Adrienne Elrod of Dept. of Commerce’s CHIPS Program Office Joins PPI’s Mosaic Project to Discuss Implementation of Historic CHIPS and Science Act

Last week, Director of External and Government Affairs for the CHIPS Program Office Adrienne Elrod and Head of Government Affairs at ASML Maryam Cope joined the Women Changing Policy Luncheon Series, hosted by the Progressive Policy Institute’s (PPI) Mosaic Project and moderated by Jordan Shapiro, Director of the Innovation Frontier Project at PPI.

Ms. Elrod discussed what the long-lasting impact of the historic Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act will mean for communities across the country, and what the Administration is doing to ensure a smooth and effective implementation of the law’s many provisions. Ms. Cope explained what the law will mean for companies like ASML and how it will bring the United States to the forefront of global competition in the semiconductor industry. The CHIPS and Science Act was signed into law by President Biden in August, 2022.

“Number one, first and foremost, we passed this legislation and we’re implementing the CHIPS and Science Act all around national security and economic security…Right now we basically make no leading edge chips in the United States, and we have got to change that trajectory,” said Adrienne Elrod, Director of External and Government Affairs for the CHIPS Program Office.

“I think governments around the world are recognizing that there is a need to have this resiliency, looking at the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, and [asking], what’s our target? What’s our part of this equation? And how can we contribute our expertise and our comparative expertise to this global system? So I think that it’s really a balance between domestic resiliency and globalization that we have to continue to look at,” said Maryam Cope.

“Mosaic was honored to have set the stage for such an important and timely conversation. It’s not everyday you get to hear from two of the country’s leading women working to advance the future of semiconductor manufacturing and paving the way for countless women in tech,” said Jasmine Stoughton, Director of PPI’s Mosaic Project.

 

Left to right: Jordan Shapiro, Director of the Innovation Frontier Project, Progressive Policy Institute; Maryam Cope, Head of Government Affairs, ASML; Adrienne Elrod, Director of External Affairs for the CHIPS Program Office at the Department of Commerce.

 

The Mosaic Project is an initiative of the Progressive Policy Institute that aims to put more women at the forefront of policymaking. The same handful of well-known men have dominated key policy conversations for decades, resulting in legislative outcomes that fail to reflect the richness of our society. It is the project’s mission to empower expert women with the tools and connections needed to engage with the media and lawmakers on today’s toughest policy challenges.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

Follow the Mosaic Project.

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Media Contact: Tommy Kaelin – tkaelin@ppionline.org

PPI on the SOTU: The Future of Tech and Innovation

Government action in regard to technology should serve to enhance the vibrant tech economy, supporting American innovation while addressing concerns that are top of mind for people who rely on it every day. The tech sector is a leader in job creation, and has held strong in the face of challenges such as the pandemic and periods of rising inflation, during which the sector was able to keep prices low. In his second State of the Union address, President Biden has the opportunity to reflect on the successes of this industry, while also calling for reform in areas where government intervention is needed to keep Americans safe, such as the protection of their data.

In the past year, the administration has pursued two major pieces of technology policy — one, the CHIPS and Sciences Act of 2022, was a resounding success, while the other, which was the partial subject of a recent op-ed from the President, a data privacy law, remains on the docket for 2023. In his speech, President Biden should commend Congress on the landmark passage of the CHIPS Act. The law pledges $52 billion dollars to invigorate and onshore the crucial semiconductor industry, injecting vital funds into chip fabs and the infrastructure, workforce, and research and development. Reshoring chip fabrication and upskilling the workforce is crucial for the future of innovation.

The President should re-state his commitment to passing strong digital privacy protections for all Americans. In his first State of the Union, Biden indicated his commitment to improving children’s privacy and safety online. Now, the president is calling for “serious federal protections for American’s privacy. That means clear limits on how companies can collect, use and share highly personal data.” The strongest candidate to get privacy done is the American Data Privacy and Protection Act, a bi-partisan privacy bill that would set the standard for privacy protections for all Americans.

This is a moment for President Biden to recognize the value in American technological leadership and look forward to the ways in which our policy regime can uplift the sector on a global stage. With the debates on approaches to internet regulation heating up across the globe, the U.S. must balance the benefits of innovation with regulatory guidelines and protections for everyday Americans in a way that the rest of the world may look to as a model. By securing privacy protections for individuals in this new Congress, we have an opportunity to do just that.

This post is part of a series from PPI’s policy experts ahead of President Biden’s State of the Union address. Read more here

Amicus brief submitted by PPI highlights potential risks to America’s digital economy 

Today, PPI submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the case of Gonzalez v. Google. The brief highlights the potential risks to America’s digital economy under the circumstances of a ruling against Google, considering the implications of changes to what falls under the liability protections provided to online platforms through Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act. Though there is certainly room for reform to Section 230 to better reflect the harms associated with the modern internet, efforts to do so must tread carefully and be targeted to specific harms to avoid destabilizing the digital economy.

The brief highlights the following points:

1.  “The digital economy, fortified by Section 230, is critical to the American economy.”

The digital economy is an enormous creator of American jobs, thus, significant changes to the fundamental legal regime through which that economy operates risks the stability of a robust industry. This is also a sector that has proven otherwise stable in the face of pandemic shutdowns and periods of high inflation.

2. “Algorithmic recommendation is critical to the digital economy.”

Action against curated algorithms will have impacts that reverberate through the economy. They are the fundamental mechanism behind a variety of business models that empower both online entrepreneurship and the use of access to information for consumers. Potential changes to liability protections for algorithms would also be misguided from a technological standpoint, as algorithms of varying complexity are the means through which all online platforms sort third-party content.

3. “Section 230 reform is warranted, but that reform should be the result of careful, holistic policymaking.” 

Given the significance of online platforms in Americans’ everyday lives, changes to Section 230 must be made with great intentionality. Internet policy should be made by Congress, not the courts. There is a need to address issues posed by dangerous online content, but a catch-all approach may result in significant unintended consequences.

PPI’s full amicus brief can be read here.

The UK Online Safety Bill is well intentioned but will undermine privacy

In Britain, Parliament is debating the oft-revised U.K. Online Safety Bill, which seeks to regulate harmful and illegal content on the internet for children and adults. Without further modifications, however, the bill could undermine that laudable goal.

Fashioned by Ofcom, the U.K.’s digital communications regulator, the bill creates a formal “duty of care” for online platforms to remove harmful content on their websites with additional responsibilities for websites that also serve young people. If passed, adult websites would need to establish age verification and commit to removing illegal content such as content depicting hate crimes, sexual abuse, and terrorism. Websites with youth users would need to prevent young people from seeing illegal content as well as potentially harmful, but not illegal, content such as that promoting eating disorders, self-harm, or suicide. Penalties for failure to comply with these requirements include fines and potential criminal liability for platforms and tech executives if they fail to comply with Ofcom’s information requests.

As I’ve written previously, managing harmful content online, and creating specific youth-protection schemes, raises a host of thorny questions. In a recent blog looking at a U.S. youth online safety bill, I wrote that content moderation is technically challenging, because content moderation systems aren’t perfectly accurate at flagging inappropriate content. The systems can overcorrect and potentially censor acceptable information. In another piece about children’s privacy, I noted that definitively identifying internet users’ age online is both technically challenging and undermines everyone’s privacy.

The latest version of the U.K. Online Safety Bill fails to strike the right balance on content moderation versus censorship, or on privacy.

Content moderation creates a host of challenges, like defining what content is harmful, censorship of content that is not illegal, and encoding all the rules into an algorithm. Even with clear definitions, content moderation is technically challenging.

Content moderation algorithms are not perfectly accurate at flagging harmful content. This means that if an algorithm is 98% effective, 2% will slip through the cracks. On popular websites, 2% could be millions of posts. It remains unclear if firms will be punished if some illegal content passes through the filters. Free speech advocates worry that firms will overcompensate content removal because of the harsh penalties and the technical compliance challenge.

In addition to challenges of censorship, the bill also threatens privacy. First, by requiring users to disclose more personal data to access websites. Second by requiring a backdoor on encrypted messaging platforms for Ofcom to scan private messages for illegal conversations or content.

There is no easy way currently to verify age online without the user voluntarily giving up personal information. While the main trend in privacy legislation is toward decreasing the amount of personal information consumers have to provide to apps and websites, the U.K. bill points in the opposite direction, requiring users to make accounts and verify age through technologies like facial recognition checks or uploading a government-issued ID card to a website.

If personal information disclosure for every website wasn’t enough, the bill also contains provisions to allow Ofcom to search private messages on encrypted platforms. The bill as currently written gives new, large scale, citizen surveillance abilities to Ofcom regardless of wrongdoing. Seventy organizations, cyber security experts, and elected officials signed a letter to warn against allowing Ofcom to search private messages. Their main message is that creating a backdoor for the government creates a backdoor for anyone and undermines the rights of British citizens to privacy.

The U.K. government isn’t the only entity searching for a better solution to make the online space safer for users. This bill, however, stifles free speech online while undermining too many peoples’ privacy.

The internet as we know it relies on Section 230

With the Supreme Court set to take on Gonzalez v. Google this term — a case with momentous implications for the legal viability of internet services as we know them — the fate of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is in question.

Section 230 is the statute that grants online platforms protection from liability for the content posted by their users, a fundamental protection that has been integral to the internet ecosystem’s explosive growth. By allowing internet platforms to take down third-party content that they deem harmful to their users in “good faith,” while also ensuring that they are not treated as the publishers of such content, Section 230 is the legal mechanism that has facilitated innovative business models which give a platform to user-generated content, shaping a robust digital economy enjoyed by both consumers and entrepreneurs today.

From a consumer standpoint, these business models provide a plethora of free resources, entertainment, and educational materials. In the case of entrepreneurs, the online creator economy is estimated to be worth more than $100 billion worldwide, with more than 425,000 full-time equivalent jobs reportedly supported by the YouTube platform alone.

In Gonzalez v. Google, however, the central question goes beyond Section 230’s protections for third-party content, asking instead whether the targeted algorithms employed by these platforms enjoy the same protections.

Most major online platforms use data at various levels to recommend content to users, whether by using specific personal or demographic information to tailor the experience to a user’s specific interests, or by presenting users with popular or relevant content at the top of the feed. These automated decisions curate a feed appealing to the user and beneficial to the content creator, whose work is then highlighted to new audiences.

Colloquially, those referring to social media algorithms are most likely referring to the sophisticated code used by many of these companies to target content to their users. However, from a technological standpoint, the term “algorithm” refers to any type of content sorting — whether it be a simpler iteration that might show content ordered chronologically or alphabetically, or the more complex, individually curated version. There is no default method of content sorting, meaning that every company or developer must choose an algorithm to sort content. The only difference lies in the complexity of the algorithm they chose to employ.

It is difficult to draw legal lines around this complexity. For example, if a platform lists a seemingly harmful piece of content first, thus making it the most obvious choice for users to select, are they liable for that content only if proven to be the result of a curated algorithm, or are they also liable if the reason it is listed first is that the feed is shown chronologically? Either way, there is some risk of exposing users to harmful third-party content. Prohibiting one platform’s algorithms — say Google’s — thus doesn’t provide a general solution.

That means the Supreme Court would either have to define algorithms in such a way that only specific types are implicated for liability, or rule that Section 230 liability protections are lost for all types of content displayed online.

Let’s be clear: A court decision that ended Section 230’s liability protections would make hosting third-party content functionally impossible for websites. On YouTube alone there are over 500 hours of content uploaded every minute, making vetting every video prior to each upload a monumental task. The risk of getting sued will lead most companies to conclude that it’s not worth it for them to offer third-party content. And in the case where only data-driven, targeted algorithms are ruled to be exposed to liability, how likely is it that users would sort through 500 hours of content with no curation in hopes of discovering useful information?

Moreover, the ramifications of making all content providers liable to lawsuits will spread across the entire Internet ecosystem, including online shopping, travel sites, and app stores, all of which rely on user reviews that are curated to reduce fakes and “ballot-stuffing.” In an era of deep fakes and sophisticated artificial intelligence chatbots, it’s all the more essential for online platforms to be able to apply algorithms that users can trust.

There’s no doubt that Section 230 raises difficult issues that need to be carefully considered by policymakers. But subjecting online platforms to lawsuits because their algorithms occasionally highlight content that someone objects to would fundamentally destroy the internet economy, while failing to address the threat posed by truly dangerous online content.

The Economic Performance of the Digital Sector Since the Pandemic Started

As we move into 2023, the digital sector still faces the key regulatory issues that dominated the previous year: Competition, privacy, and content moderation. But as the legislative, executive, and judicial branches tackle these critical questions, it is important to look back and assess the performance of the digital sector on the key economic metrics of job growth and inflation.

For clarity we split the digital sector into three subsectors:

  • E-commerce/retail (“movement of goods”)
  • Internet/content/broadband (“movement of data”)
  • Computer/communication manufacturing (“hardware”)

 

E-commerce/retail: To compete with e-commerce leaders such as Amazon, retailers with a large physical presence such as Walmart and Target have been scaling up their investment in online sales and fulfillment. At the same time, smaller retailers increasingly use online ordering, so the boundary between “brick-and-mortar” and e-commerce has become increasingly porous.  Moreover, privacy and content moderation issues such as accountability for user reviews impact all retailers. In addition to retail, this subsector also includes local delivery (NAICS 492) and fulfillment (NAICS 493).

Internet/content/broadband: With the advent of social networks and streaming, the line between content creation and content distribution has become blurry. Considerations of privacy and content moderation are high on the policy checklist. This subsector includes content creation and distribution (video, audio, print); broadband and broadcasting; wireless; software; internet publishing and search; and computer systems design.

Hardware: Especially with the funding from the CHIPS Act and the focus on export controls, this subsector is facing a different set of policy issues. We include computer and electronic equipment manufacturing, and related wholesaling.

Job Growth

(Note:These figures have been updated to account for the 2/3/23 revisions to the job data)

As of December 2022, the United States currently enjoys a 3.5% unemployment rate, the same as pre-pandemic February 2020. To a large extent, this strong labor market has been driven by job growth in the digital sector. In total the digital sector added 1.4 million net new jobs from 2019 to 2022,  accounting for 67% of net private sector job gains over the same period. Table 1 breaks down the pandemic job growth by digital subsector.

We see that the e-commerce/retail subsector accounted for net job growth of 926,000 jobs from 2019 to 2022, or 44% of private sector job growth, as consumers embraced online shopping during the pandemic, and retailers and third-party logistics companies built and staffed fulfillment centers.

The internet/content/broadband subsector created 472,000 jobs, accounting for 22% of private sector job growth. Altogether, the digital sector accounted for 67% of private sector job growth from 2019 to 2022.

The importance of the digital sector for job growth is emphasized when we look at production and nonsupervisory workers, who generally are less educated and lower-paid (Table 2). The digital sector has created 1.1 million net new production and nonsupervisory jobs from 2019 to 2022,  while the rest of the private sector has lost almost 500,000 production and nonsupervisory jobs.

In particular, the e-commerce/retail subsector has added 812,000 production and nonsupervisory jobs during the three pandemic years. That’s likely to reflect the growth of e-commerce fulfillment and delivery workers. This gain was essential to the recovery because the rest of the private sector has still not regained its pre-pandemic level of production and nonsupervisory employment.

From the perspective of policy, the current regulatory structure turned out to encourage strong job growth in a difficult economic environment. That’s not to say the current regulations cannot be improved, but we should be wary of making major changes without understanding the consequences for jobs.

Table 1. Digital Sector Drives Job Growth During Pandemic
2019-2022
Increase in jobs, thousands Share of private sector growth
Private sector 2,133
E-commerce/retail* 926 44%
Internet/content/broadband** 473 22%
Hardware*** 22 1%
Data: BLS, PPI calculations

 

 

Table 2. …Especially for Production and Nonsupervisory Jobs
2019- 2022
Increase in production and nonsupervisory jobs, thousands Share of private sector growth
Private sector 665
E-commerce/retail* 812 122%
Internet/content/broadband** 306 46%
Hardware*** 24 4%
Data: BLS, PPI calculations

 

Inflation

Before the pandemic, the digital sector had significantly lower inflation than the economy as a whole, whether measured by producer prices or consumer prices. During the pandemic period, overall consumer price inflation accelerated by approximately 3 percentage points, from roughly 1.5% annually in the pre-pandemic period (2012-2019) to roughly 4.5% annually during the pandemic years (2019-2022).

However, the acceleration of inflation was much smaller in the digital subsectors. For example, inflation in the internet/content/broadband subsector only accelerated by 0.3 percentage points when measured by producer prices, and 1.7 percentage points when measured by consumer prices.

Please note that the BLS does not publish a separate measure of e-commerce inflation for consumer goods and services, which is why that line is missing from Table 4. However, in a 2022 paper written for PPI’s Innovation Frontier Project, Marshall Reinsdorf wrote that “the pandemic greatly accelerated adoption of digital innovations such as e-commerce, so it’s reasonable to suspect that the price statistics are undercounting the impact of low digital inflation.”

From the perspective of policy, it’s reasonable to say that the current regulatory structure allowed digital companies to behave in a way that muted the pressure to increase prices. Especially given the inflationary bias in today’s economy, the government should be wary of making changes that impose large new costs on digital companies.

Table 3. Digital Producer Price Inflation Stays Low
Average annual price increase
2012-2019 2019-2022 Increase in inflation rate, percentage points
Final demand less food and energy 1.7% 4.7% 3.0%
Electronic and mail order shopping services* 1.5% 1.8% 0.3%
Internet/content/broadband** 0.7% 1.6% 0.9%
Hardware*** -1.0% 1.1% 2.1%

Based on median inflation for subsectors with multiple products or industries.

Data: BLS, PPI calculations

 

Table 4. Digital Consumer Price Inflation Stays Low
Average percentage price increase
2012-2019 2019-2022 Increase in inflation rate, percentage points
Consumer prices 1.5% 4.6% 3.1%
Internet/content/broadband** -0.4% 1.3% 1.7%
Hardware*** -7.6% -5.6% 1.9%

Based on median inflation for subsectors with multiple products or industries.

Data: BLS, PPI calculations


Appendix: Categories

In this section we define the three digital subsectors, and which statistical series we use to calculate jobs, producer price inflation, and consumer price inflation for each of them. Please note that for subsector inflation measures, we aggregate multiple price series using median inflation rather than weighted means.

*E-commerce/retail

In previous work, we distinguished between ecommerce and brick-and-mortar retail. That distinction is no longer appropriate, because retailers with large physical presence such as have also been building out their online ordering and fulfillment operations. Moreover, the latest NAICS codes do not break out electronic shopping as a separate industry anymore.

Employment data

  • Retail sector (including online ordering and fulfillment operations for single companies)
  • Couriers and messengers (including local delivery)
  • Warehousing and storage (including fulfillment centers)

 

Producer price inflation data

  • Electronic and mail order shopping services

 

** Internet/content/broadband

In earlier work, we used a narrower definition of tech. As barriers have become blurred between content and distribution, and various modes of distribution, it has become appropriate to broaden the definitions.

Employment data

  • Motion picture and sound recording industries
  • Publishing industries, including software
  • Broadcasting and content providers, including social networks and streaming services
  • Telecommunications
  • Computing infrastructure providers, data processing, and web hosting, including cloud computing
  • Web search portals, libraries, archives, and other information services.
  • Computer systems design and related services

 

Producer price inflation data

  • Bundled access services
  • Cable and other subscription programming
  • Data processing and related services
  • Internet access services
  • Internet publishing and web search portals (including advertising)
  • Software publishers
  • Video programming distribution
  • Wireless telecommunications carriers
  • Information technology (IT) technical support and consulting services (partial)

 

Consumer price inflation data

  • Wireless telecom services
  • Residential telecom services
  • Internet services and electronic information providers
  • Cable and satellite television service
  • Video discs and other media
  • Recorded music and music subscriptions

 

***Hardware

In previous work, we did not split out hardware. But the recent CHIPS legislation, and the focus on rebuilding the U.S. domestic semiconductor industry, means that it is appropriate to break out hardware separately. We note that the employment data includes relevant wholesalers, who may be “factoryless” firms designing and marketing digital products, but not actually manufacturing them.

Employment data

  • Computer and electronic product manufacturing
  • Computer and computer peripheral equipment and software merchant wholesalers

 

Producer price inflation data

  • Communications equipment manufacturing
  • Computer & peripheral equipment manufacturing
  • Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing

 

Consumer price inflation data

  • Computers and peripherals
  • Computer software
  • Telephone hardware, calculators, and other consumer information items
  • Televisions

High overall inflation and low digital inflation may spur digitization

Will the combination of high cost increases and low digital inflation spur reluctant companies to digitize?

One of the pleasant economic surprises in recent months has been the low rate of inflation for digital goods and services, compared to the overall inflationary surge. The latest producer price report, released November 15, shows that a basket of digital goods and services (described below) had a median year-over-year price increase of 1.9%. By comparison, the overall year-over-year price increase for final demand, less food and energy, was 6.7%.

We wrote about this big gap between “New Economy” digital inflation and “old economy” inflation  in a December 2021 blog item. In June 2022, leading economic statistician Marshall Reinsdorf wrote a paper for PPI examining the continued slow rate of price increases for most digital goods and services.

The growing gap between overall inflation and digital inflation means that the relative price of digital goods and services is falling. To put it another way, in the low-inflation era that preceded the pandemic, many companies  enjoyed the benefit of low costs without having to make expensive and potentially risky investments in digitizing their operations.

Now that easy period is over. Companies are looking at technology as a way out of their high-cost trap. Business spending on software, computers, and communication gear hit an all time high in the third quarter of 2022. The layoffs at companies such as Amazon and Facebook notwithstanding, there’s no evidence that companies in the aggregate are cutting back on tech investment. A survey from Gartner predicts a 5% gain in tech spending in 2023.

Nobody likes inflation. But there may be a silver lining if the threat of rising costs forces companies to take digital steps that should have come years ago.

 

 

 

Our price index of digital goods and services includes:

Bundled access services
Cable and other subscription programming
Communications equipment mfg
Computer & peripheral equipment mfg
Data processing and related services
Electronic and mail-order shopping services
Internet access services
Internet publishing and web search portals
Semiconductor and other electronic component mfg
Software publishers
Video programming distribution
Wireless telecommunications carriers
Information technology (IT) technical support and consulting services (partial)

 

 

 

 

 

Innovation Networking Happy Hour

 


Come network with PPI and DPZ staff about digital innovation policy!

Wednesday, September 28, 6:00 p.m.

DPZ Headquarters

Werftstraße 3, 10557 Berlin, Germany

Join the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) and Das Progressive Zentrum (DPZ) for a networking happy hour! This is an opportunity for like-minded folks to get together and discuss ways we can improve digital innovation policy while meeting the staff of PPI and DPZ in Berlin.

Digital Decade 2030

Digital Decade 2030

Thursday, September 27, 2022

11:00 a.m. — 12:45 p.m. CET

 Résidence Palace

155 rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels

 

About this event

Europe has ambitious targets for telco connectivity – and very real investment needs. But what’s the best way to attract the capital Europe so clearly requires? Some say the best idea is a tax or fee leveraged on so-called “content and application providers” to create a unique, two-sided market – generating new revenue streams for telcos but adding additional costs to consumers and content producers alike. Others see an opportunity for the European Commission to build on its landmark approach to modern telecommunications: creating framework conditions that attract investment, open markets to new entrants and drive forward a vibrant European data economy in a triple win for citizens, businesses and government alike.

At this high-level roundtable, co-convened by two leading transatlantic think tanks – The Lisbon Council in Brussels and Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) in Washington DC – leading telecommunications-sector experts will present new evidence and incisive analysis intended to form a backdrop to ongoing debate on Europe’s telco financing needs. Michael Mandel, vice-president and chief economist of PPI, and Malena Dailey, technology policy analyst, will present Funding the Next Generation of European Broadband Networks, a new policy brief comparing telco investment strategies between the U.S. and Europe and asking a crucial question: who got it right?

A High-Level Panel of leading telco experts will chime in with additional contributions on the outlook ahead.

Panelists:

Malena Dailey, technology policy analyst, PPI; co-author, Funding the Next Generation of European Broadband Networks

Michael Mandel, vice-president and chief economist, PPI; co-author, Funding the Next Generation of European Broadband Networks

Konstantinos Masselos, president, Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission, Greece; professor, department of informatics and telecommunications, University of Peloponnese; vice-chair (incoming), Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC)

Rita Wezenbeek, director, connectivity, directorate-general for communications networks, content and technology, European Commission TBC

Paul Hofheinz, president and co-founder, the Lisbon Council (Moderator)

RSVP here.

Regulating Tech in the Digital Age: Lessons from China


Regulating Tech in the Digital Age: Lessons from China

Wednesday, September 7, 2022

5:30 p.m. — 8:30 p.m.

Open Gov Hub

1100 13th St NW Suite 800, Washington, DC 20005

About this event

How is China approaching tech regulation? What should policymakers and regulators learn from China’s approach? And how should this impact the way the rest of the global community approaches China?

Join us for an expert panel discussion on tech regulation, geopolitics and globalism. Stay for a reception with light bites and beverages as we bring together the DC tech policy community with the Tony Blair Institute’s London, Singapore and San Francisco teams.

The Panel

Max Beverton-Palmer (Moderator) – Director, Internet Policy at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

Xiaomeng Lu – Director, Geo-technology at Eurasia Group

Matt Nguyen – Policy Lead, Internet Policy at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

Jordan Shapiro – Economic and Data Policy Analyst at Progressive Policy Institute

Prof. Jing Tsu – Professor at Yale University

 

RSVP here.

Shapiro for The Hill: New Digital Privacy Bills Won’t Protect Women Seeking Abortions

By Jordan Shapiro, Economic and Data Policy Analyst

 

Digital privacy laws are not ready for a post-Roe v. Wade future. New bills circulating on the Hill are an important step toward safeguarding Americans’ personal data, but they are not a panacea to protect women seeking an abortion or the friends and family members who might be supporting them, or even just know of their intentions.

It’s no secret that today, personal and health data about human preferences, location, characteristics and behavior are collected through phones, apps, websites, advertisements, internet sites and service providers; if a device is connected to the internet, it probably collects user data. These data are used to provide helpful information and services, but as the United States lacks universal digital privacy protections, firms are solely responsible for data privacy and security.

At the same time, law enforcement has wide latitude to purchase and request personal data from companies. They can obtain a court order about a particular crime and companies are obliged to provide information related to the crime, some companies have made special portals to more easily provide data. Even without a court order, law enforcement can purchase bulk data from data brokers about suspected crimes or general surveillance. These data can contain location information, internet searches queries, among other personal information. Companies can push back but with a court order or subpoena are obliged to comply with law enforcement.

Surveillance of this nature has historically enjoyed wide support as protection against terrorism and other societal harms. But the combination of prolific personal data collection and law enforcement surveillance are predicated on the assurance that data about everyday interactions and behaviors are not under scrutiny by law enforcement. The overturning of Roe v. Wade calls this trust into question.

Read the full piece in The Hill.

Digital Documents as a Tool for Inclusion

Photo identification is necessary for modern life. However, more than 21 million Americans do not possess valid ID, and those without home addresses cannot register for state driver’s licenses. Without that physical license, a person can’t get a job, receive aid or health care, vote, or represent themselves in court. Luckily, IDs aren’t the only way to prove identity. Those born in the US have official paper trails through birth certificates and social security cards. To lose these documents and to obtain new copies require paying a fee or appearing in court. How can legislators ensure documents are accessible and protected? The City of Austin Innovation Office’s LifeFiles initiative offers a unique and scalable approach to inclusive documents.

LifeFiles distinguishes itself from global digital ID programs in its decentralized administration and accessibility. In its initial prototype funded by Bloomberg, LifeFiles sought to help people experiencing homelessness gain autonomy over identity documents by creating an official, digital repository of documents like birth certificates. Using a web application, the program was designed for all levels of tech literacy and access: First, by making it accessible from any computer and second, by offering multi-modal sign in methods, password, biometrics, social attestation, or a security question to unlock the documents. Initial testing enabled official free notarization of uploaded documents using blockchain so the digital repository could be used in government settings like applying for a driver’s license or for food and social welfare benefits.

LifeFiles is open source and never collects user data. It uses a combination of blockchain and encryption to secure user documents. Blockchain technology creates an encrypted hash to ensure secure notarization. Then, public-private key infrastructure shares documents, giving an identity verifier the ability to check the blockchain ledger to guarantee authenticity. Decentralized identifier technology (DID) allows these official documents to be accessed via web browser without having a record of identifying information saved in that browser. Technological alternatives to LifeFiles without DID are less secure.

Though piloted as an inclusion tool, digital documents are universally advantageous. User-controlled release of identifying data and encryption make LifeFiles secure and private. The system may also lessen the paperwork burden for individuals and governments through official, centralized, digital storage of essential documents. LifeFiles researchers concluded the program may eventually lower the costs of administering IDs.

The city of Austin’s Chief Innovation Officer, Daniel Culotta, suggests the program could function nationally. Without further grant funding, LifeFiles halted its testing of prototype documents, but the code is still publicly available for replication and scaling. If the government administers the program, onboarding is as simple as volunteer-led document uploading clinics.

This pilot has potential to be adopted by many states and localities. Currently there are 47 states including Washington DC where digital notarization is legal. Eventually, widespread adoption of digitized records will save money, and digital copies of birth certificates at the time of birth will prevent the loss of important records later on, all with users’ autonomy over their identities.

LifeFiles is an open-source response to the difficulties citizens face when they lose important documents. If states fully support this approach, it could aid more than 20 million Americans in controlling their identity and accessing services.

 

Digital Privacy in America: How does the ADPPA fit into global privacy legislation?

Earlier this month, a bipartisan group of representatives and senators released a discussion draft of a federal digital privacy bill: the American Data Privacy and Protection Act. It has now moved out of committee and, if passed, would create new legal rights for all Americans regarding the collection, access, and security of their personal data.

This is not the only consumer privacy bill considered by Congress, and there may be others. As written, this bill would align the United States with other nations, such as the European Union, that have thus far set global standards for digital privacy. Introduced in 2018, the European Union’s digital privacy law filled an important gap in regulating consumer privacy. Four years on, the data revealing how the law interacts with innovation and whether it succeeds in its goal of protecting consumers is still unclear. This should give US lawmakers pause to potentially explore more creative solutions for digital privacy.

The Progressive Policy Institute released a comparative report providing a general framework for analyzing privacy legislation across three separate but interrelated layers: legal access, security, and innovation.

Legal access defines what rights individuals have to see, access, update, and delete their data. Security describes the technical responsibilities for protecting collected data. And the third level, innovation, addresses how the laws interact with economic growth.

How does the new bill fit into these layers?

1. Legal Rights

If passed, the ADPPA would codify a set of data collection and access rights for all Americans who share data with private companies. It’s important to note that ADPPA does not apply to government collection or storing of personal data. As noted in PPI’s report analyzing countries’ privacy legislation, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom put some controls on government use of data, but China did not.

ADPPA requires firms that collect consumer data to gain clear “affirmative express consent.” Consent for data disclosure is firmly rooted in the European Union’s landmark data protection law, the General Data Protection Regulation. It is typically solicited via checkboxes on web pages, and the bill requires clear, plain language description of data collection needs. Specifically highlighted in the bill is the right for consumers to opt-out of targeted advertising and a prohibition of targeted advertising to children.

Once the data is collected, ADPPA states that individuals have the right to access, correct, delete, and transfer data about themselves, with private companies; China and the European Union provide similar access rights to citizens. How to exercise these rights must be clearly stated in easy-to-read privacy policies.

Overall, the bill provides very similar data rights as other countries. 

2. Security

Global privacy laws typically address security as a principle and design feature, the U.S. bill follows this trend. Without being overly prescriptive, as digital security is highly technical and evolving, it directs data collectors to implement a risk-based approach depending on the level of sensitivity of the data collected. High-risk data includes biometric or genetic information, passport or social security numbers, and private communications like text messages or email.

In line with other data privacy laws around the world, ADPPA requires large data collectors to appoint a data protection officer and to first conduct a data protection impact assessment, which is a plan for data security and risk.

Additional security and privacy measures recommend data minimization (an essential pillar of the GDPR), or restricting data collection to specific uses and deleting data after use. Data minimization is important because if data is not collected or not stored, it can’t be improperly used or exposed. (they direct not recommend, and i write measures and only add one additional measure. Is this bill simply a copy of the GDPR, does it try to be the same thing in the American context. How it relates to the ADPPA discussion.)

3. Innovation

It’s challenging to predict how a privacy law like ADPPA will impact digital innovation. Crucially, a federal privacy law will provide clear guidance for online companies that serve Americans across multiple states. In the current system, where states are passing digital privacy laws only for their residents, a federal law would ease compliance burdens on firms.

Similar to the GDPR, the bill exempts researchers, journalists, and small data holders except for those who derive 50%of their revenue from data sales. However, it does not clarify whether research conducted by big firms for platform improvements or marketing is exempt. The bill’s right to opt-out of targeted advertising and data transfers, which include data sales, may negatively impact certain industries like advertising and data brokers. Additionally, the bill recommends a study for a universal opt-out portal, which could be an innovation, but also could bankrupt the industries that rely on that data.

These provisions have broad implications for the data economy and should be evaluated carefully. Notably missing from the bill are recommendations for studies of other privacy-preserving technologies or security technologies. To assess the full impacts on innovation it requests an economic impact study five years after the enactment of the Act.

Conclusion

This draft bill is the newest of many privacy bills to be considered by Congress. Many of its provisions mirror the GDPR, as many global privacy laws do, with a major exception that this law does not apply to government data collection.

A key point of consideration for American legislators as they consider this bill is that it replicates many statutes from the GDPR. Enacted in 2018, we still don’t yet know the full impact of regulations like the GDPR on long-term digital innovation or whether its consumer protections are effective, but more information is coming out all the time. A new study from the University of Oxford in 2022 found that small business profits were most affected by the GDPR regulation. A National Bureau of Economic Research study found that the GDPR decreased the number of apps on the Google Play app store and depressed new entrants into the app market. As of the writing of this post, this author found no data detailing the state of data breaches since the introduction of the GDPR.

It’s undoubted that consumers deserve enhanced transparency and protection of their personal data online. If ADPPA passes, it would provide new data collection and protection rights for Americans which is an essential step toward digital privacy. But remember that the United States has a unique and strong innovation culture that is not necessarily well-reflected in the GDPR and other similar global privacy legislation. Those approaches shouldn’t be the only model being considered by lawmakers to enhance digital privacy. Congress has the opportunity to use existing research and data on alternative privacy-protecting technologies and ideas to set new global standards.

To prepare for the future of the digital economy, we need to increase chip manufacturing

Congress has the opportunity to increase chip manufacturing in the United States through the United States Innovation and Competition Act from the Senate, or the America Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing, Pre-Eminence in Technology and Economic Strength (COMPETES) Act from the House. Unfortunately, a stalemate over semi-unrelated trade provisions in the bill are preventing its passage, delaying $52 billion in funding provisioned to increase production in the United States. Continued stalemate is bad news for the future of the American economy.

Computer chips, or semiconductors, live in almost every electronic device we use on a daily basis. They’re needed for cars, cellphones, medical equipment, and national security. The growing thirst for chips came to a head in 2021 and 2022, when a national shortage drove up the prices of cars and other essential electronics.

The United States is the main designer of semiconductor chips with almost 50% of global sales, according to the Department of Commerce. But designing the chip is not the same as actually building it. Despite the dominance of U.S. design, only one U.S.-owned semiconductor foundry, or factory, exists in the United States, run by Infineon in Minnesota. Surprisingly, the U.S. lost its once supreme position in semiconductors by not investing in semiconductor “fabs,” leading it to only produce 11% of global semiconductors in 2019. Instead, Taiwan is the global leader in semiconductor manufacturing with two of the largest semiconductor foundries in the world, UMC and TSMC.

Moreover, the U.S. has fallen behind in two distinct ways. U.S. companies have fallen behind in the cutting-edge technologies that are used to make the “advanced” chips that power smartphones and game consoles. TSMC and Samsung are the only general-use chip manufacturers that can produce the most advanced chips.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has also not invested in the facilities that make the “mainstream” chips that power, among other systems, speedometers or car brakes. Chips for cars, while easier to manufacture, are cheaper and have a lower profit compared to smartphone and computer chips, which are the state-of-the-art versions that drive innovation in computing capabilities.

Chipmaking requires a lot of investment, resources, and research and development to keep up with the needs of computing. The global chip shortage demonstrated the challenges for digital societies in keeping up with demand; the European Union passed The European Chips Act in February 2022 in response to the shortage.

Congressional leaders have been negotiating to discuss differences in the Senate and House bills, which are extensive. Provisions around issues, such as the denial of “de minimis” tariff waivers on small packages from China, eased filing of anti-dumping lawsuits such as those recently targeting solar panel imports, digital trade negotiating goals, energy and research, space, green energy, and more are the subjects of disagreement. In contrast, only one major provision separates the two chambers on chips: PAYGO, with the House in support and the Senate against the budget provision.

In light of the importance of chips for everyday life and for future innovations, resolving the single disagreement over chips is both more pragmatic and necessary to increase American competitiveness and security in this sector.

Why Digital Privacy Is So Complicated

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The exact definition of digital privacy is complex, imperfectly aligned with typical understandings of privacy in an analog context. Historically, the vast majority of human actions and interactions existed beyond the scope of surveillance. Today, it’s nearly impossible to go about our daily lives without digital tools that facilitate modern life, but also collect data about individuals. When this growing flood of data is linked to an individual it is called “personal identifying information” (PII), the centerpiece of the debate over digital privacy.

The discussion of digital privacy is complicated precisely because it operates on three distinct but interrelated levels. First, privacy’s social and legal dimensions depend on whether individuals, corporations, or governments are assumed to hold primary rights to personal data collected about those individuals. In Europe, for example, the individual holds primary rights over their data, while in China, the state takes precedence.

The second level of the privacy discussion addresses data use and the technical protection and security of personal information to safeguard it from unwanted intrusion or theft while allowing individuals transparent access to their data. These complicated technical issues arise no matter privacy’s social and legal structure.

The third level of the privacy debate deals with the economics of PII. How does the chosen privacy model interact with innovation and growth? And how can it be assured that individuals get the appropriate benefits from their data?

This paper will lay out the privacy models of the United States, Europe, and China, with smaller sections on the United Kingdom, Canada, and India. For each area, we will discuss the social and legal structure, the technical design of security and transparency, and the economic implications of privacy and innovation. This paper sets out a framework for PPI’s ongoing privacy work. It lays the groundwork for future discussions of privacy legislation in the United States.

DOWNLOAD AND READ THE FULL REPORT

 

Mobile IDs would serve American consumers better

How can we move the humble state driver’s license or ID card into the 21st century? Today, U.S. state licenses are the principal consumer ID for day-to-day purposes. They certify identity and age using anti-counterfeiting features and are used to verify driving, or non-driving, privileges.

However, they have two major flaws. First, showing identification cards reveals all personal information to the identifier. If the ID is scanned, personal information is then stored with the scanner. Second, current state IDs are only usable in-person, despite the trend of moving public and private services online. Estimates suggest that in 2022, Americans will be spending 60% of their time online often giving away personal information for every new site or transaction.

However, some states are using existing and well-tested technology to make their state ID cards more useful and more private at the same time without compromising security: digital ID.

Digital IDs are authorized digital copies of a physical card that, using encryption and secure hardware, verify identity without sharing personal details. They bring identity verification from the physical sphere to the digital one, filling a security gap online by offering verifiable, and private, identification for public sector benefits and services but also private transactions. In addition, digital ID programs can facilitate greater children’s privacy, by requiring age verification to access certain websites.

On the rise globally, Estonia, Canada, Germany, India, the U.K., and the European Union, among others, already use or have announced digital ID programs.

In the United States, which has no national ID, Arizona and Louisiana adopted programs where residents can digitize their state ID cards. Since its launch in 2016, a million Louisianans use the digital ID accessible from the state’s ID app. Arizona’s digital ID launched in 2022 in partnership with Apple and Google, too, announced a new mobile wallet with digital ID features at Google I/O 2022. Their program, rather than using a state-specific app, allows users to add their mobile ID directly to their smartphone mobile wallet; if Arizona’s model is successful, other states may follow. 

Naturally, there is consumer skepticism that a digital system could be as secure, or more secure, than a physical card. Tying immutable identity characteristics to government databases requires high levels of trust, security, and privacy.

India’s digital ID program has been infamously insecure, exposing the biometrics and unique identity number a million residents. Kenya’s digital identity program was halted by the Kenyan High Court, which ruled that enrolling all citizens in a biometric ID database was illegal without clear documentation of data privacy risk assessment and mitigation strategies. The United States, too, lacks universal privacy protections for citizens.

The U.S. case is different from other digital ID systems as the country has no national ID — the Louisiana and Arizona digital ID pilot do not propose that. In addition, REAL IDs, which are the current gold standard in the U.S. for secure, physical ID cards, are not linked to citizen biometrics or immutable characteristics apart from a photo compatible with facial recognition scans. These features help keep physical ID cards secure. The Louisiana and Arizona mobile ID systems do not capture any additional data that is not already captured by the state Department of Motor Vehicles. In the Arizona case, the digital copy is stored in a smartphone using mobile wallet technology. Personal information is not shared with the phone or service provider.

The digital ID system being implemented by Arizona is based on the same technology that allows consumers to add credit cards to their digital wallets for wireless payments. They require the use of a pin or biometric authentication, and due to dynamic encryption, which assigns a unique, random number to every transaction, are more secure and private than a traditional card. If a phone is lost, it can be remotely wiped, and users will still be able to use their physical credit or ID card. Digital state IDs, using this design, could be used in any situation where identity verification is required but need not be revealed, like traffic stops, in bars, with the TSA, and even in online shopping or website sign-up, all while keeping user identity secure.

ID cards are essential tools to verify access to services. In their current form, they require giving away personal information without giving users a way to securely identify themselves in a crucial modern space: online. Mobile IDs bridge this gap and, with appropriate security and privacy measures, can serve consumers more effectively than standard ID cards alone.

 

How do mobile wallets work?