FACT:

Florida’s sea turtle nest counts are growing.

THE NUMBERS: 

Average counts of green turtle nests at 27 Florida “core index beaches,” two-year average*

2020-2021    ~23,000 nests
2010-2011     ~10,000 nests
2000-2001    ~4,000 nests
1990-1991      ~1,000 nests

* Florida Wildlife Commission; using two-year averages as green turtle nesting totals appear to vary in a two-year cycle.  These are not total statewide (or U.S.) nesting estimates; they are counts of nesting at 27 long-studied beaches, representing about 10% of the known Florida nesting beaches.

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Here’s a good idea:  Somewhere around 320 B.C., proto-conservationist Mencius offers King Hui of Liang (near present-day Kaifeng) a simple solution to a complex problem:

“If you ban nets with fine mesh from ponds, there will be more fish and turtles than the people can eat.  If you ban axes from the forests on the hillsides except in the proper season, there will be more timber than the people can use.”  

Twenty-three centuries later, and in the ocean rather than in ponds, all seven sea turtle species are “endangered,” “threatened,” or “critically endangered.” As large, armored reptiles with few natural predators, these turtles are very tough. Their nesting season this summer will be roughly the 150 millionth; the series has outlasted not only the last seven ice ages, but the end-of-Cretaceous asteroid that wiped out their early contemporaries the ammonite and the plesiosaur.

But maybe they are no longer tough enough. Some are caught and traded for shell jewelry.  Many more fall victim to “by-catch,” as shrimp and fishing fleets suck them into bag-shaped shrimp trawl nets or catch them on long lines meant for shark and tuna.  And many more, with beach erosion and harvesting of nests for eggs, never hatch at all.  This series of losses accelerated in the mid-20th century; to take one example, the global estimate of nesting leatherback females done by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature dropped from about 90,000 in 1980 to 54,000 in 2010.

How to respond?  Sea turtle protection in the United States may, tentatively, be succeeding, with a mix of three measures:

(1)    Trade restriction:  The 184 countries and territories in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the world’s first international trade-and-environment agreement, listed all sea turtles in ‘Appendix I,’ in the 1980s, banning trade in turtle jewelry and other products.

(2)    By-catch reduction:  To reduce by-catch, the United States in 1987 banned sale or import of shrimp caught by boats which do not use Turtle Excluder Devices or “TEDs.”  These are barred metal grills — something like the wide meshes like those Mencius recommended for fishnets in ponds — placed in the neck of the bag-shaped shrimp nets to let mistakenly captured turtles swim out.  They cost about $375.  Each summer, the State Department publishes a list of countries which, through compliance with this rule, can export ocean-caught shrimp to the U.S.  The most recent certifies 41 countries and territories as “equivalent” to the U.S. in turtle protection, and thus able to export wild-caught shrimp to the United States.

(3)    Beach protection:  National and state laws, and local regulations set aside beaches for nesting, and limit their use.  As an example, Florida’s Marine Turtle Conservation Act (passed in 1991 under then-Gov. Lawton Chiles) bars over-building, lighting schemes that can disorient hatchlings in season, and disruption of nesting by tourists.

Does it work?  Tentatively, yes.  Florida’s green turtle population is a case in point:  while totals vary up and down each year, Florida Wildlife Commission figures shows about 20 times as many nests in the 2020/2021 season as there were in the early 190s, when the national TED and Florida beach protection laws began.  Kemp’s Ridley turtle nesting levels (almost exclusively on a single stretch of Mexican beach, though with outposts in Texas and Cape Hatteras) are up from a near-extinction low of 200 in the 1980s to about 5000 a decade ago, and perhaps as many as 20,000 in 2020.  On a larger scale, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s estimate of leatherback nesting females has risen from 54,000 in 2010 to 64,000 as of 2020, and looks ahead under current population trends (driven by strong growth in Atlantic populations) to 79,000-110,000 by 2040.

Just a start, of course.  Hardly Mencius’ “more than you can eat”; and (as an example) the IUCN’s optimistic take on Atlantic leatherbacks is offset by continuing Pacific leatherback decline.  And apparently positive trends remain open to newer questions about rising ocean temperatures, acidification, plastics accumulation, and beach erosion as sea levels rise.  But this said, a promising start and some validation for Mencius’ rather old, still simple, and still good idea.

FURTHER READING

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

FACT:

Energy accounts for 3/5 of Russian exports.

THE NUMBERS: 

Russia GDP (IMF estimates, currency-basis) 

2021    $1.7 trillion
2016    $1.3 trillion
2013    $2.3 trillion
2009    $1.3 trillion

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Most economies “grow” incrementally and undramatically (with occasional incremental dips in recessions).  Through productivity growth, investment, and slight rises in the populations of consumers and workers, they steadily add a couple of percentage points each year.  The Russian economy looks different: More like an inflating and deflating bellows, nearly doubling in size from 2009 to 2013, then contracting by nearly half over the next three years, and since 2016 another burst of growth.

Why?  The pattern reflects Russia’s exceptionally high dependence on energy production and energy sales.  According to the WTO’s Trade Profiles 2021, an annual country-by-country summary of imports, exports, partners and balances for 197 countries, “fuels and mining products” accounted for 59% of Russian exports in 2020.  This figure is quite large — among developed economies, only Norway’s is higher — and likely understates the actual role of energy in Russian trade.  The WTO lists Russia’s top four exports in 2020 as:

Crude oil, $122 billion;
Refined petroleum products, $67 billion;
Coal, $16 billion; and
Natural gas, $10 billion.

These four products combine for $215 billion, or 65% of $332 billion in total Russian goods exports that year, with the “refined petroleum products” category, presumably including include some goods classified as manufactures rather than primary “fuels and mining” products.  Overall, Russia was the world’s second-ranking exporter of these goods; the U.S. ranked second, but with energy making up a much smaller 15% of the U.S.’ $1.4 trillion in exports.

Two frequent consequences of this level of dependence on energy sales:

(1)    Countries this reliant on energy and metal ore exports are economically volatile — they boom when world prices rise and crash when prices fall — unless they have especially sophisticated ways of banking excess resource rents in good years.  Thus the odd pattern of Russian GDP.  With large shares of GDP and government revenue coming through a small group of companies and individuals, they also frequently (though again not always) develop political systems centralized around a few government officials and top executives of state or quasi-private enterprises.  The Russian examples are Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, and a few similar organizations.

(2)    Their customers need to diversify sources, so as to avoid reliance on potentially unstable partners.  Paul Bledsoe examines this question in PPI’s most recent energy and climate paper, reviewing the implications of Western and Central European reliance on Russian natural gas for heating and electricity.  He suggests an important place for the United States as an alternative source for European energy needs:

“New sources of gas, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the United States and other clean sources, can reduce the EU’s reliance on methane-heavy Russian gas. But of course, that will require the United States and other exporters to drive down methane and carbon dioxide emissions from the lifecycle as close to zero as possible, and verify their reductions with credible methodologies.  Moreover, the geopolitical costs of Russian gas continue to plague the EU broadly, and Ukraine and other Eastern European nations specifically. EU imports of Russian gas have actually increased since Moscow’s illegal annexation of the Crimea in 2015. Over time, limiting Russian gas imports thus could diminish its political leverage over Europe while also helping the EU achieve its climate goals.”

Don’t miss this PPI report by Paul Bledsoe

The report covers natural gas, Atlantic economics, and European security. Read it below:

FURTHER READING

Read PPI’s Bledsoe on natural gas, Atlantic economics, and European security here.

And read this from PPI President Will Marshall on the Biden administration, Putinist threats, and re-anchoring American foreign policy in liberal and democratic values.

Data 

The World Bank’s Russia Economic Report can be found here.

The WTO’s World Trade Profiles has exports/imports/partners by country for 197 economies can be found here.

Background reading

Anna Politkovskaya’s essay collection “Putin’s Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy,” on Russian life and politics circa 2005:

The State Department’s European and Eurasian Affairs Bureau can be found here.

The European Union is Russia’s main trading partner, buying 41% of Russian exports and providing 34% of Russian imports in 2020. Read about the EU’s Moscow mission.

The Ukrainian Embassy in D.C., can be found here.

Read about Russian gas giant Gazprom.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

FACT:

The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences program has been expired for more than a year.

THE NUMBERS: 

GSP imports, 2020 –

8 tons of Ukrainian pickles
3,700 traditional Mongolian ger (nomadic living tents)
11,900 liters of Georgian wine
1.5 tons of Pakistani spice mix
$5 million in Namibian stonework
412 tons of taro root from Tonga and Samoa
90,000 Rwandan travel bags
492 tons of Fijian ginger (candied and sushi-grade)
1 million dog collars and leashes from Cambodia
14,000 Senegalese wicker baskets
15 tons of vegetable oil from Timor-Leste
$9.5 million in Armenian-made golden jewelry
217 tons of South African essential oils (eucalyptus, orange, lemon, grapefruit)
27.3 million Thai orchids
870,000 Haitian-woven flags
32,700 Bolivian-made wooden doors

WHAT THEY MEAN:

The U.S.’ oldest and largest effort to help the poor abroad is the “Generalized System of Preferences”, or “GSP” for short.  Dating to 1974, it waives tariffs on about 3,500 types of products (more precisely, on 3,500 “tariff lines”) from 119 low- and middle-income countries meeting 15 eligibility criteria covering cooperation against terrorism, labor standards, intellectual property, expropriation, trade policy, and other issues.  The law authorizing GSP benefits lapsed at the end of 2020, so for a year the program has been stopped.  As Congress works on renewal, PPI Vice President Ed Gresser – who among other things directly oversaw GSP system administration from 2015-2020 – has observations and ideas in PPI’s newest policy paper:

By way of background, GSP is fairly simple. By waiving U.S. tariffs – 7.0% on flags, 9.6% on pickles, 2.3% on fresh taro root, etc. – imposed on things made or grown in places like Haiti, Ukraine, and the Pacific Islands, it encourages buyers otherwise drawn to the EU, China, or other larger suppliers to these smaller and poorer countries, helping them diversify their economies and create better job opportunities. Australia, EU, Canada, Japan, and other high-income countries have their own GSP programs launched around the same time as the U.S. GSP; other countries such as China, Taiwan, Chile, and Korea have created their own similar systems more recently.

The program’s scale is modest.  Imports of variously picturesque and mundane GSP products totaled $16.9 billion in 2020 – 0.8% of the U.S.’ $2.351 trillion in total goods imports, and (more relevant) 11.1% of the $152 billion in imports from the 119 participating countries – but the impact is useful.  Reviewing the results in 2016 (along with those of regional preference programs AGOA and CBI) the Obama administration concluded that “U.S. trade preference programs have encouraged exports from developing countries, with particular effect in value-added and labor-intensive goods … This is corroborated by a large body of economic literature [which has] also found that U.S. trade preference programs have made a contribution to the reduction of poverty.”

Gresser’s paper applauds Congressional interest in renewing the system – the Senate has passed a reauthorization bill and House Democrats have introduced one which differs in some areas from the Senate bill but shares much with it – noting that reauthorization will be good for the countries participating in the system and, in a small but tangible way, for the Biden administration’s effort to show that America “is back”.  It also endorses Congress’ interest in rethinking aspects of the program.  GSP’s list of “eligibility criteria” (that is, a set of policy goals a country needs to meet to qualify for tariff waivers) mainly dates to the 1970s and 1980s.  So does its list of “import-sensitive” products excluded as overly competitive with U.S. goods and its “Competitive Need Limits” on the levels of particular products a country is allowed to send duty-free.  All these could probably use a fresh look.

On the other hand, the paper expresses concern about a large proliferation of new eligibility rules in both the Senate and House Democratic bills.  It argues for dialing this back a bit and balancing new rules with new product coverage (as a complementary proposal by Representatives Stephanie Murphy (D-Fla) and Jack Walorski (R-Ind) suggests).  Three thoughts as Congress moves ahead:

1.    Set priorities when adding new eligibility rules.

The current list of 15 eligibility criteria includes some moribund issues (“domination by the international Communist movement”), misses some contemporary concerns, and overall is a bit of a hodge-podge.  But it also has some virtues, including brevity: the list is short enough to set clear priorities, so governments of GSP countries know what they need to do to retain benefits.  Both reauthorization bills risk losing this virtue by adding many new criteria: human rights, poverty reduction, environment, gender policy, anti-corruption, economic reform, microcredit availability, political participation, rule of law, digital trade, and others.  Though all appear well-intended, expansion on this scale can overload a small system, and risk forcing wholesale unintended expulsions of countries which fall short on one or two of many criteria, or pushing administrations into unsystematic and essentially arbitrary enforcement to avoid such an outcome.

2.    Recognize good-faith effort.

A second virtue is that the current eligibility criteria are flexibly written, enabling officials administering the system to recognize good-faith if imperfect efforts to comply.  Overly strict rules for low-income countries can be unrealistic: “low-income countries often have well-trained and well-intentioned leaders and senior bureaucrats who design good policies … [but] few such countries have the deep and professional civil services needed to effectively [implement] these policies uniformly and nationwide.”  Whether adding new criteria or updating old ones, good-faith effort by well-intentioned governments should continue to get credit.

3.    Balance new eligibility rules with broader benefits. 

Finally, new looks at old eligibility rules should go together with new looks at old limits on benefits.  GSP rules set in the 1970s excludes some significant categories of goods (clothes, shoes, glassware, watches) and also, under an unusual feature known as “Competitive Need Limitations”, remove products from a country’s GSP portfolio when it becomes too good at making them.  The paper suggests reconsidering some of the product exclusions, for example that of shoes not made in the United States, and applauds the Murphy/Walorski proposal’s reforms to the ”Competitive Need Limitation” feature of GSP.

FURTHER READING

>> PPI’s Gresser on GSP Renewal – “Trade, the Poor, and America is Back” – Read the Report 

Background:

The U.S. Trade Representative’s GSP Guidebook explains GSP program goals, product coverage, eligibility rules, and country participation.

The Obama administration (2016) evaluates U.S. trade preference programs (including GSP and also the African Growth and Opportunity Act and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act) and their records on poverty alleviation.

Some beneficiaries:

The Embassy of Ukraine explains GSP benefits to potential U.S. customers.

The Fiji Sun reports on a U.S. official’s 2018 visit to a GSP-beneficiary ginger factory.

USTR presentation on benefits for Mongolia (tungsten concentrate, leather bags, pine nuts, traditional “ger” tents).

Ecuadoran Ambassador Ivonne Baki updates Quito press on GSP reauthorization.

… and a Delaware vendor of Mongolian “ger” (traditional tents).

Renewal proposals from:

Senate Finance Committee (included in larger bill and passed in 2021).

House Ways and Means Democrats.

Reps. Murphy & Walorski.

… and for comparison, the current GSP statute.

And some international comparisons: 

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains the Japanese GSP.

The European Union.

Australia.

China’s “least-developed country” tariff waiver.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.