Jacoby for Washington Monthly: Germany’s Rearmament Is Stunning

The sign in the window of the German army’s storefront career center in downtown Berlin suggested it would be open all afternoon for inquiries about joining the armed forces, or Bundeswehr. But the doors were locked on a cold November day, with no lights on and no one inside. The same was true the next day when I tried again. “What kind of message does that send?” my friend, a former soldier who accompanied me, asked scornfully. “It’s like so much about the Bundeswehr these days—underfunded, undermanned, underequipped, and undervalued by the public, which still doesn’t really understand why Germany needs an army.”

Eighty years after the end of World War II, as Russia escalates attacks against Europe and the U.S. threatens to turn away from the transatlantic alliance, Germany is undergoing a historic shift. In 2022, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz called it a Zeitenwende—a “watershed moment”—and mandated a one-off infusion of €100 billion in defense spending, nearly doubling Germany’s previous annual allocation. The first thing his successor, Friedrich Merz, did after being elected last year was to amend the constitution’s “brake” on borrowing to pay for weapons and ammunition. Germany is now on track to spend €650 billion on the military over the next five years, more than doubling the amount disbursed in the previous five years.

Just days before I visited that closed army career center, Merz’s coalition government agreed to a new conscription law that could double the number of men ready to fight, growing the Bundeswehr from 180,000 to 260,000 soldiers and building the reserve force to 200,000. (Women aren’t required to comply with the new requirements but may volunteer.)

There is no longer any doubt that Germany is broadly committed to rearmament. A prospect that might once have provoked anxiety in Europe and North America is now broadly welcomed in the West. But that doesn’t make it easy for the German people, shaped by decades of post-World War II pacifism.

Read more in Washington Monthly. 

Trump Plays Warlord at America’s Expense

Now-former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was a brutal dictator whose dreadful politics and policies, largely inherited from his equally autocratic predecessor Hugo Chavez, ran his country into the ground. The U.S. military operation that captured Maduro once again demonstrated the tactical and operational proficiency of the American armed forces. But neither Maduro’s autocratic governance nor the audacity and skill of the U.S. military in executing assigned tasks are the primary issue at hand here: at the whim of one man and with no real explanation or apparent rationale, the United States has launched an unwise and illegitimate military intervention that only undermines American interests and international security. 

Here are five reasons why:

A clear and overt act of war. President Trump’s kidnapping of Maduro represents unprovoked aggression against a nation that has not declared war against the United States nor engaged in hostilities against it. Maduro and his regime may be corrupt, repressive, and possess relatively minor ties to international cocaine trafficking, but in no real sense could the United States be said to have been in armed conflict with Venezuela before last weekend’s raid. President George H.W. Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama, Operation Just Cause, does not offer a parallel: Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega declared a state of war existed between his nation and the United States five days before the invasion; the next day, an American serviceman was killed by Panamanian military personnel. 

In short, President Trump ordered the sort of aggressive action American statesmen have sought, however imperfectly, to banish from the conduct of international affairs since at least the days of Woodrow Wilson.

Illegitimate at home and abroad. Neither consulting nor seeking support from Congress at home or relevant nations and international organizations overseas, President Trump’s Venezuela raid lacks basic domestic and international legitimacy. 

  • Unlike President George W. Bush in Iraq in 2002, he has neither sought nor received authorization from Congress to use military force against Venezuela. 
  • Unlike President Barack Obama in Libya in 2011, he has not received authorization from the United Nations Security Council for military operations in Venezuela. 
  • Unlike President Bill Clinton in Kosovo in 1999, he does not have the support of a relevant regional organization (NATO, in the Kosovo case) for his intervention. 
  • And unlike President Obama’s intervention against ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2014, he does not have the support of Venezuela’s immediate neighbors for military operations against the Maduro regime — indeed, Trump already appears to be threatening similar interventions against neighboring Colombia and other nations in the Western Hemisphere. 

The lack of any sort of domestic or international authorization for Trump’s act of war against Venezuela isn’t just a matter of legality — though it is, of course, that as well. Neither Trump nor his administration have offered either the American public or the rest of the world much in the way of explanation or rationale for their use of force in Venezuela. (By contrast, the Bush administration spent months making a case for the invasion of Iraq to both the American people and the world.) Instead, they have displayed contempt for the principle of democracy at home and what the Declaration of Independence called “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind” abroad. 

Taking America to war on a personal whim. As with his other domestic and foreign policies — most notably tariffs — Trump has taken the United States to war on little more than his own personal whim, whittling the notion of “national security” down to meaninglessness in the process. He has, as noted, refused to make a clear or compelling case for this act of war against Venezuela to either the American people or the world, and has gone on to threaten the sovereignty of America’s ally, Denmark, and its longtime security partner, Colombia, as well as neighboring Mexico and Cuba. Trump clearly believes the U.S. military can be deployed anywhere at his own personal whim without providing any justification to anyone — he kept Congressional Democrats in the dark, for instance, about the Venezuela operation before agreeing to a briefing several days after the fact.

These are the actions and attitudes of an aspiring strongman with no respect for America’s republican principles, not a responsible political leader in a democracy. 

No plan for what’s next. The Trump administration has no apparent plan for what it aims to achieve in a post-Maduro Venezuela, making the Bush administration’s negligent post-war planning for Iraq in 2002 and 2003 look like a masterpiece of advanced preparation by comparison. Though the U.S. military had only snatched Maduro and left the “Chavista” regime that has ruled the country since 1999 largely intact, Trump proclaimed that the United States would now “run” Venezuela despite the fact that the Trump administration lacks a foreign policy apparatus beyond a few critical personnel like Secretary of State-slash-National Security Adviser Marco Rubio and peripatetic presidential special envoy Steve Witkoff. Trump himself dismissed Venezuelan opposition leader and Nobel laureate María Corina Machado as a potential Maduro successor because, according to anonymous White House officials, she accepted the Nobel Peace Prize that Trump imagines is his due.

The plan, such as it is, appears to be to threaten Venezuela’s new leadership with further military action if it does not give in to Trump’s unclear demands (which seem to include some sort of seizure of the nation’s considerable oil assets) — a gangster-style approach to foreign policy if there ever was one.

One giant leap toward a world where might makes right. Like Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, President Trump clearly believes the world can and should be carved up into spheres of influence to be ruthlessly dominated by great powers as they see fit, with supposedly lesser nations forced to bow to the whims of more powerful ones. His special military operation in Venezuela and subsequent threats to other Caribbean nations (to say nothing of American ally Denmark) reflect this belief — and stand in direct contradiction to the sort of world American leaders have sought to create, however fitfully, for at least the past century. As Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and their successors understood, the law of the jungle does not make for a stable, secure, or prosperous world. 

Indeed, in Ukraine alone, the United States and its European allies have spent hundreds of billions of dollars — and some 50,000 Ukrainians have given their lives — to defend the notion of national sovereignty and the right of nations to choose their own destiny that Trump has blatantly violated in Venezuela. In effect, then, President Trump has given a green light to similar great power aggression around the world, from Putin’s war against Ukraine to a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan and beyond.  

With his Venezuela raid, Trump has swung open the door to a world run on the principles of gangsterism — and America will come to regret it.

New PPI Analysis Examines Strengths and Shortcomings in 2026 Defense Authorization Bill

A new analysis from the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) finds that the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reflects growing bipartisan concern in Congress about the Trump administration’s defense posture. The legislation includes meaningful provisions to uphold U.S. commitments to allies, safeguard key weapons programs, and reinforce industrial capacity. Yet despite these efforts, the NDAA ultimately exposes the limits of congressional resistance to strategic retrenchment, with several guardrails weakened by loopholes and critical omissions that undermine America’s ability to meet current and future security challenges.

The analysis, “Inching in the Right Direction: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in the NDAA,” authored by Mary Guenther, Head of Space Policy; Tamar Jacoby, Director of the New Ukraine Project; Peter Juul, Director of National Security Policy, and Justin Littleford, Deputy Political Director, reflects that while the NDAA implements many provisions that protect America’s interests across the globe and in space, the recently passed legislation contains many policies that hinder U.S. strategic influence abroad.

“The NDAA is a small step in the right direction to buck the Trump Administration’s reckless, un-American national security policy,” said Juul. “But in too many places, Congress relies on paperwork and weak oversight instead of making the strong policy and funding decisions needed to rebuke Trump and keep America secure.”

Key findings from the analysis include:

  • A Mixed Record on Weapons Programs Funding: The legislation protects the E-7 Wedgetail program, increases funding for submarine construction, and expands multiyear munitions contracts. However, it cancels the Navy’s Constellation-class frigate, underfunds the F/A-XX fighter, and revives an unnecessary nuclear cruise missile program.
  • A Continued Agreement to Protect American Allies: The NDAA blocks troop withdrawals from Europe and South Korea, reinforces NATO commitments, restores funding for the Baltic Security Initiative and expands Indo-Pacific defense cooperation.
  • Ukraine Support Reduced to Symbolism: Despite strong language prohibiting U.S. recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Ukrainian territory and new safeguards to prevent the diversion of weapons meant for Kyiv, the NDAA sharply reduces military aid to Ukraine, so much so that it may allow Putin to win the conflict handily.
  • More Progress for Space Innovation, with Much More to Be Done: The legislation proposes restoring funding for commercial remote sensing and creates an acquisition career path within the Space Force. But it fails to reauthorize the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR/STTR) program, a critical omission that threatens early-stage defense and space innovation.
  • A Revamped But Faulty Pentagon: While the NDAA limits meddling with the military’s combatant command structure, creates a new position for international defense cooperation, and cuts unnecessary or burdensome regulations, it also allows for military equipment to be used in American deportation missions, an increased reliance on artificial intelligence,, and excludes our European allies from defense cooperation.

“The hulking legislation shows that Congress can use some of its powers to create a structured national security strategy for next year,” said Jacoby. “But it also highlights a troubling gap between intent and real-world outcomes, especially for Ukraine, where underfunding and half-measures fall far short of what the moment demands.”

Read and download the analysis here.

Founded in 1989, PPI is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Find an expert and learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org. Follow us @ppi.

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Media Contact: Ian OKeefe – iokeefe@ppionline.org

Inching in the Right Direction: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in the NDAA

Earlier this week, Congress passed the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) — one of the few pieces of regular legislation Congress manages to advance these days. Weighing in at 3,086 pages, this hulking legislation covers everything from the personnel strength of each of the armed services to the safety and security of America’s nuclear arsenal to environmental regulations at military bases and much else besides. 

It’s important to note that while this bill authorizes funding for the military — salaries for service members, money for weapons programs, and the like — it does not actually appropriate it. Instead, the NDAA sets defense policy priorities and parameters, as well as providing a sense of where Congress stands on important national security questions. And as one of the few regular legislative vehicles able to get through Congress these days, the NDAA also tends to accumulate amendments unrelated to defense or national security policy. 

As with any significantly detailed and dense piece of legislation, the NDAA contains its fair share of good, bad, and just plain ugly provisions and proposals — and the 2026 edition is no different. Whatever its weaknesses, however, this NDAA makes plain that Congress sees the world very differently than the Trump White House. 

Where the Trump administration’s recent National Security Strategy called for an effective withdrawal from Europe and the Pacific, abandoning American allies to the designs of Russia and China, the NDAA remains steadfast in America’s commitment to our allies in these parts of the world. It repeatedly calls out Russian aggression and argues for strengthening the NATO alliance as well as America’s alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other nations in the Pacific. It’s clear, moreover, that many members of Congress of both parties remain sympathetic to Ukraine and seek to draw redlines to prevent the Trump administration from imposing a false peace deal on Kyiv. 

At the same time, however, divisions in Congress remain sharp and limit its ability to make good on its intentions. Prohibitions against withdrawals from alliances come with mere reporting and certification requirements susceptible to abuse by bad-faith actors in the Trump administration, who could easily abuse them, while aid to Ukraine has become more symbolic than substantive and meaningful for a nation at war. Though less robust than it might be on these critical issues, the NDAA does nonetheless show a Congress at odds with the Trump administration on questions of foreign policy, defense, and national security.

It’s worth taking a closer look at what the NDAA says about America’s overall defense policy as well, from key weapons programs to space policy to efforts to rebuild the nation’s defense industry.

This policy memo covers the following areas of the NDAA:

  • Weapons programs
  • Allies and partners
  • Ukraine and Russia
  • Space
  • Defense industrial base
  • Policy odds and ends

Read full policy memo.

Somehow, Charles Lindbergh Returned

This article originally appeared on Peter Juul’s personal Substack, The Dive.

We’re well beyond the point where we ought to take documents like the Trump administration’s just-released National Security Strategy seriously, at least on a practical level. It’s hard to put much stock in such an embarrassingly sycophantic policy document, especially when the administration itself appears to be little more than a pack of scheming viziers to an increasingly nominal president who himself regularly struggles to stay awake during public appearances.

But it’s beside the point to engage with this document as if it’s a matter of policy, programs, or even strategy. It does no good to point out its incoherence and incontinence, much less ponder how what’s proposed in it might play out in the real world or how, if you stand on your head and squint and read it backwards, it might contain worthwhile ideas. The product of ideologues who fancy themselves world-historical thinkers but evince no real understanding of America or its place in a world permanently changed by revolutions in science, technology, and industry dating back a century and a half now, this national security strategy both betrays American interests overseas and perverts America’s traditional liberal values both at home and abroad.

In short, this national security strategy amounts to nothing less than a declaration of moral bankruptcy — a statement of immoral principle that stands in direct opposition to what America ought to stand for and represent in the world. (As always, it’s the self-styled super-patriot who hates his country the most.) It doesn’t tell us much that we don’t already know about Trump’s foreign policy, but the document does effectively distill the Trump administration’s ongoing renunciation of any real American responsibility for global affairs and international security.

Indeed, it’s a foreign policy that Charles Lindbergh would have loved: a not-quite-explicit tripartite carve-up of the globe with dictators in Europe and Asia, with America selling out its allies in those two parts of the world while building a garrison state in the Western Hemisphere to bully our own neighbors the same way Putin and Xi do theirs. Add dollops of insulting illiberalism, crude dollar diplomacy, and thinly veiled racism, and voila: you’ve reinvented the original America First platform.

In the end, this national security strategy is little more than a manifesto for global gangsterism — or perhaps the longest geopolitical suicide note in history.

Let’s look at some of the specifics: the Trump administration promises to abandon America’s allies in Europe while meddling in their own domestic politics. It parrots the Kremlin’s line on NATO, characterizing the alliance as “perpetually expanding,” while seeking “strategic stability” with Moscow — presumably at the expense of Ukraine and other erstwhile American allies. Combined with a purported 2027 deadline for NATO nations to assume primary responsibility for the alliance’s conventional defenses, a reported lack of communication with key alliance militaries like Germany, and Trump’s own eagerness to sell out Ukraine, the Trump administration seems to be setting the stage for an effective American withdrawal from the Atlantic alliance.

Worse, the Trump administration has made its intent to interfere in European politics on behalf of far-right political parties and, not incidentally, American tech oligarchs quite clear. It employs racist rhetoric to claim that the continent will be “unrecognizable in 20 years,” with certain states “majority non-European” and therefore somehow uncommitted to the NATO alliance. It goes on to assert that it must “regain its civilizational self-confidence,” primarily through the victory of illiberal far-right parties and politicians like Germany’s AfD party and Hungary’s Viktor Orban that the Trump administration views as “political allies” whose success it hopes to encourage.

Like Lindbergh and his original America First movement, this national security strategy focuses monomaniacally on the Western Hemisphere. It casts the challenges in this hemisphere—migration, narco-trafficking, and foreign (presumably Chinese) investment in critical industries — as all-important and all-consuming while tacitly dismissing traditional American strategic priorities in Europe and the Pacific as “peripheral or irrelevant to our own” interests. These priorities, the document heavily implies, were not the consequence of a careful consideration of American interests in a world transformed by science, technology, and industry, but rather the result of deceit by treacherous foreigners who have taken advantage of the United States to further their own interests at America’s expense.

Nor is it hard to see the crude, Putin-style sphere-of-influence logic behind the Trump team’s obsession with Latin America specifically and the Western Hemisphere more generally (at least beyond their obvious preoccupation with immigration). Given the language of this national security strategy, it’s difficult to avoid the conclusion that Trump — or, more precisely, his perpetually scheming advisers — would like the United States to do in Latin America what Vladimir Putin wants to do in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. We’ve already tasted the rancid fruit of this impulse with Trump’s killing spree in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, where American special operators blow small boats allegedly running drugs out of the water and, in the first instance at least, massacre the survivors.

China, for its part, is seen primarily as a commercial competitor and not a strategic problem or geopolitical challenger. That’s hardly surprising considering the general emptiness of hawkish Republican rhetoric on China, and this strategy sends yet another signal that Trump talks tough but has no appetite for confrontation with Beijing — a message reinforced by his deep-seated antipathy toward American allies like Japan and South Korea.

It all adds up to a morally bankrupt vision of a world carved up between real and would-be dictators to suit their own whims and fantasies, one supremely hostile to America’s long-standing interests as well as its traditional liberal values. Put another way, the Trump administration now seeks precisely the nightmarish world that American presidents have desperately sought to avoid for more than a century.

On the bright side, it’s unlikely this strategy will ever be fully implemented; national security strategies rarely guide any administration’s foreign policy so much as they reflect it. Moreover, the Trump administration has so hollowed out America’s foreign policy and national security apparatus — his team, such as it is, remains confined to a small clique when not farmed out to one of Trump’s former real estate pals—that it remains a mystery as to how they’d execute any strategy the administration might come up with. Secretary of State Marco Rubio continues to serve as acting national security adviser, for instance, presiding over a National Security Council largely denuded of anything resembling real bureaucratic or subject-matter expertise, while America’s military and intelligence agencies have suffered rolling political purges that will likely reduce their own effectiveness over time.

Trump’s attempt to impose gangster rule at home and abroad will eventually, inevitably fail — though it will inflict enormous damage on America and the world along the way. The danger inherent in this national security strategy lies less with the potential that it might be implemented than in the indecent principles upon which it is based and seeks to advance. It exposes the moral rot at the heart of the Trump administration and its foreign policy for all to see, presenting us with yet another manifestation of our wider crisis of national virtue and integrity.

In that respect, however, it may paradoxically prove salutary: this strategy should cause a rededication to the basic moral propositions that make America a worthwhile endeavor, an experiment in liberty and self-government that’s more fragile and endangered now than at any point since World War II. Do we stand for freedom, equality, and democracy in the world? Do we keep faith with ourselves and our friends?

Though he could be quite unsentimental in private conversations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt rightly understood that American foreign policy requires a moral sensibility — a spirit that guides it and makes clear that America stands for more than the prerogatives of raw power and the amoral pursuit of national self-aggrandizement offered actual and aspiring dictators as well as self-proclaimed “realists” throughout recent history. As Roosevelt himself explained, “order among Nations presupposes something enduring—some system of justice under which individuals, over a long period of time, are willing to live. Humanity will never permanently accept a system imposed by conquest and based on slavery.”

America may not be and may never have been the perfect embodiment of its professed liberal ideals of freedom and equality, but that’s both irrelevant and immaterial. But at its best, America has been the main champion of liberal values in a world where they have had few if any powerful defenders and many influential opponents, a standard to which the partisans of human liberty could repair when all else failed. In that regard, then, this national security strategy represents a deep and profound betrayal of America itself—one that must be repudiated in the clearest terms and replaced with a renewed moral vision that Roosevelt and his contemporaries would easily recognize.

There was an idea that was America, and it’s well past time to revive it.

Rebuilding the Arsenal of Democracy

America’s defense industry can no longer produce arms and ammunition at the required cost, scale, and speed. Despite some progress in reviving munitions production since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the American defense industry no longer resembles the famed arsenal of democracy that won World War II or the sprawling military-industrial complex that helped keep the peace during the Cold War.

To be sure, America’s defense industry makes some of the world’s finest and most advanced military hardware. But it’s expensive to develop and build that hardware, and since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon has too often spent enormous sums on gear that takes too long to field and cannot be bought in sufficient quantities — leaving the U.S. military with aging combat aircraft, warships, and other equipment that costs more and more to maintain over time. Some programs like the B-21 stealth bomber have come in below projected costs, but general problems with production speed, scale, and cost remain pervasive across the industry.

And in major armed conflicts like the war in Ukraine, strategy scholar Phillips Payson O’Brien reminds us, “The military equipment with which a country starts a war is normally eaten up in short order, and the war becomes a desperate test to make, repair and recreate military force.”

There’s no silver bullet to fix these issues — they’ve been decades in the making and will require concerted efforts to rectify. But these three core ideas can help guide efforts to make America’s defense industry the arsenal of democracy once again:

  • Send strong, consistent demand signals
  • Work with partners and allies — don’t alienate and antagonize them
  • Reform defense procurement regulations

Read the full policy memo.

Jacoby for The Bulwark: Ukraine Stands Firm

DONALD TRUMP HAS ASSUMED from the start of the war in Ukraine that Russia will win. “You have no cards,” the president told Volodymyr Zelensky when he ambushed the Ukrainian leader in the Oval Office in February, and he repeated the point recently on Air Force One. Asked why the latest U.S. peace proposal would give Russia a huge chunk of land it has been unable to win on the battlefield, Trump told a reporter, “Look, the way [the war is] going . . . it’s just moving in one direction. So eventually that’s land that over the next couple of months might be gotten by Russia anyway.”

Vladimir Putin rushed to underscore the point, boasting when Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, visited Moscow last week that Russian forces had captured the frontline city of Pokrovsk. Many Western observers parrot Putin’s claims about the contested rail hub in eastern Ukraine, arguing that the battle there is a major turning point, giving a Russia a “gateway” to the west and, before long, conquest of all Ukraine. In fact, it’s not clear that Russia has yet taken Pokrovsk—Kyiv maintains it’s still holding on. But even if the town falls in the coming weeks, it hardly means Ukraine is losing the war.

Read more in The Bulwark.

Hegseth Must Go

If recent news reports are accurate, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth likely issued an illegal order to give no quarter in the first of what are now many likely illegal strikes against alleged narcotics trafficking boats in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific. Already manifestly unfit and unqualified for the job, focused primarily on fighting culture wars and politicizing, and having previously endangered American military personnel by discussing sensitive operational details over an off-the-books group chat, Hegseth may now be guilty of war crimes if not outright murder. 

Congress must now embark on a thorough investigation of these strikes and Hegseth’s potentially criminal role in ordering them. Ultimate responsibility for these immoral and likely illegal military actions rests with President Donald Trump, but Hegseth bears significant responsibility of his own for following and executing Trump’s directives. As secretary of defense, however, Hegseth has the right and duty to refuse manifestly illegal orders from the president — but he has chosen to follow them instead.

Indeed, Trump likely nominated Hegseth as secretary of defense in part because, like Trump, he possesses few if any qualms about ordering the American military to act in direct contravention of the laws of war. As a Fox News television personality during the first Trump term, for instance, Hegseth successfully lobbied President Trump to pardon Eddie Gallagher, a former Navy SEAL accused of war crimes by his fellow SEALs, and defended others charged with or alleged to have ordered similar crimes. His partisan polemics, moreover, seep with barely-concealed contempt for the laws and rules of war. In Hegseth’s telling, America fails to win wars because the U.S. military cannot act like its enemies and commit obvious war crimes with abandon — a morally reprehensible stance that drags America down and damages our standing in the world.

Hegseth also summoned the military’s highest-ranking officers back to the United States in September for a lecture that included, among other things, a promise that the military would no longer have to follow “stupid rules of engagement.” He also reportedly forced Adm. Alvin Holsey, head of U.S. Southern Command, to resign less than a year into his three-year appointment after Holsey expressed doubts about the legality of the Trump administration’s boat strikes — doubts buttressed by the command’s senior military lawyer, whose view that such strikes were illegal was overruled by the Trump administration’s lawyers. 

In a blatant attempt to intimidate critics, moreover, Hegseth has absurdly threatened Senator Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) — a retired Navy pilot and astronaut who flew 39 combat missions during the 1991 Gulf War and piloted four space shuttle missions from 2001 to 2011 — with a court-martial for recording a video with other Congressional Democrats that reminded American servicemembers of their right to refuse illegal orders. Hegseth has acted beneath the dignity of his office in other ways, such as active trolling on social media and provoking a Canadian children’s book publisher to condemn him for using one of their characters in a juvenile AI-generated meme.

Hegseth has proven beyond any reasonable doubt that he has no business holding his present office. In a normal political universe, he would never have been nominated as secretary of defense in the first place. But we live in abnormal times, and President Trump wants Hegseth as his secretary of defense because of their shared disdain for the laws of war and the notion of basic human dignity during armed conflict. Given its general subservience to Trump, this Congress will almost certainly not impeach and remove Hegseth — no matter how much he deserves to be dismissed from office. 

Assuming he remains Secretary of Defense and Democrats retake one or both houses of Congress in next year’s mid-term election, Hegseth’s impeachment and removal from office should be one of a new Democratic majority’s first orders of business. If successful, Hegseth’s impeachment and removal from office will be only the start of accountability for the Trump administration’s lawless and immoral war in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific — but a start must be made.

Jacoby in Joan Esposito Live Local & Progressive: An Update on Ukraine

 

Tamar Jacoby, contributor to Washington Monthly (https://washingtonmonthly.com/author/…)  and the Kyiv-based director of the Progressive Policy Institute’s New Ukraine Project (https://www.progressivepolicy.org/pro…)  and the author of “Displaced: The Ukrainian Refugee Experience.” Her latest article for Washington Monthly is “ Three Lessons From Trump’s Latest Plan for Ukraine (https://washingtonmonthly.com/2025/11…) .”

Jacoby on Background Briefing with Ian Masters: What Impact Will the Resignation of Ukraine’s Negotiator Yermak Have on Peace Talks?

We assess the multiple and confusing Trump teams of negotiators trying to make a deal Putin clearly has no interest in peace with Ukraine unless he gets all of his maximalist demands. We also examine the impact of Zelensky’s right hand man Yermak’s resignation under a cloud of corruption accusations. Joining us for Kyiv is Tamar Jacoby, the Kyiv-based director of the Progressive Policy Institute’s New Ukraine Project. She was a senior writer and justice editor at Newsweek and, before that, the deputy editor of the New York Times op-ed page. Now a regular contributor to Forbes.com, she is the author of Displaced: The Ukrainian Refugee Experience and has an article at The Washington Monthly, “Three Lessons From Trump’s Latest Plan for Ukraine: Whatever emerges from U.S.-Ukrainian talks in Geneva, nothing good is likely to come from this recipe for appeasing Moscow.

 

Background Briefing with Ian Masters · What Impact Will the Resignation of Ukraine’s Negotiator Yermak Have on Peace Talks?

Jacoby for Washington Monthly: Three Lessons From Trump’s Latest Plan for Ukraine

The world appears to have dodged a bullet. Donald Trump and team are walking back from their latest and most outlandish proposal for peace in Ukraine. American and Ukrainian negotiators meeting in Geneva are working to revise the plan, and U.S. and European officials have agreed to meet separately to discuss its implications for NATO and the European Union. The outcome of these talks is unknown, and it’s hard to imagine a deal that will satisfy all parties—the Russian, Ukrainian, and European positions remain starkly at odds. But whatever the result, some things are already clear—including three lessons for the U.S. and Europe.

Kyiv and its European allies have long feared that Trump would betray Ukraine by using U.S. leverage to impose an unfair, unrealistic peace settlement modeled on a real estate deal—splitting the difference between two sides, in this case, a rapacious aggressor and its much smaller neighbor struggling to defend itself. In fact, the 28-point peace plan leaked last week was far worse than that. It didn’t even pretend to split the difference. With a few minor exceptions, Moscow got everything it wanted, and Ukraine got nothing. The deal rewarded the aggressor and pummeled the victim, strengthening a voracious Russia while enriching the U.S.

But Washington wasn’t just betraying Ukraine—the proposed deal would also be disastrous for Europe. With Ukraine sidelined—its large, experienced army and cutting-edge weapons neutered—nothing would stand between Europe and Russia, now armed to the teeth, invigorated by four years of war, and openly hungry to reclaim more of what it considers its historic sphere of influence.

Read more in Washington Monthly. 

Ainsley in the IPS Journal: ‘The working class hasn’t gone anywhere — it’s just transformed’

When Labour won in July 2024, there was a fair amount of goodwill toward the new government. However, there was also scepticism about what the government could deliver. People were worried about the state the Conservatives had left the country in. There were also questions about what Labour really meant by ‘change’, its campaign slogan.

After a fairly sure-footed start, especially on foreign policy, the government made several missteps that cost it dearly. The most significant was the decision to cut the winter fuel allowance, not just for wealthier pensioners, which would have been justifiable, but for middle-income pensioners as well. Labour did this to reassure the markets ahead of its first major budget, to show it could be trusted with public finances. But the move unsettled people and raised doubts about what Labour actually stood for.

At the same time, Labour kept blaming the Conservatives without giving a clear destination of what they were going to do. Confidence fell among businesses and voters alike. When the budget eventually came, it included a substantial increase to employers’ National Insurance contributions. Businesses felt this cut against everything Labour had promised about growth and wealth creation.

Since then, we’ve seen a disappointing economic performance. On top of that, you had the ‘freebies’ scandal: It’s quite normal for MPs to be given tickets to events or dinners or things like that, but they’re required to declare it. When this all came out, the public was quite taken aback. Labour failed to get a grip on that quickly. In opposition, they had successfully repositioned the party as fighting for ordinary working people. In government, their decisions and handling of these issues made it feel like they’d lost sight of that.

Read more in the LPS Journal. 

Lewis for The Diplomatic Courier: Is the International Treaty System Fit for Purpose?

In an era of global crises, multilateralism remains the cornerstone of international cooperation. Treaties are often seen as its highest expression—from public health to narcotics to climate change—designed to harmonize policy, set minimum standards, and catalyze collective action.

Yet today’s multipolar world has exposed the treaty system’s fragility. It’s not only the geopolitical shocks—Trump’s foreign policy reset, Russia’s aggression, or a weakened United Nations—but also deep structural flaws that have long been ignored: a lack of transparency, rigid frameworks resistant to innovation, weak enforcement, and growing hostility toward the private sector.

These challenges call for reflection. Without a more agile, inclusive framework grounded in pragmatism, collaboration, and shared responsibility, the international treaty system risks slipping into irrelevance.

Keep reading in The Diplomatic Courier.

Jacoby on Background Briefing with Ian Masters: A Report From Kyiv on Whether Europe’s Tough Talk on Russia Will Translate Into Action

Background Briefing with Ian Masters · A Report From Kyiv on Whether Europe’s Tough Talk on Russia Will Translate Into Action

Finally, we speak with Tamar Jacoby, the Kyiv-based director of the Progressive Policy Institute’s New Ukraine Project. She was a senior writer and justice editor at Newsweek and, before that, the deputy editor of the New York Times op-ed page. Now a regular contributor to Forbes, she is the author of Displaced: The Ukrainian Refugee Experience and we discuss her article at The Washington Monthly, “Can Europe Turn Tough Talk on Russia into Action?”

Jacoby for Washington Monthly: Can Europe Turn Tough Talk on Russia into Action?

The war in Ukraine has transformed Western European thinking about defending itself against its giant neighbor, Russia. The latest push, proposed last week by the European Union, is a blueprint for a better coordinated military buildup—procuring and manufacturing weapons together rather than separately, country by country. It’s an ambitious plan, in line with other pending continent-wide reforms—deregulation and a single capital market—and like them, it promises increased efficiency and scale in pursuit of shared European goals. What’s unclear is whether the 27 EU members and their allies, including Britain, can put aside national interests for the common good. The stakes could hardly be higher, but the evidence is mixed.

Much has changed in Europe since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, with countries across the continent talking a much different game than four years ago. After decades of hoping for good relations with Moscow, most leaders now see their eastern neighbor as an aggressive, revanchist power, preparing potentially for a hot war and already menacing nearby nations with an array of gray-zone weapons—from disinformation and cyberattacks to sabotage of critical infrastructure. Uncertain if an increasingly fickle and isolationist U.S. will stand by them, many Europeans recognize they must prepare to face the enemy alone, and defense is now Topic A in political circles.

Many countries are actively preparing. National defense budgets have increased dramatically—from €218 billion in 2021 to a projected €392 billion in 2025. A generation of innovative startups is competing with seasoned contractors to develop cutting-edge weapons. The most concerned capitals are discussing mandatory conscription, and some have mounted national programs to teach civilian defense.

Still, for all this progress, many across the continent, concerned about the pace of change, wonder if Europe will succeed in translating its bold talk into action.

Read more in Washington Monthly.