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Explosive reporting by The Wall Street Journal this week asserts that SpaceX CEO Elon Musk is responsible for ordering speed restrictions on Ukrainian drones connecting to Starshield, the military application of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite network. The speed restrictions impacted both offensive and interceptor drones, reducing their effectiveness against Russian missiles and making them easier targets for Russian air defense systems. The Wall Street Journal report comes after days of finger-pointing and blame-shifting between the White House and Musk, and cites several sources who say that Musk had conversations with multiple senior administration officials — to include President Trump — before instituting the restrictions. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is still pleading for resolution, asking the Trump administration to restore Starshield connectivity and allow Ukraine to defend itself against continued Russian attacks.

PPI Expert Analysis:

Tamar Jacoby, Kyiv-based director of PPI’s New Ukraine project: Nearly five years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, virtually every frontline unit has adapted to the decentralized, drone-centered way of war that is the hallmark of this conflict. Every unit has its own IT shop to assemble and upgrade unmanned vehicles for its own specific tactical needs. Small, run-of-the-mill units may have just a few men in a backroom or a bunker. Larger, elite units have extensive facilities — dozens of technicians, complicated public and private supply lines, even their own proprietary manufacturing for some essential components. What they all have in common: the platforms they prepare for combat — be they aerial, ground, or maritime unmanned systems — rely on Starlink. You can’t miss the branded boxes stacked in every frontline outpost — in humbler units, just a few cartons shoved under a cot or behind a makeshift stove; at more advanced workshops, often several packed storerooms full of still uncrated late-model terminals.

Without Starlink or its military iteration, Starshield, the Ukrainian military would be virtually blind. Uncrewed strike units rely on it for targeting midrange assaults on enemy supply depots up to 200 kilometers behind the front line. Assault troops count on it to control the short-range drones that police and protect them in the kill zone. Interceptor teams in Kyiv and other cities depend on it to shoot down the incoming enemy drones — Shaheds and their progeny — that have terrorized Ukrainian civilian life since autumn 2022.

Russia’s new reliance on jet-powered drones — which fly more than twice as fast as those with piston engines — has made high-speed Starshield more essential than ever. Without it, Ukrainian air defense units have little chance of protecting civilian life in Kyiv and other cities. Ukraine doesn’t disaggregate civilian casualty figures — how many people were killed and wounded by jet drones as distinct from cruise and ballistic missiles. But there’s no question that the recent slowdown — the software adjustments ordered by Elon Musk last week that limit the speed of Starshield-guided platforms — is costing civilian lives.

Rarely, if ever, before in the history of warfare has one man — one unelected, civilian entrepreneur with no political check or balance — held so much power over the course of a conflict. How can this be right? How have we allowed it to happen? What can be done to limit Musk’s outsized influence on the battlefield? It’s every soldier’s nightmare come true — a magic weapon with a kill switch — and it will haunt the U.S. defense industry for years to come, as governments around the world think twice about purchasing American weapons that rely on software an army in harm’s way cannot control.

Mary Guenther, Head of Space Policy: Europe’s trust in American commercial space capabilities has been severely eroded in light of Ukrainian military access to SpaceX’s connectivity services being cut off or severely degraded not just once, but now twice. This is only egged on by Trump’s statements indicating American military products sold abroad may have a kill switch. While many commercial space services are used for purely civil purposes in Europe, like wildfire detection, most are dual-use, meaning they have civil and defense applications.

In Europe, distrust in American commercial space services has accelerated efforts to develop sovereign capabilities to avoid relying on the United States for their defense. Sovereign European capabilities are not a bad thing — the United States has been pushing for Europe to take greater responsibility for its defenses for some time — but an aversion to American commercial space companies based on the actions of one company and one Administration hurts the domestic space economy writ large, which relies on supply chains and markets on both sides of the Atlantic.

Danielle Steitz, Director of National Security Policy: The perception that certain Trump administration officials (such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio) have fostered — that this disruption was caused by Elon Musk acting unilaterally to dramatically alter the state of U.S. military assistance to Ukraine — is not only dangerous, it also illustrates the two-faced nature of Trump’s Ukraine policy. This is a president who continues to berate Ukraine’s leaders, demanding new elections and a cessation of strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, and who has directed actions and policy measures designed to force Ukraine to accede to unjust terms. However, once the tragic consequences of degrading Ukraine’s self-defense capabilities have been made clear to the world, Trump reversed course after several days of finger-pointing and reportedly asked Musk to restore Ukraine’s full capability. While the blame games continue to play out in Washington media outlets, those who suffer most from this Jekyll-and-Hyde decision-making are the Ukrainian citizens who now face the onset of another winter under Russian attack.

Politicization of Promotions at the State Department

By Danielle Steitz

The Washington Sun reported this week that the State Department has begun asking foreign service officers who they voted for in the 2016, 2020, and 2024 presidential elections as part of the department’s promotions process. In addition to voting histories, civil service candidates for promotion were also reportedly asked about previous political campaign donations, and were told that any donation to Democratic candidates would be disqualifying for those seeking mid-to-upper-level roles in the Foreign Service. This type of questioning as a promotion consideration appears to be directly in contradiction of federal law, which prohibits personnel decisions for career civil servants from being made on the basis of political affiliation. The State Department has not commented on the voting history questions, but issued a statement emphasizing fidelity to “the president’s vision for foreign policy” and “demonstrated performance on behalf of administration priorities.”

PPI Expert Analysis:

Danielle Steitz, Director of National Security Policy: The overt politicization of career civil service jobs in the State Department is disheartening, yet unsurprising in the administration of a president who values loyalty to him above all else. Trump’s disregard for career Foreign Service officers has been demonstrated time and again through his preference for sending Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner flying around the world instead of trusting trained and experienced diplomats to handle difficult negotiations, but requiring explicit political support of Trump in order to reach more senior grades is the most blatantly institution-warping act yet. When they join the Foreign Service, these officers swear in their oath of office to support and defend not the policy of a particular president, but the U.S. Constitution. Warping the definition of “fidelity” to mean anything else does a gross disservice to that oath, and to those who take seriously their calling to public service.