Speedy Elections

As noted yesterday, the 2012 presidential election cycle is already informally underway, and will get very real the day after the midterm elections on November 2.

By comparison, check out our older cousins in the United Kingdom. Today Prime Minister Gordon Brown set the date for his country’s next general election: 30 days from now.

Now obviously, electioneering in Britain is not totally confined to the formal period of the campaign, but much of it actually does take place in the sprint to election day, and that’s the case in most other democracies as well. It helps illustrate one of the major drawbacks of our own system, in which constitutionally fixed general election dates allow campaigning for major offices to creep back through the calendar relentlessly.

As for the likely outcome of the UK elections, the Conservatives have long led in the polls, which is unsurprising given the long tenure of Labour control (13 years), and the condition of the economy. But the Tory gap over Labour has been shrinking lately, and if it continues to shrink, what looked like an almost certain Tory victory a year ago could turn into a narrow advantage producing a “hung parliament” — i.e., where no party has a majority in the House of Commons. That scenario could create a minority government in which either the Tories or Labour form a coalition with the third-party Liberal Democrats, or if negotiations with the LibDems fail, another quick election.

American Republicans looking to the British elections as a possible harbinger of good things to come here at home should take note of Tory leader David Cameron’s repeated pledged that protecting the National Health Service — a.k.a., “socialized medicine” in the real, not (as with ObamaCare) imaginary sense — will be his “top priority.” Tories have also been blasting Brown for exceesively austere fiscal policies. So a Tory victory, if it happens, wouldn’t exactly be transferable to the U.S.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/secretlondon/ / CC BY-SA 2.0

Presidential Field Hockey

The 2012 presidential cycle doesn’t officially begin until November 3, but the Republican field will start being seriously shaped this week down in New Orleans, at the Southern Republican Leadership Conference. Confirmed speakers include no fewer than nine people who have been “mentioned” as possible presidential candidates: Sarah Palin, Mike Huckabee, Newt Gingrich, Rick Perry, Ron Paul, Mike Pence, Rick Santorum, Haley Barbour and Bobby Jindal. Tim Pawlenty will address the event by videotape. Mitt Romney, who may be playing the traditional front-runner’s game of avoiding appearances with his lilliputian rivals, will be missing; he’s off hawking copies of his book in — two guesses where! — New Hampshire.

Other than the usual straw poll of attendees (with the main question being whether Ron Paul’s young supporters will flood the event like they did at the CPAC conference in February), and the usual informal assessments of the speeches, here are some other sources of intrigue: (1) Will any or all of Mitt’s rivals blast him for prevarication on similaries between RomneyCare and ObamaCare? (2) How many of the presidentials will claim close kinship with the Tea Party Movement? (3) Will any of them formally disclaim candidacy? (4) How bloody will the rhetorical red meat get? (5) Who if any of them will try to get media plaudits for a calm, substantive approach? and (6) Will any new “true conservative” limus tests be laid down?

The New Orleans event could represent quite a presidential field hockey match. And in case you think it’s crazy to be talking about the 2012 presidential race, remember this: it’s just 21 months til the Iowa Caucuses!

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

End of a Delusion

It’s certainly taken a while, but as we head towards the Tea Party Movement’s holy day of April 15, it seems to finally be sinking in among the commentariat that these people did not come out of nowhere or arise spontaneously from an aroused populace, but are instead simply the same old conservative Republicans who used to be so boring back in the day. A new poll of the Tea Folk by Gallup seems to have spurred this realization along, though some gabbers may persist in being baffled by the high number of Tea Partiers who self-identify as independents. The Atlantic‘s Marc Ambinder explains it to them:

[I]t’s true that just half of those Tea Partiers surveyed called themselves Republicans. Yes, the lion’s share of the other half say they’re independent. But they’re not: they’re Republican-oriented conservative voters who are dismayed by the direction of the GOP and who don’t want to identify with the party’s brand. That’s not surprising, given how tarnished that brand is. Only 8% identify as Democratic; 7% identify as liberal; 70% percent identify as conservative; two-thirds are pro-life; nearly 90% were opposed to the health care bill.

This is a very old story, one that arguably goes all the way back to the 1940s. At any given moment, a significant number of conservative Republicans don’t want to call themselves Republicans because their leadership is not, in their view, conservative enough. This is one reason why Republican self-identification numbers have chronically undershot Republican votes in actual elections. At particularly difficult moments, conservative Republicans have even threatened to form a third party — as in the mid-1970s, when National Review publisher William Rusher argued that conservatives should leave the GOP to it’s “elitist” establishment and make common cause with Wallacites and other social conservatives in a “producer’s party.” Such threats today are no more unusual, or credible, but do help encourage Republican office-holders to follow their own inclination to hew to the Right.

As the (apparent) novelty of the Tea Party wears off, its familiar outlines should become apparent, except to those with a strong bias in favor of misunderstanding the phenomenon. In an interesting column today, Mark Schmitt of The American Prospect discusses those left-progressives who persist in helplessly hoping for a “populist” alliance with the Tea Folk. Part of the allure, he suspects, involves some progressive self-loathing:

[F]inding allies among Tea Partiers is the equivalent of what finding a black friend was to liberals in the 1960s. It’s a way to get in touch with the real America, to feel a little superior, a little less elitist or isolated, less wimpy, less conformist.But the real America is at least as likely to be found in the 205 million voting age adults who aren’t Tea Partiers as the few hundred thousand who are. And the rest of that real America, with its own passions and anger and economic pain, is probably a more fruitful area to look for allies on real liberal goals that include inclusion and fairness.

In any event, I’m with Ambinder: If pollsters want to keep examining the Tea Folk, it’s time for them to drill a little deeper:

Next time, I’d love for Gallup, or any other pollster, really, to ask self-identified Tea Partiers for their vote histories, for their views on immigration and race, for their views on questions about Obama attributes (is he a socialist?), for their specific views on policy matters (do they support a “fair tax?”).

Moreover, instead of asking Republicans and independents over and over if they might be tempted to vote for a hypothetical Tea Third Party candidate, pollsters might want to focus on the actual major-party preferences of Tea Partiers, since in all but a few scattered contests, that’s what they are going to face at the polls. I say that mainly because of all the delusions surrounding the Tea Party Movement, the one that suggests Democrats will be saved by a mass of third-party candidates associated with said Movement is among the most fanciful. The Tea Folk are systematically dragging the GOP to the Right, and that’s the development that Democrats need to think about exploiting in November and beyond.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/theqspeaks/ / CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

When Democrats Unite

Despite the enduring popularity of the “Democrats In Disarray” meme in certain precincts of the chattering classes, the truth is that the enactment of health reform reflected a degree of Democratic unity, resolution, and yes, accomplishment that is becoming a bit hard to ignore. Ron Brownstein’s latest National Journal column gets it straight:

After Massachusetts Republican Scott Brown’s victory in January’s Senate special election, Democrats appeared shaken to the point of panic. But, from President Obama on down, the party has rapidly regrouped–enacting health care reform, virtually daring Senate Republicans to filibuster tougher regulation of financial institutions, and challenging the GOP with last weekend’s White House announcement of recess appointments for 15 nominees stalled in the Senate. Pundits may be pelting the party with predictions of doom in November, but Democrats have apparently decided that the best defense against a resolute Republican opposition is a good offense.

More importantly, improved Democratic morale has made it easier to get some perspective on the last turbulent year, when Democratic defections in Congress were largely limited to House Members from districts that Barack Obama lost in 2008 (defections that shouldn’t be that surprising).

The governing core of the party’s House majority has been members elected from districts that Obama carried in 2008. House Democrats who represent such districts voted 199-8 for final approval of the Senate health care bill last month. Last year, they voted 201-1 for Obama’s stimulus plan, 194-1 for federal tobacco regulation, 191-8 for financial reform, and 189-15 for climate-change legislation. The Democrats elected in districts that preferred Republican presidential nominee John McCain haven’t supported Obama nearly as reliably, but Pelosi has corralled enough of them each time to pass the president’s priorities.In the Senate, the governing core is the 33 Democratic senators elected from the 18 “blue wall” states that have supported the party’s presidential nominees in at least the past five elections. In 2009, these senators collectively recorded a stunning 97 percent party unity score on the index calculated by Congressional Quarterly. Around that axis, Democratic leaders have assembled shifting coalitions of Democrats from states that are more closely divided. On the most-momentous votes — the stimulus plan and the initial health care reform package — every Senate Democrat from either camp backed Obama.

Brownstein concludes that for all the strom and stress of the last year, Obama and congressional Democrats have put together the most impressive record of accomplishment by any Democratic administration since Lyndon Johnson’s, and a degree of party unity that rivals that of Republicans in the early years of George W. Bush’s presidency. Interestingly enough, a considerable proportion of Democratic criticism of Obama has been from those arguing that he is too committed to bipartisanship in the face of ever-more-radical Republican opposition to his entire agenda. This was not a criticism made very often of George W. Bush and his political guru Karl Rove.

The problem for Democrats this November is not so much disunity as it is distraction and disinterest among voters who don’t often show up for midterm elections and who in this difficult period of American history understandably have other fish to fry. That’s why upcoming fights like financial reform and a Supreme Court nomination could be especially important: not only adding to this administrations legacy, but providing relatively unmotivated Democratic and swing voters with a graphic illustration of what could happen to the country if the GOP returns to power.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Iran’s Role in Iraq

Tom Ricks, author of Fiasco and The Gamble, the two definitive contemporary histories of the Iraq War, has long said that Iran has been the biggest winner since Shock and Awe.

I’ve always been inclined to agree with him, even if there was scant overt evidence to support the claim. Sure, the U.S. military would parade allegedly Iranian-made explosives out to the media to “prove” Tehran’s support of Shi’ite Iraqi militias. And it has long been assumed that the leading figure of those Shi’ite militias, Muqtada al-Sadr, put his tail between his legs and decamped to Iran as soon as the U.S. figured out what it was doing in Baghdad. But for the first time, we have unquestionable evidence of Iran’s waxing influence on the new Iraqi government: They invited (almost all of) them over to play. Or their Shi’ite cousins anyway:

The ink was hardly dry on the polling results when three of the four major political alliances rushed delegations off to Tehran. Yet none of them sent anyone to the United States Embassy here, let alone to Washington. … The Iranians, however, have shown no such qualms, publicly urging the Shiite religious parties to bury their differences so they can use their superior numbers to choose the next prime minister. Their openness, and Washington’s reticence, is a measure of the changed political dynamic in Iraq.

The uninvited fourth major political party was Iraqiya, the largest vote-getter in last month’s election, a largely Sunni party (headed by Ayad Allawi, a secular Shia), which has the first crack at forming a government with Allawi as the new prime minister. This is, of course, provided they can stave off the latest round of politically motivated witch-hunting. Incumbent PM Nouri al-Maliki is fighting for his political life, and has come out swinging. He’s trying to make it as difficult as possible for Iraqiya to capitalize on its victory by having the national election commission — a body Maliki essentially controls — begin to disqualify other Iraqiya candidates on the shaky grounds that they were members of Saddam Hussein’s old Ba’ath Party. When combined with Iran’s efforts to broker peace between the Shi’ite parties, this is the best hope Tehran has of getting a large, friendly, Shi’ite majority and prime minister in Baghdad.

Will it work? It’s obviously way too early to say. The U.S. is trying to toe a razor thin line between respecting a democratic process they created and cultivating the new government (no matter who runs it) against Iranian influence. But while Tehran’s overtures are worrisome to say the least, the U.S. will continue to hold plenty of cards in the poker game of Iraqi politics. That’s because if Mr. Allawi isn’t the next prime minister, the current one will be.

That leads to two consoling final thoughts: the U.S. will continue to have strong pull with whoever is in charge, and is legally scheduled to get out anyway. In essence, Iran’s influence may be increasing, but that doesn’t mean it’s coming at the expense of America’s.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/ / CC BY 2.0

Exploding a Stimulus “Study”

It’s considered gospel truth in many conservative circles that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, a.k.a. the “economic stimulus package,” was just a porkfest aimed at buying votes or rewarding Democratic constitutencies at the expense of good, virtuous taxpayers and their grandchirren. In support of this hypothesis, Veronique de Rugy of George Mason University’s Mercatus Center, and a regular contributor to conservative and libertarian magazines and web sites, recently wrote a “study” designed to show that ARRA dollars went disproportionately to districts represented by Democrats and/or that voted for Obama in 2008, regardless of their actual economic needs. De Rugy helpfully touted her study at National Review’s The Corner yesterday, for the edification of those who look to that blog for talking points.

Looks like she should probably have kept the paper to herself. Nate Silver of 538.com took a look at it, and pretty much demolished it today.

Turns out that de Rugy didn’t notice, or didn’t mention, that most of the “Democratic districts” that show up in her study as the top recipients of ARRA dollars happen to contain state capitals. Thus, ARRA spending designed to benefit states as a whole (the Medicaid super-match, school improvement incentives, state infrastructure grants, the state “flexibility” funds, etc.) are attributed by her to individual districts. She also ignored economic indicators showing poverty and local unemployment, which may or may not be correlated with Democratic voting habits, but which certainly indicate actual need.

I hear through the grapevine that de Rugy plans to respond to Nate’s demolition job at some point. If she manages to climb out of this crater, I’ll certainly be impressed.

The larger point, though, is that without Nate’s intervention (and perhaps even after it), conservatives would be gleefully citing de Rugy’s bottom line “findings” as “proof” that ARRA was what they always said it was. She is, after all, an academic thinker, and her “study” is impressive-looking, with lots of footnotes and scatter plot charts. I’m not saying that conservatives are alone in conducting this sort of skewed and deeply flawed “research,” or in citing it without examination. But that doesn’t excuse it for even a moment, particularly when the “researcher” is out there circulating the stuff as agitprop for the chattering classes before the ink is even dry.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/jbyoder/ / CC BY-NC 2.0

To Have and to Have Not

Longtime political reporter Tom Edsall has a long and fascinating piece of analysis up at The Atlantic on the present and future shape of the two major party coalitions. While none of the data he discusses is terribly surprising, he does suggest some real internal problems with the emerging Republican coalition, which is increasingly made of up married white folks, but includes those who are “haves” only because they “have” government benefits that are perceived as vulnerable to budgetary competition from “have-nots”:

It’s entirely possible that, if the deficit forces continued zero-sum calculations, the definition of the center-right coalition of “haves” will be expanded beyond its original boundaries, stretching past the wealthy, the managerial and business class, the gun owners, the anti-taxers, the home schoolers, the property rights-ers, the Western ranchers, Christian evangelicals, and the self-employed to begin to include members of what conservative operative Grover Norquist called the “takings” coalition — men or women who get federal benefits. A Republican Party hungry for victory would welcome as new members Social Security and Medicare recipients  — “takers” who simultaneously consider themselves part of the universe of “haves” and of Norquist’s “leave us alone coalition.”

Add in people who are self-consciously dependent on federal defense spending, and you can see how a Republican coalition of public- and private-sector “haves” could be formidable if not terribly stable.

Demographic trends, though, are very dangerous for the GOP, as this Edsall nugget shows:

While there is no doubt that the increase in the number of racial and ethnic minority voters works to the advantage of the liberal coalition, white voters remain a wild card. In 2008, whites made up 74 percent of the electorate, and McCain carried them 55-43. There are precedents for much higher Republican margins: in 1972, Nixon carried 67 percent of the white vote, and in 1984 Reagan won 64 percent. Conversely, Bill Clinton only lost the white vote by one percentage point to George H. W. Bush in 1992. The one clear conclusion to draw from these figures is that if the GOP is unwilling to make major policy shifts, especially on immigration reform, a crucial issue to many Hispanics, the party will have to drive its margins among white voters back up to the Nixon-Reagan levels.

If anything, the current pressure on the GOP from its rank-and-file, including the Tea Party Movement, is in the opposite direction from any position on immigration policy that could attract Hispanics. So there will be a strong temptation on the Right for indulging heavily in what might be called White Identity Politics. In light of Edsall’s insight on the “haves” in the GOP coalition who are dependent on government spending, White Identity Politics could involve racially tinged distinctions between the “deserved” government benefits received by white middle-class retirees and the “undeserved” government benefits received or sought by poorer or darker folk. That’s a dynamic that’s already been abundantly apparent in the Republican assault on health reform.

Looks like today’s political turbulence will be with us for quite a while, particularly if relatively high unemployment and budget deficits persist, accentuating the zero-sum politics of group competition that Edsall sees in the data.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Greenhouse Gas Permits Won’t Be Required Until 2011

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) this week announced that it would not require greenhouse gas emitters to get permits until 2011, a decision that sets the stage for the administration’s regulation of greenhouse gases in the absence of climate change legislation. posted recently on the EPA’s reconsideration of the “Johnson Memo,” a piece of regulatory arcana that determines when pollutant emitters have to get permits under the Clean Air Act for new plants or major upgrades to existing plants. The EPA’s final version of the memo (cheat sheet here) shows an agency that’s attempting to juggle several imperatives: congressional concerns, industry pressure, and its own mandate to regulate greenhouse gases as a pollutant.

Under the Clean Air Act, major emitters — those that release more than 250 tons of pollutants into the atmosphere — have to get permits that include analysis of all the pollutants they emit. With the EPA’s endangerment ruling — which classified carbon dioxide as a dangerous pollutant — big emitters will soon have to include greenhouse gas analysis in their permit applications. These permits are time-consuming and expensive, and industry is very concerned about their impact.

As always, politics plays a role. Strictly interpreted, the Clean Air Act would impose big burdens on lots of emitters through a permit process that isn’t really set up to deal with the scale and volume of greenhouse gas permits required. Industry is spooked by the process, but so are the state regulators who would have to issue many of the permits. The EPA itself also doesn’t think a full-scale, immediate permit requirement is workable.

The result is a series of compromises. The most well-known is the “tailoring rule,” in which the EPA is limiting the permit requirement to big emitters (really big emitters, according to the EPA’s latest statements). The Johnson memo revision strikes another compromise by delaying the permit requirement until 2011, when the EPA claims its new mobile-source rules will enter into effect.*

I think these recent moves are partly in response to pressure from Congress. Congress, in proposals by Sens. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), has threatened to take away the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases (for mobile sources, stationary sources, or both). Part of this is driven by fears among industry and on the Hill that the EPA would wreak havoc on the economy with greenhouse gas permit requirements. By moderating the impact of these requirements, the EPA is trying to comply with the Clean Air Act and achieve its environmental goals while appeasing the congressional dragon. To be sure, the EPA and state agencies are probably concerned about their own ability to handle the permit requirements and would benefit from more time, but I think congressional pressure is a big factor. One piece of evidence is that EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced these moves first in a letter to Sen. Rockefeller.

You could characterize this series of events as influence by special interests behind the scenes, undermining an EPA regulatory program without a congressional vote. I think there’s a more benign balance-of-powers story, though. In regulating air pollution the EPA has used Clean Air Act powers delegated from Congress, and it has now followed the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision affirming that those powers extend to greenhouse gases. This has led to a problem, however: it was hardly realistic to regulate every single emitter of carbon in the economy. The agency realized that to do so would create problems for itself and would be a political non-starter. Congress aside, it’s unlikely even Administrator Jackson or her boss, President Obama, would find much value in a draconian permit scheme, so the EPA proposed a solution — the tailoring rule. Congress continued to push back with some legislative saber-rattling, and the EPA moderated its approach a little further by expanding the tailoring rule and delaying the permit requirement. Time will tell whether that is enough to forestall congressional action against EPA, but it appears to be sufficient for now.

This isn’t ideal, but it’s regulatory government at work. In a real way, however awkward, politicized and bureaucratic, the three branches of government have had a conversation of sorts on climate policy. A compromise seems to have been reached. Of course, new climate legislation would be much better not only because of its Schoolhouse Rock clarity but because of the superior policy mechanisms that Congress has the power to implement.

* This is because the rules apply to model-year 2012 cars and trucks. A 2010 rule applies in 2011 to 2012 vehicles. Only in Washington…

“About” Race

A perennial issue that’s been bubbling up a lot since the rise of Barack Obama has been whether and when it’s fair for progressives to suspect racial motives in conservative political appeals. Obama’s race has made the subject pretty much unavoidable, but the special ferocity of conservative reactions to Obama’s candidacy, presidency and policies has raised the possibility that something a bit unusual is going on. But if the subject ever comes up, conservatives now angrily accuse their accusers of “playing the race card,” as though the issue is by definition illegitimate or demagogic.

Frank Rich of the New York Times stirred up the latest contretemps with a column that suggested the heat behind much of the grassroots anger towards Obama comes at least in part from “fears of disenfranchisement among a dwindling and threatened minority in the country” — e.g., white men. At RealClearPolitics, a noted analyst of and sometimes advocate for the political views of white men, David Paul Kuhn, issued a response that accused not only Rich but “liberal elites” of perpetually playing the race card in order to ignore or dismiss legitimate discontent with liberal policies.

I have no interest in adjudicating the Rich/Kuhn dispute, other than to say that Rich is clearly imprecise in his attribution of semi-racist motives to conservatives, and that Kuhn trumps that mistake by pretending that Rich has accused every single white person who doesn’t approve of Obama’s job performance of being a racist.

I am interested in Kuhn’s broader argument, which is pretty characteristic of conservative “race card” rhetoric. His standard on this subject seems to be that if there is any possible non-racial motive for a political posture, then it’s irresponsible to impute any racial motives, not just today, but in the past:

For decades, leading liberals explained white concerns about urban upheaval, crime, welfare, school busing, affirmative action and more recently, illegal immigration, as rooted in racism. Not safer streets or safer schools. Not concern about taxes for welfare, as working class whites (like all races) struggled in their hardscrabble lives. Not regular men who never knew “white male privilege” but were on the losing end of affirmative action (recall Frank Ricci). Not job competition or economic class. Instead, leading liberals constantly saw the color of the issue as the only issue.

I don’t know which “leading liberals” he’s talking about, but generally speaking, that’s just not true. “Liberals” have typically viewed conservative appeals on issues like crime, welfare, busing, affirmative action, welfare and immigration as designed to play on both racial and non-racial fears and concerns. Kuhn, however, seems to think so long as there is an available non-racial motive for a “concern,” then examining possible racial motives is out of bounds. It’s got to be one thing or another — all race, or all something more noble-sounding or at least less disreputable.

It doesn’t take a lot of deep thinking, or “liberalism,” for that matter, to understand the folly of this approach. Self-conscious, highly-motivated racists do not often proclaim their racism these days, precisely because it is disreputable and does not win friends or influence people. And even back when open racism was more common, racists often denied racism as a primary motive (viz., Confederate and neo-Confederate claims that secession was not “about” slavery, but about states’ rights, constitutional protections for private property, southern “culture,” anti-capitalism, or regional honor — anything other than the ownership of other human beings). And during the more recent period of southern resistance to civil rights, which I experienced personally, and whose constitutional “theories” have been so avidly seized upon by many of today’s conservative activists, you didn’t hear much talk about segregation as a means of subjecting black folk as inferior. It was all about “racial peace,” and “the southern way of life,” and again, state’s rights and constitutional protections for private property. And it didn’t fool a soul.

If David Paul Kuhn really believes that antagonism to busing, affirmative action, welfare and immigration did not have any racial content, or that conservative appeals on these issues (which, as far back as George Wallace’s 1968 presidential campaign, always avoided overt racial language) did not count on racial resentment as one factor for their success, he’s living in a land innocent of actual experience with human beings.

If he doesn’t believe that, and has at least one foot in the real world where racial motives coincide with others, then the issue is not some sweeping effort to delegitimize the “race card,” but an examination of when political appeals cross the line into deliberate efforts to promote white racial resentment.

I’d say, for example, that the strange centrality of the (now-defunct) inner-city advocacy group ACORN in recent conservative demonology is hard to understand as anything other than a deliberate dog whistle to racist sentiments. According to an awful lot of right-wing rhetoric, ACORN’s housing advocacy for poor and mainly black people helped create the mortgage finance crisis, which led to the financial collapse, which in turn led to demands by poor and minority people for relief, which then led to a wholesale socialist agenda, promoted by a black politician who worked with ACORN in Chicago, who counted on ACORN-secured fradulent votes for his election. Elements of this ACORN Derangement Syndrome made it into McCain-Palin campaign ads and speeches, and also fed the Republican-led drive in Congress to “defund ACORN” last year. Polls have shown a remarkable degree of rank-and-file Republican fixation on ACORN.

Is it possible to believe or promote these preposterous things about ACORN’s vast and sinister influence while being innocent of racial motives? I guess so, but it’s most unlikely, given the organization’s inner-city focus, inner-city staffing and inner-city clientele. Why pick ACORN as the center of this conspiracy if you don’t want to paint it black? Beats me.

A closer call is the return of conservative “anti-welfare” rhetoric, generally abandoned after the 1996 national welfare reform law. It popped up first in Republican (and McCain) attacks on Obama’s campaign proposals (particularly for an increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit for the working poor), and then during the health reform fight. Recent conservative discussion of the the EITC as “welfare,” enabling people to vote for more benefits without paying taxes (not really true, since working poor families still pay heavily regressive federal payroll taxes), has been interesting because that rhetoric was rebuked by none other than George W. Bush when Tom DeLay raised it back in 1999. Combined with the “welfare queen” treatment of minority families who supposedly took out mortgages they couldn’t afford, triggering the mortgage crisis, the 2008 “anti-welfare” rhetoric sure looked suspiciously racial. And there’s nothing illegitimate, either, about wondering if the “undeserved” beneficiaries of mortgage relief or health care benefits might look a little dusky in the eyes of resentful middle-class voters who are being encouraged to oppose this sort of socialist looting.

The bottom line is that anti-Obama appeals aren’t just “about” race, but it’s naive to think they are just “about” everything else. He is, after all, the living embodiment of the elite-underclass “liberal alliance” that conservatives have been warning white middle-class folks about for several decades now. At an absolute minimum, conservatives ought to accept responsibility for the racial sentiments their rhetoric can sometimes stimulate, and try to avoid such appeals, instead of simply intoning “race card” and trying to shut down any discussion of the subject.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/andrewaliferis/ / CC BY-ND 2.0

Cap-and-Whatever

Via TPM, I learned that Interior Secretary Ken Salazar went on CNBC today and said the administration would no longer be using the term “cap-and-trade” for its climate change proposals.

This decision does not appear to mean any change in the actual proposal, which would still presumably involve placing a “cap” on carbon emissions and then creating a system whereby credits for exceeding carbon goals could be “traded,” thus creating market incentives for pollution control efforts and technology. It’s the label that seems to be the problem, probably because conservatives have taken to calling it “cap-and-tax.”

I can sympathize with the rebranding effort (though it’s not clear what the new moniker will be). We at PPI — early proponents of “cap and trade” — spent years trying, without a lot of success, to find simple ways to explain the cap-and-trade approach to carbon emissions. It wasn’t as hard as, say, trying to write descriptions of the “revolution in military affairs,” another perennial head-scratcher, but it was never possible to capture it on a bumper sticker.

It probably doesn’t matter, so long as the administration and congressional proponents continue to make it clear that cap-and-whatever is a way to limit potentially catastrophic carbon emissions while employing market mechanisms to create incentives for private-sector innovations in clean energy technology. It is, indeed, the kind of market-friendly alternative to command-and-control environmental regulations that conservatives ought to find attractive, and often have in the past. But it’s the substance, not the politics, of this approach, that really matters, and that will remain regardless of the marketing.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/muora/ / CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

What’s Next for Russia?

Tuesday’s Moscow attacks may do more to define the path of Russia’s future as a democracy than any single event since 1991. In a worst-case scenario, Vladimir Putin could return to the presidency. A sunnier forecast sees popular sentiment rising against Putin – and the emergence of a wild card that could lead the way to real change in Russia.

Hyperbolic? Sure, but certainly within the realm of possibility. Three things worth noting:

First, after the tragic Beslan school attack in 2004, then-President (and current Prime Minister) Putin used the event as a catalyst to execute a political power-grab in the name of national security. Most glaringly, Putin canceled the election of regional governors and chose to appoint them himself, thus consolidating power in the president’s hands. This was, as I mentioned yesterday, akin to George W. Bush canceling all elections for state governor in the wake of 9/11. That’s downright crazy. So Putin has set the power-grabbing precedent following past acts of terror — might he do so again?

Second, anecdotal evidence suggests the public may be starting to tire of Putin’s act. Ilya Yashin, a self-described youth activist, makes the point that since Putin has concentrated so much power in his own hands, “he is responsible for everything that happens in our country” and should therefore be held accountable for the latest attacks. “Not long ago Putin promised an end to terrorist acts in Russian cities and a military victory over terrorism. For this we gave up our political rights and civil liberties. We gave up the right to elect governors,” Yashin said.

Will this gently percolating anti-Putin sentiment boil over once Russians add concerns over security to concerns over a stagnating economy, as Josh Tucker and I wrote last year?

And then there’s the wild card: President Dmitri Medvedev. Let’s not forget that Putin may have handpicked Medvedev as his presidential successor, but Medvedev has shown an inclination to be open and possibly more pro-Western, having never been involved with the ex-KGB cadre that surrounds Putin. What’s more, Medvedev has distanced himself slightly from Putin’s Caucasus strategy, saying (from NYT) that the government should aggressively hunt down the terrorists, but also focus on the poverty and government malfeasance that he contended nurtured extremism.

Weighing these factors, I can envision two distinct outcomes for Russian democracy.

1. Putin brazenly unmasks himself as Medvedev’s puppet master. He uses the Beslan precedent and Moscow bombings to justify another round of power consolidation, saying that the last round had clearly not been effective enough. He crushes any sort of domestic civil opposition and launches a drive to change the Russian constitution to allow him to run for another term as president. Medvedev proves powerless to object and is slowly moved off to the side.

2. Medvedev realizes he has a potentially strong domestic political constituency as a resolute but smart antiterrorism president. He offers a different strategy to Russians to deal with the threat and successfully distances himself from Putin while effectively holding off Putin’s attempts to grab power.

Much of the outcome rests with Medvedev’s desire and ability to be independent from the man who picked him. I’m hopeful for the second, but my money is on the first.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/gloel/ / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Over the Brink

The craziness surrounding futile efforts to overturn health reform via lawsuits reached a new crescendo in Georgia yesterday, when Republicans in the state House introduced articles of impeachment against Georgia Attorney General Thurbert Baker. You see, Baker (a Democrat) refused to join Republican Attorneys General who are launching a suit charging that federal health reform is unconstitutional. He argued (very accurately) that the suits have no change of succeeding, and that pursuing them would be a waste of time and money. Republicans claim he’s required to file suit at the request of Republican Gov. Sonny Perdue.

By threatening impeachment on such transparently partisan grounds, GOPers are probably doing Baker a big favor: he’s running for governor, and has been trailing former Gov. Roy Barnes in the polls. In addition, there’s something a bit attention-grabbing about the spectacle of Republicans demanding that an African-American statewide official embrace neo-Confederate constitutional theories on “state’s rights” grounds.

As Eric Kleefield of TPM has noted, the “massive resistance” approach to health reform has already become a litmus test for conservative Republicans, right up there with criminalizing abortion and defending trust fund babies against “death taxes.” So get used to it; they just can’t help themselves any more.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

No Bump?

In the run-up to health care reform’s passage, many people (including yours truly) predicted that the president’s approval ratings would see a bump once the bill passed. Bill Clinton went out on a limb and forecast a 10-point bounce. And in the days immediately following passage, Obama’s approval ratings did seem to nudge up a little.

More than a week later, however, Obama’s approval ratings seem to have been little changed:

Democrats who held out hopes that President Barack Obama’s health reform win would mean a quick boost to the party’s political fortunes are getting a reality check — a reminder that it takes more than one good week to shake up a year of sliding polls.

Obama and his health reform plan did get a bump in several surveys immediately after the House vote eight days ago — but the numbers in some of those polls flattened out, showing how difficult it will be for Obama to capitalize on reform, even after his top legislative goal cleared Congress.

Even the bounce for the plan itself has proven evanescent. A USA Today/Gallup poll immediately after passage found 49 percent favoring it versus 40 percent against, an improvement from earlier polls. But the newest USA Today/Gallup poll now finds a 47-50 favor/oppose split. An aggregate of polls on health care finds little movement from the pre-passage days.

How to read the numbers? For one thing, it reveals just how divisive the health reform debate has been. After months of Republicans demonizing the plan as the next stage in Obama’s grand totalitarian scheme, it’s no surprise that a week-plus of good news cycles has done little to change public opinion.

But perhaps the more important lesson here is just how much the economy overrides everything right now. With the employment situation still dismal and the recovery yet to manifest itself on Main Street, the public mood is still understandably sour.

In a blog post yesterday, Charles Franklin repeated an observation he made earlier — that Obama’s public approval ratings, and the forces influencing it, track very closely with what we saw with Ronald Reagan:

The short version is both come in with inherited economic troubles that don’t turn around miraculously in the first 24 months. Both replace deeply unpopular predecessors, and suffer from high expectations in comparison. And both set out to dramatically change the direction of national policy. Reagan suffered substantial losses in the House in his first midterm (26 seats lost), and Obama looks headed to similar if not larger losses in 2010.

So how is the analogy holding up? In approval terms, still quite well. The two continue to track rather well. Obama has occasionally been slightly below and recently slightly above Reagan’s trend, but the parallel movement remains striking. Likewise, their relative location compared to other first term post-war presidents continues to drive home the point that these have been (so far) among the lowest approval ratings in the first 24 months.

One bright spot for Democrats is that the economy seems to be turning earlier for Obama than it did for Reagan. Even though unemployment has not yet begun its descent, the upward trend in GDP is a hopeful sign. (According to Franklin, GDP is “consistently a better predictor of midterm outcomes than is unemployment,” counterintuitive though that may seem.)

The other bright spot for Dems comes from a closer look at the polling numbers. Though the overall numbers have seen little improvement, Democratic enthusiasm seems to have been buoyed by health reform’s passage. In a midterm election, when traditionally low turnout puts even greater pressure on a party to bring its faithful to the polls, a depressed base would have been disastrous for Democrats. Obviously, the Republican rank-and-file will be fired up for November. But now, at least, the Democrats can make a fight of it with its own energized base.

Mitt’s “Problem” Redux

Back at the beginning of the year, I wrote a piece suggesting that putative 2012 Republican presidential front-runner Mitt Romney might have a hard time overcoming his sponsorship of a form of health care reform in Massachusetts that was impressively similar to that great socialist abomination, ObamaCare. This has now become a pretty common refrain in the early 2012 handicapping (viz. this Jonathan Martin-Ben Smith item in Politico yesterday), to the point where the estimable Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic posted a rebuttal to the Mitt-as-toast hypothesis yesterday.

Ambinder made four reasonable points about Romney’s potential viability regardless of RomneyCare. Let’s consider them in order:

(1) RomneyCare may look more successful by 2012. I don’t think the problem with RomneyCare is that it’s unpopular on unsuccessful in MA; it’s that it bears a lot of resemblence to ObamaCare, which is by definition, regardless of public opinion or objective reality, a horror to the kind of people who participate in Republican presidential primaries.

(2) Health care may not be a transcendent Republican issue by 2012 (just as the Iraq War began to recede once the 2008 Democratic contest reached its climax). Sure, other major issues of importance to Republican primary-goers may emerge, but until such time, if ever, health reform is repealed, there is virtually no chance that it will be forgotten by 2012 (and it can’t be repealed before then unless Republicans win every single Senate race this year and also win two-thirds of the House). If the Iraq War is a suitable analogy, as Ambinder suggests, I think it’s indisputable that Barack Obama would have never emerged as a viable presidential candidate in 2008 if Hillary Clinton hadn’t voted for the war resolution and then refused to say she made a mistake by doing so. Other issues mattered, but that was the big threshold issue. (One of my fellow Mitt-o-skeptics, Jonathan Chait, did a response to Ambinder today that mainly focuses on his own belief that RomneyCare will actually be a bigger issue for Republicans in the future than it is today.)

(3) The Republican nominating process is “hierarchical,” and especially favorable to establishment favorites like Romney. This is something you hear all the time, and it’s valid in the very limited sense that the rules for awarding delegates in Republican contests don’t demand strict proportionality, and thus help front-runners consolidate early victories. But in 2012, as in 2008, Mitt’s problem could be getting out of the gate, not finishing off the field. Recall that in Iowa in 2008, he couldn’t survive what was basically a one-on-one contest with Mike Huckabee, despite a vast financial advantage and endorsements from most of the local GOP establishment, and even though he was running as the “true conservative” in the race. None of Romney’s problems from 2008 (a wooden speaking style, a history of flip-flops on cultural issues, his religion, his history as a corporate downsizer) have gone away, and it’s very likely the Iowa Caucuses will be even more dominated by cultural conservatives than ever, given the huge importance of the gay marriage issue to conservatives in that state. Add in RomneyCare, and the odds look pretty bad; skipping Iowa like McCain did is a possibility, but would also give another candidate a good chance to become the early front-runner, going into two states (Michigan and New Hampshire) that Romney can’t lose and still have a prayer for the nomination.

(4) Romney is just too reasonable and accomplished a candidate to get knocked out by one issue. Maybe so, but as noted above, he has more than one problem, and as it happens, “one issue” — in fact, one utterance — knocked Mitt’s father, George, out of the 1968 presidential contest, and his resume was if anything stronger than his son’s. If I were a Republican, I’d actually be worried that Mitt’s sitting there soaking up attention endorsements, and poll numbers that could go to some attractive darkhorse candidate, leaving the GOP with a very weak field if he does go belly-up. And you don’t have to be a total Democratic partisan to observe that Republicans aren’t disposed at the moment to be completely rational about their choice of candidates: a recent PPP survey suggested that nearly as many rank-and-file Republicans think it’s more important to nominate a candidate who is “conservative on every issue” as those who think it’s more important to nominate someone “who can beat Barack Obama.”

In any event, will all due respect to Marc Ambinder (who may simply be playing devil’s advocate), I’d say the burden of persuasion should be on those who think Mitt Romney’s stronger than he was in 2008 than on those who think he’s in very deep trouble thanks to RomneyCare.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Photo credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/newshour/ / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

“Populist Crossfire”

Over the weekend Ron Brownstein wrote up the nightmare scenario for Democrats in terms of their appeal to white working class voters:

[P]olling just before the [health reform] bill’s approval showed that most white Americans believed that the legislation would primarily benefit the uninsured and the poor, not people like them. In a mid-March Gallup survey, 57 percent of white respondents said that the bill would make things better for the uninsured, and 52 percent said that it would improve conditions for low-income families. But only one-third of whites said that it would benefit the country overall — and just one-fifth said that it would help their own family….Obama has already been hurt by the perception, fanned by Republicans, that the principal beneficiaries of his efforts to repair the economy are the same interests that broke it: Wall Street, big banks, and the wealthy. The belief that Washington has transferred benefits up the income ladder is pervasive across society but especially pronounced among white voters with less than a college education, the group that most resisted Obama in 2008. Now health care could threaten Democrats from the opposite direction by stoking old fears, particularly among the white working class, that liberals are transferring income down the income ladder to the “less deserving.”

Brownstein calls this dynamic “an unusual populist crossfire.” The antidote, he suggests, might be two-fold: continuing to stress the benefits for the middle class, and to the country, of health reform, while spending more time reinforcing a Democratic message on the economy and the financial system that makes Republicans, not Democrats, defenders of Wall Street and the wealthy. The White House and congressional Democrats seem to be moving briskly on both those fronts, and how well they succeed could be fateful in November. At the same time, it wouldn’t hurt to make sure that perceptions (which Brownstein also documents) by poor and minority voters that health reform does in fact help them and help the country produce a greater willingness to vote this year than would normally be the case in a midterm election.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Primary Challenges, Ideology and Electability

Something interesting is going on in Arkansas Democratic politics right now: a serious primary challenge to an incumbent senator, Blanche Lincoln, who is not mired in any sort of personal scandal, and is not, it would seem, mispositioned ideologically for a general election in her conservative state.

As Steve Kornacki notes at Salon today, Lt. Gov. Bill Halter’s primary challenge to Lincoln is hard to categorize as simply an ideological challenge to a wayward politician who has offended the party base, or as simply an “electability” challenge to a weakened incumbent who looks likely to lose in November:

Generally, it’s easy to categorize these primary challenges. There are two basic varieties: ideological, with an exercised party base seeking retribution for an incumbent’s dissent from the party-line; and pragmatic, with party members responding to the perceived electoral deficiencies of the incumbent. And then there’s the Democratic Senate primary now underway in Arkansas, which seems to be a perfect hybrid of these two types. With the latest poll showing Blanche Lincoln’s challenger, Bill Halter, within 13 points of her, that primary – now just seven weeks away – has become the hottest Democratic contest in the nation.

Lincoln, who’s in the final year of her second term, has managed to pull off a somewhat remarkable feat, infuriating both the left-of-center base of her party and her state’s right-leaning general election audience at the same time. Thus, the challenge she’s receiving from Halter doesn’t neatly fit into either of the above categories.

Kornacki goes on to examine prior examples of ideological primary challenges, and finds little evidence of any that were also based on evidence of superior electibility (absent some non-ideological factor like a personal scandal affecting the incumbent’s political standing).

Now it should be obvious that Kornacki’s premise would not be accepted by a fair assortment of people in both parties. Among both self-identified progressives in the Democratic Party, and most especially self-identified conservatives in the Republican Party, many have argued for decades that “centrists” aren’t really more electable, and that rigorously ideological candidates could actually, if given the chance, exert a superior general-election appeal (via better “frames,” or clearer messages, or by mobilizing non-voters, or simply by providing a “choice”), even in difficult partisan terrain like the one Democrats face in Arkansas. There’s definitely evidence that this proposition is true at times and in places where there are significant numbers of voters who are “mispositioned” by adherence to parties with ideologies alien to their own (e.g., southern conservative Democrats in the 1980s and 1990s, and northern moderate-to-liberal Republicans more recently). A subset of the “electability” argument for ideological rigor is that Democratic progressives or conservative Republicans can and will offer messages that have particular appeal to swing voters in a given constituency. That’s also sometimes true, as with antiwar Democrats in times of unpopular wars, or with anti-tax Republicans in places where some state or local tax revolt is underway.

But the Halter challenge to Lincoln is emphatically not in a state where there are liberals outside the Democratic Party ripe for the picking, and there’s not much evidence that Arkansans are generally receptive to any particular progressive arguments, notwithstanding the ancient claim that southerners are especially receptive to anti-corporate “populism” (a complicated topic which I won’t get into here, other than to say that I personally think the claim is vastly overstated since southern conservatives are conservatives on nearly every imaginable topic, including economics).

Lincoln is, however, an incumbent senator at a time when incumbency is not an advantage, and that alone could make Halter as competitive as, if not more competitive than, Lincoln in a general election. And it’s not as though Halter is running as the re-incarnation of Huey Long. His anti-corporate rhetoric, in fact, is pretty much indistinguishable from what we hear from Tea Party folk, opposing bailouts rather than promoting regulation.

It appears Lincoln’s strategy (other than touting endorsements from relatively popular Democrats like Bill Clinton) is to use Halter’s challenge as evidence that she’s not the raging socialist that Republicans make her out to be. If it works, this playing-off-the-left message would presumably boost her general election standing, thus making it easier for her to appeal to Democrats on electability grounds. But she doesn’t have much time to pull this off, and if she doesn’t, she hasn’t instilled enough loyalty in Arkansas Democrats to give her much confidence in a primary win absent an electability argument.

Arkansas will thus be an interesting test of the limits of tolerance for Democratic heterodoxy in tough terrain. And if Halter wins the primary, his performance in the general election will be watched closely for its broader implications as well. The last widely-discussed Democratic primary challenge to an incumbent senator, the Ned Lamont candidacy in Connecticut in 2006, involved a totally different situation: a blue state, a more famous incumbent, a red-hot issue where Joe Lieberman was horribly mispositioned with local opinion, and most of all, a third-party Lieberman general election candidacy that Republicans largely supported. The results of a Halter nomination in Arkansas would be sui generis.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.