The High Court Dismisses the Uighurs’ Case

On March 23 the Supreme Court was set to hear Kiyemba v. Obama, the most significant case regarding Guantanamo Bay detainees since it decided that detainees had the ability to challenge their detention through use of the constitutional right of habeas corpus. The question before the court in Kiyemba was whether if a Gitmo detainee is granted release by a federal court through a habeas corpus challenge the executive branch must let him go him even if it meant releasing them into the United States. Today, the court decided to avoid answering that question and sent Kiyemba back to a lower federal court.

Here’s a brief background of the case. The detainees involved in Kiyemba are members of a Chinese ethnic minority called the Uighurs. U.S. forces captured them at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan shortly after the beginning of operations there. The Uighurs were training to carry out terrorist attacks against China. They eventually ended up at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, and were held there for years despite the fact that they were not deemed to be enemy combatants. They were held because legal constraints prevented the U.S. from transferring them back to China due to the likelihood that they would be tortured — even executed — and the U.S. could not find another suitable country to accept them. The Uighurs filed the Kiyemba suit demanding they be set free even it if meant releasing them into the U.S.

The central issue in Kiyemba is this: What good is the right to challenge detention if there is not also a right to be released from incarceration? It seems logical that when a court decides that a prisoner is not being lawfully held, he is entitled to be released immediately. However, it is not so black and white with the Gitmo detainees.

There are serious concerns over releasing Gitmo detainees on U.S. soil. One is that a court could end up releasing a dangerous detainee because of shaky evidence that couldn’t be used for their prosecution. It has proven difficult for government attorneys to justify the continued detention of some detainees because evidence against them was classified, tainted by questionable interrogation techniques, rests with government operatives still overseas, or is based on questionable statements made by fellow detainees. This means that a dangerous detainee could actually be released into the U.S. because of a lack of reliable evidence to justify their detention.

Another legitimate concern is that even if a detainee was not a danger to the U.S. when they began their incarceration, they are now. As you can imagine, being wrongfully incarcerated by a country for years may lead to some pretty negative feelings toward that country – feelings that could be expressed violently.

Finally, there is the “not in my back yard” argument. No one is going to want former Gitmo detainees in their community. Even though a detainee may not be a legitimate security threat, a volatile situation could be created by citizens that are afraid of or angry at a detainee in their community.

Tackling difficult and complex issues is the Supreme Court’s most important job. Did the court punt on a major issue in this instance? Some might think so, but this case is different — the security concerns involving Gitmo detainees are very real and very serious.

The fact is that there are diplomatic solutions to the problem. In the Uighurs’ case, only five out of the original 22 Uighurs remain at Gitmo. The executive branch has been working hard to relocate them, and had recently persuaded Switzerland to take two of the men. In addition, the other detainees had been offered -– and refused – to be released to the island nation of Palau. The administration argued that those offers changed the circumstances under which the detainees’ challenge was brought in the first place -– an argument with which the court agreed.

By sending it back to the lower court, the Supreme Court forestalled having to rule on a difficult question. Indeed, if the remaining five Uighurs are released to another country, the judicial system will be able to avoid having to make a decision on the case. Once the Kiyemba case is resolved, the executive will have more time to relocate the remaining detainees at Gitmo, and hopefully will be able to right the constitutional ship through diplomatic efforts rather than by judicial order.

Two More Scooped Up in Zazi Case. Where Are Progressives?

Two men who were already in custody, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay, were charged (along with Najibullah Zazi) in a plot to attack New York’s subway system. The plot was derailed by federal agents back in September, just days before it was set to be executed.

Details of the plot continued to emerge at the previously scheduled hearing for the two men Thursday when Jeffrey Knox, the assistant U.S. attorney, strongly implied that Medunjanin and Ahmedzay were two of the operatives in the “three coordinated suicide-bombing attacks on Manhattan subways during rush hour.” Knox added that the plot was undertaken at the direct command of al Qaeda’s central leadership. That’s a heavy charge, and I’m normally skeptical of prosecutors making grandiose assertions to attract press attention. But — bin Laden’s direction or no — the fact remains that this was a very real plot with very real consequences.

After three significant arrests, I’ll restate the question I asked the other day: Where are progressives on this one? Yet again, we have a large-scale terrorist plot against a major American target that was successfully thwarted due to the good work and cooperation of our law enforcement and intelligence communities. The civilian court system has already gotten one guilty plea out of the ringleader (Zazi), and he’s continuing to provide intelligence. Progressives should be pounding their chests about a strong victory against a ruthless enemy.

But instead, as Greg Sargent at The Plum Line quotes one Democratic strategist saying, “We’re behaving like the President has a 30% approval rating. On these [national security] issues, Democrats inherently believe no one will believe our arguments” (a quote that admittedly was made before the Zazi guilty plea, though the sentiment still applies).

 

It’s time to snap out of it. I argued before that progressives have to respond to conservative attacks (if they’re brazen enough to criticize the Zazi case…wait a minute, I forgot who we’re dealing with here — of course they’re brazen enough), not on policy grounds, but with forceful rhetoric. National security is an emotional issue for Americans, not a policy one. Using the Zazi case to show our strength and smarts to contrast conservatives recklessness is an argument that continues to resonate. We’ve got great ammo — let’s use it.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/99887786@N00/ / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Leaving Iraq

Take a minute to soak in Tom Ricks’ column in NYT today. Here are a two key excerpts:

IRAQ’S March 7 national election, and the formation of a new government that will follow, carry huge implications for both Iraqis and American policy. It appears now that the results are unlikely to resolve key political struggles that could return the country to sectarianism and violence.  If so, President Obama may find himself later this year considering whether once again to break his campaign promises about ending the war, and to offer to keep tens of thousands of troops in Iraq for several more years. Surprisingly, that probably is the best course for him, and for Iraqi leaders, to pursue.

[…]

The political situation is far less certain, and I think less stable, than most Americans believe. … All the existential questions that plagued Iraq before the surge remain unanswered. How will oil revenue be shared among the country’s major groups? What is to be the fundamental relationship between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds? Will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what will be the role of Iran (for my money, the biggest winner in the Iraq war thus far)?

Ricks goes on to advocate slowing down the U.S. withdrawal, which can really only occur if the Iraqis offer to re-open negotiations on the status of forces agreement (SOFA). It was signed in the waning days of the Bush administration and establishes December 31, 2011, as the date when “all United States forces shall withdraw from Iraq.”

While the future in Iraq certainly continues to look murky and Ricks’ suggestion should be kept in mind, I don’t think we’re quite at the point of seriously debating a change to the SOFA just yet. Let’s wait until the March 7th elections have passed and the mood of the country and new government shake out until we think about it. After all, it’s not our call anyway — as the SOFA clearly states, “The United States recognizes the sovereign right of the Government of Iraq to request the departure of the United States Forces from Iraq at any time,” and that’s a politically weighty sentence to revisit if you’re a brand new Iraqi government.

That’s why I don’t think the announcement of General Odierno’s contingency plan to delay withdrawal is much of a definite harbinger at this point. That’s what the military does — it plans for things. They’re the best Boy Scouts (motto: Be Prepared) in the world. And just because it plans, doesn’t mean the commander-in-chief is about to put those plans in motion. After all, we have a plan on the books to attack Iran. And I’ve got $20 that says we have a plan to attack Canada.

But then again, invading Canada would make winning the hockey gold medal a lot less fun.

Progressives Need to Slam the Right With the Zazi Case

Najibullah Zazi pled guilty yesterday in what should be a major coup for the administration. Right now, they’re not exploiting it for all it’s worth.

First, some background: Zazi traveled from Colorado to New York with explosives in his car and the intention to detonate them in the New York subway, potentially killing hundreds of innocent Americans. The NYT is reporting that Zazi copped to it after DOJ pressured him into cooperation out of fear that the inquiry might widen to include other members of his family. As a part of the deal, prospectors believe he’ll prove a valuable source of information about his contacts in Pakistan, where he met with al Qaeda and learned to make the devices.

Though Zazi’s plea has been sealed by the judge, he has admitted to conspiracies to use weapons of mass destruction, to commit murder in a foreign country, and to provide material support for a terrorist organization. In exchange, he’ll reportedly be sentenced to a life term in a June 25th hearing. Leaving Zazi to anonymously rot in jail is a win-win for the USA in the worldwide PR battle with al Qaeda, too. Sentencing him to die denies terrorists the sickening prospect of using Zazi as a “martyr” in recruiting and financing propaganda. This is worth remembering when KSM’s sentencing comes around.

The case demonstrates that the intelligence community can partner with law enforcement agencies to provide swift, effective justice to those who would harm us. The American security apparatus “connected the dots” to prevent a major terrorist attack. What’s more, it shows that the Obama administration is committed to defeating terrorism and can apply the civilian justice system as part of that effort.

The bottom line is that this is an absolutely huge win for a sound, progressive worldview on national security. The good news is that Attorney General Eric Holder is out making the case. The bad news is that he’s making the case in the wrong way. Here’s a telling statement on the usefulness of the civilian court system from his press conference:

To take this tool [civilian courts] out of our hands, to denigrate this tool flies in the face of facts and is more about politics than it is about facts.

It’s a perfectly sound and correct argument. It’s also one that most Americans ignore.

It would be much more effective to frame the national security argument in terms of emotion, not wonkery. Americans want to hear that their country is strong, that we’re beating terrorism, and that we’re on the offensive in that fight. Using civilian courts shouldn’t be referred to as a “tool”; rather, the entire case should be framed as a “strong victory over those who are dedicated to killing us.”

Conservatives don’t care about facts. They fight these ideological battles on emotional grounds, and for decades their arguments have resonated more with Americans than progressive ones. I would rather have the AG preempting conservative attacks using the Zazi case by projecting an image of staunch, fist-pounding resolve to defend the country, not wonkishly responding to conservatives’ false assertions that civilian courts are weak.

Think I’m wrong? Look no farther than this WaPo/ABC poll that shows the only category that conservatives are “winning” on national security right now is the civilian courts vs. military courts argument, despite the civilian courts’ effectiveness in the Reid, Moussaoui, and, now, Zazi cases. Why? My hunch is that the emotional idea behind a military court simply projects a better image of strength, irrespective of the justice it may deliver.

Now is the time to go on the offensive. Progressives should use this very tangible example of progressive strength and smarts on national security and show that conservative approaches continue to be reckless. Or we could continue fighting this battle on conservatives’ terms and keep wasting our breath.

The Dalai Lama Does Democracy

It’s not hard to understand China’s angry reaction to President Obama’s meeting yesterday with the Dalai Lama. Beijing claims that Tibet’s spiritual leader is a “separatist,” but he has never demanded independence. Instead, the Dalai Lama has become a living symbol of ideals that China, for all its burgeoning strength, deeply fears: human rights, free expression, religious liberty and democracy.

Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, is unquestionably a thorn in Beijing’s side. Since being forced into exile in 1959, he has been a gentle but relentless opponent of China’s attempts to suppress Tibetan cultural and spiritual identity. The “simple Buddhist monk,” as he calls himself, won the Nobel Peace Prize for espousing nonviolence in the struggle for Tibetan autonomy within China.

The Dalai Lama is cut from the same mold as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., great moral leaders who rose to prominence by fusing the spiritual and the political. But where Gandhi and King couched their demands for justice in values honored (if in the breach) by their oppressors, the Dalai Lama confronts a Chinese regime that rejects liberal ideals as exclusively Western. On the contrary, it vaunts the superiority of  “Asian values” of order, social harmony, and deference to authority.

Of course, the Dalai Lama’s rejection of violence, his refusal to foment ethnic hatred, and his calls for dialogue with Beijing, are prudent as well as grounded in the values of Tibetan Buddhism. After all, there are only six million Tibetans living in close proximity to over a billion Han Chinese. But as Carl Gershman noted today at a packed ceremony at the Library of Congress, the Dalai Lama’s approach also has “preserved the moral integrity” of the Tibetan cause and left open the door to a future reconciliation with a less insecure, more tolerant Chinese government.

Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy, presented the Dalai Lama with NED’s Democracy Service Medal. The award is intended to highlight what Gershman called an underappreciated dimension of the Dalai Lama’s work – his staunch support for democracy. Over the years, Tibetan exiles in India have developed representative institutions and held elections to select political leaders. Such efforts, of course, only aggravate China more by giving the lie to its claims that democracy isn’t for Asians. In this sense, Gershman noted, Tibet is not a mere sideshow; its fate is linked to that of China’s intrepid dissidents and democracy activists.

They too deserve recognition and moral support from U.S. political leaders, even if that too chafes China’s ruling elites.

Another Top Taliban Bites The Dust… For Now

The English language online version of Der Spiegel is reporting that Mullah Abdul Salam — a big-fish Taliban commander who has been responsible for recent attacks against German forces stationed in northern Afghanistan — has been arrested by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Salam has been described by both Der Spiegel and the LA Times as the “shadow governor” of province of Kunduz. While Salam doesn’t appear to be the critical lynch-pin that Mullah Baradar was, the LAT explains:

In Kunduz, a once-quiet corner of Afghanistan, Salam presided over a major buildup of Taliban forces over the last 18 months. The insurgents took over entire districts, repeatedly attacked Afghan security posts, harried NATO troops in the province — who were mainly Germans — and menaced a NATO supply line running through Kunduz.

One of the worst civilian-casualty episodes of the war occurred in August after suspected Taliban fighters hijacked a fuel truck. The Germans, fearing the vehicle would be used for an attack on their main base in Kunduz, called in an airstrike that killed dozens of insurgents — and also dozens of civilians.

Late last year, a series of raids, carried out mainly by U.S. special forces, drove the insurgents underground in Kunduz, but their presence remained a threat.

What in the dickens is going on here? As is eloquently detailed in Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars, the ISI essentially started and supported the Taliban throughout the ’90s, and has an institutional culture that has been loathe to crack down on its own project.

Why now? Why has the ISI suddenly decided to wrap-up two significant Taliban commanders in two days, a batting average that makes them look like Ted Williams compared to their standard impersonation of the 1987 Cleveland Indians’ Otis Nixon (I’ll spare you the click — .059 BA).

Consider this: By arresting these guys, the ISI is amassing credit and power. Sure, you could say that the Americans have finally convinced the Pakistanis that it’s in Islamabad’s interest to side with Washington. In the long-term, it definitely is.  But as the strategic landscape shifts and there may be some sort of negotiation with the Taliban (ill-advised though that may be, in my opinion), the ISI is simply collecting all the big cards in its own hand.

The bottom line is that nothing’s for certain just yet — the ISI could continue to cooperate with the Americans, or simply look the other way during an escape attempt, just like the Yemenis.

China and the Cyber Threat

James Fallows of The Atlantic has an excellent piece on China and the cyber threat (as well as some other points on the Chinese military). A few excerpts about cybersecurity:

China has hundreds of millions of Internet users, mostly young. In any culture, this would mean a large hacker population; in China, where tight control and near chaos often coexist, it means an Internet with plenty of potential outlaws and with carefully directed government efforts, too. In a report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission late last year, Northrop Grumman prepared a time line of electronic intrusions and disruptions coming from sites inside China since 1999. In most cases it was impossible to tell whether the activity was amateur or government-planned, the report said. But whatever their source, the disruptions were a problem. And in some instances, the “depth of resources” and the “extremely focused targeting of defense engineering data, US military operational information, and China-related policy information” suggested an effort that would be “difficult at best without some type of state-sponsorship.”

[…]

[Cyber authorities] stressed that Chinese organizations and individuals were a serious source of electronic threats—but far from the only one, or perhaps even the main one. You could take this as good news about U.S.-China relations, but it was usually meant as bad news about the problem as a whole.

[…]

This led to another, more surprising theme: that the main damage done to date through cyberwar has involved not theft of military secrets nor acts of electronic sabotage but rather business-versus-business spying. Some military secrets have indeed leaked out, the most consequential probably being those that would help the Chinese navy develop a modern submarine fleet. And many people said that if the United States someday ended up at war against China—or Russia, or some other country—then each side would certainly use electronic tools to attack the other’s military and perhaps its civilian infrastructure. But short of outright war, the main losses have come through economic espionage. “You could think of it as taking a shortcut on the ‘D’ of R&D,” research and development, one former government official said.

And Fallows adds one general extraordinarily striking cautionary note that has little to do with China, but that all policy makers should pay attention to:

[N]early everyone in the business believes that we are living in, yes, a pre-9/11 era when it comes to the security and resilience of electronic information systems. Something very big—bigger than the Google-China case—is likely to go wrong, they said, and once it does, everyone will ask how we could have been so complacent for so long. Electronic-commerce systems are already in a constant war against online fraud. [emphasis added]

The entire piece is worth your time, but those are the big highlights. From my perspective, I’ve seen first-hand how the Pentagon is well-aware of the threat and is devoting substantial assets to detect and disrupt the intrusions. I’m not just talking about the NSA’s new cyber command either — cyber is the hot, new frontier and that creates incentives for every agency under the sun to grab a few million smackers from the budget for working the issue. But where’s the line between effective cyber defense and too many agencies tripping over one another?

What the Capture of the Taliban’s Commander Means

The capture of Mullah Baradar, the Taliban’s top military commander, is indeed very welcome news. If you want the full scoop on Baradar, read Ron Moreau’s Newsweek profile of him from last August, which depicts Baradar’s role thusly:

Baradar appoints and fires the Taliban’s commanders and governors; presides over its top military council and central ruling Shura in Quetta, the city in southwestern Pakistan where most of the group’s senior leaders are based; and issues the group’s most important policy statements in his own name. It is key that he controls the Taliban’s treasury—hundreds of millions of dollars in narcotics protection money, ransom payments, highway tolls, and “charitable donations,” largely from the Gulf.

[…]

Baradar determines much of the Taliban’s grand strategy as well. In late 2007 he ordered Taliban forces to focus their attacks on disrupting the flow of U.S. and NATO military supplies, and to push closer to the cities, especially Kabul. U.S. military chiefs were dismayed by his success.

[…]

Partly because of Baradar’s strong roots among the Popalzai—Afghanistan’s largest and most influential Pashtun tribe—he could bring a number of tribal leaders onboard in the event of serious peace talks. But for now, Taliban leaders seem convinced that negotiations are merely a ploy to peel off elements of the insurgency, which U.S. commanders have more or less acknowledged. “We see no benefit for the country or Islam in such kind of talks,” Baradar told NEWSWEEK.

Taking Baradar into custody not only removes a critical operational commander from the field of battle, but also has the potential to be a treasure trove of intelligence about ongoing Taliban operations. And though I think that Pakistan’s security services will continue to play both sides, this operation is one piece of notable collaboration between the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

What should we expect? We should keep in mind a tried and true axiom — we can’t kill or capture our way to victory. As is the pattern after most high-value terrorist/guerilla arrests, Baradar will be almost immediately replaced, likely by a younger and less experienced operative who will maintain a substantial though degraded medium-term operational tempo. These are the kinds of arrests that prove the administration is serious about degrading the Taliban’s capabilities.

But based on this high-value pattern, I expect to see a near-term spike in Taliban attacks as the group attempts to prove its continued viability. It will be interesting to see what sort of effect the arrest has on the ongoing battle at Marja (a Taliban stronghold in the Helmund province), a joint U.S.-Afghan operation that could have been timed to knock the Taliban further on their heels during a period of internal instability.

The GOP on Terrorism: Hypocritical, Disingenuous, Ineffective

This is unbelievably rich. Check out this exchange from Dick Cheney’s appearance on the ABC’s “This Week” on Sunday:

DICK CHENEY: I think, in fact, the situation with respect to al Qaeda, to say that, you know, that was a big attack we had on 9/11, but it’s not likely again, I just think that’s dead wrong. I think the biggest strategic threat the United States faces today is the possibility of another 9/11 with a nuclear weapon or a biological agent of some kind. And I think al Qaeda is out there even as we meet, trying to figure out how to do that.

JONATHAN KARL, ABC NEWS: And do you think that the Obama administration is taking the necessary steps to prevent that?

CHENEY: I think they need to do everything they can to prevent, and if the mindset is it’s not likely, then it’s difficult to mobilize the resources and get people to give it the kind of priority that it deserves.

Every time Dick Cheney claims or infers that the Obama administration isn’t fighting al Qaeda as hard as the Bush administration supposedly did, repeat after me: Remember the Iraq War? If the Bush administration was as focused on al Qaeda as Dick Cheney misremembers, would we have gone into Iraq?

It’s even more astounding that Republicans are so desparate to criticize the administration on national security that they’re now claiming that the Obama administration is being too harsh. You read that correctly. Here’s Sen. Kit Bond (R-MO), the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee:

Over a year after taking office, the administration has still failed to answer the hard questions about what to do if we have the opportunity to capture and detain a terrorist overseas, which has made our terror-fighters reluctant to capture and left our allies confused. If given a choice between killing or capturing, we would probably kill.

If Senator Bond will take the flowers out of his hair for a second, he might remember an exchange with CIA Director Leon Panetta as Panetta revealed the cancellation of a legally questionable CIA program to kill al Qaeda operatives. Bond seemed far more in favor of killing AQ members back in July when he asked the director:

Why would you cancel [the program to kill AQ operatives]? If the CIA weren’t trying to do something like this, we’d be asking ‘Why not?’ “

I guess he was for it before he was against it.

Keep in mind that none of the Republican attacks on national security are working anyway, as evidenced by the latest polls.

Obama and the Push for Middle East Democracy

Francis Fukuyama is often derided in progressive circles because he was one of the architects of neoconservatism. Fair enough — when you’re one of the intellectual driving forces behind the Iraq War, that’s going to cost some credibility down the road. But Fukuyama’s shaky track record goes back even farther, when he predicted in 1992’s The End of History and The Last Man that the end of the Cold War essentially signaled the end of ideological struggle between civilizations. Someone forgot to tell that to al Qaeda.

With all that behind him, it’s understandable why some would be leery about paying him heed now. But Fukuyama’s most recent WSJ op-ed is actually worth your time. Fukuyama’s piece focuses on democracy promotion in the Middle East, a policy that has traction with groups across the political spectrum, including PPI, the National Democratic InstituteThe Project on Middle East Democracy, and the International Republican Institute. And if a high-profile neoconservative acknowledges the failings of the Bush administration and smartly pushes the current administration on a sound policy, then we should pay attention. He says:

While Mr. Obama paid lip service to the need for greater Middle East democracy in his June 2009 Cairo speech to the Muslim world, he has done very little concretely to back this up in terms of quiet pressure for democratic change on the part of allies like Egypt, Jordan or Morocco. Indeed, the administration’s ramping up of military support for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of the attempted Christmas day airliner bombing suggests that we’ve gone back to the traditional U.S. policy of reliance on Arab strongmen.

This would be a big mistake. For the core premises of the Freedom Agenda remain essentially correct, even as its enunciation in the midst of the Iraq invasion undercut its credibility. Mr. Obama runs the risk of falling in bed with the same set of Middle Eastern authoritarians and alienating broad political populations in the region. …

The problem with the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda wasn’t its fundamental analysis, but the way that it was articulated in the midst of the highly unpopular Iraq war. Democracy promotion was used from the start to justify the invasion, and in the eyes of many Arabs became synonymous with American occupation….

Mr. Obama arrived in office with none of this baggage, and therefore had an opportunity to recommit the United States to peaceful democratic change. But the window is rapidly closing as the U.S. draws closer to the region’s authoritarian rulers.

While I’m not sure that the Obama administration’s focus on Yemen undercuts the Cairo speech in the way Fukuyama suggests, I think the general point is valid. After all, the trick is protecting America’s immediate interests while encouraging openness over the long term. So how to strike that balance? I’d recommend checking out a few of POMED’s publications, like those here. Or, check out a paper Shadi Hamid wrote for PPI last year.

High Noon in Tehran

Iranians are bracing for violent clashes in the streets of Tehran today, the Islamic Republic’s 31st anniversary. Both the government and the opposition Green Movement are calling for demonstrations to mark the occasion.

Reza Aslan, a PPI friend and contributor, says the regime’s increasingly brutal crackdown on domestic dissent has brought Iran to the verge of civil war. Other observers fear a Tiananmen Square-style massacre that could cripple the democratic opposition, which flared up after last summer’s rigged elections.

Meanwhile, Iran’s rulers are promising rude surprises for their external critics, too. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad warns of a “telling blow” Thursday, while Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, threatens a “punch” for the United States and other countries that have worked to end Iran’s nuclear program.

Such cryptic belligerence no doubt reflects the regime’s desire to distract the world’s attention from its increasingly shaky position at home. The mullahs’ old tactic of whipping up paranoia and striking defiant poses against supposed U.S. or Western plots is wearing thin. A broad cross-section of Iranian society seems focused instead on the Islamic Republic’s metamorphosis into an Islamic police state.

“The Islamic Republic is nothing but an economic-religious-military complex that applies its coercive power not through political institutions but through a military and security apparatus under the direct supervision of Ayatollah Khamenei,” said Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy at a congressional hearing last week. No “engagement” with opponents for this regime; instead, it has unleashed its vast security apparatus on Iranian society. Scores of anti-government protestors have been killed and hundreds more imprisoned. Prominent regime opponents have been subjected to totalitarian-style show trials, and the government has announced plans to execute nine protesters. The government is relentless in policing the internet, jamming foreign broadcasts and blocking contacts with the outside world.

Ahmadinejad underscored his contempt for global opinion last weekend in announcing that Iran will begin enriching uranium to higher levels, bringing it much closer to fuel that can easily be “weaponized.” He also threatened, implausibly, to build 10 more nuclear plants over the next year. In any case, Ahmadinejad’s latest antics should have been an embarrassment to China, which has been blocking tougher sanctions because, it claims, the regime is ready to deal on enrichment.

How should the United States react to these and coming provocations? Not by intensifying efforts to “engage” the regime in talks focused narrowly on the nuclear dispute. Washington needs to broaden its angle of vision to encompass the Iranian people’s struggle for freedom and democracy. Twice before, in 1953 and 1979, America failed to side with such popular aspirations, sacrificing our own ideals to the logic of superpower rivalry. It was a bad bargain then, and we can’t afford to make the same mistake again.

Leaders of the Green Movement have made it clear they neither expect nor need America’s help in their struggle. But without offering direct support to democratic reformers, the United States should be more vocal in defending human rights in Iran. And, together with our European partners, we should justify stricter sanctions on human rights grounds as well as nonproliferation.

And as Khalaji noted, “The threat to regional peace and Iranian democracy are the same: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).” The Corps is in charge of Iran’s nuclear program, and is Khamenei’s chief instrument for political suppression. It also funnels Iranian aid and arms to extremist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as Shia militants in Iraq and other Sunni-majority countries.

Of course, Washington should keep probing for signs of Iranian tractability on the nuclear issue. But the United States should be wary of doing anything now -– either by overreacting to its bluster, or rushing to engage in high level talks –- that would boost the sagging prestige of the Iranian leadership and the IRGC. Over the long haul, political change inside Iran is our surest guarantee of safety.

Not Working: Republicans’ Assault on Obama’s National Security Policies

A new ABC News/Washington Post poll confirms what we already knew: Republicans may be hammering away at Obama for being soft on terrorism, but the public isn’t listening.

Since the Christmas Day bombing attempt, the percentage of Americans who approve of the White House’s handling of terrorism has actually increased by 3 percentage points, from 53 to 56 percent between November and now (39 percent disapprove). Respondents also gave the president a five-percent edge over Republicans on the question of who is more capable of handling terrorism issues. Public attitudes have shifted, however, on the issue federal courts vs. military tribunals — the number supporting federal courts has slipped a full eight points since the end of last year.

It’s slightly curious that Republicans view terrorism as such a winner, especially because the only effect they’re having is on the electorally dubious issue of which mechanism should be used to try suspects. Even there, the administration has made arguments in favor of federal trials (like the one that sentenced shoe bomber Richard Reid to life) that are only now taking hold.

So why are Republicans continuing to hammer away? I imagine its a bunch of factors. The anti-Obama sentiment has them pushing back on absolutely everything (even if they supported the same policies under Bush), they really believe Obama is a weakling, and they fundamentally misunderstand national security in the 21st century. It’s also an issue that really fires up the conservative base almost as much as taxes, and that will be important to motivate volunteers and donors in an election year.

Take Sarah Palin’s remarks at the Tea Party Convention. She said, “We need a commander-in-chief, not a professor of law.” The truth is that in the fight against terrorism — if we really stand a chance at long-term American security — we need the president to be both. And a clear majority of the public believes he is.

Miranda Rights and the Public Safety Exception

Over the last couple of weeks, Republicans have been going hard against the administration over its handling of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian man being held for attempting to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day.

On January 26, several high-ranking Senate Republicans sent a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder asserting that the administration rushed into giving Abdulmutallab constitutional Miranda rights without first coordinating with all necessary national security agencies and ignored him as a possible “intelligence resource.” This week, Newt Gingrich appeared on “The Daily Show” to slam the “mirandizing” of Abdulmutallab (falsely claiming that the same treatment for “shoe bomber” Richard Reid was fine because he was a U.S. citizen — Reid is British), while Sen. Kit Bond (R-MO) called for the removal of John Brennan, the White House’s top counterterrorism official.

Last week, Holder wrote a five-page letter to Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, defending the administration’s actions. Holder cited numerous incidents in the past in which terrorists had been apprehended, given constitutional rights, and then successfully cultivated as intelligence assets.

Despite what the Republicans claim, authorities can, in fact, obtain intelligence from terror suspects after Miranda rights are given. Moreover, there is a legal provision that could allow them to question terrorists before granting them their Miranda rights. As Holder stated in his letter, there is a public safety exception to the Miranda rule that allows authorities to question a suspect before reading him his Miranda rights if they believe an immediate danger to public safety exists.

Here’s how it works. Authorities on the scene of a terrorist act or attempt can make the determination whether or not a danger to public safety exists. If authorities determine that such a danger exists, as would be the case in almost any terrorist attack or attempted attack, they could invoke the public safety exception to allow them to question the suspect for some time before reading them their Miranda rights. After authorities are satisfied that they have gathered the information necessary to protect against imminent threats, the prisoner can then be given his rights. The suspect can challenge the use of the public safety exception and the length of questioning in a subsequent court hearing, where it would be up to a judge to decide whether use of the exception was justified. In clear-cut cases like Abdulmutallab’s, the exception would almost certainly always be upheld.

The public safety exception to Miranda was used in Abdulmutallab’s case. But in a way, that’s beside the point: Reports indicate that Abdulmutallab continues to give up valuable intelligence even after his rights were read to him. It’s an important point to remember: the public safety exception need not be a precondition to extracting information from suspected terrorists. Questioning after Miranda can take place with the suspect’s attorney present, which obviously can yield good information, as is reportedly the case with Abdulmutallab.

I tire of the notion, so often trumpeted by conservatives, that protecting constitutional rights and protecting national security are diametrically opposed ideas. Holder’s letter points out that even the Bush administration charged over 300 people with terrorism-related charges under the civilian justice system, with all traditional constitutional rights respected. We’ve used existing civilian law to combat terrorism in the past, and there is no reason to discontinue the practice now. America’s principles have endured for more than two centuries. Compromising them now is unnecessary and it will not make us safer.

The views expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

Cheney’s Terrorists

The following is a guest column from Major General Donald Edwards, Vermont Army National Guard (Ret.), who served in the military for 37 years.

Just last week, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair declared with certainty that there will be another terrorist attack aimed at the United States within the next six months. With the Obama administration pursuing record numbers of drone attacks and taking out top al-Qaeda leaders, it’s hard to understand how this could be the case. But the paradox becomes clearer if we take a quick trip back through time to examine the track record of one particular individual: Vice President Dick Cheney.

As a former military officer, it is immensely difficult to speak out against our former vice president. While he was in office, I believed that it was inappropriate to criticize Dick Cheney. But now that he is no longer in government, I am compelled to speak my mind about his disastrous national security policies.

In the days and years following September 11, 2001, Vice President Cheney stood out as the chief architect of a calamitous approach to U.S. foreign policy that resulted in a weakened United States and the recruitment of a new generation of terrorists dedicated to anti-American jihad. The Bush-Cheney contribution to terrorist recruitment is clear from the numbers: In 2000, there were 423 international terrorist attacks. The Iraq War heralded a sharp spike in terrorist attacks, which continued with a 607 percent average yearly increase. Eight years later, there were 11,770 international terrorist attacks, as the terrorists birthed by the Bush-Cheney policies grew up.

Unlike Dick Cheney, who glorifies conflict but has never put his own body on the line, I am a retired military officer. I know firsthand the long list of security threats that our country faces. And I know that Cheney’s reckless strategy, out of touch with today’s threats, made that list longer. The first rule of grand strategy – from Sun Tzu to General Petraeus – is to choose your own battlefield. On September 12, 2001, the United States was in a position to frame the security threats of the new century as the world united against violent, radical extremists. Osama bin Laden, on the other hand, was eager to frame his battle as the West versus Islam. The Bush administration walked onto al-Qaeda’s battlefield and began fighting Osama bin Laden’s war.

As even former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld realized, winning the fight against al-Qaeda requires killing more terrorists than we create. Instead, Cheney served as a prime recruiter for our enemies. Al-Qaeda featured Guantanamo Bay in its recruiting videos, citing its evasion of the Geneva Conventions as “evidence” of American’s lack of moral standing and antipathy toward Islam.

Defeating al-Qaeda turns on human intelligence, which requires careful infiltration, relationship-building, cultural research, and triangulation of information. But conservatives based their intelligence-gathering tactics on Hollywood movies: bust a knee cap hard enough, and the truth will pour out like blood. In reality, interrogators rarely know whether they have the right knee cap — and even if they do, actual intelligence agents know that busting it is likely to yield a string of lies, misinformation, and false leads. Instead of generating information and creating leads, Cheney’s strategy led to an Arab generation growing up on images of Abu Ghraib.

Finally, quashing al-Qaeda requires focusing on the countries where the movement had built relationships and infrastructure. For over a decade, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership had lived in and erected training camps along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Meanwhile, Bin Laden’s roots lie in Yemen, and he repeatedly recruited the radically loyal tribes originating in that country for his riskiest missions. Yet the past administration ignored Yemen and starved Afghanistan for troops in order to launch a war in Iraq, where there were no terrorists. Terrorist attacks spiked following the invasion of Iraq, and have continued to grow since.

For a generation of young Arabs now in the prime terrorist age range of 18-25, September 11 was their first political memory. The Bush-Cheney strategy handed Al Qaeda the colors they needed to paint a false picture of “America versus Islam.” It produced hundreds of terrorists who learned that they could be heroes by fighting the West — the West that tortured and indefinitely detained Arab brethren and killed women and children.

And to think we had an opportunity, in the wake of 9/11, to bring about a smarter, more hopeful strategy. America was unified and ready to sacrifice on September 12. If our leaders had called on the best and brightest to learn Arabic or join the CIA, we would now have a flood of fresh intelligence experts. If they had asked us to declare our independence from oil – demanding that auto companies innovate and asking environmentalists to accept a resurgence of nuclear power – we would have stopped funding the bullets that are now going into terrorist guns.

We have not heard the last from Cheney’s terrorists. We cannot waste another day. We must act immediately to build the covert networks we need to fight terrorists. We must prioritize shutting down Guantanamo — a gift that keeps on giving for Al Qaeda — and not make it a political football. And we must understand that, as we did during the fight against the Soviet Union, claiming the higher ground in the debate is strategically important. Cheney sold America’s greatest weapon – our moral authority and our freedoms — on the cheap. Let’s win it back, before more of Cheney’s terrorists strike again.

Update: The original version of this piece did not include the author’s full rank and title. We regret the error.

Human Rights Really Is the Key

Here I sit in my soon-to-be snowbound DC office, preparing for the certain doom that lurks behind the next menacing cloud. I should be standing in line with 542 of my neighbors at Safeway, buying two weeks’ worth of bread, milk, frozen pizzas, and Miller Lites for this 36-hour storm, but instead, I’m too busy brooding on the notion that the Obama administration has to do a better job on human rights.

A few days ago on Iranian television, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad let it slip that after months of heel-dragging, outright refusal, and/or disinterest, he was suddenly intrigued by a long-dead international uranium swap, designed to remove low-enriched uranium from Iran in exchange for higher-enriched uranium needed by Iran’s medical facilities. I’m brushing over the details, but the goal of the exchange was to provide Iran with uranium required for humanitarian purposes while denying Tehran the practice of performing the enrichment — an experience that could be applied to making a nuclear bomb.

Ahmadinejad isn’t really serious about suddenly embracing the international community’s offer, of course. But by appearing interested in continuing dialogue, Iran was attempting to drive a wedge between members of the UN Security Council as talk of new sanctions against the regime are discussed. Guess what? It’s working. China, a veto-wielding member of the Security Council that isn’t too hot on punishing a fellow despotic regime, has reacted positively to Ahmadinejad’s overtures, calling any discussion of sanctions now premature in light of a possible diplomatic solution.

It’s a critical juncture — any diplomat worth his salt knows that the international community shouldn’t back away, but should keep pushing sanctions to force Tehran to prove its seriousness. But China is letting them off the hook. Why? In part, it’s because China has the U.S. back on its heels.

Consider two recent events: The U.S. agreed to sell $6.4 billion of military equipment to Taiwan, and President Obama set a meeting with the Dalai Lama. The Chinese continue to warn that such actions endanger U.S.-China relations and they profess to be deeply offended. The pattern of events is clear — the U.S. does something, China gets offended, and the U.S. is thrown on its heels.

It’s time to level the playing field. Instead of having to explain or apologize for American actions, the Obama adminstration should knock China off the offensive by opening another diplomatic front: human rights. Every time China is offended for something we’ve done, the Obama administration has to hit right back, and hard, about China’s disregard for basic rights and freedoms. Secretary Clinton’s speech on Internet freedom was a good start, but the issue needs to be highlighted every time the Chinese take offense at an American decision. It puts China on the defensive by having to explain their actions, and would free the White House to pressure China on other issues, like Iran — another candidate for the same human rights treatment.

Charters and Civil Rights

Gary Orfield, a UCLA education professor, has long been the nation’s foremost chronicler of racial segregation in schools. According to today’s Washington Post, a new study by Orfield’s Civil Rights Project shows that public charter schools are less racially diverse than traditional schools.

“As the country continues moving steadily toward greater segregation and inequality of education for students of color in schools with lower achievement and graduation rates, the rapid growth of charter schools has been expanding a sector that is even more segregated than the public schools,” the report concludes.

This assertion seems suspect on several grounds, and it illustrates the pitfalls of viewing the public charter school movement through the frame of the nation’s great school integration battles of the 1960s and 1970s.

For one thing, minority families are freely choosing charter schools. In the bad old days of Jim Crow, they were forced to attend segregated schools. Later, as many whites fled the cities to avoid sending their children to integrated schools, black families were left behind and had no choice but to attend their local district school. As Orfield and others have documented, this “re-segregation” in impoverished urban neighborhoods was a disaster for big city school systems.

Public school choice arose in Minnesota in the late 1980s to give parents the option to send their children to schools outside their local districts. The charter school idea was conceived in part as a way to bring innovative public schools to the students, rather than forcing them to travel to other districts to find them.

The Charter Record in D.C.

 

As it happens, Washington is in the vanguard of the public charter movement (full disclosure: I’m a member of the D.C. Public Charter School Board). About 84 percent of charter school students here are black, compared with 78 percent in traditional public schools. Why have so many charters located in poor and working-class minority neighborhoods? Because it is precisely the kids in those communities who urgently need better education options. The city’s regular public schools have historically ranked near the bottom in comparisons of major urban education systems, although Mayor Adrian Fenty and Chancellor Michele Rhee have launched a determined effort to lift their performance.

The city’s 58 charter schools have given low-income black and Latino children something they never had before: a choice of where to attend school, as well as an array of innovative learning programs tailored to diverse interests and learning styles. That 28,000, or 38 percent, of D.C.’s students have exercised that choice — in effect voting with their feet — attests to the need for new options. And the shrinking of the traditional school sector’s “market share” was no doubt a big factor behind Fenty’s decision to take it over.

The important question, as Charter School Board Vice Chairman Brian Jones observed to the Post, is not the racial composition of charters, it’s whether they are providing a better education than traditional schools.

The answer is fiercely contested in the research community. Here the evidence is mixed: Many of the District’s best schools are charters, but not all charters are performing well. That’s why our Board has shut down four schools and accepted the voluntary surrender of charters from seven more since 2003.

Why Segregation Is Not the Issue

 

There’s considerable irony here. When I was advocating for charter schools back in the early 1990s, many Democrats in my native Virginia and other southern states were suspicious. Given the region’s bad racial history, they feared that charters would become a new, publicly funded version of the old “segregation academies” – private schools to which white families turned to avoid sending their children to school with blacks. That’s one reason Virginia has lagged in charter school innovation.

In this respect, the Orfield report indirectly raises a very interesting question: Why aren’t there more charter schools in white neighborhoods in Washington and other major cities? Given that the dismal reputation of urban education is a chief catalyst for suburban flight, more charters might be a good way to keep more middle-class families (white and black) in the urban core.

If charters are less racially diverse than other public schools, it’s largely because they are cropping up in the urban communities that desperately need school innovation and choice. Since many charters aim at closing the educational achievement gap between white and minority students, it seems perverse to cast them as agents of school segregation.

There is a civil rights issue here, but with all respect to Gary Orfield, it’s not segregation. It’s that too many low-income black, Latino, and immigrant students are trapped in dysfunctional urban school systems.