Okay, okay… simmer down there. Before you go accusing me of being a commie-loving freedom-hater, I’m not asking that question. But General Norton Schwartz, the Air Force’s Chief of Staff, is. He continues in the WaPo, “This is our year to look up and out…to ask big questions. Who are we? What are we doing for the nation’s defense?…Where is this grand institution headed?”
Just think about the gravity of those questions. The Air Forces’ FY2011 budget slides in at $170.8 billion, and if the AF’s top general is asking those types of existential questions, I’ll wager that there are quite a few nerves fraying down on contractor’s row in Crystal City.
At the end of the day, they’re good questions. Greg Jaffe’s article frames the tension right now in terms of the “old” Air Force (one whose hierarchy is predicated on daring pilots risking their lives in dog-fights) versus the “new” Air Force (that trains pilots to sit in air-conditioned trailers in Nevada and pilot drones in Afghanistan) as they are involved in America’s current military deployments.
It’s a fascinating juxtaposition to be sure, but I don’t think the article fully captures what’s at stake here. Instead, these questions cut to definitions of basic mission and competency. The Air Force will tell you that it has six core competencies: “air and space superiority; global attack; rapid global mobility; precision engagement; information superiority; agile combat support; and core values.” In the interest of brevity, I won’t get into a full discussion of each here, but rather direct you to the Air Forces’ whizbang of a website. However, if you read through the varying definitions of each core competency, it’s readily apparently why Gen. Schwartz is asking these questions. The USAF dominates the skies and no other country’s air wing could hope to compete with America’s for another 25 years. So “air superiority”? Check. “Global attack”? Ditto. “Combat Support”? Yup. On top of that, it’s not entirely clear whether the AF should be charged with missions like “information superiority” (that doesn’t fly, does it?) or “global mobility” (after all, you can move more stuff on the Navy’s back).
No better example of the AF’s mission conundrum might be the F-22 fighter jet, canceled last year. The F-22 was designed during the Cold War and designed to engage principally in air-to-air combat against a large nation-state air force. Tellingly, not a single one has flown over Iraq or Afghanistan since 2001. Since we already own 187 of them, we aren’t using them in our current deployments, and there isn’t a single air force out there that stands a chance of challenging the USAF’s “air superiority,” we didn’t need to buy any more. Gen. Schwartz and AF Secretary Michael Donley agreed.
It doesn’t seem anyone has great answer to these pressing questions, and I sure don’t either. But if Gen. Schwartz is willing to ask them, the public dialogue over the next year should be fascinating.
