It’s clear that China’s Navy is growing in size and quality. Not only does China have the largest navy in East Asia, it has an increasingly modern and capable force of imported and indigenously produced destroyers, frigates, missile patrol craft, and submarines. Beijing is even planning to deploy its own aircraft carriers, a development sure to alarm neighbors such as Japan, Vietnam, and India.
But what does it mean for American policy makers? Should the United States increase its own maritime power in response to Beijing’s growing strength? Are there diplomatic levers that Washington might pull to forestall potential Chinese aggression? Below, I explore these issues, first by giving a brief history of China’s evolving naval strategies since the People’s Republic began in 1949. (It’s critical that U.S. policy makers understand the evolution of China’s thinking about the roles and missions of its navy.) Then, I provide a full accounting of recent Chinese naval hardware developments. Finally, I draw policy recommendations designed to help American policy makers manage the challenges that have arisen as a result of China’s improving capabilities, regional assertiveness and expanding global interests.
In short, the U.S. will need to strengthen its ties to key countries in East Asia and develop strategic and tactical military concepts and capabilities that would allow it to counter China’s growing military power. Meanwhile, U.S. policy makers must seek collaboration with the Chinese military in an effort to highlight the benefits of being a global stakeholder to Beijing.
Next month, Chinese President Hu Jintao will be visiting Washington and Defense Secretary Gates will be visiting Beijing. Though the U.S. and China have had their disagreements of late – over North Korea, over human rights, over currency valuations – both have much more to gain from cooperation than conflict.
Such was the general consensus at a PPI Event today entitled, “China’s Choice: Regional Bully or Global Stakeholder?” The event featured: The Honorable Chris Coons, U.S. Senator (D-Del.), Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; The Honorable Wallace “Chip” Gregson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Harvard University; James Fallows, The Atlantic Magazine; Michael Chase, Naval War College.
Sen. Coons kicked off the event by relating the experiences of a newly elected Senator who had spent the last several months on the campaign trail listening to the ordinary Americans’ trepidations about China.
“I’ve seen and heard the growing frustrations of average Americans, and their perceptions, or misperceptions, about the rise of China,” Coons said. “Americans are deeply concerned we’ve lost our economic and manufacturing edge and Washington has taken its eye off the ball.”
But Coons also registered an optimistic note: “I don’t view it as a zero-sum game. China’s rise does not have to mean the decline of America.” The Senator expressed hope that the U.S. and China could overcome the short-term impasses over such issues as trade and intellectual property and could have a “long-term harmonious relationship”
Assistant Secretary Gregson followed Coons with a similar hope. “Together,” he said, “the U.S. and China can build a new century of global prosperity, and the time to begin is now…both countries have a great deal to gain from cooperation.”
Gregson highlighted the importance of the Pacific region, which is home to 15 of the world’s 20 largest ports, including nine in China. Five of the world’s seven largest standing armies (China, North Korea, South Korea, India, and Pakistan) are there as well. “China sits at a fulcrum,” said Gregson.
The Assistant Secretary outlined the three pillars of the U.S. approach to China:
An effort to sustain and strengthen bilateral cooperation;
An effort to strengthen relations with other Asian allies;
And that a rising China should abide by global norms and international laws.
He noted that China’s military build-up, which has often been less than transparent, has raised real concerns. “This type of military build-up far exceeds China’s defensive needs,” he said. “We call upon China to become more transparent. We are not asking for an unreasonable degree of disclosure. Just enough to allow all parties to avoid miscalculation.”
Professor Nye, author of a new book entitled The Future of Power (about how power is transitioning from the West to the East, and from state to non-state actors), spent a few minutes musing on a question he posed: “Can the rise of China be peaceful?”
Referencing Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War and the rise of Germany in the early 20th Century, Nye noted that the rise of a new power often provokes fear from rivals, and “if we fear too much it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Referencing FDR, Nye argued the more apt position to take with China was that “the greatest thing we should fear is fear itself.”
“There is a rise in Chinese power, but a mistake to over-estimate it,” said Nye. “The size of China’s economy and our economy may be equal in size by 2030, but they will not be equal in composition, and per capita income will only be 1/3 of our per capita income.”
Fallows, who spent four years living in China and has written about his experiences inPostcards from Tomorrow Square: Reports from China (and is writing another book about China), argued that in most respects, the fundamental arrangement and consensus between the U.S. and China has been remarkably stable for the last 30 years: It’s better to work together than as enemies; China’s prosperity need not be at the direct expense of the United States; and there are going to be real disagreements.
As for America’s perceived sense of decline in the face of a rising China, “The central thing here is that the issues that matter to America’s viability have nothing to do with China,” said Fallows. “They would be identical if China did not exist. The greatest concerns are the functionality of the political system.”
Chase, who has written three memos on China’s military for PPI, noted that one of the challenging things about assessing China’s military prowess is that the military hasn’t been involved in a hot war since 1979 (Vietnam). Chase recommended a path of working with China as well as building up our military capacity to match China’s possible threats.
The event concluded with a question about climate change, which will probably be the most pressing challenge that the U.S. and China will have to solve. Nye noted that China has now surpassed the U.S. in greenhouse gas emissions. Fallows put it simply: “There is either a collaborative strategy of the U.S. and China, or no hope at all.”
The US was in an awkward position in Cancun. The administration clearly wanted to show leadership, but it was hamstrung by an inability to deliver legislation with any tangible commitments. Since that seemed unlikely to change in the new Congress, US negotiators were left playing defense on the key issue — mitigation.
This makes movement in other areas (such as finance and forests) difficult, though that is in part due to US insistence on parallel, rather than serial, treatment of issues.
The result was sometimes bizarre diplomatic displays by the US, such as Energy Secretary Steven Chu’s address — essentially a remedial crash course in climate science. Secretary Chu did not take questions, one suspects because it would have been difficult to answer the obvious one — how does the US plan to meet the President’s 17%-cuts-by-2020 goal articulated last year?
Difficult, but not impossible. The awkward position in which US officials find themselves and the effects it has on US credibility and capability make the administration’s continued avoidance of serious public discussion of EPA carbon regulations puzzling. Research at RFF and elsewhere indicates that EPA regulations, either on the books already or likely in the near future, could achieve emissions reductions in the range of the President’s goal.
I’ve studied these regulations over the past year or so, and I’ve been repeatedly surprised by their likely impact. Vehicle fuel economy standards, new power plant permitting rules, and whatever the agency decides to do for existing sources can each make a significant emissions impact. Perhaps more interestingly, coming EPA regulations ostensibly aimed at other pollutants could have a big impact on carbon by pushing a substantial portion of coal plants into retirement, and replacing them with cleaner technology.
It’s not clear why the US administration and negotiators didn’t trumpeting these regulations as evidence of a commitment to cut emissions. It’s possible it is felt that a regulatory approach won’t be understood or taken seriously by the international community, but EPA regulations are far from the only complex issue on the table (just ask your local climate finance expert for a quick summary if you suspect otherwise). And other countries are undoubtedly familiar with a regulatory approach — for many it is their preferred domestic environmental policy. One thing is certain, though — the best way to ensure that the international community (and the American public) fails to understand or appreciate the EPA’s capabilities is for the administration and its negotiators to refuse to explain them.
Another possibility is that the administration worries that hyping EPA’s powers is politically dangerous. The agency is more effective, this argument goes, if it can operate quietly and at its own pace. To put it more directly, to speak of regulation is to destroy it — perhaps because Congress would respond by seeking to cripple the agency.
But the President should not forget that his party still controls the Senate, and that he still wields the veto pen. Even if the President resigned himself to giving up EPA powers (or delaying them) as part of a compromise, it would surely be in his interest to say how strong these powers are, thus increasing their value in any bargain.
Moreover, the argument that regulatory emissions cuts are more effective if kept quiet contradicts what is arguably the central dogma of US foreign climate policy — that US action is valuable not for its small contribution to global goals, but as a tool for unlocking negotiations and prompting action elsewhere. If US negotiators can’t or won’t talk about the best policy tool the US currently has, they can’t do their jobs. This makes the long term likelihood of a meaningful international agreement much smaller.
EPA regulation is not the first, best option for US climate policy; it is above all likely to be more costly over the long run than a pricing mechanism. But neither this admission, nor the fact that EPA regulations are legally required, are good reasons not to forcefully and frequently articulate their emissions benefits. Perhaps we as a country should be embarrassed that we cannot adopt a national climate policy that more closely approaches the ideal in terms of both costs and benefits. But the administration should not let any embarrassment about what the country cannot currently do prevent them from talking about what it can.
As my colleague Dallas Burtraw pointed out in his talk here this week, US credibility on climate requires that the administration be a lot bolder — not by making new commitments that it lacks the domestic powers to back up, but simply by publicly, loudly, and clearly saying what it can and will do with the tools it already has.
Last Friday the AFL-CIO and several big unions came out against the U.S.-Korea free trade deal. As news, this was strictly “dog-bites-man” stuff. The bigger story is the appearance of cracks in Labor’s usually monolithic opposition to trade pacts.
Several unions, namely the United Auto Workers and the United Food and Commercial Workers, endorsed the agreement after President Obama wrung concessions from Seoul on cars and U.S. beef earlier this month. Ford Motor Company, which strongly opposed the original deal negotiated by the George W. Bush administration on the grounds that it didn’t do enough to pry open South Korea’s auto market, is also on board.
The unusual split in Labor’s ranks makes it easier for Congressional Democrats to back Obama. Although voting treaties up or down is the exclusive prerogative of the Senate, it’s significant that the deal also has the support of Rep. Sandy Levin (D-Mich), a tireless defender of the U.S. auto industry and long the House’s leading skeptic of free trade agreements.
If the Senate approves the treaty next year, it will be a major boost for Obama’s pledge to double exports over the next five years. It may also signal a shift in trade politics within the Democratic Party. As a candidate, Obama played to his party’s anti-trade gallery, even pledging to re-negotiate the 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement. Now, as President, he recognizes that opening overseas markets is integral to economic recovery. With consumers still winding down their debts, and businesses hoarding cash, a good part of the economic demand we need to create jobs must come from abroad.
In fact, the Commerce Department reported Friday that U.S. exports rose to their highest levels in more than two years. The U.S. trade deficit (in goods and services) fell to $38.71 billion, a more than 13 percent drop over the previous month and considerably less than the $44 billion economists had predicted. Best of all, U.S. exports to China grew nearly 30 percent to reach a record high of just over $9 billion. Along with a slight decrease in Chinese imports, that narrowed the monthly U.S. trade deficit by 8 percent, to $25.52 billion. This was the best economic news we’ve had for some time, and it sent stocks soaring.
South Korea has the world’s 12th largest economy. By lowering its high tariffs and dealing with non-tariff barriers to U.S. communications and financial services firms, the deal could boost U.S. exports to South Korea by $10 trillion annually, the administration says. Crucially, thanks to Obama’s success in getting South Korea to modify its auto provisions, it exempts up to 25,000 U.S. vehicles from Seoul’s environmental and fuel economy standards, and builds in safeguards against a surge of imported cars from South Korea.
That was enough to satisfy the UAW and Ford though not, it seems, the rest of organized labor. Intriguingly, the automakers’ union also parted company from the AFL-CIO in backing another controversial Obama deal: his tax-cut compromise with Republicans. It’s another sign that, even within the progressive camp, arguments for spurring job-creating growth are prevailing over class warfare themes.
South Korea is more than a major trading partner. It’s also a key U.S. ally. North Korea’s recent artillery attack on one of its islands – and China’s refusal to condemn it – seems to have made Seoul more tractable about negotiating changes in the treaty. In any event, the free trade pact also offers the United States an opportunity to cement relations with an prosperous market democracy that increasingly shares our apprehensions about Beijing’s propensity for throwing its weight around in the Asia Pacific.
The U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement would be worth ratifying on foreign policy grounds alone. But unlike several previous bilateral trade pacts with small nations, this one will deliver real benefits to America’s struggling economy.
The Center for New American Security (CNAS) just released a new report on the way forward in Afghanistan. As the report’s title indicates, “Responsible Transition” calls for the United States to hand over responsibility for security to the Afghans over the next few years. The plan involves leaving 25-35,000 U.S. troops behind to defeat Afghanistan, with the rest withdrawn by 2014. “Responsible Transition” also calls for America to put more pressure on Pakistan to crack down on extremists.
CNAS’s plan to scale down the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is a wise one, recognizing as it does that “all options are likely to be suboptimal” but a long-term nation-building project is particularly suboptimal. But it seems wishful thinking that more pressure on Pakistan coming from the Obama administration will do what nine years of pressure haven’t already: convince Pakistan to expel the Taliban and any other troublemakers from its territory. As long as Pakistan knows we need it more than it needs us, it can take U.S. money while doing little.
Moreover, as Michael Cohen points out, CNAS’s report entirely sidesteps the thorny issue of talking with the Taliban. This is a key issue, since the Taliban have deep roots in the Pashtun community. Any long-term peace is going to have to include elements of the Taliban, as the administration sometimes seems to realize.
A more realistic plan would be something along the lines of what the Afghanistan Study Group and the Center for American Progress have recommended. Encouraging political reconciliation must be at the forefront of U.S.’s strategy going forward, not simply an afterthought. Military operations will have to take a backseat to diplomacy and politics if long-term progress is going to be made. Deal-making will have to include bargains with the Taliban, unsavoury though that prospect is. There simply is no other way to bring a modicum of stability to the troubled region unless the Taliban are made a part of some power-sharing agreement.
It’s a positive sign that the gang at CNAS recognizes that a sizable U.S. footprint in Afghanistan is unsustainable. As the strongest boosters of large-scale counterinsurgency approaches, CNAS has an important role to play in forming a strategy that focuses primarily–and eventually, exclusively–on preventing terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland. That should always be the top priority. When the Obama administration releases its Afghanistan review next week, let’s hope it agrees.
Beijing has arm-twisted nineteen countries to not send representatives to tomorrow’s Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo. At issue is the honoree, Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese political prisoner whose views on human rights and democracy don’t jive particularly with the Chinese Communist Party’s. Imagine that.
On the surface, Beijing’s deft deployment of “soft power” seems impressive: to keep nineteen countries from attending supporting democratic movements is impressive. “Soft power,” as Harvard professor Joe Nye explains in an October Washington Quarterly article, is an area where Beijing is just coming into its own.
But Nye also points out that Chinese soft power has limits:
It is not easy for governments to sell their country’s charm if their narrative is inconsistent with domestic realities. In that dimension, except for its economic success, China still has a long way to go.
Such is the case with the Nobel event. Let’s examine the nineteen no-shows, and their political and press rankings from 2009 by Freedom House, the NGO that tracks these sorts of things:
Country
Political Status
Freedom of the press status
Afghanistan
Not Free
Not Free
China
Not Free
Not Free
Colombia
Partly Free
Partly Free
Cuba
Not Free
Not Free
Egypt
Not Free
Partly Free
Iran
Not Free
Not Free
Iraq
Not Free
Not Free
Morocco
Partly Free
Not Free
Pakistan
Partly Free
Not Free
Russia
Not Free
Not Free
Saudi Arabia
Not Free
Not Free
Serbia
Free
Partly Free
Sudan
Not Free
Not Free
The Philippines
Partly Free
Partly Free
Tunisia
Not Free
Not Free
Ukraine
Free
Partly Free
Venezuela
Partly Free
Not Free
Vietnam
Not Free
Not Free
Yikes. Only two unfettered “free”’s in the lot. In other words, as Nye acutely observes: ‘[I]f the authoritarian growth model produces soft power for China in authoritarian countries, it does not produce attraction in democratic countries. In other words, what attracts in Caracas may repel in Paris.” How spot-on.
And if you’re interested in hearing it straight from the horse’s mouth, come see Joseph Nye, Under Secretary Michele Flournoy, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) and a host of others talk about these issues at a PPI panel discussion on China, next Tuesday, December 14th in DC. Click here to see the invite and RSVP.
Taking its cues straight from Will Marshall’s keyboard, no doubt, the Obama administration correctly labeled China as an “enabler” of North Korea over the weekend. If Pyongyang is the crack addict in the alley behind my house, Beijing keeps it high.
Beijing’s unwillingness to curtail the Hermit Kingdom’s frustrating bellicosity falls within its national interest. Well, in the short term, anyway: As North Korea continues to cause headaches in Washington, Beijing is probably quite content to let a distracted DC spend time and energy containing the North and placating the South. Further, China alone maintains significant diplomatic leverage over the Kim dynasty, and a mischievous Pyongyang reinforces Beijing’s position as regional powerbroker.
Consider the flip side: If North Korea starts to behave itself, China not only loses that pivotal position, but Washington can spend more time focusing the basket of issues it would prefers keeping front and center: currency valuation and debt, trade, improving military ties, freedom of international waterways, and India’s UN Security Council seat, amongst others.
But as the Korean situation continues to deteriorate, it should be dawning on the Chinese that an escalation isn’t in their interests, either. With each Northern provocation–the Cheonan sinking, the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, and the consistent threat of another nuclear test launch–the South Korean public loses patience with diplomatic responses. Should the day arrive when a military response is unavoidable, the egg will ultimately end up on Beijing’s face: it will be drawn into full-blown crisis-control mode if for no other reason than to manage the inevitable refugee catastrophe awaiting on its boarder.
In talks with the Chinese, the Obama administration must highlight these facts: allowing a rambunctious Kim to needle Washington’s eye is fine for today, but it serves no one’s interest to allow such behavior continue. This is the choice China faces: regional broker or global stakeholder — it’s very difficult to be both over the long term.
If you want to learn more, you should check out PPI’s All-Star panel on US-China relationship next Tuesday, December 14th, featuring UnderSecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy, new Senator Chris Coons (D-DE), Harvard professor Joe Nye, writer James Fallows, and Naval War College professor Mike Chase.
MEDIA COVERAGE:
The event is open to the press. Media in attendance are required to register in advance of the event to Steven Chlapecka at 202.525.3931 or schlapecka@ppionline.org. Camera pre-set: 9:30 a.m.
Hosted in collaboration with the University of California Washington Center.
The democratic cause lost an eloquent and effective champion yesterday when former Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) succumbed to cancer at age 70.
Over nine terms in the House of Representatives, Steve distinguished himself as one of that body’s preeminent spokesman on international affairs. He understood that the foundational principle of a liberal foreign policy – what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called its “fighting faith” – is implacable opposition to tyranny. And he applied that principle with unswerving consistency, backing Eastern Europe’s bid for freedom from its Soviet overlord, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and democratic reformers challenging pro-American autocrats in the Phillipines and South Korea.
We at PPI drew inspiration from Steve and were proud to count him as a friend and sometime contributor to our work. See his chapter in our 2006 book, With All Our Might, in which he argued presciently that Pakistan is the pivotal battleground in America’s fight against al Qaeda and Islamist extremism in general.
Finally Steve was a staunch backer of the National Endowment of Democracy, serving on its Board and receiving its Democracy Service Medal in 2001.
There may be no method in North Korea’s madness, but the world’s response to its episodic outrages has settled into a familiar pattern. It’s a dangerous pattern, and one likely to recur as long as China keeps enabling Pyongyang’s belligerent behavior.
First comes an utterly unprovoked attack on South Korea. Seoul reacts angrily and threatens unspecified consequences. Washington firmly backs its ally, and solicits global censure of North Korean aggression. The Chinese, however, decline to assign blame and instead urge resumption of direct talks with Pyongyang. South Korea eventually backs away from confrontation, on the perfectly rational premise that living with the North’s occasional spasms of violence is preferable to an all-out war that would devastate both countries.
The latest crisis began last week when the North shelled a South Korean island. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak called the attack, which killed two civilians and wounded 16, a “crime against humanity” and warned that Seoul would not tolerate a direct attack on its soil. The United States dispatched an aircraft carrier, the George Washington, while China called, irrelevantly, for a resumption of the long defunct six-party talks aimed at dismantling the North’s nuclear weapons program. And yesterday, Seoul moved to dampen war fever by canceling live-fire artillery drills on the stricken island.
Essentially the same cycle played out last spring, when North Korea sunk a South Korean patrol boat, the Cheonan, killing all 46 sailors aboard. Pyongyang paid no price for this act of war, either.
Pyongyang’s behavior may look like a classic case of winning through intimidation, except that it’s not clear what it gains from such brutal tactics. The North is as isolated and poverty-stricken as ever, and, with dictator Kim Jong il preparing to hand off power to his son, no relief is in sight for its thoroughly regimented society.
One explanation is that the regime from time to time must manufacture external threats to justify the extreme sacrifices it demands of its people. Another is that its assaults are part of an elaborate shake-down racket meant to get the world’s attention – along with bribes for good behavior. Except that it seems to be having the opposite effect. Last week’s shelling, along with the Cheonan incident, have driven the final nail in the coffin of the South’s “sunshine policy” of economic and humanitarian aid to the North. Nor is Washington eager to reward Pyongyang’s bellicose conduct by rushing back into the six-party talks.
This latest outrage throws a spotlight on China’s role as North Korea’s enabler. Not only does Beijing shield Pyongyang from the consequences of its disruptive behavior, it also helps to keep the regime afloat by supplying fuel and other economic assistance. Perhaps it’s too facile to assume – as Republicans like John McCain and Lindsay Graham do – that China can bring the mercurial Kim regime to heal just by threatening to shut down oil shipments or cross-border trade. But is it really too much to ask of China that it at least not cover up the North’s crimes and collude in its ludicrous lies?
Beijing wants very badly to be accorded the respect that its growing wealth and power implies. It wants a seat at the table where global decisions are made. Yet on issue after issue, China is proving to be a free rider. Beijing takes maximum advantage of an open world economy while contributing little to strengthening the system that has made it rich. Instead, it pursues a mercantilist policy that creates enormous imbalances in world trade and investment flows, while keeping its currency artificially high to make discourage imports from the U.S. and elsewhere. Instead of trying to tamp down tensions on the Korea peninsula, it feeds them by shielding its delinquent ward in Pyongyang from accountability. Instead of throwing its weight behind international efforts to restrain rogue regimes from Khartoum to Tehran, it seeks commercial advantage while hiding behind the supposedly sacrosanct principle of non-interference in other nation’s internal affairs.
China’s amoral and selfish behavior increasingly engenders doubt and fear, not respect. Its failure to accept the responsibilities that accompany its growing power undermines global cooperation and stability. It’s time for the Obama administration to move China’s free-riding to the center of its engagement with Beijing.
No sooner had Congress convened this week for a post-election, lame duck session than a partisan squabble erupted in the Senate that threatens to scuttle a major nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia.
The contretemps began when Jon Kyl, the Senate Republican Whip, said he doubted the Senate could take up ratification of the NEW START arms accord until next year. This may seem like an innocuous comment on scheduling, but delay could well spell death for the treaty. This year, President Obama needs eight GOP Senators to meet the 67-vote threshold for ratifying treaties; next year, he would need 14.
Kyl’s remarks were especially galling to treaty backers since he had earlier called New START “relatively benign” so long as the United States also takes steps to assure the reliability of its nuclear arsenal. Obama duly committed enormous sums to upgrade national weapons laboratories and modernize again nuclear warheads, including budgeting an additional $4 billion specifically to placate Kyl. In his statement, however, Kyl referred cryptically to “complex and unresolved issues” that still need to be worked out.
The administration nonetheless has said it will press for a vote this year. Failure to ratify the pact would be a major embarrassment for Obama, who promised the Russians the deal would be concluded this year. But even more, it would be a triumph of blind partisan animus over America’s national security interests, and our government’s to carry out a coherent and effective diplomacy with the rest of the world.
More is at stake than the rather modest arms reductions (under the treaty, both sides would cap their nuclear warheads at 1,550, down from the previous ceiling of 2,200). Senate rejection of the treaty could unravel the administration’s efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to disruptive states, as well as its “reset” of relations with Russia, which it believes has begun to pay dividends on Afghanistan, Iran, and other important fronts.
It’s one thing for Washington partisans to squabble over domestic issues, like extending the Bush tax cuts. It’s quite another to let their fights spill over in the international arena, and undermine America’s ability to lead abroad. In the not-so-distant past – namely, the presidency of George H.W. Bush – arms accords passed the Senate on nearly unanimous votes. If Senate Republicans kill NEW START, it will be another dismal sign that our deeply polarized politics no longer stops at the water’s edge.
Fully half – $100 billion – of Deficit Commission Chairmen Erskine Bowles’ and Alan Simpson’s reduction proposals target that infamous five-sided building on the Potomac. In a paper containing at least something for everyone to hate, you can almost hear the battle lines being drawn from parochial quarters: weapons makers, veterans groups, and personnel contractors will all howl as their respective cash cows linger in the cross hairs for uncomfortably long periods.
When parsing Bowles’ and Simpson’s suggestions, it’s worth bearing in mind the authors’ guiding principle: “America cannot be great if we go broke.” In essence, the proposal channels the White House’s own National Security Strategy, “Our economy… serves as the wellspring of American power.”
That’s the bad news: both the Deficit Commission and administration are right, and the country is in a bad spot. Here’s the worse news, as told in the introduction of the Deficit Commission’s Report: The Problem Is Real; the Solution Is Painful; There’s No Easy Way Out; Everything Must Be On the Table, and Washington Must Lead.
The Bowles/Simpson proposals do deserve serious consideration. They also must be placed in context — first, they are “illustrative” cuts, ones that are on the table and illustrate how the Commission might save $100 million in defense over five years. These cuts are on top of Secretary of Defense Bob Gates plan, announced over the summer, to wring $100 billion out of the Pentagon’s $700+ billion budget over five years, by reducing contractors, saving on personnel costs, and riding herd on and/or canceling over-budget and delayed programs. While many of Gates’ plans coincide with Bowles/Simpson (contractors and V-22 Osprey, for example), reconciling what to do with the savings is sure to cause a fight. More on that below…
It’s most useful to evaluate the Bowles/Simpson illustrative cuts against three core criteria:
Does a proposal fundamentally weaken the country’s ability to defend itself?
If not, does a proposal fundamentally weaken the country’s core non-military national interests?
If not, does the savings benefit to the country outweigh the parochial interest of the proposed cut?
With that in mind, on balance, most of the Commission’s proposals on Defense spending are quite sensible. For readability’s sake, I’ll lump several of the proposals into larger categories.
First, a starting point:
A simple way to enforce budgetary discipline at the Pentagon starts with one basic policy adjustment: end the practice of supplemental budgeting. DoD has three budgets, not one: a baseline appropriation, plus two “supplemental” appropriations that are supposed to pay for the war, but do oh-so-much-more. I’ve written about the problem for Forbes.com, and you can see an excerpt here:
Having three budgets is like having three strikes in a baseball at-bat — you have the luxury to swing and miss twice. Projects that don’t make the baseline DoD budget (strike one!) can be considered in either of the additional supplementals (strike two! strike three!) before they’re “out.” Ending the supplementals would be like giving the batter just one strike. By combining all defense spending into one (larger) appropriation each year, the batter has just one swing — miss the first time, that’s it. The practice would force Congress to make hard choices that prioritize the war-fighter.
If we have just one budget, it would be much easier to implement many practices recommended in the Bowles/Simpson plan, such as “reducing procurement by 15 percent” and “reduce ‘other procurement’”. Procurement is bloated with multiple, supplemental budgets. Having just one a year forces appropriators to make hard choices.
Savings over five years: $28.5 billion, per Commission estimates.
Next, the low hanging fruit amongst the “illustrative” cuts:
Salary freezes for civilians and military, doubling cuts to contracting personnel and replacing some with civilians. These check all categories without question. The commission could perhaps go even further by advocating a freeze in combat pay as well — Yes, our military has performed heroically in difficult circumstances, but we’re talking about not increasing warzone pay, we’re not talking about eliminating it. Reducing contractors is a no-brainer.
Troop reductions in Europe and Asia. Europe is the easier sell: Twenty years after the Cold War and with staging needs for Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, the American military does not need as extensive a footprint on the European continent. The Commission proposes reducing American forces in Korea by 17,000 troops, which leave 11,500 by my math. That’s hardly a comforting thought, with an unstable and nuclear-minded North Korean regime in the midst of a power transition. We would continue to maintain 32,000 in Japan, and it perhaps makes more sense to split reductions between the two countries, even though removing troops from Japan has been a local political hot potato of late.
Modernize TriCare: Let’s be honest: this isn’t a move to “modernize” defense health care, it’s an effort to bring the military’s health system’s co-pays and deductables in line with cost-structures of private insurers. Does it seem like we’re giving our servicemembers the shaft? Yes. But are military health care costs, “are eating the Defense Department alive,” according to Secretary Gates. It’s unfortunate, but servicemembers’ premiums must rise to correct this problem.
Reduce base support, facilities maintenance, retail activities, and DoD schooling: With the exception of closing unused DoD schools, there’s no question these cuts will hurt. But is reducing the deficit more important? In these times, yes.
Savings over five years: $45.1 billion, per Commission estimates.
Slightly tougher to swallow:
Weapons Cuts: Not all platforms are created equal: certain are needed for modernization, others for replacement, and yet others to fill niche capabilities.
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) takes a beating from Bowles/Simpson, something followers of the program probably suspected. After all, when procurement of the F-22 was ended last year at 187 planes, DoD proclaimed itself ready to buy 2,443 F-35 JSFs instead. At the time, 2,443 JSFs seemed a preposterously and unrealistically large number. It still does, which is why a revised purchase plan, mixing in refurbishments of cheaper F-16s and F-18s while cancelling the USMC’s version of the JSF outright, falls within my comfort level.
We’ve already purchased 288 V-22 Osprey, which is two-thirds of the planned buy, and enough to meet the lion’s share of mission requirements. Along those lines, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle’s (EFV) capabilities are ably substituted by other technologies under development, allowing for EFV’s cancellation.
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Ground Combat Vehicle, and Joint Tactical Radio would be delayed, not canceled, under the Bowles/Simpson plan, which seems reasonable as the Army’s tactical vehicle fleet received an unexpected influx of cash to procure IED-hardened MRAP vehicles for Iraq.
Reduce R&D: This might seem unwise (“Why do we want to cut R&D while we’re dropping weapons? Shouldn’t we invest in developing weapons even if we don’t end up producing them?”), but it’s not as big a deal as it originally seems. Fact is, by combining the defense budgets and reducing certain weapons buys, R&D organically decreases as a natural function of those actions.
Knowing how Congress works, it’s highly unlikely that these planned weapons buys will be fully endorsed. But they will likely be negotiated reductions, in order to maintain capability while sending a strong signal that there’s a changing culture of fiscal discipline.
Savings over five years: up to, but probably less than $30.45 billion, per Commission estimates.
Up in the Air:
Secretary of DefenseBob Gates came out with his own plan to trim $100billion from the Pentagon’s budget, which he intended to reinvest in DoD modernization plans. He was coyly getting out in front of Bowles-Simpson, who want to take Gates’ savings and apply them not to modernization, but rather to deficit reduction.
The trick is convincing the Secretary to follow through with these plans, knowing that the Pentagon won’t get to keep all the planned savings. The good news is this fight probably won’t happen, as Gates will likely leave his post before final decisions are made. Savings reinvestments is just one of the reasons the new Secretary’s views on deficit reduction will have to align with Obama’s.
You Can’t Touch This:
The only illustrative cut in the Bowles-Simpson plan that I whole-heartedly disagree with is the notion of canceling the Navy’s Future Maritime Prepositioning Force. These plans are currently under study, and if executed correctly, could end up saving money while allowing the Navy to project force more efficiently in an era of restrained budgets. There’s still work to be done here, and at $2.7 billion in potential savings, isn’t exactly a budget buster.
George W. Bush, in the absence of broadly agreed-upon guidelines for fighting and meting out justice to terrorists, stumbled badly in attempting to write his own rules for the “war on terror.” Barack Obama has done better, but his administration is just as bollixed up over the right way to detain and try suspected terrorists.
Nine years after 9/11, let’s get it right once and for all. Obama should lead an international effort to clear up confusion and ambiguities surrounding terrorism, war, and the “right” to resistance invoked by groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to justify attacking civilians and using them as human shields.
Specifically, Obama should call for a new Geneva Convention — the fifth — to provide a common legal framework for combating terrorism. This would help the world resolve the “neither soldier nor criminal” quandary that has bedeviled two successive U.S. administrations. More importantly, it would stigmatize the routine use of violence against civilians in fragile or disordered countries around the world.
A tough new anti-terrorism convention would give the international community new weapons in the struggle to discredit violent extremism. By designating mass casualty and suicide terrorism as crimes against humanity, it would take some of the glamour out of violence. It would also provide the legal basis for international tribunals to indict those who recruit the killers and plan the attacks. Finally, leading the charge for a new Geneva Convention would reinforce a core theme of Obama’s foreign policy: restoring U.S. moral leadership within a framework of international cooperation for mutual security.
Because terrorism is a global scourge, it makes no sense for every country to write its own rules for combating and punishing terrorists. It’s time to arm the civilized world with the legal tools it needs to fight and defeat terrorists — in a civilized way.
It goes without saying that National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command are playing a significant role in defending military and government computer networks. It appears they’re now playing a role defending domestic U.S. civilian computer networks as well. In past statements, General Keith Alexander – head of NSA and Cyber Command – said that the DoD entities would not be involved in the protection of domestic civilian networks because it is the purview of the Department of Homeland Security. Despite those statements, a memorandum of agreement released on October 13 announced that the DoD and DHS would coordinate their cybersecurity efforts, collocating personnel.
While the NSA and Cyber Command both fall under the purview of the DoD, their missions are different. The NSA is a hybrid civilian/military entity whose main function is to gather signals intelligence from foreign communications and provide information assurance to prevent foreign adversaries from accessing classified materials. Cyber Command is a new, purely military entity that is responsible for providing the U.S. military with both offensive and defensive capabilities in cyberspace.
Because the NSA was at the center of the Bush administration’s domestic wiretapping scandal in the years just after 9/11, its involvement with protecting domestic computer networks makes privacy advocates uneasy. They’re worried that the NSA might use its new role to monitor U.S citizens. However, it’s worth noting that the NSA’s participation with U.S. domestic computer networks is not unprecedented. In February, the NSA assisted Google in investigating an attack against the company in which it is believed that Chinese hackers stole large amounts of intellectual property as well as information about Chinese human rights activists. More recently, the NSA was tasked with executing “Perfect Citizen,” a program that gives NSA access to U.S. critical infrastructure networks in order to detect cyberspace threats. This means NSA would deploy sensors on many large privately owned networks.
Meanwhile, General Alexander stated in September that he did not believe Cyber Command should operate in the civilian sphere. However, that statement contradicts the memorandum of agreement, which specifically directs Cyber Command to locate personnel at a DHS facility to provide support and “operational synchronization.” It also instructs Cyber Command to coordinate operational and mission planning with DHS and NSA. Moreover, Cyber Command’s involvement with civilian networks was presaged by the June 2009 DoD memorandum announcing its formation which specifically states that part of its mission would be to protect civilian networks.
The question now is: how much of a role will DoD play? How much of a role should it play? In 2003, a presidential directive established DHS as the agency in charge of coordinating the overall effort of securing civilian networks. The agency has since written a strategy and will to hire large numbers of cybersecurity professionals over the next few years, indicating the agency will maintain a large role in protecting civilian networks.
But critical cyber experience and technical expertise lies with the military, which would be foolish to ignore. Furthermore, DHS wants to work with the military, admitting that it has at least contemplated leveraging NSA assets in its efforts to put together a comprehensive plan to protect critical cyberspace assets. Even so, it’s not that straight forward: as the NSA wiretapping scandal shows, DoD’s involvement in civilian networks would stir civil liberties controversy.
Currently, no overarching cybersecurity strategy exists that clarifies agencies’ responsibilities. Despite sweeping cybersecurity legislation being proposed in Congress – particularly by Senators Lieberman, Carper, and Collins – the White House must step in to clarify these roles.
Just a few years ago, Lebanon appeared to be a foreign policy success for the United States. Outraged by the brutal assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (likely at the hands of Syria and its allies), the Lebanese people, bolstered by international support, succeeded in expelling Syrian military forces and asserting Lebanese sovereignty in 2005 for the first time in decades. And again in 2009, the Lebanese affirmed their support for the pro-Western ruling coalition, awarding them a solid majority of seats in Parliament during the May general elections.
These days, however, the country looks headed for a frightening crisis. The March 14 coalition, as the ruling group is known, has been unable to capitalize on its popular mandate. This is due in large part to the overwhelming force wielded by Hezbollah – which is funded, trained, and armed by Iran and Syria. But it’s also because U.S. policy toward Lebanon has been unwilling to back up bold words with actions. Far from protecting America’s allies, consecutive U.S. administrations have not only failed the pro-Western government but also empowered its worst enemies.
The slow-burning confrontation is about to reach a boiling point over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, charged with bringing Hariri’s killers to justice. The court, established by agreement between the U.N. Security Council and the Lebanese government, is expected to issue indictments against members of Hezbollah in the coming months. As the Wall Street Journal reported Monday, up to six members are slated to be indicted by the end of the year, including Mustafa Badreddine, a senior Hezbollah military commander and brother-in-law of the infamous Hezbollah mastermind Imad Mugniyah.
In an effort to preempt what would surely be a massive blow, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has launched a war against the tribunal, and U.S. officials believe that Hezbollah will stop at nothing to prevent indictments from being handed down. The risk of war is palpable, and if Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons — and their Syrian puppets — unseat the elected government and take control over Lebanon, it will be a grave blow to U.S. security and credibility around the world.
It would also bolster the reach and credibility of Iran. Fred Hof, deputy to U.S. Special Middle East envoy George Mitchell and point man on U.S.-Syria policy once put it bluntly: “Whether most of his organization’s members know it or not, and whether most Lebanese Shiites know it or not, [Nasrallah] and his inner circle do what they do first and foremost to defend and project the existence and power of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” (He was speaking to the Middle East Institute in the midst of the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.)
The rise of Iranian influence in Lebanon is particularly dangerous at the present moment, when moderate Arab countries are desperately looking for the United States to contain Iran. From the perspective of the United States’ Arab allies, if the world’s superpower can’t contain the mullahs before they have a nuclear weapon, how could they be expected to contain them if they have the bomb?
Given the disturbing drift in American policy since the 2005 Cedar revolution, what is at stake, and the choices we must make to support those seeking our help, Hezbollah’s crimes against us bear repeating.
Accused of terrorism on virtually every continent, Hezbollah has killed more Americans than any terrorist group except Al Qaeda, and today they posses weapons of state.
They murdered 63 people, including 17 Americans and eight CIA officers in our Beirut embassy in 1982. They slaughtered 241 American marines in the Marine barracks’ bombing in 1983, and a year later killed another 18 American servicemen near the U.S. Air Force Base in Torrejon, Spain. Robert Stethem, a US Navy diver, was beaten to death and thrown on the tarmac when Hezbollah terrorists hijacked TWA flight 847. And of course the brutal kidnapping, heinous torture, and eventual murder of the CIA’s Beirut station chief Bill Buckley and Col. William ‘Rich’ Higgins were carried out by Hezbollah terrorists.
Fred Hof was a close friend of Col. Higgins and, at the time, part of a small team that worked every possible angle to free Higgins before his death. “I am one of a small handful of Americans who knows the exact manner of Rich’s death,” he explained years ago. “If I were to describe it to you now – which I will not – I can guarantee that a significant number of people in this room would become physically ill. When [former Deputy Secretary of State] Rich Armitage described Hezbollah a few years ago as the “A-Team” of international terrorism and suggested that there was a “blood debt” to be paid, he was referring to a leadership cadre that is steeped in blood and brutality.”
It is that ‘leadership cadre’ of Iranian backed terrorists, who have been killing our allies and us for over 30 years, that is today working for Tehran, “maneuvering furiously”, according to the New York Times, to derail the tribunal, and destroy the native forces inside Lebanon seeking to restore self-determination for the Lebanese people.
Lebanon is again at a cross roads, and so is American policy.
How did the situation become so dire, so soon after the West finally helped the Lebanese people shake off the foreign forces driving thirty years of civil war and violence? Is it now too late to stop Iran from successfully exporting their revolution into a country as culturally diverse and multi-confessional Lebanon?
It’s difficult not to lay the blame at the feet of former President George W. Bush and his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. The Bush administration was eager to hold up Lebanon as an example of its successful Middle East policy: “We took great joy in seeing the Cedar Revolution. We understand that the hundreds of thousands of people who took to the street to express their desire to be free required courage, and we support the desire of the people to have a government responsive to their needs and a government that is free, truly free,” Bush said at the time. However, when push came to shove, the president did little to help our Lebanese allies when they needed him most.
Judgment day came May 7, 2008. An emboldened Hezbollah, alarmed that the government was moving to control the group’s illicit private communications network, invaded the streets of Beirut and the Chouf Mountains to the south, forcing Lebanon’s democratically-elected leaders to accede to a power-sharing agreement at the point of a gun. The result was yet another capitulation by the Bush administration, which signaled its acquiescence to the Doha Agreement, signed on May 21 of that year, formalizing Hezbollah’s veto over any government decision, including its own disarmament.
But if the Bush administration opened the door to Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon, Barack Obama’s administration is holding that door ajar, doing little to support America’s erstwhile allies in the March 14 coalition out of fear that such a move would damage any chance of engaging with Syria.
In an October 18 letter, Congressmen Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and Dan Burton (R-IN), chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East,protested the administration’s lack of support for moderate elements in Lebanon: “We remain concerned that your strategy of offering diplomatic overtures to hostile regimes has done little to provoke Middle East peace, and has only taken away leverage from our democratic friends and allies.”
For its part, the Administration continues to put the emphasis on reaching out to Damascus, and has gone only so far as to indicate there are limits to America’s patience. “Syria and the United States have taken some modest steps to see if we can improve the bilateral relationship, but this cannot go very far as long as Syria’s friends are undermining stability in Lebanon,“ explained Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman, on a visit to Syria earlier this month.
It is vital that the United States reverse these years of drift and act decisively to help the Lebanese people reassert their right to self-determination — because it is in America’s national interest. The alternative is to give in to the foreign agenda of the Mullahs in Tehran and their terrorist proxy at time when containing Iran’s expansionist ambition is the paramount necessity in the region. So what do we do?
The Obama administration must decide to resist the “resistance,” and lead the West in a program to further empower Lebanese civil society and aid the dormant democratic forces in the country. It is these courageous actors, with the proven ability to lead successful political and media campaigns and expose the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis, who were specifically targeted by Hezbollah in May 2008 — exactly because they are effective. The Lebanese people need to know that the president of the United States supports their pursuit of freedom and democracy, especially as Hezbollah’s role in attacking the state is on the verge of being exposed.
President Obama should immediately look to Lebanon’s pro-democracy media, which has largely been silenced over the last year, intimidated not only by pro-Syrian, pro-Iranian, and Hezbollah foes, but hobbled by Saudi patrons who mistakenly thought they could pull Syria away from Iran’s influence. That strategy, like our own outreach to Syria, has proven a disastrous failure, for Lebanon, the region and US national interests. The Obama administration can help take the muzzle off of these Lebanese patriots—like Prime Minister Saad Hariri and head of the Lebanese Forces party Samir Geagea—whose courageous voices are the first defense against Hezbollah’s “resistance.” Let Lebanon speak.
And, the Obama administration must ensure that the Special Tribunal goes forward, prosecuting those it indicts. America’s $10 million contribution last week is commendable, but it is not enough. No problem, other than stopping Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, calls as urgently for international focus as does the effort to stop Iran from expanding its sphere of influence and overpowering another people.
The United States must be willing to work with its allies in Europe and the Middle East to support those democratic elements who want to save their country. This policy will not be easy. It may require making the tough decision to give up on forces and programs that have failed to serve as a bulwark against Hezbollah, or it may require a deep reform of the same, but tough choices are what we face.
It was Harry Truman who said “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Those words are as true today under President Obama as when they were uttered in 1947 by a young former Senator thrust suddenly into power, forced to make some of this nation’s most fateful, difficult and ultimately, successful decisions. America is no less the leader of the free world today than we were then, unless we act otherwise.
If the Obama administration takes a bold stand in favor of Lebanon’s independence and starts pressing the Saudis to support Lebanese civil society, it will find that many figures in Beirut, and other countries with a stake in Lebanon’s stability will enthusiastically follow its lead.
But whatever methods it chooses, the administration must make a clear public signal that the United States will not sit on the sidelines while Iran, through its satraps Syria and Hezbollah, successfully exports the Iranian revolution to Lebanon. President Obama has spoken eloquently about the need to support democracy and tolerance in the Middle East. The time of decision has come. The President must now put America’s words into action.
President Obama is in Seoul today for what promises to be a contentious meeting of the world’s leading economic powers. He probably won’t mollify China, Germany and other critics of the Federal Reserve’s plan to pump more money into the U.S. economy. But the President does have a chance to further his goal of doubling U.S. exports by bringing home an improved trade agreement with South Korea.
In addition to attending the G-20 summit, Obama is slated to meet with South Korean officials to finalize a bilateral free trade pact negotiated by President Bush. Congress has not ratified the treaty, which is snagged by concerns about U.S. auto exports to South Korea, as well as lawmakers’ eroding faith in the benefits of free trade. The president said in June that he had instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to have all the outstanding issues “lined up properly” before he arrived for this week’s visit, so he could close the deal with Korea and present the agreement to Congress again in the coming months.
South Korea isn’t just a major trade partner, it’s also a key strategic ally and a counterweight to China’s growing heft in the Asia-Pacific. Since its tariffs traditionally have been much higher than ours, there’s little doubt that the agreement would spur U.S. exports and help offset weak economic demand at home. It requires South Korea to lower its high taxes on U.S. farm goods and open markets for insurance and other services to American firms. As the treaty has languished in Congress, however, Seoul has been busy on other fronts, deepening economic ties with China and finalizing an important trade pact with the EU last month.
Although President Obama sounded an ambivalent note at best on trade during the 2008 presidential campaign, he understands that expanding U.S. exports is crucial both to creating jobs and shrinking America’s outsized trade deficits. Now that he’s made the Korean deal a top priority, we’ll find out if the newly Tea Party-infused GOP will be more amenable to passing the treaty than Congressional Democrats were.
The agreement would lower tariffs on auto imports on both sides. South Korea’s are higher — 8 percent compared to 2.5 percent here. (The United States also would gradually lower a 25 percent tariff on imported pickup trucks.) Nonetheless, U.S. auto makers, especially Ford, have argued that the treaty would not bring down cultural and non-tariff barriers that have confined their sales to a sliver of South Korea’s lucrative auto market.
They have a point. Seoul exports more than 400,000 vehicles (mostly Hyundais and Kias) to the United States each year, while manufacturing an additional 200,000 cars at U.S. plants. According the U.S. Commerce Department, U.S. auto makers sent a paltry 5,878 vehicles to South Korea in 2009. Ford’s Stephen Biegun notes that more than 70 percent of the cars made in South Korea are exported, while imports account for less than 10 percent of sales, well below the average of 40 percent in other economically advanced countries.
As an auto industry representative explained in testimony before Congress, Korea has an extensive web of non-tariff barriers that make it harder for foreign car makers to penetrate the Korean market. Some of these are technical regulations like emissions standards and even license plate size. Establishing a clear link between such policies and the small U.S. market share in Korea isn’t always easy. But there’s no doubt that some of Korea’s policies reflect a well-entrenched hostility toward imports. For example, until recently anyone in Korea who bought a foreign car would automatically have their income taxes audited—a policy that chilled demand even after it was officially ended.
Ford, America’s healthiest car maker, sees itself as the chief victim of South Korea’s import-unfriendly policies. That’s because General Motors, through its Daewoo subsidy, makes cars in South Korea, selling more than 100,000 locally and exporting hundreds of thousands more elsewhere (including to the United States).
What can President Obama do to resolve the impasse over autos and get the U.S.-South Korea agreement through the Senate? He can’t reopen negotiations, but he can use the presidential jawbone to win binding side agreements with Seoul to remove non-tariff barriers to U.S. auto exports. He could, in short, bring pressure on South Korea to fully liberalize its auto markets and embrace the reciprocal obligations that come with free trade. Much like his powerful message in New Delhi that “India has emerged,” the president needs to make the case that South Korea has also fully emerged as a mature economy, and it can no longer justify the kind of protectionist and mercantilist trade policies that are more typical of poorer developing countries.
A more aggressive stance would show that the President is serious about doubling U.S. exports. But there’s a complicating factor: the global spread of auto production, design and supply chains. That makes it hard to say just how “American” any given car really is, or how many U.S. jobs are engaged in making cars.
Nonetheless, as long as the answer is “greater than zero,” the President has an obligation to ensure that major U.S. trade partners offer as much access to their domestic markets as we do to ours. And the Korean pact presents him with an opportunity both to restore U.S. global leadership on trade liberalization and to integrate America more deeply into the world’s fastest-growing markets in East Asia.
The US was in an awkward position in Cancun. The administration clearly wanted to show leadership, but it was hamstrung by an inability to deliver legislation with any tangible commitments. Since that seemed unlikely to change in the new Congress, US negotiators were left playing defense on the key issue — mitigation.
Last Friday the AFL-CIO and several big unions came out against the U.S.-Korea free trade deal. As news, this was strictly “dog-bites-man” stuff. The bigger story is the appearance of cracks in Labor’s usually monolithic opposition to trade pacts.
The Center for New American Security (CNAS) just released a 
Beijing has arm-twisted 
Taking its cues 
The democratic cause lost an eloquent and effective champion yesterday when former Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) succumbed to cancer at age 70.
No sooner had Congress convened this week for a post-election, lame duck session than a partisan squabble erupted in the Senate that threatens to scuttle a major nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia.
It goes without saying that National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command are playing a significant role in defending military and government computer networks. It appears they’re now playing a role defending domestic U.S. civilian computer networks as well. In past statements, General Keith Alexander – head of NSA and Cyber Command – said that the DoD entities would not be involved in the protection of domestic civilian networks because it is the purview of the Department of Homeland Security. Despite those statements, a 
Just a few years ago, Lebanon appeared to be a foreign policy success for the United States. Outraged by the brutal assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (likely at the hands of Syria and its allies), the Lebanese people, bolstered by international support, succeeded in expelling Syrian military forces and asserting Lebanese sovereignty in 2005 for the first time in decades. And again in 2009, the Lebanese affirmed their support for the pro-Western ruling coalition, awarding them a solid majority of seats in Parliament during the May general elections.