During his 60 Minutes interview Sunday night, President Obama underscored the point that Seal Team 6 collected a “treasure trove” of information that could prove of incredible valuable to the intelligence community. So what’s in all the thumb drives, and how might, as the president asserted, the information “serve us very well”?

To be clear, part of what you’re about to read is speculation. It’s at least informed speculation, based on my time as a DoD counter terrorism analyst. As far as I can tell, the bottom line is that we’re now entering a crucial period — the United States has a strong short-term advantage and can exploit this find to hit al Qaeda while the group is scrambling. Here’s why:

First: Whenever the IC gets a major intel dump from a high value al Qaeda target, the very act of exposing new intelligence forces the remaining leadership’s hand. You can be sure that’s why President Obama emphasized our possession of the new material in the interview. The rest of AQ Core doesn’t know what we have, but must assume that its cover has been blown, which means their current lodging has become temporary quarters. The upshot is that in the coming days, they will be making plans to move. To accomplish this task, they’ll have to activate a support network of operatives, any of whom could unwittingly expose targets while in transit. In other words, the mere act of capturing substantial information has set up the United States to execute a number of near-term raids or bombings that could strike a fatal blow to AQ’s remaining leadership.

Second: Initial post-raid intelligence indicates that OBL was more involved in ongoing operations than previously believed, including a possible railway plot. It is an IC maxim that al Qaeda has always valued successful plot execution over adherence to a specific date or timeline. Exposing existing plans effectively compromises them, and AQ operatives — rather than risk a potentially compromised plot — are likely to delay or cancel ongoing operations while sending mid-level lieutenants into hiding for a period.

Third: Al Qaeda’s hierarchy has traditionally been composed of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, plus a chief of external operations and a chief of internal operations (defined as Af/Pak). These nodes all have to communicate with one another, and have long-since abandoned the creature comforts of technology in the 21st century. The key to finding OBL was identifying the courier who was in contact with him, and new information could expose other members of this network’s identities. This means that known couriers, too, will have to go into hiding, and the remaining AQ leaders will have to develop a new cadre of trusted sources. Building trust takes time and further delays ongoing operations of all stripes.

Forth: Follow the money — Al Qaeda’s financial network has to assume it is blown. The group traditionally channels money from all over the world into a few operatives near AQ Central. If OBL was maintaining a higher operational profile than we had previously believed, it stands to reason that he was involved with collecting and distributing finances. He might not have had much of a hand in the cookie jar, but the information on his computer drives might say who did.

Fifth: New information will likely shed light on the extent to which al Qaeda’s “branch offices” in failing states like Somalia and Yemen are taking direction from the Af/Pak-based leadership. If these regions had truly taken over some operational planning, newly captured information may reveal the nodes of international contact, which could theoretically be exploited. Information on the “abroad” AQ groups should also send a powerful message to Congress on the necessity of cutting aid to failing states, as they could now take on even greater prominence in the wake of OBL’s demise.

In sum, OBL’s death and the cache of new information it has created open a stark window of opportunity for the United States. The remaining leadership may be forced to expose themselves when they don’t want to, while delaying ongoing operations and reconstituting communications and financial networks from scratch. The Obama administration has proven its willing to take risks against al Qaeda. Now it has to keep its foot on the gas.

President Obama is justifiably proud of having fulfilled his campaign vow to settle accounts with Osama bin Laden. But he might want to dial back the euphoric White House claims that killing al Qaeda’s chief marks a turning point in Afghanistan.

The Washington Post today quotes an unnamed administration official as saying bin Laden’s demise “changes everything” and begins the “endgame” in Afghanistan. In this view, it will make the Taliban more tractable and ready to negotiate an end to the fighting in return for a share in the Afghan government.

I’d love to be proved wrong, but this assessment seems wildly optimistic. The theory that the Taliban will now be eager for talks is based on two premises.

First, that America’s surgical strike on bin Laden’s compound deep into Pakistan shows Taliban leaders who have taken refuge in Quetta that we can reach them too. No doubt we could, but there must be a reason why we haven’t yet struck at Taliban chief Mohammad Omar and the Quetta Shura. Maybe it’s because there will be no one left with the authority to enforce a truce if we decimate the high command. More likely it’s because Pakistani intelligence, which helped create the Taliban, is protecting its leaders.

Second, bin Laden’s death relieves Omar of any obligation to continue protecting al Qaeda or allow it to entrench itself again in Afghanistan. After all, the Taliban suffered greatly when Omar, after 9-11, refused to expel al Qaeda. U.S. and Afghan forces routed the Taliban and sent its leaders scurrying into exile in Pakistan. Now that al Qaeda is a spent force, there’s no longer any reason for Afghans to suffer on its behalf.

There’s only one thing wrong with this theory, but it’s a big one: It overlooks the role of ideology. Omar and the Taliban, after all, are Islamist fundamentalists who imposed precisely the kind of puritanical rule on Afghanistan that bin Laden and his ilk prescribe for the whole Muslim umma. They enforced Sharia law with fanatical zeal, banned music and dancing, had women accused of adultery stoned to death in stadiums, barred girls from school, and destroyed ancient Buddhist carvings they considered idolatrous.

As Peter Bergen and other terrorist analysts have noted, al Qaeda and the Taliban have essentially experienced a kind of ideological mind-meld in recent years. Bin Laden swore allegiance to Omar, who likewise seems himself leading a jihad against foreign infidels. The assumption that Omar and his claque in Quetta are Afghan nationalists who will compromise their religious beliefs for a slice of power seems naïve.

What might induce them to sue for peace, however, is the military battering they’ve received at the hands of the United States and NATO forces. The U.S. surge has severely depleted the Taliban’s ranks and driven it out of wide swaths of the country, especially its Pashtun heartland in the south. Drone strikes in Pakistan have killed hundreds of its leaders. Sustained military pressure could crack the Taliban’s resolve, and the Obama administration ought to have a blunt talk with Pakistan about Omar and the Quetta shura. Until they decide to make peace, they, not less than bin Laden, are legitimate targets for U.S. strikes.

If, on the other hand, the United States, having killed the 9-11 mastermind, now seems over-eager to withdraw from Afghanistan, we’ll give the Taliban incentives to wait us out. The Obama administration is not wrong to seek negotiations with Taliban leaders at various levels, but we need to be persistent and patient, and not start declaring premature victory. The death of bin Laden doesn’t change the reality that the Taliban, not al Qaeda, pose the greatest threat we face in Afghanistan.

President Obama’s dramatic announcement last night that U.S. intelligence and security forces finally caught up with Osama bin Laden was deeply satisfying. Bin Laden picked a fight with America, slaughtered thousands of our citizens, and has been called to account for his crimes. That’s a huge victory for the United States in its fight against terrorism, but it’s also a vindication of universal human values.

Terrorism experts have been quick to point out that al Qaeda will survive the demise of its leader. True, but for now at least, not terribly relevant. Operational control long ago passed to subordinates, and to the chiefs of offshoots in Yemen and Somalia. But in depriving al Qaeda of its most charismatic and inspirational figure, bin Laden’s death will likely demoralize aspiring jihadists and lead to a further splintering of the terrorist network.

As more details emerge, some other significant implications of bin Laden’s violent death are coming into clearer focus:

1. The United States is creating a credible deterrent to terrorist strikes.

In an age of suicide bombers, it’s obvious that not all terrorists can be deterred by the threat of retaliation. But the certainty that America will be relentless in hunting down those who organize to attack our citizens will likely dissuade more opportunistic jihadists. While recruiting young people for suicide missions, neither bin Laden nor other top al Qaeda leaders have been in any hurry to achieve martyrdom themselves.

In addition to bin Laden, U.S. forces and drones have killed scores of al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the mastermind of al Qaeda’s 2000 attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen. Much of bin Laden’s appeal stemmed from his messianic preaching that radical Islam represents an unstoppable moral force. In his narrative, Islam’s holy warriors toppled the haughty Soviet empire in Afghanistan and would soon drive the United States out of the Muslim world, if not bring it down altogether. But it’s hard to sustain a belief in inevitable victory when U.S. intelligence and armed forces are more deeply engaged in the region than ever, and are decimating the ranks of terrorist leaders.

For this, Americans owe a debt of gratitude to our much-maligned intelligence services. The CIA evidently tracked bin Laden down, and with the help of Navy Seal Unit 6, killed him in a firefight that claimed no U.S. lives. Thanks to the long arm of U.S. intelligence agencies, other terrorist chiefs, like Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s number 2, and Anwar al-Aulaqi, a key leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, should sleep less easily at night.

2. Pakistani duplicity remains a huge problem.

Although President Obama was careful to underscore Pakistani cooperation with U.S. intelligence efforts, today’s reports suggest the killing of bin Laden was a wholly American affair. The obvious question is why Pakistani intelligence couldn’t find bin Laden. He was living in a highly fortified mansion apparently build specially for him in 2005, in a city just 35 miles north of the capital of Islamabad. That city also houses units of the Pakistani army, who apparently weren’t inquisitive about the mansion either.

Most damning are news reports that the United States didn’t notify Pakistani officials about the operation. Unfortunately, Washington has good reason to suspect that the country’s intelligence service is playing a double game on terrorism. While ostensibly cooperating with the United States, Pakistani intelligence has ties to jihadist groups that have launched terrorist attacks in Kashmir and India, as well as Taliban and affiliated groups, including the notorious Haqqani network, that launch vicious attacks on Afghan and NATO forces from its base just over the border in Pakistan’s North Waziristan province.

Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan – despite official denials – should make Washington less defensive about launching drone missile strikes against terrorist targets there. U.S. officials should also ask why we are funneling large amounts of aid to a government that can’t seem to decide which side it’s on in the struggle against terrorism, even though Pakistan itself is increasingly the target of Islamist terrorists.

3. Freedom, not jihadism, is the wave of the future in the Muslim world.

The popular revolution sweeping the Middle East advances under the banner of freedom and self-government, not Islamist purity and strict enforcement of Sharia law. The Arab street isn’t burning American flags. It’s burning with indignation against homegrown tyrants and corruption, and asking America to back its demands for political and economic reform and representative government.

Meanwhile, al Qaeda’s stock has plummeted in the region. While Americans focus on the wounds of 9/11, Muslims have been the chief victims of al Qaeda’s gruesome tactics. Suicide bombings and indiscriminate attacks have claimed tens of thousands of civilian lives in Iraq alone, and the scourge has spread to Indonesia, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries. Opinion polls show a dramatic decline in sympathy for al Qaeda and strong condemnation of its methods. The carnage also has led Islamist and al Qaeda theorists to renounce indiscriminate attacks on non-combatants.

The Arab revolt, in fact, is the ultimate repudiation of bin Ladenism, which posits a remorseless and apocalyptic struggle between Muslims and the rest of the world. What most Arabs and Muslims want is not to recreate the Caliphate and wage endless jihad, but the freedom to join the modern world on their own terms. In this sense, bin Laden’s removal is a distraction from the main drama in the Middle East – but a welcome one nonetheless.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Let’s grant that Washington has limited leverage over Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad. Let’s further stipulate that Assad’s claim that it’s either him or the Islamists, while self-serving, could turn out to be true. Even so, the White House seems strangely tongue-tied when it comes to condemning the regime’s violence against its people.

Sure, various administration mouthpieces have issued perfunctory condemnations. But even as regime tanks and snipers fire indiscriminately on civilians in Deraa and other cities, President Obama has yet to speak out forcefully against the killings, or to mobilize international efforts to bring pressure on Assad to stop.

Trotting well behind the galloping pace of the Arab revolt, the administration is just now getting around to imposing mild sanctions on Syria. Whether you come at the issue from a humanitarian or realpolitik standpoint, this lack of urgency is puzzling.

Around 400 Syrians already have been killed, and the regime has escalated attacks on protesters. The Guardian reports desperate conditions in Deraa, where people lack electricity, food and water, yet can’t leave their homes for fear of being picked off by snipers. Security forces go door to door, rounding up suspected rebels.

Already entangled in three Middle Eastern countries, the United States probably can’t intervene militarily to stop an incipient massacre in Syria. But the President can offer unequivocal moral support to Syrian demands to open up one of the region’s grimmer police states; he can dramatically stiffen sanctions against the Assad regime; and, he can challenge the international community to apply the “responsibility to protect” principle to Syrians.

Siding with the Syrian resistance also aligns with America’s strategic interests. The fall of the Assad dynasty would remove a determined foe of American purposes in the region, and likely deprive Iran of a loyal satrap in Damascus. But even a more open and pluralistic political order in Syria could moderate the regime’s rougish external conduct. For example, it might mean less Syrian meddling in Lebanon, and less clandestine support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

So why is the administration holding back? Why won’t Obama endorse the goal of regime change, as he has in Libya?

Perhaps he fears being dragged into another Libya-style intervention. Or maybe somewhere in the bowels of the State Department there are still people who think the United States should pursue “engagement” with the Syrian dictator.

But hopes that the Western-educated Assad would turn out to be some kind of closet modernizer were dashed long ago. Since inheriting the regime in 2000, Assad has made Syria a client state of Iran. His regime also has been implicated in the assassination of Lebanese democrats who oppose Syrian domination of their country. To vaunt his credentials as a leader of the rejectionist camp, Assad funnels arms to Hezbollah and Hamas. At the height of the sectarian carnage in Iraq, Syria also was a key transit point for foreign suicide terrorists who flocked to the country to kill U.S. troops as well as Iraqi civilians.

In short, Assad is a thoroughly nasty piece of work. His links to Iran and regional terrorism make him more dangerous by far than Muammar Qaddafi. Yet you don’t hear anyone in Washington (or Europe) demanding a no fly zone over Syria.

That’s probably a perverse sort of tribute to Syria’s brutally competent machinery of repression. It’s also true, though, that Assad enjoys support from other minority groups in Syria, such as Christians. Accurately or not, they accept Assad’s description of himself as their only bulwark against Sunni Islamists.

Yet Assad’s brutality is doubtless a reflection of his basic political insecurity. As a member of the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot which comprises about a tenth of Syria’s mostly Sunni population, Assad’s hold on power is intrinsically precarious and can only be sustained by intimidation and violence.

Syrians nonetheless seem increasingly willing to risk their lives to pry Assad’s grip on their country lose. They deserve America’s unqualified support.