#2: What do we do with the money?

Assuming you’ve auctioned at least some allowances (or have revenues from a carbon tax), what should the government do with the money? There is no easy answer here, but in general we have three options:

a) Reduce existing taxes

If the government receives revenues from a carbon price, one response is to cut the taxes already on the books. Reducing other taxes shifts the U.S. tax burden from those who currently bear it (primarily income earners) to carbon emitters and, indirectly, to consumers of carbon-intensive goods and services. In general, this is a good thing, for the simple reason that you are lowering taxes on something you generally want people to do (work) and raising them on something you don’t want them to do (emit carbon). In economic terms, you move from taxing something we generally think has positive externalities to something we know has negative externalities. And politically, who doesn’t like lower taxes? One drawback is on that you may end up reducing progressive income taxes in favor of carbon pricing, whose costs might be harder to bear for those who can least afford it.

b) Dividends to consumers

If you’re troubled by the possibly regressive character of tax cuts, but think returning carbon price revenues to the people ultimately affected by increased prices is a good idea, then a good alternative is direct payments to consumers. This is the “cap-and-dividend” approach taken by the Cantwell-Collins bill in the Senate that Danny wrote about recently. Under cap-and-dividend, revenues generated by an allowance auction (or a carbon tax) are used to make payments directly to consumers. In other words, every household would get a check. Because all households would get equal payments, the plan turns a somewhat regressive carbon price scheme on its head by transferring money from those with a large carbon footprint (often the wealthy) to those with a smaller one (often the poor). Politically, it’s broadly appealing—even conservatives that tend to oppose redistribution of wealth find a lot to like, in large part because dividends “cut government out of the picture.”

Instead of sending everyone the same amount, it’s also possible to try to identify specific losers from climate policy and compensate them directly. One example of such relative losers might be trade-exposed industries, who would stand to lose competitive ground against foreign firms not subject to a carbon price (more on this issue later in the series). Making payments to industries instead of households isn’t usually characterized as cap-and-dividend, but the difference is only distributional—who gets the money. One disadvantage is that direct dividends pose a bureaucratic challenge — there is no clear mechanism for distributing them.

c) Public goods

Alternatively, the government could spend the revenues from an auction. In some cases, the government can create greater benefits by spending revenues than by giving them back. Restricting ourselves to climate-related spending, good examples might be energy R&D, investments in adaptation to climate change, or efforts to reduce emissions internationally or verify international emissions offsets. Indeed, the federal government will need to spend money in some of these areas regardless because the private sector may underinvest in energy R&D, and will almost certainly underinvest in climate change adaptation and international mitigation efforts. The Waxman-Markey bill devotes auction revenues to many of these areas, and a Senate bill probably will (and, in large part, should) do the same.

Of course, carbon price revenues could also be used for any other government expenditure, from education to infrastructure or defense. Revenues could also be used to pay down the debt. Any of these might be worthwhile expenditures, but it’s important to remember that any revenues that are not returned through dividends or lowering other taxes represent a tax increase on anyone who uses carbon—that is, everyone. Opponents of action on climate often characterize it as a major tax increase. To the extent that revenues from a carbon price are dedicated to unrelated government expenditures, this criticism isn’t dirty politics, it’s a fact. Taxing and spending on a given project may or may not be a good idea, but bringing carbon into the picture doesn’t change the fact that it’s taxing and spending.

#3: Market design: banking and borrowing

A major policy and political priority for climate legislation is to reduce emissions as effectively and cheaply as possible. Whether this goal proves to be attainable or not depends greatly on how cap-and-trade markets are designed. While these issues tend to fly under the radar of the political debate — partially because they are complex and partially because they are not very sexy — they have major implications not only for how firms will behave under a cap-and-trade system, but the timing of actual emissions reductions.

There are multiple options for controlling the costs of climate legislation compliance (most of which will covered in our next post), but the key aspects are the closely related concepts of banking and borrowing of allowances. The general concept of banking isn’t terribly complicated: firms ‘bank’ allowances by overcomplying with the cap (they reduce their emissions more than is required) throughout the program, thus building a surplus of allowances that they can use at a future date. Similarly, firms may choose to ‘borrow’ allowances, by using an allowance from a future year, then repaying that allowance with future reductions (possibly with interest).

Polluting firms have two reasons why they want to be able to bank and borrow. First, the path of the lowering cap (established by legislation) will likely not be set in a way that is optimal for regulated parties. Banking and borrowing credits gives them the flexibility to take an emissions-reduction path that is most cost effective, either by filling their bank with credits through overcompliance in the early years of the market or by borrowing in later years if they expect some kind of efficiency increase to come through at a certain future time. Second, banking and borrowing can protect firms against unforeseen shocks to their compliance paths. For instance, a company may have unanticipated problems that force it to use a more carbon-intensive energy source, increasing its emissions above the number of allowances it possesses. Borrowing allows the firm to get more allowances now in exchange for stronger future reductions.

While some may claim that banking and borrowing look like a way to game the system, they are simply mechanisms to help firms control costs and reduce their emissions as efficiently as possible. A strict cap-and-trade system where firms can only trade amongst each other would be more expensive. Banking and borrowing helps reduce costs while still achieving the cumulative emissions reductions desired. A study by Resources for the Future scholars Harrison Fell and Dick Morgenstern contends that borrowing generates significant cost savings, especially when the cap is being lowered at some rate (which is the case in all serious climate proposals). If borrowing is restricted, costs go up.

Allowance banking and borrowing are key issues for climate policy because they will not only play a major role in the behavior of firms in the cap-and-trade market, but they will also have a strong influence on the actual path of emissions reduction. This gets back to the point we made in the last post, where we said that specific reduction targets don’t matter as much cumulative emissions reductions. The ability to bank means that carbon polluters may strongly overcomply, meaning that they will reduce far beyond the 17-20 percent reduction goals in 2020. Analyses from the EPA and the EIA back this up. The flipside, however, is reductions in later years may be less than the cap as companies start to cash in their banked allowances. As long as the cumulative emissions over the life of the regulation come in under the cap, it’s fine for the year-to-year levels to be ruled by how regulated parties bank and borrow.

The Bottom Line

In the last post, we presented three issues that we deemed essential to any climate bill. Here we discuss the merely important:

  1. How are emissions allowances allocated—are they auctioned, or given away?
  2. How are the public revenues from climate policy spent?
  3. Is the allowance market designed for economic efficiency—does it allow banking and borrowing?

In our next post, we will travel further down the rabbit hole and address some further issues climate policy that are still relevant and meaningful, but less important than what we’ve talked about so far.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/uwehermann/ / CC BY-SA 2.0

Earth Day and Energy Security

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

Throughout the progressive blogosphere, Earth Day generates tons of buzz as like-minded liberals gather in chat rooms and on message boards for an annual rally to protect Mother Earth. Re-energizing (pun intended) focus on the environment in the wake of a so-so Copenhagen Summit is a worthy endeavor, of course, but it can sometimes feel like preaching to the choir.

Meanwhile, the Kerry-Graham-Lieberman bill is languishing in the Senate with little hope of movement before November’s elections. And despite its tri-partisan co-sponsorship, conservatives continue to insist on peddling the notion that climate change and Santa Claus share more than a melting polar ice cap. Meanwhile, their supporters continue to buy it, grasping at incontrovertible “proof” like leaked emails from Cambridge.

While the right is intent on pretending climate change doesn’t exist, there’s one aspect of it that’s getting tougher and tougher to ignore: energy security. Not everyone believes that the earth is warming, but most eagerly accept the idea that America should be buying less gasoline from the Middle East. The most credible messenger is the military — the one organization whose mission demands that it become more energy efficient.

Late last year, my PPI colleague Mike Signer wrote a piece on the topic for U.S. News. Here’s what he said:

[T]he most innovative and effective actors in the carbon-reduction arena bear zero resemblance to this outdated cartoon. No hemp-wearing hippies here: Today, it’s the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard who are aggressively pursuing plans for sustainable energy, reducing carbon, and achieving energy independence.

It’s no mystery why: Our armed men and women are truly the point of the spear. The services aren’t motivated just by the “soft power” of moral authority or the pursuit of idealism for its own sake. It’s in fact “hard power” concerns—the security of our troops, the economic independence of our energy supply, and the long-term need to better control the geopolitical implications of climate change—that have driven the military to take the lead.

Consider the facts. Today, an infantry soldier on a three-day mission in Afghanistan carries over 25 pounds of batteries to charge his equipment, hampering his maneuverability and can even causing muscular-skeletal injuries. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have suffered chilling casualties guarding convoys of trucks carrying oil. Meanwhile, every $10 increase in the price of oil translates into a $1.3 billion increase in the Pentagon’s operating costs.

In all of these cases, clean energy and efficiency programs would not only help reduce our carbon output and achieve energy efficiency; they would directly increase the effectiveness of our military.

Remember in the summer of 2008 when the price of a gallon of gas ran to a shocking $4? Well, multiply that by 100 — literally — to get cost of a gallon every day in Afghanistan. By the time you add the transportation price and supply losses from attacked convoys, the Pentagon estimates that fuel costs the American taxpayer $400 a gallon. And much of that $400/gallon is put in Abrams tanks that get… wait for it… just over a half-mile to the gallon. Ergo, one mile in an Abrams tank costs about $700.

The good news is that organizations like Operation Free — a group of military veterans who recognize the life and death nature of fuel efficiency – are traveling the country to promote the policies that will improve our energy security. So whether or not you “buy” climate change – and frankly, you really should — it’s tough to argue against a military that is trying to cut the tether to carbon-based fuels that hamper mission effectiveness. Focusing on this aspect of the issue may well be the best bipartisan way to move public opinion on reducing the use of carbon-based fuels.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/ / CC BY 2.0

Rah-Rah for Retrofits

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

We’ve heard a lot of doom and gloom on environmental topics recently, with progressives providing dark statistics about escalating carbon levels and conservative rebutting with stormy predictions of economic eclipse.

But Earth Day is supposed to be a feel-good day. And, as Thomas Friedman argued yesterday, when you start winning, everything becomes easier. That’s why President Obama’s victory on health care helped led National Security Advisor Jim Jones’ to declare that “America is back” on the world stage.

So it’s fitting that Vice President Joe Biden yesterday announced just under a half-billion dollars worth of stimulus monies for efficiency retrofits. In a little over a year, the administration has won a surprising number of victories in the push to mine “negawatts” through efficiency. Where we were slouching toward disaster through the laissez-faire, do-nothing inertia of the prior administration, we are now plowing toward a brighter, cleaner horizon.

Among other highlights, Biden announced that $20 million will be distributed to cities in the southeastern states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia to dramatically increase the effectiveness of retrofits across the region. The new programs will use a pay-for-performance approach to finance affordable, accessible programs for both small and large residential, commercial and public buildings. But that’s just one of dozens of programs spread through Boulder to Camden, Cincinnati to Seattle.

What’s not to like? These projects pay for themselves. They work with local and state governments to quickly upgrade buildings. They employ local workers and are the quintessence of “shovel-ready.” And perhaps most importantly, they showcase in very public ways the powerful nexus of public works and progressive policy. These are wins — and, hopefully, preludes to victory this summer, as the administration and Congress turn to the effort to price carbon.

Plan B for Climate Policy?: A PPI Series

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

PPI has long been a proponent of an economy-wide cap-and-trade system to confront the problem of climate change. But as the fortunes of cap-and-trade legislation in the Senate fade, we need to begin looking at other options before Congress. In the first post of this series, we looked at the Cantwell-Collins “cap-and-dividend” bill. This post examines the Carper-Alexander “3P” plan introduced this February, a bill that regulates only non-greenhouse-gas pollutants that some have suggested could be expanded into an electric-sector carbon cap-and-trade plan.

In early February, Sens. Tom Carper (D-DE) and Lamar Alexander (R-TN) introduced what we will call the “3P” (P for pollutant) bill, which tightens emissions of SO2, NOx and mercury from coal and oil-fired power plants through cap-and-trade markets. While the bill covers only non-greenhouse-gas pollutants, it has been discussed as a possible template for a climate bill targeting the electricity sector — or “4P.”

Carper-Alexander is nothing radically new. Considering how knowledgeable the American public is about cap-and-trade in general, it’s a safe bet to say most people don’t know that there is already a cap-and-trade market working to reduce air pollution from fossil fuel-fired power plants in the U.S. as we speak.

If you’ve ever had any discussions about market solutions to pollution problems, then chances are you’ve heard about the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which established a pollution reduction market to address acid rain in the Northeast. Specifically, it created a cap-and-trade market for sulfur dioxide (SO2: primarily responsible for acid rain, not a greenhouse gas) and nitrogen oxides (NO and NO2, both commonly labeled NOx: harmful to humans, primary precursor to ground-level ozone, which is a greenhouse gas) for the eastern half of the country. Since its inception in 1990, it has impressively reduced acid rain problems at much lower costs than initially predicted. It is the example advocates and economists point to when discussing how cap-and-trade can help control greenhouse gas emissions. This program was further strengthened in 2005 when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which established permanent caps and aggressive reductions for SO2 and NOx emissions beyond the Clean Air Act.

Designed to protect human health, CAIR is in poor health itself. A D.C. Circuit Court in 2008 found it failed to follow Clean Air Act statutory mandates and vacated the rule. The court then reinstated it under the stipulation that the EPA make some significant changes. The EPA is currently retooling CAIR to bring it in line with the court ruling. Just like with carbon emissions, however, it would be nice if Congress stepped up to the plate and made a law that clearly told the EPA how to administer these regulations. Unlike on carbon emissions, there’s a chance Congress can act relatively quickly.

The Basics

The Carper-Alexander bill sets a 3.5 million ton cap for a national market of SO2 emissions in 2012, then ratchets it down to two million tons in 2015 and 1.5 million tons in 2018, an 80 percent reduction of 2008 emissions. This final limit would remain unless after 2021 the EPA finds a lower cap is needed to protect public health.

The NOx market would operate slightly differently, as the country would be split into two zones, with the eastern states and western states each getting their own NOx market. The eastern market will face a cap of 1.39 million tons in 2012, which will tighten to 1.3 million tons by 2020. The western market will be capped at 510,000 tons in 2012, cranking down to 320,000 ton by 2020. When combined, the two markets will reduce NOx emissions from 2008 levels by 53 percent. The bill calls for mercury to be reduced by 90 percent by 2015, but it is not regulated in a market. Rather, the bill sets a cap for mercury (no trading) and leaves it to the EPA to promulgate the program rules.

A 4P bill could be very similar to the 3P proposal. Likely, the bill would establish a single market for CO2 emissions from power plants with reduction goals for future years, likely extending out to 2020. The bill could possibly call for New Source Performance Standards on all four pollutants for new plants. It might also include offset provisions for CO2 production. This legislative approach could be appealing if a more comprehensive proposal fails to gain support in the Senate and legislators begin to look for smaller-scale, more piecemeal approaches to emissions reduction.

The Good

The 3P bill takes aggressive action to reduce harmful air pollutants that derive from the combustion of fossil fuels, namely coal and oil, for electricity generation. Even though it targets only non-greenhouse gas pollutants, 3P could actually lead to indirect climate change benefits. While pollutants capped under the bill can be lowered through the use of filters and other technologies, a 3P scheme could also spur plant upgrades, the retirement of older (and dirtier) plants, and fuel-switching to less carbon-intensive sources, including natural gas, renewables, nuclear and hydropower — all of which would lead to lower carbon emissions. By successfully applying a cap-and-trade system for mitigating environmental damages, 3P also reinforces the notion that these systems can work in the real world without harming the economy.

Furthermore, 3P saves the EPA from legal limbo by clearly establishing the reduction goals for SO2, NOx and mercury emissions over the next 10 years and providing clarity for both firms and regulators. The bill also seems politically innocuous — even infamous climate change denier Sen. Jim Inhofe has said vaguely positive things about it. If the Obama administration goes looking for a bipartisan win on the environmental front, it may look to push the 3P.

The Bad

As already mentioned, 3P is not a climate bill, though it may have some indirect climate benefits. But even a 4P climate bill would be less than ideal. If CO2 were added to the 3P’s list of targeted pollutants, the bill would still fall short as it would regulate only the electricity sector — transportation, manufacturing and other carbon-emitting sectors would evade regulation. Electricity generation accounts for roughly one-third of total greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S., meaning that a 4P bill would still be far less preferable than an economy-wide cap-and-trade system.

Additionally, were a 4P bill to be structured similarly to the current 3P bill, it would give a great deal of authority for market design and administration to the EPA as CO2 would technically be regulated under the Clean Air Act. Regardless of your opinion about the EPA’s ability to properly administer a massive emissions market, it’s a political sticking point, as highlighted by current proposals to strip EPA of its authority to regulate greenhouse gases.

The Upshot

The 3P bill could provide a viable pathway for carbon regulation of the electricity sector. If the highly anticipated tri-partisan climate bill from Sens. John Kerry (D-MA), Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) does not create the kind of momentum for climate and energy legislation the authors are hoping for (more on that in the next entry), one option could be for the Senate to take a more piecemeal, sector-by-sector approach, in which a 4P bill (SO2, NOx, mercury and CO2) moves forward.

Both Carper and Alexander have sponsored carbon emissions legislation specific to electricity generation in past sessions of Congress. Both those bills called for electricity-specific cap-and-trade markets to reduce carbon emissions. Carper has signaled he’s open to incorporating his bill into a broader climate bill, though it’s unclear if he meant including CO2 in the structure of his bill or working the SO2, NOx and mercury caps into another piece of legislation.

The Carper-Alexander bill provides a simple structure, and clarifies existing regulations within EPA. It would not be an ideal approach to emissions reduction, but if all else fails, it could provide a workable jumpstart. The Clean Act Air showed that cap-and-trade can work once before, and it might have a chance to do it again.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/emmajg/ / CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Cheat Sheet for Climate Policy: Part I – What’s Essential for a Good Climate Bill

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

How to tell a good climate bill from a bad one? This series will guide you through the main issues that are likely to arise in the coming weeks as the Senate takes on climate change. In this post, we identify the essential ideas that need to be enshrined in any climate bill. These are the provisions that no good climate policy can do without. (To read the other posts in the series, click here.)

With Sens. John Kerry (D-MA), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), and Joe Lieberman (I-CT) set to release their climate legislation next week, climate change seems poised to return to the top of the agenda in Washington. One lesson learned from the last big fight on the Hill — health care — is that things can get confusing and ugly quickly for non-expert observers when media attention shines a light on the congressional sausage factory. It becomes hard to keep issues and ideas straight, harder still to understand which are important, and the avalanche of political rhetoric can make it tempting to just tune out.

Our goal for this short series is to help you cut through the noise. These posts are intended to be a climate policy cheat sheet that will help you decode the discussions. The issues we’ll cover are not equally important — some, like a price on carbon, are integral to the success of any climate and energy policy. Others, like expanding oil drilling, are substantially less significant from a climate/emissions perspective, though perhaps more relevant from other angles (energy security, politics, etc.).

To make the relative importance of these issues clear, we’ve divided them into four categories of decreasing significance — the crucial, the merely important, the relatively minor and the distractions. We’ll summarize the issues in each of the four categories in different posts, starting today with the absolutely vital issues. These categories, we hope, will help you figure out whether something is relatively trivial, or if the farm is being given away in the course of the legislative debate.

We want to make it clear that these categories are based only on the policies’ impact on the key issue: reducing emissions as much as possible for the lowest cost. Other policy goals like economic equity, increased domestic energy production, energy security, etc. might all be important, but (at least in the context of climate policy debates) they’re subordinate to the primary aim of emissions reduction. We’ll mention these goals when one of the policies we discuss affects them, but they are not our focus. We also won’t spend much time discussing the relative levels of political support for different policies – we’ll leave the political commentary to others.

We’re sure that not all of you will agree with our judgment of the relative importance of these issues. That’s fine — encouraging and enabling quality debate on climate policy (look elsewhere for a science debate) is the entire point of the list.

Category I Issues: The Sine Qua Non of Climate Policy

#1: A price on carbon

As Nathan’s written here before, a climate policy without a price on carbon isn’t a serious one. Fossil fuels have deep roots in our economy, and only a carbon price can effectively reach all sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Just as important, no other policy can achieve reductions as efficiently as a carbon price can. The price mechanism forces firms to identify inefficiencies that generate excess greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in the cheapest emissions cuts.

A carbon price can come in one of two forms: either tax carbon emissions directly, or cap them and distribute a limited number of emissions allowances. While a carbon price is not the only policy that matters, it is the one that matters most by far. Anyone who tells you a carbon price is not the most important aspect of climate legislation, no matter how well-intentioned, is wrong.

No climate proposal from the Hill, and few media reports, however, will mention a carbon price. Instead, you’ll hear about cap-and-trade or, since that term has become politically unpalatable, any one of a number of rebrandings: “cap and dividend,” “creating a green economy,” “incentives-based mechanisms,” or something altogether new. If there’s one point worth making here, it’s this — none of these names matter very much, at least substantively. They serve a political purpose, not a policy purpose.

By far the most important question to ask is whether a rebranded proposal puts a price on carbon or not. Is there a cap on emissions and allowances or permits that emitters can trade? Is there a single price (whether it’s called a tax or not) on carbon emissions? If there is, the rest of the proposal is secondary (the details of which may or may not be important). If not, it’s not an honest climate policy.

#2: Breadth of coverage—how much carbon gets priced?

A related issue is how much of U.S. carbon emissions a price mechanism covers. A tax or cap-and-trade system could cover the entire economy, or just one or more sectors. Generally speaking, the broader the coverage of a single emissions market, the greater the possible emissions reductions and the lower the cost per unit of emissions reduction. In other words, broader markets are better. There is some indication that the Kerry-Graham-Lieberman proposal will have an energy-sector only cap, with other measures used to reduce emissions elsewhere. This is useful, but not as good as an economy-wide cap.

A useful rough rule of thumb is that electricity-sector emissions are a third of total U.S. emissions, transportation-sector emissions are another third, and everything else (industry, agriculture, etc.) comprises the remaining third. Since it’s hard to measure emissions from some sectors (like agriculture), a program that includes all U.S. emissions isn’t practical. But including electricity, transportation and industry is feasible and can cover approximately 85 percent of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Policies that cover these sectors are better than those that don’t, and policies that have the same price mechanisms for all three are best of all.

#3: Emissions reduction targets — setting the cap

Setting a price on carbon is critical, but it’s only a means to an end. The goal, of course, is to reduce greenhouse gas (primarily CO2) emissions and limit environmental damages. Once you know that a proposal is a serious one (because it includes a price on carbon), your next question should be how much that policy will reduce emissions. In short, what’s the target?

For a cap-and-trade system, knowing the target is easy: it’s the cap. The concept is pretty simple: set a finite number of emissions allowances and distribute them to actors in the economy in the first year of the program. In each succeeding year, lower the number of allowances available until you reach a desired level of emissions.

For a carbon tax, figuring out emissions reductions is a little more complicated. A rising tax produces similar results as a tightening cap, but you trade emissions certainty (you don’t know exactly how much reduction you’ll get, unlike with cap-and-trade) for price certainty (emitters know exactly how much it will cost for them to emit greenhouse gases). With a cap, it’s the opposite – we know exactly how much we’ll get in reductions, but the market for allowances will determine the price.

More often than not, the first thing highlighted about a new climate proposal are the reduction targets, especially the near-term targets. From an environmental perspective, however, the more important issue is cumulative emissions, not emissions at any point in time. That’s because CO2 and other greenhouse gases are stock pollutants — they accumulate over time. It doesn’t necessarily matter if high or low volumes are released at certain times, just what those volumes add up to over the course of the regulation.

The current global benchmark, to which U.S. action will contribute, is to reach an emissions path that keeps average temperature rises to 2 degrees Celsius. For climate legislation, what matters is the general path of emissions, not necessarily the specific reductions in 2020 or 2040. As we’ll explain in our next post, specific market regulations will determine the exact emissions in any given year, but the market needs a path to follow, which is determined by the lowering cap (or increasing tax). There’s no way to guarantee some set percentage reductions in any year without a direct mandate, which would be extremely costly and restrictive. When you hear lawmakers railing about how 20 percent reductions from 2005 levels in 2020 are unreasonable but 14 percent cuts are attainable, know that they are having a political discussion, not a policy one.

In short, the exact percent emissions targets don’t matter too much year to year. Instead of worrying about whether the goal is to reduce greenhouse gas output by 17 percent or 20 percent in 2020, worry about the trajectory of emissions reduction over the lifetime of the regulation. The long-term outlook is much more important than the short-term benchmarks. Unfortunately, finding out what this long-term outlook is can be hard. It’s a failure of policy leaders and the media that short-term single-year targets are widely publicized while the effect of a given policy on the future stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is rarely discussed.

The Bottom Line

These issues — a carbon price, its reach and the emissions target — are by far the most important parts of a climate proposal. The first questions you should ask of any such proposal are:

  1. Does it create a price on carbon?
  2. How much of U.S. emissions are covered by that price?
  3. What is the path of emissions reduction set by the cap?

The answers to these questions are the most critical to designing effective climate policy. Other things are important, too, as we’ll describe in our next post, but don’t let them distract you. If you care about climate change, keep your eyes on these three ideas.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/evenprimes/ / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Update: This item has been corrected.

Earth Day at 40: Can Obama Outperform Nixon?

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

Today is the 40th anniversary of Earth Day, the first of which took place in 1970 at the beginning of the golden age of environmental legislation in the United States. It’s a telling statement that in the past four decades, the most successful environmental record belongs to Richard Nixon.

Our most disgraced president looks rather hippie-esque when you look at the achievements that passed during his administration: the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Marine Mammals Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Endangered Species Act all became law under his watch, and he established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) soon after Earth Day One.

Since then, environmental policy has often meandered from favored conservative punching bag to a second-tier issue. President Barack Obama has a chance to cement a similar environmental legacy by acting on climate, energy and natural conservation legislation. How has he done so far? In his first term in office, President Obama has achieved notable environmental progress by simply not being President Bush.

Following arguably the most anti-environment administration since the 1970s, almost anyone would shine in comparison. Like on many other fronts, Obama does not lack for ambition. He included energy as one of his three top priorities during the 2008 campaign and has signaled that it will be getting his attention very soon. That being said, the Obama administration has not yet established an impressive or even cohesive environmental record. Many of the president’s actions have been piecemeal, either addressing specific policy problems or cleaning some of the messes left over from the previous eight years. He has yet to achieve a stout victory on the environmental front, but it has only been one year. He still has time to work.

Below is a list of the top five environmental actions that occurred in the first year of the Obama administration – and five other items on which he needs to do more work:

The Accomplishments

  • Endangerment finding: This finding, which said that carbon dioxide is a pollutant that endangers human health, gave the EPA authority to regulate it under the Clean Air Act. This is the most significant step toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions the U.S. government has yet taken.
  • CAFE standards: The EPA increased average fuel economy standards for cars and trucks in the U.S. fleet to be 35 mpg in 2020, the first increase since 1990. The regulation is estimated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 960 million metric tons by 2030.
  • The stimulus package: The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act channeled $8 billion toward energy projects, mainly focusing on renewables and energy efficiency. It included another $6 billion in water and wastewater projects.
  • Copenhagen: Simply put, international climate negotiations would have collapsed were it not for the direct personal involvement of the president. He was instrumental in getting almost every country in attendance to commit to two-degree temperature rise targets, helped get important concessions from China on emissions monitoring and established long-term financing ($100 billion annually by 2020, $20 billion for the U.S.) for international adaptation efforts.
  • Executive appointments: Lisa Jackson at EPA. Steven Chu at Department of Energy. Nancy Sutley at Council on Environmental Quality. Ken Salazar at Department of Interior. John Holdren at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Jane Lubchenco at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Carol Browner as special adviser to the president on energy and climate change issues. These are all smart, competent, committed people who will help the president shape effective environmental policies over the course of his administration.

So what can Obama do for the environment in 2010 and the second half of his term? Here are just a few things:

The To-Do List

  • Climate: Above all, the president should push Congress hard to pass legislation that controls greenhouse gases by setting a price on carbon. The president already has a climate bill, Waxman-Markey, that had passed the House last year and was ready to go to the Senate. Instead of pushing this bill, he and the Senate leadership chose to focus on health care. That process consumed the heart of this Congress’ legislative calendar and much of its political energy. While that choice was understandable, it leaves action on climate and energy as the largest unfulfilled element of the president’s legislative agenda.Debates on climate appear set to start again in the Senate with the release of a new bill next week. The president should push the debate forward, hopefully resulting in a new law that sets economy-wide greenhouse gas controls before the November elections. This is admittedly an ambitious goal. If it proves impossible, Obama should dedicate as much energy in the second half of his term to climate as he did to health care in the first.
  • Air pollution: With so much focus on climate, traditional forms of pollution haven’t drawn much attention. Conventional pollutants like sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides, mercury and ozone still pose significant health risks, and economists believe reducing emissions of these pollutants would result in substantial net benefits to the economy in life expectancy and quality of life. The EPA’s recent attempts to tighten regulations on these pollutants (both of which, it must be said, were authored by the Bush EPA) were struck down by courts. The Obama EPA should renew efforts to regulate these pollutants by issuing new versions of these rules (called CAIR and CAMR) as soon as possible. The president should throw his support behind proposed “3-pollutant” legislation on the Hill that would remove the legal barriers to stricter regulation of these pollutants, and follow that legislation up with action from the EPA. (More on that bill in a later post.)
  • Nuclear waste storage: The president has thrown his support behind nuclear power with $8 billion in loan guarantees for two new plants in Georgia. Regardless of your opinion of nuclear power as an energy source, you have to admit the storage of waste poses quite a problem. The president eliminated Yucca Mountain, the long-controversial water repository in Nevada, without proposing a specific alternative. He organized a blue-ribbon panel to look into solutions to the nuclear waste problem, and the commission is supposed to issue its recommendations sometime next year. They have their work cut out for them.
  • Environmental foreign policy: The president should also consider making environmental issues a more central part of his foreign policy. Whether it’s pushing China, India, Russia and others to agree to global cuts in carbon emissions, or calling Japan out for its cynical efforts to avoid limits on bluefin tuna fishing, ample opportunities exist for advancing U.S. environmental interests internationally and re-establishing our position as the global leader on environmental policy innovation. The president has made a good start in this area, but he can do more.
  • Future environmental dangers: Finally, the president can move beyond environmental issues that have been neglected in the past to examining possible future environmental risks. Many such risks, such as pollution of water with pharmaceuticals and the environmental impacts of nanotechnology, aren’t sufficiently understood. Government also lacks the tools to deal with these issues even if they are identified as dangers. The president should dedicate resources to investigating these and other future risks, and push Congress to give the EPA authority to regulate them when supported by the science. These are the kinds of forward-looking reforms that Nixon pursued, and which could give Obama an enduring environmental legacy.

Success on these fronts — and above all on climate — would not only fulfill President Obama’s environmental promises, but would put him in contention as the most environmentally successful president since Nixon, and likely ever.

As the Earth Turns: How Environmentalism Has Evolved

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

When Earth Day was first celebrated 40 years ago today, environmental distress was in our face. Rivers caught fire, oil spills fouled U.S. shores, toxic waste dumps proliferated, and Los Angeles seemed permanently wreathed in smog. Now we worry more about things we don’t see — runoff and waste from farms, growing carbon concentrations in the atmosphere, fish disappearing from the oceans.

This change underscores both the successes and the limits of the “first generation” of environmental law and regulation. Starting with the landmark Clean Air Act of 1970, Americans for the first time began to grapple seriously with the environmental havoc wrought by the industrial revolution.

We’ve made undeniable progress since then, as Gregg Easterbrook and other writers have documented. Our air and water are cleaner. This would be a good day, in fact, for environmentalists and their business antagonists not to indulge in the usual doomsday talk. What we’ve learned since the first Earth Day is that ecological calamity isn’t inevitable, that the damage we do to nature is often reversible, and that we can curb pollution without wrecking our economy.

Republicans still cling to the myth that a clean environment is a luxury we can’t afford, hence their refusal to take climate change seriously. And some environmental activists evidently believe that alarmism in the defense of ecological health is no vice. If the idea is to shake Americans out of their “denial” about global warming, the opposite seems to be happening. Polls show the public is growing more skeptical about the hazards of climate change. Allegations (unfounded, as it turns out) that British university researchers cooked climate data in an excess of environmental correctness haven’t helped.

Even discounting for some hyperbole, however, the new environmental challenges are real enough. Unlike the great industrial cleanup, which focused on specific “point sources” of pollution like smokestacks and drainage pipes, we’re faced today with damage from “non-point” sources like fields and hog farms, high-tech fishing fleets and the millions of cars, dry cleaners, lawnmowers and even cows pumping carbon and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.

The top-down, “command and control” regulations of the first generation of environment activism could not cope effectively with these new problems. That’s why PPI back in the 1990s started advocating a “second generation” of policy tools for dealing with new and more diffuse ecological challenges. Examples include innovations like the Toxic Release Inventory, which allows citizens to find out about health risks posed by local polluters; market incentives like carbon pricing and the cap-and-trade system first set up in 1990 to combat acid rain; and “civic environmentalism,” which decentralizes decisions about, say, how to manage habitat vital to endangered species, from Washington regulators to local landowners.

Now it appears as though we’re heading into a third phase, in which environmental and energy policy merge into one. The environmental movement traditionally has aimed at mitigating the impact of industrial society on nature. Now we’re talking about something truly revolutionary – a shift from a dirty economy powered by cheap fossil fuels to a clean, low-carbon economy. This prospect beckons not only because of the environmental benefits, which would be large, but also because of the potential for immense economic and security gains. It would enable the United States to reduce its costly dependence on foreign oil suppliers, many of whom don’t have our best interests at heart. And it opens up broad new avenues for economic innovation and growth in the development of clean technology and fuels.

Some will use Earth Day to depict America as an energy wastrel and despoiler of the earth. Instead of donning hair shirts, progressives ought to stress America’s opportunity to lead the world toward its clean energy future.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/thomas-merton/ / CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Our Eco-Friendly Military

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

“The Army’s mission is not to be green. Our mission is to defend the nation. In that context, we’ve found it’s in our interest to develop sustainable projects.”

This is the powerful quote by the Army’s program director for energy security in a new must-read article in USA Today. At the E3 Initiative, we’ve been arguing for months that new energy practices are essential to upgrading our national security strategy.

The military has recently spent over $100 million to insulate tents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why? It cuts the leakage of air conditioning by at least 50 percent. Taxpayers recoup their investment within 90 days.

All this is important to defense because it addresses the sluggish, dangerous practices of our old-energy defense posture. For example, truck convoys carrying water and gas (required by inefficient energy in theater) are vulnerable to roadside bombs, which themselves are the biggest killer of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. As USA Today reports, “Greater energy efficiency also helps keep troops in war zones safer, because it reduces the number of trucks on the road carrying fuel to outlying bases.”

As the Army recognizes, sustainability isn’t about ideology — being “green” for the sake of being green. It’s about making America smarter, tougher, more competitive and more resilient: lessons we should remember as we head into the inevitable fight in Congress about legislation to price and control carbon.

Energy Realism and Hype

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

Thanks to new drilling techniques, U.S. natural gas reserves may have doubled, Energy Secretary Steven Chu announced this week. “That’s a big deal because it will be a transition fuel as we go to renewables,” Chu said at a conference hosted by the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Chu’s emphasis on natural gas as a bridge fuel, together with President Obama’s decisions to allow offshore drilling and expand loan guarantees for building nuclear power plants, attest to a new realism in U.S. energy policy. The Obama administration is trying to move the deadlocked energy debate beyond a false choice between fossil and renewable fuels. For now, America needs more of both.

This “no fuel left behind” approach also lays the groundwork for bipartisan cooperation on capping carbon emissions. If Republicans say “no” to things they’ve long demanded, namely more nuclear power and offshore drilling, as part of a comprehensive climate bill, it will be another sign that they are unwilling to help solve the country’s biggest problems.

Some environmentalists (including, apparently, Al Gore) are chagrined over Obama’s support for offshore drilling, which they see as a concession to the “drill, baby, drill” right.  So let’s be clear: offshore production in U.S. waters will not lead us to “energy independence,” nor will it lower prices at the pump. Our share of the world’s oil reserves — even if much more is aggressively produced — is still not large enough to move global oil prices. This would be the case even if there was a truly competitive and free global petroleum market. But the global oil market is not free and competitive — it is dominated by low-cost producers in the Persian Gulf, who are aligned in a cartel and could easily counteract any downward price influence from an increase in U.S. supply. The only way that U.S. oil could directly and dramatically lead to low U.S. gas prices would be for us to adopt the Venezuelan model: nationalize the industry, close the borders, and grossly subsidize the industry. Not gonna happen.

Nonetheless, modest expansions of domestically produced oil would yield modest benefits. Estimates range from a low of 39 billion barrels of recoverable oil to a high of 63 billion barrels. “If ramped up quickly enough, that could overcome the underlying decline rate of current U.S. output and add significant net production for a decade or two, at a time when competition for the oil we are currently importing is likely to be fiercest,” writes energy consultant Geoffrey Styles.

In addition to marginally reducing our reliance on foreign imports, offshore drilling would create U.S. jobs and lower our massive energy trade deficit. These benefits shouldn’t be exaggerated, but they certainly aren’t negligible. Further, to the extent that our offshore development leads to large and cost-effective finds of natural gas, that is almost certainly a good thing since unlike oil, gas is not as subject to global price pressures or oligopolistic manipulation as is oil. Moreover, to really reduce our greenhouse gas emissions, the United States will have to substitute baseload gas for baseload coal on a large scale and abundant gas developed in an environmentally acceptable fashion (more likely to apply to offshore development than to much of the contemplated onshore development of “unconventional” sources) is a key to that goal.

What about the environmental risks of drilling? Without question, the history of petroleum development and delivery is rife with calamities. The decades-old Santa Barbara spills are still seared into the minds of many and, of course, the Exxon Valdez has not – and should not – soon leave our collective memories. But the former was decades ago and the latter is a compelling argument for even stronger protections in the transportation of petroleum. The next Exxon Valdez could be carrying oil from onshore or offshore sources. But the technology and regulation of offshore production has greatly improved since Santa Barbara, and while one could compellingly argue for even more protections, the fact is that offshore development is much less risky than ever before.

Finally, Obama has deftly maneuvered his political opponents into a tight corner. The White House understands that the paramount goal of energy policy should be to price carbon. That goal is unlikely to be achieved in Congress as long as conservatives continue to fantasize over a supply-side panacea that will lead American to a golden age of “energy independence” and “lower prices at the pump.” This is an energy policy of abdication and isolationism. By taking a balanced approach, Obama has challenged conservatives to take “yes” for an answer — or show that they really don’t believe in their alleged “alternative” path to energy security.

The Greening of Massachusetts

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

Much to Mitt Romney’s chagrin, Massachusetts has been in the news a lot recently as the birthplace of President Obama’s new health care reforms. Despite Romney’s protestations to the contrary, Obama’s ideas indisputably grew out of the reforms that the commonwealth enacted a few years ago.

Now it turns out that Massachusetts is also leading the country in another area that will likely become the subject of intense national controversy later this year: environmental regulation and the quest to build a clean economy. In one of America’s oldest and most traditional states, a coalition of business, policy-makers and nonprofits are leading the way in transforming the American economy – and bringing us closer to a clean, green future.

Massachusetts has a distinctive environment that makes clean energy a particularly bright choice. The commonwealth has unusually expensive electricity (from a lack of indigenous coal or natural gas) and a deregulated power market (where utilities do not own power plants).

Recently, PPI convened about three dozen clean tech industry leaders at the beautiful Parker House Hotel in downtown Boston. PPI’s new E3 Initiative held an event keynoted by Massachusetts Secretary of Energy and Environment Ian Bowles and also featuring Nick Darbeloff and Peter Rothstein, president and senior vice president, respectively, of the New England Clean Economy Council.

Secretary Bowles recounted for the audience the advances that have taken place under Governor Deval Patrick. Massachusetts has taken the lead in New England’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative covering all major power plants, which caps emissions at 2009 levels through 2015, after which the cap will decline to reduce emissions 10 percent by 2019. Its efficiency programs have been so successful that the state is on track to cut its energy use by 30 percent by 2020. And under the renewable portfolio standard it adopted they have already exceeded their targets. Massachusetts has also built greenhouse gas emission reductions into the state environmental review process, which is leading to greater private investment in green buildings. The state will also provide utility customers with $1.6 billion in incentives to conserve energy at home, including free energy audits and rebates to purchase more efficient appliances.

National leaders looking to Massachusetts for lessons would do well to keep one thing in mind. Just as muscle needs a skeleton for support, structure and politics both matter for environmental regulation. Soon after Patrick was sworn in, and with the cooperation of Massachusetts’ legislative leaders, Massachusetts became the first state in the nation to merge all its energy and environmental agencies (six total) into a single cabinet secretariat with the overall mission of bringing clean energy technology to market, curbing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving energy efficiency.

With that structure in place, Bowles and his team went about achieving their agenda by closely cooperating with legislative leaders in the state House and Senate. Too often American states (or the federal government, for that matter) have seen promising environmental issues die on the vine, as special interests whittle ambitious legislative proposals into pilot projects that fail to achieve the economies of scale and systemic effect necessary for change. In Massachusetts, however, Bowles and his team began working very closely with legislative leaders in 2007, soon after Patrick took office. With a lot of elbow grease and diplomacy, Massachusetts enacted six major energy and environmental laws achieving broad energy reform, greenhouse gas reduction and comprehensive oceans management.

In advance of the battles certain to come this summer in Washington about a carbon control system, the E3 Initiative was proud to showcase Massachusetts’ pioneering work on achieving a clean economy. With smart ideas, proven economic benefits and steady political talent, we can see results instead of gridlock.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/mnsomero/ / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Why the New CAFE Standards Are Good – But Hardly the Best Climate Policy

Posted on by The Progressive Policy Institute

Cars and trucks sold in the U.S. will have to be a little more efficient, according to new Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards released last week by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Transportation.

The new standards are largely a product of a compromise between states, the federal government and auto manufacturers last year. (Is it still a compromise if one party—the feds—owns a big chunk of another—the U.S. auto industry—and has Supremacy Clause powers over another—the states? Just asking.) They are also the end product of the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision requiring the EPA to address impacts of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. The requirements appear relatively modest: the existing requirement of 35 mpg fleet average fuel economy by 2020 is moved up to 2016 and increased by 0.5 mpg.

That apparently small change can have a big impact when you consider how many cars and trucks there are in the U.S. and how long those vehicles will remain on the road. The EPA claims that the standards will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 960 million metric tons and cut U.S. auto emissions by 21 percent over business as usual by 2030. The EPA also estimates that increased up-front vehicle costs of about $1,000 will be offset over the course of each vehicle’s life by reduced fuel costs, resulting in a savings of about $3,000.

That’s good news for the environment, and good news for consumers, right? The auto industry is (at least for now) OK with the new standards, and the environmental community is generally happy as well. I think the positive spin is broadly correct — we’re better off with stricter CAFE standards than we would be without them.

That said, I’m skeptical about the size of the benefits estimated by the EPA. Performance standards, and in particular efficiency standards, are flawed policy tools — emissions benefits may be lower, and costs higher, than with the best alternative: a carbon price.

The largest problem with efficiency standards is that they encourage increased use of whatever is being made more efficient. If your car is more efficient, it’s cheaper to drive it, and you’ll probably do so more often (and for longer distances). You might even move farther away from work or make other choices that increase your fuel consumption (but not your cost — remember, you’re more efficient now). This is great for you since you get increased utility from driving more, but your vehicle emissions won’t go down as much. Even if you “save” more money over the life of the car, the added cost per unit of emissions reduction goes up. Other social costs, like traffic congestion and increased risk of accidents, go up as well. This is called the “rebound effect,” and estimating its size is the subject of significant research among economists.

The EPA is aware of this effect and, as you might expect from an 837-page rule (with a 475-page regulatory impact analysis and 215-page technical support document), accounted for it in its analysis. Both the EPA estimates of emissions reductions and of costs to consumers assume that owners of new, more efficient vehicles will drive more. Good job by the EPA, right? Maybe.

Digging deeper suggests that while the EPA is accounting for the rebound effect, it might be underestimating it. The EPA assumes the effect will be 10 percent — that is, increased driving will erase 10 percent of the emissions reductions that would otherwise be achieved. This estimate, the EPA admits, is lower than that suggested by most studies of the effect for vehicle efficiency standards in the U.S. These studies give estimates from seven percent to 75 percent, with the average around 22 percent — more than double the 10 percent the EPA chose. The EPA bases its choice on other studies that suggest that the effect declines over time and then projects that trend into the future. It’s possible the EPA is right here (they are relying in part on the most recent and well-regarded work on the subject), but it still seems like a relatively optimistic estimate. Because of this, I think it’s more likely that the EPA will have overestimated the benefits of the new standards than underestimated them.*

The EPA’s analysis has other limitations as well. For example, fuel prices are projected to increase in the future due to rising global demand and other factors. This will lead to demand for more fuel-efficient cars independent of any standards, possibly making CAFE requirements superfluous. Emissions would still go down, but CAFE standards might not deserve the credit.

For me, the worst part isn’t that the EPA might have overplayed an obscure (but important) assumption, or taken credit for something that might happen anyway. Even if they haven’t done either of these things, none of this is necessary. Pricing carbon, whether through an economy-wide cap-and-trade system, a transportation-sector only cap, or (hide the children) a higher gasoline tax, could achieve emissions gains without these perverse effects and estimation problems. These policies would increase the cost of gas — which is the point. If your reason for buying a more efficient car is a higher fuel price, there’s no incentive to drive more — there would be no rebound effect. In fact, there is a powerful incentive to drive less, reducing carbon emissions even further and giving other benefits: less congestion, fewer accidents, better air quality, etc. A gas tax or trading scheme would also be simpler, easier to administer and more transparent. It need not even hurt consumers: the revenues from permit auctions or taxes can be returned to households through lower taxes elsewhere, rebates or investments in public goods.

The reason CAFE standards, with all their problems, are and have long been our only policy option for controlling vehicle emissions has nothing to do with efficiency or good government — it’s politics. It’s not politically possible (or politicians think it’s not politically possible) to support a policy that increases prices at the pump. Instead, we hide costs in suboptimal and inefficient programs like CAFE. While it’s true that our cities and in some ways our society are built around driving, often long distances, that doesn’t mean we should hide the costs of those choices, or use second-rate policy tools because we can’t handle the truth. The politics behind CAFE are a shame, whatever benefits last week’s regulations will have.

* If you’re interested in the EPA’s decisionmaking process on the rebound effect, it’s candidly explained in Section 4.2.4 of the Technical Support Document.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/joelogon/ / CC BY-SA 2.0