On the surface, Bahrain’s invitation to Saudi forces is really bad. A small but all-powerful ruling class is fearful that internal calls for democracy could reach the undesirable fervor of the masses’ brethren in Tunisia, Egypt, and in the extreme, Libya. When you dig deeper, it’s even worse: sidelined by 30 years of bankrupt policy in the Middle East, America’s relative ambiguity is providing a unique opportunity for Iran to — however absurdly — identify with its oppressed Shi’ite cousins across the Gulf.

In an effort to snuff out the Libyan option amid ever more vehement protest, the Bahraini monarchy has tried to forge an awkward policy. In near-perfect English, Bahraini crowned prince Saman Bin Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa sought to appease at least the Western governments watching him:

We know that a significant portion of the electoral base feels that their voice is unheard. And they want the respect due to them by — to be given to them by the opposition. They want to sit with them and talk to them. So, you know, at the end of the day, we’re all going to have to live in the same country together. And we’re all going to have to talk to each other.

… while calling in the Saudi military in a desperate and potentially disastrous attempt at crowd control.

Stuck in the middle is the U.S., ally to both kingdoms and free democratic expression. It’s telling, for example, that Washington’s call for “restraint on all sides” was delivered neither from the presidential bully pulpit or Foggy Bottom, but from a lowly National Security Council spokesman. America’s relative inaction is due more to thirty years of bankrupt policy across multiple presidential administrations; while that may provide the White House a plausible excuse, there are still consequences.

Shi’ite Iran is filling the void left by a handcuffed and silenced United States. It’s a shameless and disingenuous target of opportunity, but could be ultimately effective: as the pro-democracy Shi’ite majority in Bahrain look abroad for apparently reform-minded backers, they see Tehran, not Washington, unambiguously standing with them.

It’s downright scandalous that this statement came from Iran’s Foreign Ministry and not the U.S. State Department:

The presence of foreign forces and interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs is unacceptable and will further complicate the issue… People have some legitimate demands and they are expressing them peacefully. It should not be responded to violently … and we expect their demands be fulfilled through correct means.

But it did. The Iranian government’s hypocrisy could not be more blatant — a scam 2009 election returned Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to power but brought the masses into the streets for weeks of protests. Dissent was ultimately crushed by the same repressive spirit fueling Bahrain’s rulers, a sentiment wistfully cast aside when the opportunism beckons.

The only question in my mind is whether Bahrainis see through Tehran’s lies or grasp on to any semblance of international support they can muster. The White House should speak up — and act — before they have to choose.

One of the many tragedies of the Iraq War was that the Bush administration presented it as a humanitarian venture when in fact not a single established humanitarian organization supported the intervention. The International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, for instance, both argued that the War could not been as a humanitarian venture.

Again we are seeing calls for some sort of humanitarian intervention, in Libya this time. From my former colleague Job Henning to columnist Charles Krauthammer, the U.S. is being called upon to arm the rebels, establish a no-fly zone, or something in between.

Since the humanitarian argument was used so cynically in Iraq in 2003, it’s worth checking in with what the humanitarian groups are actually saying this time around. The results are not what one might think.

Let’s start with the most aggressive: The Genocide Intervention Network has been the lead group calling for the “[e]stablishment of a no-fly zone by willing countries, with the express aim of preventing continued operation of Libyan military aircraft if attacks against civilians continue.” GIN’s position might seem counterintuitive given that nobody claims genocide is taking place in Libya, but the organization’s goal is to stop genocides before they begin. Once the genocide begins, time is already lost.

Only slightly less interventionist is the International Crisis Group. Notably, it says that “forceful measures” – sanctioned by the UN Security Council and the Arab League and African Union—might become necessary to stop the “full-blown civil war.” The ICG’s position is very different from its position on Iraq, when the organization’s president said in March 2003 that the situation in Iraq did not merit an invasion. Still, the ICG thinks “nothing should be allowed to preempt or preclude the urgent search for a political solution” in Libya. At this time, “Western calls for military intervention of one kind or another are perilous and potentially counter-productive.”

And yet, it is significant that ICG’s former president Gareth Evans—who was president in 2003—wrote in the Financial Times that with regards to Libya “it is the responsibility of the international community to provide [basic security], if necessary–should peaceful means be inadequate–by taking timely and decisive collective action through the United Nations Security Council.” ICG’s relative hawkishness on the issue is important, both because it is highly respected and rarely insistent on military solutions. The left-wing Nation magazine has been surprised and troubled by the International Crisis Group’s positions, for instance.

Now to the firmly anti-US-intervention organizations: Amnesty International welcomed news reports in late February of the African Union’s plans to send a mission to Libya. No mention has been made of NATO, UN, or US no-fly zones, however. For its part, Human Rights Watch has called for the regime in Libya to allow relief aid in and refugees out (good luck with that!), but has conspicuously avoided advocating outside military intervention. Unlike other NGOs, HRW does take positions on wars, and so its silence essentially means it is stalwartly against military action.

The latest news is that aid groups are having trouble delivering supplies inside Libya, unsurprisingly. Perhaps if that keeps up, more humanitarian NGOs will call for intervention inside that country. Until then, the scorecard shows mixed enthusiasm for military action among the actual humanitarians.

Ouch. Sorry about the pun in the title.

But it happens to be true. Little noticed was a potentially significant piece of news, as a representative of the Arab League told French Foreign Minister Alan Juppe that the League would, in fact, support a no-fly zone over Libya. On the surface, it seems a big deal: autocrats across the Middle East and North Africa are standing on the side of oppressed peoples in the face of their murderous leader.

In the search for international legitimacy, securing the Arab League’s endorsement, not to mention ones from the Organization of Islamic Conference and Gulf Cooperation Council, should go some distance, even if those organizations essentially draw on membership from the same states.

Then you ask yourself: Whoa. So WHY are Middle East leaders now standing with the masses? Strongmen throughout the region continue to resist protesters’ wishes, so why side with them on this?

Certainly, one reason is that Qaddafi definitively crossed a line into war. Strongmen the region over may be interested in maintaining a tight grip on power, but the protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Libya may have concretized the lengths to which the region’s unelected leaders are willing to go. The Mubaraks of the region will muffle press, stifle political organizations, restrict Western-sponsored NGOs, and arrest and beat their opponents, but as we’ve clearly seen from Tunis to Cairo, they are not willing to descend their countries into war to hold on to power.

The B-side could be more calculated. Are regional leaders looking to use their “solidarity” with the masses as a mechanism to defuse their own domestic opposition? Did they really have a choice? And what’s the benefit of opposing one anyway?

The next questions become increasingly uncomfortable: Now that there is a sense of Arab legitimacy behind a no-fly zone, what’s next?

First up is the question of whether it is the proper remedy for the cure. My colleague Will Marshall argued last week that a no-fly zone “would entail high political costs while yielding uncertain military returns.” And while Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings believed a no-fly zone was “eminently doable”, it “might not accomplish its goals of fending off Qadhafi’s brutes and foreign mercenaries, since their major weapons do not appear to be airplanes.”

Since those writings, there are mixed reports on the extent of pro-Qadhafi air raids. Report after report detail that he’s using them more extensively near the oil terminal at Ras Lanouf. Though Ivo Daalder, the American ambassador to NATO said there’s been a fall in air activity in recentdays, reiterating questions about a zone’s usefulness. Watch this space.

Britain and France are working to prepare a UN Security Council Resolution, and NATO will begin considering one on Thursday.  Both entities say that they are considering the no-fly zone as a contingency should the situation warrant it, and British Foreign Minister William Hague has insisted that there be a “clear, legal basis”, implying the value of an explicit UN resolution.  That continues to be a difficult proposition given resistance from the likes of China and Russia, but there is a glimmer of hope — China has left open the possibility of undefined “action beyond sanctions.”

Where does that leave us? More evaluation, essentially. If a no-fly zone proves to be an effective tool that advances the rebels’ cause, it remains critical that the United Nations grant it a mandate. It would most likely be conducted by NATO, but it would be helpful if at least one Arab nation participated to avoid giving it too much of a Western imprimatur.

As an unregenerate liberal interventionist, I believe America should aid Libyan rebels fighting to rid their country of Muammar Qaddafi.  But for all the attention a no fly zone has received, there are better ways to even the odds in this so far unequal contest.

The impulse to “do something” as Qaddafi’s planes and foreign mercenaries attack rebel-held towns is understandable. But at this point, imposing a no fly zone would entail high political costs while yielding uncertain military returns.

A key question, of course, is who would impose it? Given the likely opposition of Russia and China, the U.S. Security Council won’t authorize a no fly zone. Europe, as usual, is brimming with moral outrage but can’t muster the consensus to hand the job to NATO.

U.S. military authorities are scarcely enthusiastic. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned Congress this week that imposing a no fly zone is a lot harder than it sounds. For one thing, it’s basically an act of war that requires that U.S. forces first attack and destroy Libya’s extensive air defense systems. For another, it would mean shifting aircraft and surveillance assets from the war in Afghanistan to the Mediterranean.

What really spooks U.S. officials is the spectacle of America, already engaged in two Middle East conflicts, launching yet another military attack on an Arab country. That could instantly change the Libyan narrative, shifting the world’s focus from ordinary Libyans’ valiant struggle for freedom to U.S. actions and motives. It could rekindle suspicions in the region that the United States is bent on imposing democracy on Muslim nations, undoing the Obama administration’s painstaking efforts to refurbish America’s image in the Middle East. In the worst case scenario, it could draw in jihadists and regional provocateurs hoping to lure the United States in a grinding and prolonged civil conflict.

Above all, Washington should avoid any step that might break the momentum of the popular upheavals now erupting across the Arab world. These bottom-up revolts hold out the best hope for democratic change that the people of the Middle East can believe in.

The best outcome for all concerned, of course, would be for the Libyan rebels to topple Qaddafi by themselves, with little or no outside help. That may not be in the cards.

The rebels, a mixture of lightly armed but highly motivated civilians and military defectors, so far seem to have stood up well to Qaddafi’s professional security forces and mercenaries. Take that assessment with a grain of salt, however, as this piece in the Guardian argues that much of the international narrative may be skewed by rebel sources. While the regime has lost control of eastern Libya, few observers believe that rebel forces can crack Qaddafi’s redoubt in Tripoli and the west, where he also enjoys support from his tribe.

A military stalemate thus may be the likeliest scenario. Since the real fighting is on the ground, a no fly zone might not have much impact. Says Jeffrey White, a military analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies:

Most of the attention so far has been on establishing no-fly zones, but these may be inadequate to deal with Qadhafi’s remaining forces. The regime’s key instruments are ground units, so no-drive zones or airstrikes would likely be needed to truly curtail its ability to move against the opposition.

So what should the United States and other leading powers do now? One answer is to intensify international and regional diplomacy aimed at isolating Qaddafi and his henchmen. Another is to get food and medical supplies to Libyan rebels and refugees. It’s also imperative to get a more accurate assessment of what’s really going on in Libya.

If the tide of battle shifts decisively in Qaddafi’s favor, the United States should be willing to provide the rebels with arms and intelligence. It is true that they are a disparate lot, that we know little about their aims once Qaddafi is gone (they may not know either), and that their ranks probably include Islamist groups.

Nonetheless, the rebels are determined to overthrow Qaddafi, which puts them clearly on the side of greater freedom and positive political change in Libya. And for now, that should be enough to merit America’s support.

The Middle East is a political outlier, the world’s least hospitable place for liberal democracy. But as popular demands for freedom spread virally across the region, they are illuminating a varied political landscape, not just monolithic tyranny.

Think of it as a continuum of despotism. On the “soft” end are Tunisia and Egypt, where longtime strongmen were ousted with surprising ease. Mostly nonviolent popular protests were sufficient to shove them into involuntary retirement.

On the “hard” end is Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi. Unlike Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the self-anointed “Brother Leader” has shown no compunction about massacring his own people to hold onto power. While rebels are fighting back valiantly, it could take a hard shove from the outside world to topple hardcore tyrants like Qaddafi.

In any case, the popular uprisings are sorting out where the region’s countries fall along the autocratic continuum. It’s also shedding light on the conditions that make some countries more receptive to political change than others.

A month ago, there didn’t seem to be anything particularly “soft” about Mubarak and Ben Ali. They were essentially dictators who ruled by decree, clamped down hard on political opponents, routinely violated basic human rights, including torturing prisoners, and tolerated pervasive corruption and cronyism.

Yet, to invoke Jeanne Kirpatrick’s famous Cold War-era dichotomy, they were authoritarians rather than totalitarians. They depended on the tacit support of respected national institutions like the army, as well as governing and economic elites who preferred “stability” to the hazards of open political competition. When the uprisings made it clear that the heretofore voiceless masses had turned against the rulers, that support quickly evaporated and they had little choice but to step down.

In contrast, the megalomaniacal Qaddafi has ruled absolutely for 42 years. Rather than use Libya’s oil and gas wealth to develop and modernize the country’s economy, he funneled much of it into overseas intrigues, including several vicious civil conflicts in Africa. Libya remains a highly tribal society where national institutions (including the army), private markets and civil society – key building blocks for democracy – are weak.

In general, America’s friends and allies in the Middle East are mostly grouped toward the soft end of the despotic continuum, while our adversaries congregate at the hard end. This should surprise no one except for foreign policy “realists,” who reject the idea that the internal political structures of countries have any effect on their conduct abroad. Yet it can hardly be a coincidence that the least open societies and most illiberal regimes in the region – Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq before 2003 – are the most likely to foment terrorism, chase after nuclear weapons, reject Israel’s existence, and brutally oppress their own people.

That Syria hasn’t seen much unrest is surely related to the fact that it’s a thoroughly nasty police state run by hereditary dictator Bashar al-Assad, whose father, Hafez al-Assad, leveled the rebellious city of Hama in 1982, at the cost of over 17,000 lives. Iran’s Green Movement has managed a few small protests in solidarity with the Arab revolt, but has been mostly kept under wraps by the Islamic Republic’s thuggish security organs.

With the exception of Bahrain, the region’s monarchies also have dodged the revolutionary bullet – so far. Arab kings evidently enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy and popular acceptance than secular strongmen. King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Mohammed V of Morocco have proven adept at creating at least a façade of parliamentary rule and at displacing popular anger onto governments they can dismiss from time to time to appease public wrath. Nonetheless, Washington should nudge such “liberal autocracies” to go beyond cosmetic reforms, lest they be engulfed by the rising revolutionary tide.

The country that really has U.S. policy-makers holding their breath, of course, is Saudi Arabia. It falls somewhere in the middle of the autocratic continuum. On the one hand, they’ve been U.S. allies since FDR’s day, sit atop oil reserves vital to America’s auto-centric culture and share our interest in destroying al Qaeda. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is a run by a deeply illiberal monarchy that enforces Sharia law, uses its oil wealth to export Wahabbist fundamentalism, and relegates women to second-class status. The appearance of a serious pro-democracy movement there would force Americans to face these contradictions and rethink our close ties with the ruling family.

The Middle East’s variegated political landscape offers grounds for measured hope about prospects for liberal democracy. Political and economic freedom will likely advance fitfully and partially in some places, hardly at all in others. There will be slippage and backsliding. But there’s a striking opportunity for the United States to nudge its friends and allies further toward the “soft” end of the despotic continuum, and eventually off it altogether.

While a revolutionary wave in the Middle East has captivated most of our attention recently, the Korean peninsula remains volatile. In recent months, North Korea has launched two unprovoked attacks, and questions remain about the best way to diffuse the tension, especially with China acting as an enabler.

Yesterday, the Progressive Policy Institute, in conjunction with the University of California Washington Center, held a panel discussion on “Defusing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: What America—and China—Should Do.”

The event featured: The Honorable Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Scott Snyder, Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation; Karin Lee, Executive Director, The National Committee on North Korea; and Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Mansfield Foundation. PPI’s Jim Arkedis moderated.

Sec. Campbell’s remarks were off the record (so I can’t report on them), but a lively discussion followed.

Flake kicked off the conversation with a blunt assessment of the obstacles of getting back to the negotiating table, arguing it’s hard to start a discussion when North Korea is beginning from such a bellicose stance.

“The fundamental problem is that if we want to get back to the negotiating track, we can’t enter formal negotiations as long as North Korea continues to assert that it’s a nuclear power and wants to be recognized as a nuclear power,” said Flake. “The question is: how do you get North Korea to change its mind and its position?”

Flake went on to argue that China had to play a major role. But while China and the U.S. used to have a good working relationship, that’s fallen off lately. Flake tried to see things from China’s perspective: “In my mind, China has always had three lousy options: no war, no collapse, and no nukes…In the last year and a half, there’s been a shift. China prioritized no collapse over no war and no nukes, and China came to the position that to do that they were going to back North Korea more openly.”

Flake criticized China for enabling North Korea by “shielding North Korea from the consequences of its actions.” He accused China of blocking investigations, ignoring information, and simply not raising issues.

Karin Lee followed by saying that in light of recent developments, she was almost nostalgic for the six-party talks. “At least the six-party talks put us in a position where China was invested in getting North Korea to do something as opposed to not to do something, and China was much better at getting North Korea to do things that not to do things”

Snyder worried that the U.S. was being torn between working with its traditional allies of Japan and South Korea and working with the more prickly but increasingly important China.

“The issue that is particularly challenging is do people perceive the U.S. as looking at North Korea through the lens of South Korea or through the lens of china,” said Snyder. South Korea is very nervous as to what happens. But the challenge is that we have to manage the tensions and interact with China, and in contrast to the situation in the past where U.S. hegemony guaranteed security, this puts tensions on the management of alliances.”

Snyder also noted that the fact that Chinese president Hu is at the end of his regime also poses some challenges.

But should the U.S. resume talks, as Sen. Kerry recently suggested?

“One trope the administration puts out is that they don’t want to reward them with talks,” said Lee. “But talks are not a reward. Talks are diplomacy.”

Flake, however, argued that until North Korea reiterates the commitment to de-nuclearization agreed on in during the last round of six-party talks, there’s no point. “We want to see some indication of serious intent and purpose,” he said. “That would at least open the groundwork.”

Snyder put it more colorfully: “In response to Obama’s invitation to engage with countries that unclenched their fist, North Koreans gave us the finger. So there should be low expectations”

On whether the Chinese can change their tune on being a little tougher on North Korea, Snyder offered some hope. “The Chinese would like to see North Korea follow in their model, but the Chinese are tired of leading the horse to water. They’re trying to make it drink. So we might be able to engage on how do we extend economic governance.”

Lee agreed: “We should say, you’re trying to get the horse to drink, and it’s not working, so how can we work with you to get the horse to drink?”

Certainly, it won’t be easy. And Snyder ended the panel on a pessimistic note: “The key issue is that North Korea has defined itself as a guerrilla state outside the international system.”

A rift seems to have opened between the Obama administration and Sen. John Kerry (D-MA), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the ever-sensitive topic of North Korea. Sen. Kerry convened a hearing today on the subject, and previewed his own views in a press statement released this morning:

[T]he best option is to consult closely with South Korea and launch bilateral talks with North Korea when we decide the time is appropriate. Fruitful talks between the U.S. and North Korea can lay the groundwork for resumption of the Six Party Talks. Right now, we simply cannot afford to cede the initiative to North Korea and China because neither country’s interests fully coincide with ours.

Let me be clear: We must get beyond the political talking point that engaging North Korea is somehow “rewarding bad behavior.” It is not. [bold mine]

This differs from what Kurt Campbell, President Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, had to say on the issue as he spoke during Sen. Kerry’s hearing:

The United States remains committed to meaningful dialogue, but we will not reward North Korea for shattering the peace or defying the international community. If North Korea improves relations with South Korea and demonstrates a change in behavior … the United States will stand ready to move toward normalization of our relationship. However, if it maintains its path of defiance and provocative behavior and fails to comply with its obligations and commitments, it stands no chance of becoming a strong and prosperous nation. [again, bold is mine]

Kerry seems ready to tango, Obama isn’t. Which is it? I could write a diatribe with my own analysis and recommendations, or I could take the easy way out and suggest you attend PPI’s event on North Korea tomorrow. We’ll have Assistant Secretary Campbell and a panel of experts there to answer your questions and see just where the US — and China — should do to defuse tensions on the peninsula. Click here to register. Details below.

Defusing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula:

What America—and China—Should Do

Keynote Address:

The Honorable Kurt Campbell

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Featured Panelists:

Scott Snyder, Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation

Karin Lee, Executive Director, The National Committee on North Korea

Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Mansfield Foundation

Date:

Wednesday, March 2, 2011, 2 p.m.

Location:

University of California Washington Center

First Floor Auditorium

1608 Rhode Island Ave. NW

Washington, DC

Click here to register

Are the current pro-democracy uprisings in the Middle East a vindication of Francis Fukuyama’s theory about the ‘End of History’? Max Borders ponders the question over at the Daily Caller, arguing that the demonstrations in Libya, Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, and elsewhere are at least partial proof of Fukuyama’s ideas.

For those uninitiated in Fukuyamaism, the now-Stanford Hoover Institute political philosopher argued in The National Interest in 1989 that “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” In a matter of time, all countries in the world would inevitably evolve in one way or another towards capitalist liberal democracy, because only it can satisfy mankind’s universal yearnings for freedom and dignity.

Looking at the current upheaval in the Middle East, there is some evidence supporting Fukuyama’s argument. The crowds are overwhelmingly calling for democracy. From the Islamists to the Communists, anti-regime protestors seem genuinely eager to put their ideas to the electoral test. For all the talk about Chinese-style market authoritarianism being a sexy ideological competitor to liberal democracy, few of the millions of individuals braving oppression on the streets are demanding local versions of the Chinese Communist Party. The accountability and equality that democracy ideally provides appears to be the most appealing form of government to most of the world. Score one for Fukuyama.

It is equally true, however, that there seems unanswered questions regarding whether the Middle East would embrace either American-style capitalism or social liberalization. For all Borders’ (and Fukuyama’s) entreaties, there is no indication of popular petitions in these protests for free markets or libertarianism. The majority of those in the streets of Egypt and Libya are practicing Muslims and may prefer some form of Islamic democracy. Polls show that the biggest values gaps between the Islamic world and the West occur over the issues of gay rights, women’s rights, and other matters of social freedom. “Muslim publics overwhelmingly welcome Islamic influence over their countries’ politics,” as a December 2010 survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found.

Surveys show that what (most) Americans see as freedom in the realms of sexual preference, marriage, and families looks to many of the world’s Muslim-majority countries as moral decay and decadence. The full separation of religion and state is also less appealing to the world outside the West, where secularism (let alone atheism) is much more frowned upon. None of this is to imply that Islam is incompatible with free markets or liberalism—only that there is no inevitability that they will all necessarily combine.

Rather than The End of History, I would suggest a variation of Fareed Zakaria’s notion of ‘Illiberal Democracy’ is a more accurate indicator of where the world seems to be heading. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1997, Zakaria presciently saw that while many countries were embracing the ballot box in the post-Cold War world, the rule of law and human rights norms were far less popular. “Since the fall of communism, countries around the world are being governed by regimes…that mix elections and authoritarianism—illiberal democracy,” Zakaria wrote in the book he based on his Foreign Affairs essay. A different form of illiberal democracy might be erupting in the Middle East, one where the full trappings of democracy are united with a deep social conservatism that cannot be considered ‘liberal’ in any sense of the word. These regimes might be more democratic than the ones Zakaria described, but they could be equally illiberal, albeit in a different manner.

Fukuyamians would likely respond, like good Hegelians, that illiberal democracy is just a bump on the inevitable path to liberal democracy. It is a phase that will be experienced but eventually jettisoned as it is realized that the universal yearning for individuals’ self-determination is stronger than any other desires. Perhaps. But history is known to thwart all predictions. But what seems clear for now is that the crowds in the Middle East like the ‘democracy’ part of Fukuyama’s cherished ideology. The liberal part? Remains to be seen.