The Senate this week rejected House Republicans’ “chainsaw massacre” approach to deficit reduction, voting down a $61 billion hit list of domestic programs – including, shockingly, a number designed to reduce teenage pregnancy and abortions.
It’s one thing for Republicans to go after such perennial targets as National Public Radio. For decades, however, conservatives have warned that the breakdown of the nuclear family is devastating poor communities. That Republicans now want government to abandon efforts to curb teen pregnancy shows how far the Tea Party has pushed its agenda.
During Bill Clinton’s presidency, Democrats and Republicans stopped fighting over whether poverty is caused by irresponsible behavior or social and economic injustice. They agreed that both were implicated in the explosion of out-of-wedlock births and single-parent families, and they tried to do something about it.
What would it mean for theories of U.S. income inequality growth if the U.S experience has been similar to that everywhere else?
Yet again and again [economists and other researchers not named Hacker or Pierson] have found themselves at dead ends or have missed crucial evidence. After countless arrests and interrogations, the demise of broad-based prosperity remains a frustratingly open case, unresolved even as the list of victims grows longer.
All this, we are convinced, is because a crucial suspect has largely escaped careful scrutiny: American politics.
– Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner Take All Politics
Here’s a chart showing trends in the share of income received by the top one percent for all the modern industrialized nations for which data is available going back to the early twentieth century:
The data is from a new website created by several of the leading scholars studying inequality with tax data. The American trend, the thick black line, is from the much cited work of Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, which is part of this new database.
From 1910 to 1970, American inequality trends follow the broad international pattern, and inequality levels are in the middle of the pack. That’s basically still true from 1970 to 1986:
It’s rising a bit over the period, but only by a percentage point. Note I’m keeping the scale of the charts the same for each one. Here’s the chart for 1988 to 2006:
Uh-oh. Now we look like our inequality levels are higher than everywhere else. What happened? 1986 to 1988 happened, as is evident from the 1970-2006 trend:
Wow, that’s a four percentage point increase in two years—three times the increase over the 16 years from 1970 to 1986, and bigger than the 12-year increase from 1988 to 2000. Huh. There are two possibilities here. One is that the data is right. You can see where I’m going here.
It helps to know that the 1986 tax reform created big incentives for people who had previously reported income on corporate returns (where it is invisible to the datasets above) to report on individual income tax returns (where it appears as an out-of-the-blue increase). And if this may be considered a permanent change in the tax regime, then the effect is for more income to show up on individual returns after 1986 than before, artificially lifting the top income share in every subsequent year.
Hmmm…which possibility is more likely? Let’s look at another chart showing the trends just for the northern hemisphere Anglophone countries, to which I’ll add a new line:
OK, from about 1940 to 1986, these trends line up strikingly, then the U.S. trend goes AWOL. However, let’s instead assume the post-1986 U.S. trend is an artifact of the 1986 tax reform. First, let’s increase the top one percent share from 1986 to 1988 by the same rate that it increased in the U.K. Then let’s let the top share in the U.S. increase by the same rate that it actually did from 1988 to 2006, but from the new, lower 1988 level. The result is the revised line above. This makes the U.S. trend and level consistent with not just the U.K., but Canada.
Of course, if the 1988 to 2006 top share levels are more accurate in the U.S. after 1988 than before 1986, then rather than lowering the post-1986 trend, we should raise the pre-1988 trend. That would make U.S. levels uniformly higher than in the U.K. and Canada. But of course, the measured U.K. and Canadian top share levels may also be artificially low due to tax avoidance. And of course, the common trend over the three countries would remain.
So, to review, when the post-1986 U.S. trend is corrected, the U.S. experience with inequality over the past 100 years is broadly consistent with the rest of the modern world. Here’s the summary chart for 1910-2006, with the revised U.S. trend.
Comparing levels is more difficult, but many recent cross-national comparisons related to inequality are about why trends differ. What these five charts clarify is that explanations for the recent rise in American inequality that focus on uniquely American causes—such as greater political muscle-flexing among corporations and the mega-rich—are insufficient (and unnecessary).
Update: I’ve received several responses offline that it’s going to far to say the experience of the U.S. is like that “everywhere else” and that it is really only like the other Anglophone countries. To some extent, that’s a fair criticism. But of 15 countries shown here, only Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland haven’t experienced an increase in inequality since 1980. And the increases in Norway and Finland are as big or bigger than in the U.S., U.K., and Canada. Sweden’s increase is also nearly as great in relative terms (starting from a much lower level of course). But even if this is a story about the U.S., U.K., and Canada or the Anglophone countries versus the rest of the world, that’s still a problem for Hacker’s and Pierson’s U.S.-centric theory.
Yesterday, I began exploring the idea of an “Anxiety Belt” – an upper Midwest group of six swing states from Pennsylvania west to Iowa. I showed how these states were whiter, older, less well-educated, and slightly poorer than the nation at large, and argued that, with 81 electoral votes between them, Obama needs to pay attention to them. Today, I want to look at what’s happened to the partisan dynamics in those states in the last two years.
Across almost the entire country, the number of individuals identifying as Democrats or at least leaning Democrats (according to Gallup) has declined since 2008. But in the Anxiety Belt, that decline has been more pronounced. In all six states, the state-level decline than the national (average of 7.6 percentage points, compared to 6.1 percentage points nationwide). Overall, the Anxiety Belt went from slightly more Democratic than the rest of the nation to slightly less Democratic. Not an encouraging trend for Dems.
As might be expected, the Republicans have made greater gains in these states. Again, the Republican gain in each of these states is higher than the national average Republican gain, and overall, the average state-level gain among Anxiety Belt states in Republican identification (4.2 percent) is 50 percent more than the national average (2.7 percent).
Republicans won all five governor’s races in these six states last November, with the sixth being Indiana, where Republican Mitch Daniels was elected to a second term in 2008. Republicans also won all four Senate seats up for re-election in these six states.
Of course, it’s worth pointing out that Democrats still enjoy an overall partisan identification advantage in five out of the six states.
Certainly, Obama should still be competitive in all of these states, though Indiana might be a stretch. But the direction of this region is unmistakably away from Democrats, and even moreso than the nation as a whole. Democrats are going to have to continue to think hard about why they are having a particularly time here, and what they can do to speak to these voters.
But it happens to be true. Little noticed was a potentially significant piece of news, as a representative of the Arab League told French Foreign Minister Alan Juppe that the League would, in fact, support a no-fly zone over Libya. On the surface, it seems a big deal: autocrats across the Middle East and North Africa are standing on the side of oppressed peoples in the face of their murderous leader.
In the search for international legitimacy, securing the Arab League’s endorsement, not to mention ones from the Organization of Islamic Conference and Gulf Cooperation Council, should go some distance, even if those organizations essentially draw on membership from the same states.
Then you ask yourself: Whoa. So WHY are Middle East leaders now standing with the masses? Strongmen throughout the region continue to resist protesters’ wishes, so why side with them on this?
Certainly, one reason is that Qaddafi definitively crossed a line into war. Strongmen the region over may be interested in maintaining a tight grip on power, but the protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Libya may have concretized the lengths to which the region’s unelected leaders are willing to go. The Mubaraks of the region will muffle press, stifle political organizations, restrict Western-sponsored NGOs, and arrest and beat their opponents, but as we’ve clearly seen from Tunis to Cairo, they are not willing to descend their countries into war to hold on to power.
The B-side could be more calculated. Are regional leaders looking to use their “solidarity” with the masses as a mechanism to defuse their own domestic opposition? Did they really have a choice? And what’s the benefit of opposing one anyway?
The next questions become increasingly uncomfortable: Now that there is a sense of Arab legitimacy behind a no-fly zone, what’s next?
First up is the question of whether it is the proper remedy for the cure. My colleague Will Marshall argued last week that a no-fly zone “would entail high political costs while yielding uncertain military returns.” And while Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings believed a no-fly zone was “eminently doable”, it “might not accomplish its goals of fending off Qadhafi’s brutes and foreign mercenaries, since their major weapons do not appear to be airplanes.”
Since those writings, there are mixed reports on the extent of pro-Qadhafi air raids. Reportafterreportdetail that he’s using them more extensively near the oil terminal at Ras Lanouf. Though Ivo Daalder, the American ambassador to NATO said there’s been a fall in air activity in recentdays, reiterating questions about a zone’s usefulness. Watch this space.
Britain and France are working to prepare a UN Security Council Resolution, and NATO will begin considering one on Thursday. Both entities say that they are considering the no-fly zone as a contingency should the situation warrant it, and British Foreign Minister William Hague has insisted that there be a “clear, legal basis”, implying the value of an explicit UN resolution. That continues to be a difficult proposition given resistance from the likes of China and Russia, but there is a glimmer of hope — China has left open the possibility of undefined “action beyond sanctions.”
Where does that leave us? More evaluation, essentially. If a no-fly zone proves to be an effective tool that advances the rebels’ cause, it remains critical that the United Nations grant it a mandate. It would most likely be conducted by NATO, but it would be helpful if at least one Arab nation participated to avoid giving it too much of a Western imprimatur.
If there’s any hope for making headway this year against America’s debt crisis, it lies with the bipartisan “Gang of Six” in the U.S. Senate. This group is filling the political vacuum created by House Republicans’ lemming-like rush to the ideological cliffs, and President Obama’s reluctance to commit himself on tough fiscal choices.
Led by Virginia Democrat Mark Warner and Georgia Republican Saxby Chambliss, the Gang of Six has picked up where the President’s Fiscal Commission left off. They’ve embraced the commission’s main political breakthrough – a hard-won bargain in which some key conservatives like Sen. Tom Coburn agreed to cut tax expenditures, while liberals such as Sen. Dick Durbin agreed to constrain Social Security costs.
This is the only bipartisan game in town, and it makes the Senate the main arena in Washington’s three-ring budget circus. What’s happening in the GOP House is essentially a sideshow, though it could turn into a very destructive bit of political theater.
Despite the jobless recovery, the House proposes to cut $61 billion in domestic spending this year – the largest immediate spending cut in U.S. history. Everyone knows there’s no way such a draconian measure gets through the Democratic Senate or past a presidential veto. Senate Democrats have countered with $6 billion in domestic program cuts, but that’s not likely to clear the filibuster-proof 60-vote threshold either.
So we’re in for a game of budgetary chicken in which both sides maneuver to blame the other if the federal government runs out of money in two weeks. Even if there is a federal shut-down, however, it’s unlikely to go on for very long, given how fed up U.S. voters already are with the antics of Washington politicians of all stripes.
But what’s really dumb, if not tragic, is to expend all this political blood and energy in a battle over domestic programs, which account for only 12 percent of the federal budget. Yes, their growth needs to be constrained too, but there just isn’t enough money there to make a sizeable dent in our fast-growing national debt, now $12 trillion and inexorably rising toward 90 percent of GDP if we don’t act soon. In the real world, stabilizing the debt at a sustainable level and eventually whittling it down means putting everything on the table – defense spending, taxes and entitlements.
That’s why the deal struck within the Fiscal Commission is so significant. It targets over $1 trillion in tax expenditures, like the tax exclusion for employer-paid health and scads of smaller business subsidies. To Senate conservatives like Chambliss, Coburn and Gang of Six member Mike Crapo of Idaho, these are essentially back-door spending programs administered through the tax code. And unlike many House Republicans and self-appointed tax commissar Grover Norquist, the GOP Senators don’t regard closing loopholes as tantamount to raising taxes. That brave departure from anti-tax fundamentalism is crucial to any bipartisan budget deal, because no self-respecting Democrat is going to negotiate deficit reductions on the spending side of the budget alone.
In a reciprocal show of political courage and country-first patriotism, commissioners Durbin and Kent Conrad of North Dakota signaled their willingness to entertain reforms in Social Security, notwithstanding all the overheated blather in the lefty blogosphere and cable TV land about the “cat food commission.”
According to today’s Washington Post, the Gang of Six is trying to recruit other Senators to join their center-out coalition. Let’s hope they succeed – and that President Obama enters the lists soon. Obama did the Fiscal Commission he created no favors by declining to endorse any of its recommendations. Worse, top White House aides lately have dropped hints that the administration may try to separate Social Security reform from negotiations over deficit reduction. If true, it would represent backsliding from Obama’s forthright pledges on taking office to confront Social Security’s problems.
In a recent op-ed, OMB Director Jack Lew argued that “Social Security does not cause our deficits,” and added: “Strengthening Social Security is an important, but parallel, issue that needs to be addressed as quickly as possible. But let’s not confuse it as either the cause of or a solution to our short-term fiscal problems.”
It’s true that health care costs are a far bigger problem, but Social Security also faces a long-term spending gap that will contribute to our mounting national debt as the baby boomers retire. The fact that it’s more easily fixed than Medicare or Medicaid is no reason to put that chore off. On the contrary, Democrats’ willingness to get serious about entitlement reform is an indispensible element of any plausible bipartisan deal for getting our fiscal house in order. It’s also the best way to take the heat off domestic programs, including progressive investments in education, infrastructure and social mobility that Democrats rightly defend.
If Durbin, the Democrats’ Senate whip, understands this, then surely President Obama does as well. His reticence on the specifics of a bipartisan budget deal may be purely a matter of tactics, but Durbin, and the Gang of Six, deserve his unequivocal support.
Asking what our energy mix will be three decades from now is exactly the right question to reframe the debate about our national energy policies—or lack thereof. Most of our discussions would be a lot more productive if advocates for different approaches laid out a clear vision of what our future mix of fuel sources would look like in 30 years, so voters and policy wonks alike will be able to better understand and compare competing proposals. We should start with simple but achievable targets, such as the “Balanced Energy Portfolio” that sets a 2040 goal of using one-third renewables, one-third nuclear, and one-third fossil fuels to generate the country’s electricity and avoiding increases in greenhouse gas emissions.
Too often our recent battles over energy legislation have focused on specific mechanisms for shaping our energy future, without making a clear case for what that future should actually look like. Trying to sell cap-and-trade, carbon taxes, or renewable energy standards isn’t going to work unless we can judge these abstract ideas against easily understood energy targets. That’s why President Obama was right to reduce his new energy agenda to a simple goal: producing 80 percent of our electricity from clean energy sources by 2035.
The elegance of the President’s clean energy messaging is made possible by his nearly total avoidance of mechanistic details about how he wants the country to reach this goal. Secretary Chu has offered an overview of a very broad Clean Energy Standard (also a fact sheet) that would include a system of mandates satisfied with tradable credits for renewables, nuclear, natural gas, and clean coal technologies. But the administration has not laid out a full proposal for how those credits would be allocated or traded, because there is no sense in making a case for implementation until President Obama can convince a critical mass of the public that his goal is worth pursuing.
The President’s Clean Energy Standard is important in another respect, because it is a form of energy resource planning, a realm of energy policy that has historically been handled by the states. It’s an anachronistic and unfortunate result of our federal system that the most important decisions about the types of energy resources we will build are made on a purely piecemeal basis by state regulators and local utilities, with no coherent plan or coordination at the federal level. Part of the political appeal of carbon-pricing models is that they offer an indirect method to influence resource planning decisions without totally upending the current patchwork of state and regional decision making. But there is no reason that the federal government should not take a more active role by adopting national goals and working with states and utilities to implement strategies for meeting them.
If we are going to have a national debate about resource planning, we will need to be more specific and forthright in setting goals than the administrations broad 80 percent standard. In a recent paper released by the Progressive Policy Institute, Jim Conca and Judith Wright offer a realistic Balanced Energy Portfolio with a 30-year target energy mix of one-third renewables, one-third nuclear, and one-third fossil-fuel generation. Their target would be an ambitious departure from our current mix of 69 percent fossil fuels, 20 percent nuclear, and 11 percent renewable energy. But it is a realistic, pragmatic first step to restart a national conversation about determining our own energy future, and it provides clear goals to evaluate policy proposals.
The best hope for finding common ground in this debate is to build consensus around long-term targets for how we as a nation produce and consume energy. Once we get some agreement on the big-picture goals, we can then work on reverse-engineering specific policy proposals to achieve those goals and argue over which approach is best.
It’s not exactly Sophie’s choice, but you have to admit there’s something a little poignant about Mitt Romney’s dilemma. To win the GOP nomination for president, he’s being forced by Tea Party types to distance himself from his greatest public achievement – making Massachusetts the first state in the union to achieve universal health care.
To mask this abject act of self-repudiation, Romney is attacking Obamacare with unwonted ideological zeal. “Obamacare is bad law constitutionally, bad policy and it is bad for America’s families,” he assured a group of New Hampshire Republicans over the weekend. Ladling on the conservative boilerplate, he added, “The federal government isn’t the answer for running health care any more than it’s the answer for running Amtrak or the Post Office.”
The problem for Romney – as his presidential rivals gleefully keep reminding conservatives — is that Romneycare is the policy template for Obamacare. It has the same basic architecture: a menu of competing private health care options (“exchanges” in the federal law, the “Connector” in Massachusetts), public subsidies for those who need them, and an individual mandate requiring all adults to buy medical coverage. The biggest difference between the two approaches, ironically, is that Obamacare is a lot tougher on containing health care costs than the Massachusetts law.
Nationally, about 15 percent of Americans (roughly 45 million) lack basic health care coverage. Thanks to Romneycare, it’s less than three percent in Massachusetts. Romney says he’s proud of that accomplishment, but Massachusetts may have to file a paternity suit to get him to own up to the individual mandate.
Romney’s disingenuous attempts to disavow the obvious similarities between his approach and the President’s aren’t doing much for his reputation for intellectual honesty. Given conservatives’ fanatical loathing for the President’s bill – “Repealing Obamacare is the driving motivation of my life,” avers Minnesota Republican and Tea Party pin-up Rep. Michele Bachmann – Romney evidently feels the bill he hammered out with Massachusetts Democrats poses an existential threat to his candidacy.
So the GOP front-runner is seeking refuge in federalism: “One thing I would never do is to usurp the constitutional power of states with a one-size-fits-all federal takeover,” he said in New Hampshire. Let me get this straight: it’s OK for states to adopt a “socialist” approach to universal coverage, including the heartily despised individual mandate, as long as it’s not foisted on them by Washington?
Maybe Romney will find a way to persuade conservatives to forgive him for governing effectively in a deep-died blue state. But at what cost? Let’s face it, Romney is basically a pragmatic problem-solver, not a right-wing ideologue. Pretending to be otherwise will cast further doubt on his authenticity as a candidate, even if it’s the only way to run in today’s radicalized Republican Party.
With House Republicans on a slash and burn mission to cut federal spending, an agency on the chopping block is the Corporation for National and Community Service and the AmeriCorps programs it operates.
Defunding the community service program would be a huge mistake: AmeriCorps is exactly the kind of program that Republicans should love because it’s so efficient. It’s also the kind of program New York Times columnist David Brooks – who calls this period of fiscal austerity “a potential blessing if it spurs an effectiveness revolution” – should love too.
First launched as a demonstration program under President George H.W. Bush, AmeriCorps legislation was formally enacted during the Clinton administration and later expanded by President George W. Bush. AmeriCorps programs are a kind of domestic Peace Corps. They recruit, train and place citizens in service to meet community needs in education, the environment, disaster response and other areas. The fiscal investment required to operate these programs is widely regarded as reasonable considering the return. The program staff and AmeriCorps members engaged in community service leverage additional outside investments of time and resources, stretching their AmeriCorps grant dollars far beyond their face value. AmeriCorps programs are competitive and performance based with rigorous requirements to establish and reports on progress toward meaningful outcomes. If the outcomes aren’t met, the funding doesn’t get renewed.
A perfect example of how AmeriCorps works is its JusticeCorps program, which helps the judicial system in California better serve the four million or so people who come to court each year to resolve important civil legal matters but can’t afford an attorney. While anyone facing a criminal matter is afforded the right to counsel, a single mother who needs to establish paternity or child support, or an elderly landlord who needs to issue a restraining order against a threatening tenant, for example, is on their own. At rates now hovering close to $300 an hour, few of us can afford to hire an attorney. Legal aid organizations are so under resourced that they have to turn away two of every three meritorious cases. National data indicates that 60 to 90 percent of family law cases involve at least one self-represented litigant. As foreclosures rise, additional self-represented litigants have begun to clog the courts with housing related issues.
In several counties across California, the state judiciary partners with local public universities to recruit, train and place about 300 undergraduate college students in the courts’ self-help legal access centers where people can come get answers about how to file legal paperwork, navigate the system and resolve legal matters on their own. In the 2009-10 program year, JusticeCorps members assisted 60,000 litigants and helped to complete 38,900 legal forms. At a cost of roughly $1 million in federal AmeriCorps and local matching funds combined, that’s $16 per instance of assistance to litigants. This assistance allows people to take less time off work to be in court, avoids costly case continuances, keeps people from being evicted before they can find replacement housing, helps finalize parenting plans to support family stability, keeps potential victims of domestic violence safe and more.
The JusticeCorps program proves what early supporters of national service had hoped—that like any entrepreneurial start-up, AmeriCorps could adjust its founding premises and assumptions against the realities of the markets in which it competes. Seeing the same substantial need in the community and the potential for impact, New York, Chicago and Milwaukee among other cities, are actively trying to replicate the California JusticeCorps model, leveraging AmeriCorps funding to create new partnerships with local universities, bar foundations and the courts.
President George W. Bush praised AmeriCorps members as “armies of compassion.” We need them now more than ever. Leave these armies in place to do their good work while we all cope with other cuts we know lie ahead.
Dr. Michael Mandel will lead a forum for journalists and policymakers to discuss key trends in U.S. and global savings and investment, with the goal of identifying potential story ideas and policy opportunities. Topics will include why investment in physical, human, and knowledge capital is essential for the future of the U.S. economy, and an examination of why the government data measuring investment is woefully incomplete and misleading. Dr. Mandel is a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute and former chief economist at BusinessWeek. Strictly limited seating.
Date:
Monday, March 21, 2011
12 p.m.
Location:
Progressive Policy Institute
1730 Rhode Island Ave. NW
Suite 308
Washington, DC
As an unregenerate liberal interventionist, I believe America should aid Libyan rebels fighting to rid their country of Muammar Qaddafi. But for all the attention a no fly zone has received, there are better ways to even the odds in this so far unequal contest.
The impulse to “do something” as Qaddafi’s planes and foreign mercenaries attack rebel-held towns is understandable. But at this point, imposing a no fly zone would entail high political costs while yielding uncertain military returns.
A key question, of course, is who would impose it? Given the likely opposition of Russia and China, the U.S. Security Council won’t authorize a no fly zone. Europe, as usual, is brimming with moral outrage but can’t muster the consensus to hand the job to NATO.
U.S. military authorities are scarcely enthusiastic. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned Congress this week that imposing a no fly zone is a lot harder than it sounds. For one thing, it’s basically an act of war that requires that U.S. forces first attack and destroy Libya’s extensive air defense systems. For another, it would mean shifting aircraft and surveillance assets from the war in Afghanistan to the Mediterranean.
What really spooks U.S. officials is the spectacle of America, already engaged in two Middle East conflicts, launching yet another military attack on an Arab country. That could instantly change the Libyan narrative, shifting the world’s focus from ordinary Libyans’ valiant struggle for freedom to U.S. actions and motives. It could rekindle suspicions in the region that the United States is bent on imposing democracy on Muslim nations, undoing the Obama administration’s painstaking efforts to refurbish America’s image in the Middle East. In the worst case scenario, it could draw in jihadists and regional provocateurs hoping to lure the United States in a grinding and prolonged civil conflict.
Above all, Washington should avoid any step that might break the momentum of the popular upheavals now erupting across the Arab world. These bottom-up revolts hold out the best hope for democratic change that the people of the Middle East can believe in.
The best outcome for all concerned, of course, would be for the Libyan rebels to topple Qaddafi by themselves, with little or no outside help. That may not be in the cards.
The rebels, a mixture of lightly armed but highly motivated civilians and military defectors, so far seem to have stood up well to Qaddafi’s professional security forces and mercenaries. Take that assessment with a grain of salt, however, as this piece in the Guardian argues that much of the international narrative may be skewed by rebel sources. While the regime has lost control of eastern Libya, few observers believe that rebel forces can crack Qaddafi’s redoubt in Tripoli and the west, where he also enjoys support from his tribe.
A military stalemate thus may be the likeliest scenario. Since the real fighting is on the ground, a no fly zone might not have much impact. Says Jeffrey White, a military analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies:
Most of the attention so far has been on establishing no-fly zones, but these may be inadequate to deal with Qadhafi’s remaining forces. The regime’s key instruments are ground units, so no-drive zones or airstrikes would likely be needed to truly curtail its ability to move against the opposition.
So what should the United States and other leading powers do now? One answer is to intensify international and regional diplomacy aimed at isolating Qaddafi and his henchmen. Another is to get food and medical supplies to Libyan rebels and refugees. It’s also imperative to get a more accurate assessment of what’s really going on in Libya.
If the tide of battle shifts decisively in Qaddafi’s favor, the United States should be willing to provide the rebels with arms and intelligence. It is true that they are a disparate lot, that we know little about their aims once Qaddafi is gone (they may not know either), and that their ranks probably include Islamist groups.
Nonetheless, the rebels are determined to overthrow Qaddafi, which puts them clearly on the side of greater freedom and positive political change in Libya. And for now, that should be enough to merit America’s support.
Pew has some new data out about trust in and anger towards government. The short headline: a little more trust, a little less anger than a year ago at this time. All of this bodes well for Obama in 2012. Fewer angry voters and more trust (particularly among Republicans) means fewer voters who are motivated to devote long hours to campaigning to defeat Obama.
Overall, 29 percent of Americans now say that they can trust the government in Washington to do what is right at least most of the time, up from 22 percent last March (which was pretty much an all-time low). On this front Democrats look exactly as they did a year ago (34 percent). But Republicans have gone from 13 percent to 24 percent, and Independents from 20 to 27 percent. Interestingly, the biggest shift has been among self-identified moderate and liberal Republicans (a dying breed). In March 2010, 17 percent had trust in the government. Now 36 percent do.
Looking more deeply at the anger numbers also is revealing. A year ago, 21 percent of Americans claimed to be “angry” with the federal government. Now only 14 percent do. Again, the big drop-off is among Republicans (from 30 percent a year ago to 16 now), and Independents (from 25 percent a year ago to 15 now). Democrats are flat (9 percent a year ago to 10 percent now). Interestingly also is that the percent expressing anger among has remained flat for both Blacks (12 percent) and Latinos (17 percent). But for Whites, it’s fallen from 23 percent to 14 percent.
Most of this makes sense. With Republicans gaining a stake in government by winning the House, Republican voters are more likely to feel that somebody is representing them, and they are thus more likely to have faith in government, since faith in government is effectively a question of how much faith you have in the people running the government, which is also tied up with the state of the economy (which seems to be doing a little better). And likewise, since anger is often aroused in response to blame, with shared control of the government, it becomes less clear who to blame when things go wrong, and therefore harder to get angry.
The declining anger is likely to especially benefit Obama. Anger is a potent mobilizing force in politics. But if anger is on the decline, there will be fewer Republican campaign activists to do all the hard campaign volunteering work. This will make it harder for a Republican to win in 2012.
This is a number worth keeping close tabs on. If the percent of voters who are angry stays low and the number trusting Washington continues to increase, Obama should do well.
The Middle East is a political outlier, the world’s least hospitable place for liberal democracy. But as popular demands for freedom spread virally across the region, they are illuminating a varied political landscape, not just monolithic tyranny.
Think of it as a continuum of despotism. On the “soft” end are Tunisia and Egypt, where longtime strongmen were ousted with surprising ease. Mostly nonviolent popular protests were sufficient to shove them into involuntary retirement.
On the “hard” end is Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi. Unlike Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the self-anointed “Brother Leader” has shown no compunction about massacring his own people to hold onto power. While rebels are fighting back valiantly, it could take a hard shove from the outside world to topple hardcore tyrants like Qaddafi.
In any case, the popular uprisings are sorting out where the region’s countries fall along the autocratic continuum. It’s also shedding light on the conditions that make some countries more receptive to political change than others.
A month ago, there didn’t seem to be anything particularly “soft” about Mubarak and Ben Ali. They were essentially dictators who ruled by decree, clamped down hard on political opponents, routinely violated basic human rights, including torturing prisoners, and tolerated pervasive corruption and cronyism.
Yet, to invoke Jeanne Kirpatrick’s famous Cold War-era dichotomy, they were authoritarians rather than totalitarians. They depended on the tacit support of respected national institutions like the army, as well as governing and economic elites who preferred “stability” to the hazards of open political competition. When the uprisings made it clear that the heretofore voiceless masses had turned against the rulers, that support quickly evaporated and they had little choice but to step down.
In contrast, the megalomaniacal Qaddafi has ruled absolutely for 42 years. Rather than use Libya’s oil and gas wealth to develop and modernize the country’s economy, he funneled much of it into overseas intrigues, including several vicious civil conflicts in Africa. Libya remains a highly tribal society where national institutions (including the army), private markets and civil society – key building blocks for democracy – are weak.
In general, America’s friends and allies in the Middle East are mostly grouped toward the soft end of the despotic continuum, while our adversaries congregate at the hard end. This should surprise no one except for foreign policy “realists,” who reject the idea that the internal political structures of countries have any effect on their conduct abroad. Yet it can hardly be a coincidence that the least open societies and most illiberal regimes in the region – Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq before 2003 – are the most likely to foment terrorism, chase after nuclear weapons, reject Israel’s existence, and brutally oppress their own people.
That Syria hasn’t seen much unrest is surely related to the fact that it’s a thoroughly nasty police state run by hereditary dictator Bashar al-Assad, whose father, Hafez al-Assad, leveled the rebellious city of Hama in 1982, at the cost of over 17,000 lives. Iran’s Green Movement has managed a few small protests in solidarity with the Arab revolt, but has been mostly kept under wraps by the Islamic Republic’s thuggish security organs.
With the exception of Bahrain, the region’s monarchies also have dodged the revolutionary bullet – so far. Arab kings evidently enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy and popular acceptance than secular strongmen. King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Mohammed V of Morocco have proven adept at creating at least a façade of parliamentary rule and at displacing popular anger onto governments they can dismiss from time to time to appease public wrath. Nonetheless, Washington should nudge such “liberal autocracies” to go beyond cosmetic reforms, lest they be engulfed by the rising revolutionary tide.
The country that really has U.S. policy-makers holding their breath, of course, is Saudi Arabia. It falls somewhere in the middle of the autocratic continuum. On the one hand, they’ve been U.S. allies since FDR’s day, sit atop oil reserves vital to America’s auto-centric culture and share our interest in destroying al Qaeda. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is a run by a deeply illiberal monarchy that enforces Sharia law, uses its oil wealth to export Wahabbist fundamentalism, and relegates women to second-class status. The appearance of a serious pro-democracy movement there would force Americans to face these contradictions and rethink our close ties with the ruling family.
The Middle East’s variegated political landscape offers grounds for measured hope about prospects for liberal democracy. Political and economic freedom will likely advance fitfully and partially in some places, hardly at all in others. There will be slippage and backsliding. But there’s a striking opportunity for the United States to nudge its friends and allies further toward the “soft” end of the despotic continuum, and eventually off it altogether.
From Tunisia to Egypt to Libya, as governments in countries continue to teeter and fall, the voice of a new generation bolstered by the internet is opening doors for democracy. But though the celebrations in the town squares of Tahrir and Mohammad Bouazizi are still fresh, brutal crackdowns in Iran, Libya, and Bahrain show how fragile the call for democracy is – and why technology alone can’t sustain democratic revolution.
Over the past month, the world watched as legions of young tech-savvy Twitter and Facebook users banded together in a virtual civil society to create change in their governments. Using a new, free, and open tool such as the internet was a powerful way for the first plugged-in generation in history to demand change. When their respective government bodies attempted to censor the protesters, a world-wide safety web was immediately cast for the photos, videos, and online messages that would mobilize, organize and encourage the citizens. The rules of political organizing had been changed — freedom was literally in the air.
Social media is filling an important vacuum in these revolutions: social media is becoming the fabric of civil society that is otherwise missing from autocratic states. A vibrant civil society with a strong NGO community is the glue that keeps any democracy together. It takes a multitude of organizations, student groups, institutions, and other volunteers to safeguard the fresh, new democracies that are springing up in countries such as Egypt, Liberia, and Ukraine. Without a strong civil society and an independent open economy where citizens feel safe, democracy will fail.
Strong and independent non-government groups support democracy by providing a channel for every citizen to work within to achieve change in policy and to safeguard hard-won freedoms.
Such independent groups provide necessary forums for citizens to moderate conflict, teach democratic principles, and push for political change in a peaceful and legitimate manner.
If the United States wants to help citizens protect their new democracies around the world, we ought to start with the basic foundation of our country – that a government for the people and by the people requires more than Facebook and Twitter. Capacity-building NGOs and volunteer citizens must band together to offer their country a support system during these fragile times.
Americans and like-minded countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic can lend a hand, organizing advocacy groups that can mobilize the NGO community and citizens. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, ‘Freedom Fighters’ traveled around the globe to share their first-hand knowledge with these stakeholders of other emerging countries.
Social media has played an integral part, but for an effective follow up to virtual revolt, an old fashioned civil society is what these fresh new democracies require. Though the door to democracy has opened in some countries, it will take a strong, independent civil society to ensure that it will not be slammed shut once again. As the online world comes face to face with the military might of the entrenched powers that be, there is a need for on-the-ground organized citizen engagement and dialogue.
Why is Florida’s rookie Republican Gov. Rick Scott hell-bent on rejecting $2.4 billion in federal funds for a Tampa-Orlando high-speed railway? Is it because his argument that Florida taxpayers would be “on the hook” for cost overruns was about to be exposed as a bunch of hooey?
Until Scott announced he would veto the rail program on Feb. 16, the new 84-mile rail line was going to be put out to private bid. It was an open secret in business circles that expected bidders, including Japan’s JR Central (builder of the high-speed Shinkansen) and South Korea’s Hyundai Rotem (builder of Korea’s bullet trains), would be willing to pay for Florida’s $280 million share of the project, plus any construction cost overruns and operating losses, in return for a 30-year lease on the Tampa-Orlando railway.
In other words, the private sector, not the Florida taxpayer, would cover any non-federal costs for the project. Since such a revelation would throw a monkey wrench into Scott’s ideological stance that “Obama rail” is “a federal boondoggle,” he tried to veto the program before it got to the bidding stage.
But Scott may have overstepped his state constitutional authority. Two state senators, Republican Thad Altman and Democrat Arthenia Joyner, filed a lawsuit Tuesday before the Florida Supreme Court arguing that Scott exceeded his powers by “retroactively vetoing” the project after the legislature voted to move ahead with the project and prior governor, Charlie Crist, agreed to accept the federal rail funds.
According to the suit, “The legislation implementing high-speed rail and the appropriation of the state and federal monies were fully accomplished prior to the election or inauguration of the Respondent, [but] once elected, Gov. Scott has refused to permit the Grant Amendment to be executed by the Florida Rail Enterprise,” thus halting the process of issuing a so-called “design-build-operate-maintain-and-finance” contract with a private bidder.
Predictably, Scott roared back yesterday by saying the two legislators overstepped their bounds by criticizing him. “Fortunately for the taxpayers of Florida, nothing in Florida law compels the Governor … to pour millions of dollars into a black hole during the historic fiscal crisis with which the state is presently grappling,” wrote Scott’s general counsel.
Scott vowed to veto any future appropriation for high-speed rail by the Florida legislature and added imperiously that he would reserve the right to declare the federal government’s stimulus package, from which the high-speed rail funds were derived, “an unconstitutional infringement on his rights as governor.”
The governor’s intransigence has set off a scramble by federal, state, and local officials to circumvent his office and save the long-planned project. Local governments, including Orlando, Tampa, and Miami, have formed a coalition they said could assume responsibility for putting the project out to bid and ensure that a private company would cover any construction cost overruns. A group of mayors presented the plan to Scott earlier this week, but he did not budge from his anti-train stance.
There is no dispute that the project would create about 30,000 construction jobs in the economically depressed central part of Florida and aid tourism by providing a fast ride from Orlando International Airport to Disney World.
Scott campaigned for office promising to create thousands of new jobs for Florida. But those jobs are to be created “his way” by building new roads, expanding local ports and cutting taxes, not by accepting a program whose job creation might rub off favorably on Barack Obama during the 2012 presidential election.
Scott may be speeding toward his own political fall – his poll numbers are slipping – but at the moment he seems to have the momentum to bring down the Obama administration’s most “do-able” passenger rail project. So far, it’s unclear whether the White House wants to stand up and fight Scott or redirect the federal funds to places like California and New York where the governors are openly campaigning for the money.
U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood has given Scott until the end of Friday to accept or reject the federal rail funds. Doubtless we know what Scott will do. The Florida story, however, won’t be over until the local entities give up on their plan to take over the project and the state Supreme Court weighs in on the constitutional issues raised by the Altman-Joyner suit.
Last year’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill revealed not just technological problems, but policy gaps as well. Among the most notable of these gaps is the federal limit on liability for oil spills, set at $75 million for offshore facilities. This is three or four orders of magnitude smaller than the damages associated with a major offshore spill like Deepwater Horizon, whose damages are estimated in the tens of billions. Firms that cause more damage than the limit aren’t liable, at least not under federal law. It is only BP’s decision to waive this limit that has kept it from being a much larger problem.
But we may not be so lucky next time, and the spill has greatly increased pressure to increase or eliminate the cap. I and my colleagues at Resources for the Future have written on this and, most notably, the President’s Commission on the spill recommended significantly raising liability caps. Congress could not agree on a measure to do so last year, however, and urgency ebbed in the election season. The problem still exists, however, and discussions in Congress have begun again. The latest development is a potential compromise between Democratic Sens. Mark Begich and Mary Landrieu. But unfortunately, this compromise is likely to make the situation worse, not better.
The Begich/Landrieu compromise has two elements: first, it raises the liability cap to $250 million. This is relatively meaningless given the size of large-spill damages, but let’s set that obvious objection aside for now. The deeper problems with the compromise exist even if the cap number is much higher. The second element is a kind of insurance pool, funded by contributions from all drilling firms, that would cover spill damages above the cap level.
This insurance pool creates problems that undermine any benefit from an increased cap. The first is moral hazard – liability works because, by forcing wrongdoers to pay for damages they cause, it creates incentives to avoid dangerous or negligent activity. But when liability is pooled, these incentives are blunted. Under the compromise, if a firm spilled oil that caused damage over $250 million, it would not pay much for these “excess” damages – but its competitors would. In a sense, the pool lets firms outsource the costs of their dangerous activity, and therefore erases much of the incentive to avoid it. This “moral hazard” is a recognized problem with insurance and particularly pooled insurance. There are ways to deal with it, but it is impossible to resolve it entirely.
But this isn’t the only way the compromise would kill firms’ incentive to operate safely. It would also undercut spill victims’ only real remedy under current law. Critics of the federal spill liability cap often forget that it isn’t the only game in town – spill victims can sue under state law. And with the big exception of Louisiana, state law has no liability caps at all. This means that victims can recover damages even beyond the federal cap levels. Now federal caps do still matter – for procedural reasons and due to protections offered under federal law, it is a better route for most victims. And of course Louisianans are out of luck under either law.
But if there is an insurance pool, victims won’t pursue claims under state law. No good lawyer would advise them to do so when they could just recover from the insurance pool. State liability laws would become largely meaningless, and any incentives they give firms to operate safely would fade. This makes the moral hazard problem even worse. The only remaining reasons for firms to prevent major spills would be avoiding bad press and cleanup costs (which aren’t covered under the caps). And that’s not likely to be enough to increase safety investments, as the recent spill has shown is necessary.
The spill illustrated something we probably should have recognized earlier – that our liability policy for oil spills is totally inadequate. The liability cap was too low when it was passed, and it is far too low now. There’s a very strong case that we shouldn’t have one at all.
But changes to the liability cap won’t happen without compromise. It’s a good thing that legislators continue to discuss the issue and are making such compromises (though getting Republicans on board will be necessary eventually). But whatever political benefits the Landrieu/Begich compromise has, it’s bad policy. It will make the problems with current liability policy worse, not better. The senators risk expending political capital only to make the Gulf less safe. Oil companies and the legislators that champion them may still oppose this compromise, but there will be a certain amount of Br’er Rabbit and the briar patch in their cries. Even if politics means an ideal spill liability policy is impossible, we can do better than this.
The views expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.
While a revolutionary wave in the Middle East has captivated most of our attention recently, the Korean peninsula remains volatile. In recent months, North Korea has launched two unprovoked attacks, and questions remain about the best way to diffuse the tension, especially with China acting as an enabler.
Yesterday, the Progressive Policy Institute, in conjunction with the University of California Washington Center, held a panel discussion on “Defusing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: What America—and China—Should Do.”
The event featured: The Honorable Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Scott Snyder, Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation; Karin Lee, Executive Director, The National Committee on North Korea; and Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Mansfield Foundation. PPI’s Jim Arkedis moderated.
Sec. Campbell’s remarks were off the record (so I can’t report on them), but a lively discussion followed.
Flake kicked off the conversation with a blunt assessment of the obstacles of getting back to the negotiating table, arguing it’s hard to start a discussion when North Korea is beginning from such a bellicose stance.
“The fundamental problem is that if we want to get back to the negotiating track, we can’t enter formal negotiations as long as North Korea continues to assert that it’s a nuclear power and wants to be recognized as a nuclear power,” said Flake. “The question is: how do you get North Korea to change its mind and its position?”
Flake went on to argue that China had to play a major role. But while China and the U.S. used to have a good working relationship, that’s fallen off lately. Flake tried to see things from China’s perspective: “In my mind, China has always had three lousy options: no war, no collapse, and no nukes…In the last year and a half, there’s been a shift. China prioritized no collapse over no war and no nukes, and China came to the position that to do that they were going to back North Korea more openly.”
Flake criticized China for enabling North Korea by “shielding North Korea from the consequences of its actions.” He accused China of blocking investigations, ignoring information, and simply not raising issues.
Karin Lee followed by saying that in light of recent developments, she was almost nostalgic for the six-party talks. “At least the six-party talks put us in a position where China was invested in getting North Korea to do something as opposed to not to do something, and China was much better at getting North Korea to do things that not to do things”
Snyder worried that the U.S. was being torn between working with its traditional allies of Japan and South Korea and working with the more prickly but increasingly important China.
“The issue that is particularly challenging is do people perceive the U.S. as looking at North Korea through the lens of South Korea or through the lens of china,” said Snyder. South Korea is very nervous as to what happens. But the challenge is that we have to manage the tensions and interact with China, and in contrast to the situation in the past where U.S. hegemony guaranteed security, this puts tensions on the management of alliances.”
Snyder also noted that the fact that Chinese president Hu is at the end of his regime also poses some challenges.
“One trope the administration puts out is that they don’t want to reward them with talks,” said Lee. “But talks are not a reward. Talks are diplomacy.”
Flake, however, argued that until North Korea reiterates the commitment to de-nuclearization agreed on in during the last round of six-party talks, there’s no point. “We want to see some indication of serious intent and purpose,” he said. “That would at least open the groundwork.”
Snyder put it more colorfully: “In response to Obama’s invitation to engage with countries that unclenched their fist, North Koreans gave us the finger. So there should be low expectations”
On whether the Chinese can change their tune on being a little tougher on North Korea, Snyder offered some hope. “The Chinese would like to see North Korea follow in their model, but the Chinese are tired of leading the horse to water. They’re trying to make it drink. So we might be able to engage on how do we extend economic governance.”
Lee agreed: “We should say, you’re trying to get the horse to drink, and it’s not working, so how can we work with you to get the horse to drink?”
Certainly, it won’t be easy. And Snyder ended the panel on a pessimistic note: “The key issue is that North Korea has defined itself as a guerrilla state outside the international system.”