Uncompromising Activism: The New Threat to the Environment, Geopolitics and the Biden Administration

Under pressure from green activists, the Biden administration is considering adopting a climate test in permits for new liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facilities. Coming out of the pandemic-driven supply shocks and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, American LNG exports were the largest of any single country in 2023 and served crucial roles in the U.S. economy, the environment and geopolitical support for European allies.

The activists hope to stop LNG infrastructure projects in spite of these benefits apparently out of misguided trust for a single study and seemingly without concern for the political backlash among working-class and swing-state voters at home and allies abroad. The form of policy demand these left-wing activists have adopted is to require the inclusion of climate impacts in the federal government’s calculation of public interest in permits for LNG export facilities. Based on an unreviewed paper with what we view as overly narrow calculations and sorely outdated evidence, it seems the activists assume that the inclusion of climate criteria in the permit decision would end the export of LNG — which they believe would constitute climate progress. But gas is cleaner than coal, and because U.S. gas is relatively clean and getting even cleaner due to signature Biden policies, the climate calculus of growing liquefied gas exports does not mean that a comprehensive test of their impact would bear out the anti-export position of some environmental activists.

The economic and political risk for Democrats is enormous. President Biden knows that his political future is tied directly to issues like inflation and to winning back working-class voters in swing states like Pennsylvania. Remember that Biden made a late 2020 campaign stop in Pennsylvania for the explicit purpose of letting voters know that he was not against fracking. To allow the far left to derail the natural gas successes of this administration would be electorally disastrous.

Furthermore, world energy markets and our allies in Europe and East Asia are relying on the U.S. to serve as a clean backstop supplier of LNG exports to avoid market shocks like COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Because American natural gas exports provide such significant geopolitical and economic benefits, and because they provide world markets that lack other coal substitutes with a key source of lower-polluting LNG, a well-constructed test for the climate impact of LNG exports would not be the death knell of the export industry supposed by both sides of this debate. If the groups pushing for a test were to write it themselves, the simplistic result could cause significant damage to the global environment and world energy markets.

By contrast, a well-designed calculation could serve as a rigorous and transparent benchmark for assessing the relative climate benefits of U.S. natural gas and the development of differentiated markets for lower-methane gas with like-minded green importing allies. An honest approach to evaluating the climate and geopolitical impacts of LNG facilities would take into account the climate costs of mining more coal, burning more coal and using coal as a chemical feedstock. A fair test would acknowledge air pollution differences and coal mine methane leaks that exceed natural gas methane emissions by likely underestimated official measurements. It would account for the boon to Putin if U.S. LNG shipments to Europe and Asia declined, sending those markets back into the fold of the Russian petrostate.

The U.S. reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 2% in 2023, largely as a result of lower coal use. The U.S. was instrumental in averting an energy catastrophe in Europe following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. There is finally a path forward to help Asia reduce its dependence on coal by switching to cleaner U.S. LNG. The synergies of natural gas electricity production with intermittent wind and solar are paying huge climate benefits. And future technology deployments in carbon capture and hydrogen may require infrastructure innovations developed in gas transport.

Some far-left environmentalists seem willing to throw all of that away in a misguided attempt to just keep all of the oil and gas in the ground. Who benefits from this new push to stymie the U.S. LNG infrastructure buildout? Ultimately, it would be the coal industry and Putin. Out of a misguided fear of stranded assets and infrastructure lock-in, some greens believe that turning off U.S. exports will reduce emissions, simple as that. However, America exports LNG to meet real global energy demand, and simply cutting off supplies of gas does not mean that demand disappears; instead, energy importers will be forced to buy dirtier fuels and are likely to reward autocratic suppliers like Russia.

The energy transition is a global and gradual process that cannot be implemented immediately with only good intentions to power it. We have no choice but to build our way through the energy transition with the energy system we have.

There are credible environmental organizations working on pragmatic greenhouse gas reductions from energy supply chains in concert with industry, such as the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and ambitious policies in the Inflation Reduction Act will allow the Biden administration to push already declining emissions down even further. The real absurdity here lies in an unreviewed working paper using 30-year-old numbers that, in a matter of months, has ascended to seemingly steer national policy at the highest levels of the Biden administration. Our geopolitical allies, the climate, the U.S. economy and the electoral future of the Democrats depend on better policy.

This op-ed was originally published in The Messenger.

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: 55 countries have ratified the WTO’s 2022 fishery subsidies agreement. They need 55 more by late February.

FACT: 55 countries have ratified the WTO’s 2022 fishery subsidies agreement. They need 55 more by late February.

THE NUMBERS: ‘Capture fisheries’ annual tonnage by country, 2021 –
Country Total Ratified WTO Fisheries Agreement?
World: 92.2 million tons
China 13.1 million tons Yes
Indonesia 7.1 million tons Not yet
Peru 6.6 million tons Yes
Russia 5.2 million tons Not yet
India 5.0 million tons Not yet
U.S. 4.3 million tons Yes
European Union* 3.7 million tons Yes
Vietnam 3.5 million tons Not yet
Japan 3.1 million tons Yes
Norway 2.6 million tons Not yet
All other ~34.5 million tons 26 yes, 104 not yet
Non-WTO members** ~1.5 million tons n/a

* Represents itself and the 27 member states.
** Among countries and territories outside the WTO, top capture fisheries include Iran at 0.8 million tons, Micronesia 0.2 million tons, North Korea 0.2 million tons (World Bank’s estimate), Marshall Islands 0.10 million, Nauru 0.1 million tons, and a group of smaller fisheries countries – Ethiopia, South Sudan, Somalia, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Bahamas – collectively at about 0.3 million tons.

WHAT THEY MEAN:

It’s been sadly difficult to get countries to agree on good things in this century, but as the 164 members of the World Trade Organization prepare for their 13th Ministerial Conference at the end of February, they have a chance.  It has to do with fish:

Fish, Boats, and Money: The world’s fishing fleet — 45,000 big factory-style vessels and 4.1 million small boats — hauls in 80 million tons of “capture” on the high seas and off the world’s seacoasts, and 10 million tons from lakes and rivers. To put this figure in context, all humans put together weigh about 500 million tons (~60 kilos per person x 8 billion people). Various gloomy studies report the consequences: About 100 million sharks are taken each year, declines of up to 90% in counts of large fish, and more than a third of the world’s fishing grounds are unsustainably depleted.

What to Do? In a world of 8 billion humans and their need for protein, shrinking forests and land habitat, and limited new farmland options, no single solution for pressure on marine life seems likely. Aquaculture, limits on particular species, bycatch reduction, bans on especially destructive fishing technologies, etc. all have their part. For the last 25 years, though, the WTO members have been circling around a partial solution, which at least in principle is among the simplest and easiest of all: stop paying people to fish more than they should.

Subsidies: One reason fish counts fall is that governments are paying fishing fleets to get bigger and catch more of them. A widely used count of world subsidies to fishing fleets, done in 2019 by a group of academics at the University of British Columbia (Sumaila et al), yields a figure of $35.4 billion. This is about a tenth of the world’s $400 billion annual fishing industry, and a quarter of the $150 billion in annual fish trade. About $28 billion goes to large boats — pretty easily identified as the least needy recipients; by purpose, $22 billion goes to make fishing fleets larger, and another $7 billion to give them cheap fuel.  By region and top eight countries (counting the EU as a single economy), their rundown of subsidies looks like this:

World Total $35.4 billion
Asia $19.5 billion
                China   $7.5 billion
                Korea   $3.2 billion
                Japan   $2.9 billion
                Thailand   $1.1 billion
                Indonesia   $0.9 billion
Europe   $6.4 billion
                EU members   $3.8 billion
                Russia   $1.5 billion
U.S./Canada/Mexico   $4.4 billion
                U.S.   $3.4 billion
South/Central America   $2.0 billion
Africa   $2.1 billion
Pacific countries   $0.8 billion

 

The WTO: The WTO is well-placed to do something about this, given its mission and since its members includes 49 of the world’s top 50 capture fishery countries, and account for about 97% of world fishing. (The one big fishing country not in the WTO is Iran, whose fisheries account for 0.8 million tons annually or 1% of the total.)  Having debated fishery subsidy controls since 1998, they took a big first step at the 12th Ministerial Conference in June 2022, which “prohibits support for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, bans support for fishing overfished stocks, and ends subsidies for fishing on the unregulated high seas,” and now have two opportunities this February:

(a) Bring the 2022 agreement into force. So far, this remains an agreement on paper rather than something that is actually starting to bring down subsidies.  Its entry into force requires ratification by two-thirds of the WTO’s 164 members, or 110 in total.  As of mid-January, 55 have done so. Another 109 — including five of the world’s ten largest fishery countries – have not. Five of the top ten capture fishery countries including the U.S., China, EU, Japan, and Peru have ratified; the other five so far have not. India, Vietnam, Russia, Norway, and Indonesia — and a bit further down the scale, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand, and others — you have 40 days left before the Ministerial.

(b) Finish the work left incomplete last year: The 2022 agreement did not include limits on subsidies contributing to “overcapacity” in national shipping fleets, or to overfishing.  The WTO members (or at least the right-minded ones) hope to complete this by the Ministerial conference in February, working from a text that requires members (with exceptions for least-developed countries and countries such as small islands whose fishing tonnage is very low) to abandon eight kinds of subsidies contributing to overcapacity — ship construction; machinery and technology purchases; fuel, ice, and bait; subsidies for required benefits; salaries and income support for crew; fish prices; at-sea support; and vessel loss or damage — and regular notifications to the WTO of all subsidies with justification for sustainability.

As a final exclamation point, the 2022 agreement — if actually brought into force — lasts only four years and self-terminates if the WTO members can’t agree on the overcapacity limit. If successful, the fisheries subsidy agreements will be something people remember quite a long time into the future, as an example of governments willing to make modest political sacrifices for the general good. If not, well, that would also be something to remember about this generation of political leaders.

FURTHER READING

The WTO:

The WTO’s 2022 agreement on fishery subsidies reduction.

… Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala takes recent ratifications from the U.K. and Gambia.

… and Fisheries Committee Chairman Gunnarsson updates on progress toward a broader agreement.

Subsidy counts:

Rashid Sumaila et al. in Science Direct tabulate a worldwide $35.4 billion in fishery subsidies by region, purpose, large vs. small ships, and more.

… while NGO Oceana reports that $5.4 billion worth of subsidies, or a fifth of the world total, goes to support fleets operating in other countries’ water, and $800 million for high-seas operations.

… and UNCTAD looks at subsidies and sustainability.

Fish & boats:

The World Bank has ‘capture’ fishery totals by country, in tons.

The UN Food and Agricultural Organization’s State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2022 reports on fish take, fleets and employment, sustainability, and more.  The 80 million tons of ocean capture looks like this:

*    67 million tons of fish, led by anchovies, Alaska pollock, and skipjack tuna;
*    5.6 million tons of crustaceans, mostly varieties of shrimp and crab;
*    5.9 million tons of mollusks, topped by squid;
*    0.5 million tons of edible jellyfish, sea urchins, sea cucumbers, and miscellaneous other sea life.

It concludes that “the fraction of fishery stocks within biologically sustainable levels decreased to 64.6% in 2019” from nearly 90% in 1974, and that 35.4% of world fisheries are overfished — take the dead Atlantic cod grounds off New England and Canada as an example — while 57.3% are at “maximum yield” and only 7.2% are “underfished.”

UNCTAD’s World Maritime Review 2023 tracks the world’s merchant fleet.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

Kilander for The Messenger: Republican Budget Concessions Enrich Tax Cheats and Increase the Deficit

By Alex Kilander

The budget deal recently struck by congressional leaders would be a bittersweet resolution to this year’s spending fight. On the one hand, it prevents a harmful government shutdown and adheres to the spending levels in the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) negotiated by President Biden and former House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.)  in June. But it rewards Republicans for threatening to renege on the agreement they already made and may help wealthy tax cheats in the process. Moreover, it avoids any real discussion about what is needed to remedy our nation’s fiscal imbalance.

The bipartisan agreement calls for just under $1.66 trillion in discretionary spending for fiscal year 2024, split between domestic and defense programs. Defense spending will be set at $886 billion, a 3% increase over the previous year, while non-defense spending will be set at $773 billion, roughly flat from the previous year. After accounting for inflation, this amounts to roughly flat defense spending with a 3.4% cut for non-defense spending.

Most importantly, this deal averts a harmful shutdown that would interrupt important federal programs and create a costly disruption to the nation’s economy through higher unemployment, lower GDP and disruptions to important sectors. Depending on their length, previous government shutdowns have cost the economy as high as $20 billion.

Read more.

This story was originally published in The Messenger on January 16, 2024.

Marshall for The Hill: Beyond partisan deadlock, there’s a nation in search of ‘can do’ democracy

By Will Marshall

Campaign 2024 is just getting underway, but President Biden already has framed it as a fight to save American democracy. That’s true no matter who wins the Republican presidential nomination.

If it’s Donald Trump, the threat to democracy is obvious. Having already instigated one failed coup attempt, he won’t hesitate to reject the voters’ verdict if he’s defeated again in November.

And if he wins, Trump has vowed to sic the Justice Department on his political enemies and pardon the Jan. 6 rioters, defining treason down for future insurrectionists.

Even a Biden victory, though, would only be a reprieve from our deeper dilemma: Public confidence in democracy is cratering.

Read more in The Hill.

Moss in Vox: Trump says a lot of stuff about the economy. What would he actually do?

Antitrust enforcement has been ticking up since the Obama administration, said Diana Moss, vice president and director of competition policy at the Progressive Policy Institute, a progressive think tank. The question with Trump, however, is whether in his next administration he would try to use antitrust laws and agencies to go after perceived enemies.

“He weaponized antitrust for sure, which I think will happen again should he come back into power,” Moss said. She pointed to reports of Trump’s attempts to block the AT&T-Time Warner merger because of his hate for CNN and to the Trump Department of Justice’s investigation into automakers that made a deal with California on emissions (the investigation was later dropped).

Read more in Vox.

Jacoby for The Wall Street Journal: Will Ukraine’s Refugees Want to Go Back Home?

By Tamar Jacoby

The startling news slipped by almost unnoticed in the last minutes of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s year-end press conference in December. Asked about the 6.2 million Ukrainians—nearly 15% of the population—who have fled the country over the past two years, Zelensky dashed off a list of incentives to encourage their return: cash payments, subsidized mortgages, startup business loans. But he devoted most of his answer to a very different idea: multiple citizenship. The goal would be to allow Ukrainians who live and work elsewhere to continue visiting, investing and otherwise contributing to the nation’s life.

It’s not a new concept, but hearing it from Zelensky was surprising. Was he acknowledging that many Ukrainian refugees may never return? The stakes are high: If the refugees don’t come back, demographic projections suggest that the country’s population, already shrinking before the war, could contract by 25% in decades ahead. Surveys suggest that the people who left Ukraine are better educated than the population at large, with two-thirds having completed higher education, so their absence would be a devastating economic blow for a country struggling to rebuild.

Zelensky expects European nations to encourage Ukrainians to return, including by tapering benefits for refugees except those in what he called “dire” circumstances. Czechia, Ireland and Switzerland are already considering travel subsidies to help Ukrainians go home when the fighting stops. Still, no one is talking about forcing them to return.

Read more in The Wall Street Journal.

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: A quarter of Ohio’s manufacturing workers work for international businesses

FACT: PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: A quarter of Ohio’s manufacturing workers work for international businesses.

THE NUMBERS:
U.S. private-sector employment, 2021: 124.38 million
… at foreign-owned businesses: 7.94 million
U.K.-owned: 1.22 million
… German-owned: 0.92 million
… Canadian-owned: 0.87 million
… Japanese-owned: 0.96 million
… all other countries: 3.97 million

 

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Anxiety-filled comment from Sen. J.D. Vance, an Ohio Republican, last month in response to U.S. Steel’s acceptance of a $14 billion purchase offer from Tokyo-based Nippon Steel:

““Today, a critical piece of America’s defense industrial base was auctioned off to foreigners for cash …”

In fact of course the company was not at “auction” as a sort of estate sale or distressed asset, Japan is not a random group of unknown foreigners but a core U.S. ally, and Nippon Steel is a long-term participant in U.S. metals production. A more temperate comment from Lael Brainard, running the White House’s National Economic Council, says these sorts of transactions can have implications beyond the capital markets, and that the U.S. government has a well-established process for examining them:

“This looks like the type of transaction that the interagency committee on foreign investment Congress empowered and the Biden Administration strengthened is set up to carefully investigate. This Administration will be ready to look carefully at the findings of any such investigation and to act if appropriate.”

Here’s some background:

Steel Output: The world’s steel mills pour about 1.9 billion glowing tons of metal a year.  The World Steel Association’s “World Steel in Figures 2023” summary places China’s 1.018 billion tons at more than half of 2022’s 1.885 billion-ton total, with India a distant second at 125 million tons, Japan third at 89 million tons, and the U.S. fourth at 80.5 million tons.  Six of the world’s 10 largest producers are Chinese; the remaining four include two Japanese firms, one Korean company, and the equivocal Arcelor-Mittal, which is based in Luxembourg but Indian by origin and management. Nippon Steel’s 44.4 million tons of output placed it fourth in the world.  U.S. Steel’s 14.5 million tons ranked 27th worldwide and third in the U.S. after Nucor’s 20.6 million tons and Cleveland-Cliffs’ 16.8 million.

Foreign Investment in the United States: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, meanwhile, tracks U.S. business investment abroad and foreign investment here. Its most recent annual tally, out last August and covering the year 2021, reports that international businesses employed 7.94 million American workers in 2021 – that is, a modest 6.2% share of that year’s 124.3 million private-sector workers. The international role in U.S. manufacturing is a lot larger, though: 2.81 million American manufacturing workers — about 23% of 2021’s 12.35 million total — go to work daily for international businesses. This includes 153,000 of Ohio’s 675,000 manufacturing workers, mirroring the national 23% employment share and the fourth-largest total of any state.  In Ohio as nationwide, Japanese firms are the top employer and Germans second. By country of origin, the largest groups are:

All manufacturing workers: 12.35 million
U.S.-based firms: 9.54 million
International firms total: 2.81 million
Japanese firms: 0.54 million
German firms: 0.32 million
British firms: 0.24 million
French firms: 0.21 million
Swiss firms: 0.18 million
Canadian firms: 0.15 million

 

By industry, the single largest group of workers at international manufacturers — 512,000 — are in automaking, followed by 426,000 in chemicals and 334,000 in food production.  In “primary metals” (which in BEA’s reports are combined as a group – steel, copper, aluminum, lead, etc.) BEA finds international firms producing $7.1 billion of 2021’s $74 billion in value-added U.S. output and employing 62,000 of the 357,000 total American metal workers. As an example, the Calvert mill in Alabama, with a 5.3 million ton annual capacity, has operated as a joint venture by Nippon Steel and Arcelor-Mittal since 2014, after its 2010 launch by German industrial conglomerate Thyssen-Krupp.

BEA’s “primary metals” employment figure is actually a bit low in historical terms — noticeably down from the 95,000 workers of 2000 and the 92,000 of 2019.  The post-2019 decline appears mainly to reflect Arcelor-Mittal’s 2020 sale of most of its U.S. steel assets (but not the Alabama site) to Cleveland-Cliffs. This event wasn’t especially unusual for FDI transactions, in which ownership occasionally shifts back and forth among the U.S., Canada, Europe, and Japan.  In autos, for example, Fiat’s current ownership of the venerable Chrysler Motors factories — now operating under the name “Stellantis”, with French producer Peugeot also a partner – followed a period of sole U.S. ownership from 2007-2014; and this in turn succeeded the company’s 1998-2007 incarnation as DaimlerChrysler.

U.S. Policy & Institutions: With all this in the background, (a) international participation in U.S. heavy industry in general, or metals specifically, isn’t new, and (b) some purchases, of course, are sensitive by the nature of the industry or the prospective buyer.  To examine and answer the questions they raise — for the defense industry, critical infrastructure, intellectual property, and research, or other reasons — and take such action as might be necessary (if any is needed), the U.S. government uses the long-functioning interagency group Dr. Brainard’s comment cites.

Known as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, “CFIUS”, this is a permanent executive-branch expert group composed of nine agencies — the Treasury Department as the chair, along with the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, Energy, and Defense, plus the U.S. Trade Representative and the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy. CFIUS reviewed 154 FDI deals in 2022 (some easily decided to be non-controversial, others requiring more investigation), a total slightly below the 164 reviews of 2021 and a bit above the 120 of 2020.  These involved facilities and enterprises ranging from auto parts, metalworking, pharmaceuticals, and boat-building through the information sector such as software publishing and data processing to telecommunications, financial services, and medical labs.

In sum: International businesses are a large and lively part of the U.S. economy, particularly in manufacturing. They carry on lots of research, make lots of cars and a significant amount of metal, and employ about a quarter of the American factory workforce. It’s perfectly reasonable nonetheless to examine new purchase proposals.  And given U.S. Steel’s unusually evocative history — sepia-tinged images of Carnegie, Morgan, and Schwab; mid-20th-century black-and-white reels tagged “Rooting for the Yankees is like …” — emotional reactions aren’t surprising. But neither the basic issues, nor Nippon Steel as a particular company given its significant participation in U.S. metals production over time, are novelties. As Brainard suggests, the government has a perfectly functional way to examine any questions the transaction might raise, and a hyperventilating response probably isn’t very useful.

FURTHER READING

Perspectives on metals:

Sen. J.D. Vance worries.

National Economic Council Chair Brainard suggests a review.

The World Steel Association’s most recent stat summary, with top producing and consuming countries, companies, and trends.

And the Alabama Department of Commerce on international steel investment at Calvert.

Data:

BEA’s summary of foreign multinationals’ U.S. affiliates.

… and data back to 2007.

Looking the other way, U.S.-based multinationals produced about $5.1 trillion worth of goods and services in the U.S. in 2021, and $1.5 trillion abroad, while employing 28.9 million workers in the U.S. and 14.0 million overseas.

And UNCTAD’s World Investment Report has global context.

And CFIUS explained:

U.S. Treasury Department’s background and foreign investment policy guidance.

… and CFIUS’ annual reports with stats and investigation summaries back to 2008.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

PPI Weighs in on FTC’s Junk Fee Rule: Encourages a Consumer Protection Rule that Supports Competition And Does Not Duplicate Other Regulations

Washington, D.C. — Today, the Progressive Policy Institute’s Dr. Diana Moss, Vice President and Director of Competition Policy filed comments in the Federal Trade Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Unfair or Deceptive Fees. The proposed consumer protection rule responds to the mandate in the Biden Administration’s 2021 Executive Order on competition that calls out — among other anti-consumer and anti-competitive practices — murky price transparency and hidden fees. These “junk fees” can harm consumers directly by raising prices, and indirectly by preventing comparison shopping and stifling competition. PPI’s comments emphasize, however, that consumer protection policies and competition enforcement are both “pro-consumer” but they work very differently.

“PPI’s comments to the FTC signal support for policies that take on harmful practices of saddling consumers with junk fees,” said Dr. Diana Moss. “PPI is urging the Commission to ensure that where the consumer protection requirements of the junk fee rule impact competition the rule supports, and does not undermine, competition.”

The FTC’s proposed junk fee rule targets unfair or deceptive practices such as “bait and switch” schemes (i.e., hidden fees) and misrepresenting the nature and purpose of fees. The proposed requirements have significant implications for market participants, including consumers and businesses. They do not prohibit junk fees, but instead discourage businesses from levying junk fees on consumers in the first place. The rule, therefore, requires businesses to provide information about the total price of a product or service so that consumers can better understand what they are purchasing, for how much, and better compare prices across sellers.

PPI’s comments urge the FTC to take a closer look at three major issues before finalizing the proposed rule:

1. The junk fee rule targets businesses’ ability to levy unfair or deceptive fees. However, it does nothing to reduce incentives to engage in such practices. It is well known that incentives to exercise market power are best reduced through antitrust enforcement of harmful mergers and anticompetitive practices. There are good reasons for using consumer protection policy to combat junk fees but PPI’s comments stress that it should not displace or weaken the role of competition enforcement in getting to the root cause of junk fees. PPI asks the Commission to do more analysis of incentives to impose junk fees and how it will coordinate the agency’s competition and consumer protection missions in implementing the junk fee rule.

2. The junk fee rule includes requirements for businesses to disclose total prices and detailed information on fees. But in some markets, different pricing models — such as unbundled versus all-in pricing in airlines and some wireless services — are important for consumers. Different pricing methods can also be an important way that firms beneficially compete. PPI suggests that the rule be clarified to explain how the requirements affect consumers who benefit from different pricing models and how the rules will not interfere with them.

3. The junk fee rule leaves open the question of whether the rule should be applied to certain “covered” businesses and whether small businesses should be excluded. It calls out egregious junk fee practices in certain markets, such as live events, transportation, financial services, hotels, and telecommunications. The proposed rules may, however, be similar to regulatory and legislative initiatives that focus on price transparency in certain markets. PPI asks the Commission, therefore, to provide more analysis of other regulatory rules that could overlap with the proposed rule and explain how the proposed requirements do not duplicate, or conflict with those rules, with unintended consequences for consumers and competition.

PPI’s comments on the FTC’s junk fee rule conclude that — while it is headed in the right direction — the proposed rule is not yet ready for “prime time.”

To read PPI’s full comments to the FTC in the FTC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Unfair or Deceptive Fees, please click here.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

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Media Contact: Amelia Fox – afox@ppionline.org

PPI Comments on the FTC’s Proposed Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is pleased to provide comments to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Unfair or Deceptive Fees (“proposed rule”), issued on November 9, 2023 (R207011) in docket FTC-2023-24234. PPI is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C., with offices in Brussels, Berlin, and the United Kingdom. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. PPI is home to a center on competition advocacy that features expert analysis and commentary that is rooted in promoting competitive markets and the democratic values that support them.

Read the comment on the FTC’s Proposed Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees.

Looking Forward: Pacific Strategy and U.S. Relations with Vietnam and Thailand

Thoughts and Conclusions After Consultations in Hanoi and Bangkok, December 2023

Note: A five-person PPI staff group including Marshall and Gresser recently returned from a two-week visit to these two countries, with extensive consultations in Hanoi and Bangkok.  The following lays out some of the information and conclusions the group drew from these visits.

Vietnam and Thailand both possess strong and successful relationships with the U.S., but ones we can strengthen — particularly through more ambitious trade policy engagement.  As Americans look, in economics, to “de-risk,” “friend-shore,” and reduce single-source reliance on Chinese imports — and in politics to develop diplomatic and security relationships with strong and influential middle-sized Asian powers —both are attractive choices.

These are medium-sized countries by Asian standards, but large by anyone else’s: Thailand’s 70 million people and Vietnam’s 100 million together aren’t far below the 215 million combined for Germany, France, and the U.K. Though their economies are obviously smaller, Thailand is a prosperous upper-middle-income country and Vietnam a fast-growing lower-middle-income state.  Both countries, with their very different histories and political cultures, have all but eliminated absolute poverty and developed large and well-educated middle classes. It’s particularly striking to see that Vietnam, with 21,900 students now at American universities, sees the United States as the partner of choice in developing its next generation of leadership.

Both countries likewise have independent and carefully managed foreign policy strategies, whose core concerns are logical and compatible with U.S. goals. Vietnam is engaged in very high-stakes competition with China over maritime territorial claims, the main issue being a Chinese claim to vast areas of water and island chains quite far south of China’s coast and very near those of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Vietnamese policy sees a close political relationship with the United States as a way to ensure that China does not simply impose its view on the smaller countries to its south, and is also a way of reducing the risk that conflicting claims will erupt in crisis. Thailand, a long-time treaty ally of the United States, does not have territorial concerns and worries most about spillovers from instability in neighboring countries.  Like Vietnam, and with a deep tradition of bilateral military and intelligence cooperation, Thailand sees the United States as a valuable partner and contributor to regional stability.

Economically, the U.S. relationship with these countries is large and generally successful, but in some ways limited. Vietnam has been the “winner” of the Trump administration’s trade war, with U.S. imports rising from $46 billion in 2017 to a likely $110 billion this year with particularly rapid growth in consumer electronics such as cell phones and personal computers.  Much of this is, however, processing work that continues to rely on Chinese components — a business source estimated that only about 20% of Vietnam’s $370 billion in annual exports is local value, mostly in the form of skilled labor. Vietnam’s government and businesses are looking for ways to increase local value, diversify their own component sourcing, and become somewhat more of a “creative” economy and somewhat less of a “processing zone” exporter. And from an American perspective, the United States’ export figures to Vietnam remain quite small, around $10 billion annually.

Thailand is a smaller manufacturing exporter, but one with more developed local industries which add more value to the country’s export trade, especially in automotive and food production. The culturally and intellectually liberal Thai tradition — involving open media, independent universities, a lively civil society and NGO landscape, and close observation of policy trends in major countries — continues to make Bangkok mainland Southeast Asia’s center of transport, media, finance, and culture, and supports a creative class in strong fashion, design, and artistic industries.

The goals of both countries appear to mesh well, though in somewhat different ways, with the program Biden administration Cabinet Secretaries Yellen and Raimondo have laid out: diversification of sourcing, reduction of over-reliance on China especially for products critical to major supply chains, and successful competition with China over the longer term. With this in the background, interlocutors in both capitals were puzzled by the Biden administration’s decision to pull back from conclusion of the Trade Pillar of the “IPEF” (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) it had launched early in 2022. This decision was particularly startling given the Pillar’s relatively modest goals in particular, the administration’s unwillingness to negotiate on tariff and market access issues.  Looking back at the experience, this choice meant IPEF elicited little enthusiasm in America’s exporting industries and farm sectors, and also left American negotiators with little leverage to entice IPEF’s other countries (including both Vietnam and Thailand) to make very sweeping commitments on the labor, environmental, and supply-chain issues the administration placed at the center of the talks.

The good news is that there is a lot of room for change, and still time to make it. U.S. export industries — medical technologies, agriculture, aerospace, machinery, energy — are competitive and successful, but in Southeast Asia, as in many parts of the world, face large market barriers. It is particularly frustrating, in the Vietnamese case, to see U.S. competitors taking advantage of the TPP commitments the Obama administration worked so hard to achieve while we lose ground.

And just as the export sector needs more, the case for avoiding tariffs on defensive grounds is very weak. The actual U.S. tariff schedules (as the New Democrat Coalition suggested last November) are plagued by regressivity and gender bias, ineffectual as job protectors, and ripe for a thorough review and purge even without international negotiations. Meanwhile, the Trump campaign is proposing a radical economic isolationism, with a Hoover-style tariff increase at the core, which rests on deep and groundless pessimism about U.S. workers’ competitiveness and threatens growth and innovation in the U.S. and abroad.  The Biden administration, though now entering its fourth year, still has the opportunity to respond with an optimistic, growth-oriented program that returns market access and export industries to the center of policy. Vietnam and Thailand are countries that will likely respond well to this, and they’re probably not alone in that.

Some Observations on Proposed Capital Requirements

Strong capital requirements help protect taxpayers and prevent financial crises. As the savings and loan industry bailout of 1989 and the 2008 financial crisis underscore, when banks take on too much risk with too little capital, workers, small businesses, and American taxpayers pay the price.

PPI believes strong, tangible capital requirements for depository institutions are key to ensuring a well-functioning banking system. Given the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank last spring, we applaud federal regulators for undertaking a review of what changes are needed to prevent similar outcomes in the future.

With regard to the proposed rule to increase capital standards on large banks by as much as 20%, we find ourselves in agreement with Senator Mark Warner of Virginia. As the Senator stated earlier this fall, we must “make sure that when we think about the safety and soundness of the system, we think about the interaction between interest rate rise, capital standards, and other factors.”

Or in other words, given the many economic challenges facing the nation today — a 22-year high federal funds rate, an inflation rate that has dropped significantly but remains higher than the Fed’s target, weakening loan demand, and ongoing political dysfunction — regulators must be careful that the impact of any changes in capital requirements not inadvertently hurt middle-and working-class families and small businesses.

Balancing the safety and soundness of the financial system has always been a difficult tightrope to walk. But that is the job of banking regulators. Regulators may be correct that higher capital standards may be needed, but the evidence must be clear, rational, and thorough.

Quantifying the Economic and Health Benefits from COVID-19 Vaccines and Boosters

Washington, D.C. — With the recent surge of new COVID-19 variants, the question of whether to receive a COVID-19 booster has become front of mind for many Americans. The development, manufacturing, and administration of COVID-19 vaccines to the great majority of the adult United States population has been an impressive scientific and policy achievement.

Today, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) released a new report “Quantifying the Economic and Health Benefits from Rapid-Development COVID-19 Vaccines and Boosters” by Michael Mandel, Ph.D., Chief Economist at the Progressive Policy Institute, Robert Popovian, Pharm D., M.S. Senior Health Policy Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, and Wayne Winegarden, Ph.D., Director at the Center for Medical Economics and Innovation Pacific Research Institute.

Using conservative assumptions, the report finds that the COVID-19 vaccines saved 2.9 million lives, avoided 12.5 million hospitalizations, and saved $500 billion in hospitalization costs. This is in comparison to the counterfactual of no successful vaccine, relying instead on the development of natural immunity through infection.

Looking forward, the report uses the same framework to examine the decision to receive a new COVID-19 booster each year, which boosts protection against severe outcomes. The analysis assumes that existing protection against severe outcomes decays as new variants arise and that the benefits of the booster depend on the nature and speed of changes in the virus.

The report provides illustrative calculations of the benefits from annual COVID-19 boosters at different ages. One such illustrative calculation shows that the expected 5-year economic losses to an individual choosing not to receive boosters rises from $654 at age 30 to more than $65,000 at age 75.

“The data shows that COVID-19 vaccines have provided enormous health and economic benefits to the United States, saving millions of lives and hospitalizations, as well as $500 billion in hospital costs,” said Dr. Michael Mandel. “This comprehensive report also analyzes the individual consequences of deciding whether or not to receive a COVID-19 booster and finds that there is a great economic benefit to getting COVID boosters.”

“Immunization continues to be the most cost-effective and clinically safe way of gaining immunity against viral pathogens of COVID-19. While the data demonstrates that both prior infection and vaccination provide similar protection against future COVID-19 infections, there are typically more health and economic consequences from obtaining protection through prior infection compared to vaccination,” said Dr. Robert Popovian.

Read and download the full report here.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.orgFind an expert at PPI and follow us on Twitter.

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Media Contact: Amelia Fox – afox@ppionline.org

Quantifying the Economic and Health Benefits from Rapid-Development COVID-19 Vaccines and Boosters

ABSTRACT

This paper assesses the health and economic benefits of the rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines. Using a simple framework of stylized facts, we find that the COVID-19 vaccines saved 2.9 million lives, avoided 12.5 million hospitalizations, and saved $500 billion in hospitalization costs. Importantly, these are conservative estimates, based on the assumption that successfully surviving COVID-19 infection offers protection against future severe outcomes similar to vaccination.

Using the same framework, we examine the consequences to individuals of choosing to receive or not receive new COVID-19 boosters, given the continued evolution of the virus. An illustrative calculation shows that the expected 5-year economic losses to an individual from choosing not to receive boosters rises from $654 at age 30 to more than $65,000 at age 75.

INTRODUCTION

From the moment COVID-19 was first identified, researchers were projecting the potential economic and human cost of an unchecked major pandemic and the corresponding economic and human benefits of an effective COVID-19 vaccine. Some of these projections were exceedingly influential in guiding private and public responses to the pandemic.

The development, testing, manufacturing, and administration of COVID-19 vaccines to almost 80% of the population over the age of 12 in the United States (fully vaccinated) has been a tremendous scientific and policy achievement. Globally, about 67% of the world population was fully vaccinated as of March 2023.

Unfortunately, hopes that a sufficiently vaccinated population could mostly avoid initial infections have turned out to be excessively optimistic. As of November 2022, 77.5% of the population was estimated to have been infected by COVID-19 at least once. In the 16- to 49- year-old age group, the percentage infected is closer to 85%.

In particular, the Omicron variant turned out to be extremely contagious in the U.S. and globally. As of April 2022, 60 to 80% of the European population was estimated to have been infected with COVID-19. More recent estimates are even higher. According to one model, an estimated 95% of the European population has been infected at least once as of December 2022. In Japan, the cumulative infection rate, measured by antibody tests, rose sharply from 28.6% in November 2022 to 42.3% in February 2023. In Japan, an estimated 80% of the population has been infected at least once. In Korea, the cumulative infection rate was 83%. Even the draconian measures applied by the Chinese government were unable to contain the wave of infections.

A related observation is that neither infection nor vaccination with the current generation of vaccines appears to offer long-lasting immunity against reinfections. Past a certain point, the spread of the virus through the population could not have been prevented by a more aggressive vaccination program or other policy interventions.

However, the exceedingly good news is that vaccination appears to provide durable protection against severe outcomes such as invasive ventilation and death. Obviously, that might change as new variants arise, but for now, that’s what current evidence shows.

Notably, prior infection also appears to provide durable protection against severe outcomes, even for those people who have not been vaccinated. This is no longer a “novel” pathogen attacking unprepared immune systems. Once again, this could change for a sufficiently different variant.

So now we can get a clearer picture of the benefits of COVID-19 vaccination. Vaccination provided a much lower risk path for achieving protection against severe outcomes. Without vaccines, many more people would have died or have been hospitalized.

This paper has both a backward-looking component and a forward-looking component. Based on the evidence, the backward-looking component constructs a set of stylized facts that allow us to understand the economic and health benefits of a rapid-development COVID-19 vaccine compared to reasonable counterfactuals (including no vaccine and more rapid roll-out of the vaccine at the beginning of 2021). These estimates include the mortality and hospitalization outcomes of the “worst case” counterfactual of no successful vaccine, along with the associated health-related costs.

Read the full report.

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: The price of a 40-inch TV set has fallen by 99% in 25 years

FACT: The price of a 40-inch TV set has fallen by 99% in 25 years.

THE NUMBERS: Price of a 40-inch flat-screen TV –
2023 $150 – $300 (Best Buy and Amazon range)
2005 $4,000 (Sony)
1997 $22,900 (Fujitsu’s first 40″ plasma TV)
WHAT THEY MEAN:

The election year 2024 opens with many questions, but one is basic: Can a person, who has attempted to overthrow a settled election and has called for “termination” of unspecified parts of the Constitution, in good faith take an oath to “faithfully execute the office of President of the United States” and “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution”?

Policy choices fall pretty far beneath this. (If they’re wrong, they can always be changed.)  But they aren’t irrelevant and are sometimes connected to this large constitutional matter. Here, for example, is the former U.S. Trade Representative Amb. Robert Lighthizer, defending Trump campaign proposals for a 10% worldwide tariff and a sharp break in economic relations with China to a team of New York Times political writers by making a more general plea:

“If all you chase is efficiency — if you think the person is better off on the unemployment line with a third 40-inch television* than he is working with only two — then you’re not going to agree …  There’s a group of people who think that consumption is the end.  And my view is that production is the end, and safe and happy communities are the end.  You should be willing to pay a price for that.” 

The apparent idea is that if everyone’s cost of living rises and families buy fewer things, the country as a whole will be better off because it will make more things and unemployment will decline. More simply, if Americans are to be “rich” and secure, living standards must fall.

The flaw here is pretty obvious — if people are less affluent they will buy fewer things, and production of things will not rise but drop. Two illustrative examples of how this works, and then a thought on how this might relate to the really basic question:

1. TVs, Efficiency, Productivity, & Innovation: People buy TV sets, and by extension lots of things, on the basis of quality and price. An “efficient” firm will reduce costs through productivity, develop new products through innovation, and offer high-quality sets at low prices. Back in the 1970s, for example, Sony’s 19-inch color Trinitron introduced flatter screens with better visual resolution, and the company’s efficiency and productivity allowed it to sell them at the same prices its competitors charged for blurrier and heavier consoles. Late-1970s anti-dumping suits and import quotas didn’t change these facts. A generation later in 1997, a 10% tariff on Fujitsu’s inaugural $22,900 40-inch plasma might have been daunting even for the few hedge-funders and studio execs interested in showing one off, but wouldn’t have affected production much. Since then, efficiency has cut the cost of a 40-inch TV by 99% to a current range of $150-$300,* making today’s much better versions easily available to Amb. L’s supposedly spendthrift waitresses and bus drivers. The same tariff today would set them back about $20 (or $60 if they wanted to buy three). Over the entire TV-making and -selling world, this would likely put some retail clerks out of their jobs, but likewise wouldn’t affect production.

2. Metals, Tariff Payments, and Production: In the event of a 10% tariff, someone will pay and it’s pretty clear who it will be.  The aluminum and steel tariffs the Trump administration imposed in March of 2018 (10% and 25% respectively, with some exclusions) offer a modest case study of the economy-wide effects of higher input prices and consequently reduced efficiency.  The U.S. International Trade Commission’s March 2023 report summarizes their effects five years on:

“U.S. importers bore nearly the full cost of these tariffs.  The USITC estimated that prices [of the metals] increased by about 1 percent for each 1 percent increase in tariffs. … U.S.  production of steel was $1.3 billion higher due to Section 232 tariffs.  U.S. production of aluminum was $0.9 billion higher in 2021 due to Section 232 tariffs.  U.S. production in downstream industries [Editors note: the ITC’s major examples are machinery manufacturing, auto parts, hand tools, and cutlery] was $3.5 billion less in 2021 due to Section 232 tariffs.” 

So the ITC’s finding is (a) a $2.2 billion increase in output of the metals (about 5%), compared to the model’s guess at an economy continuing on the same course without tariffs, (b) a somewhat larger decline of $3.5 billion in the machinery, auto parts, and tool-making industries using metals to make their products, and therefore (c) an overall slightly smaller manufacturing sector, though one in which the modestly diminished machinery- and parts-makers buy somewhat more metal from local mills.

In fairness, the administration’s stated reason for imposing the tariffs five years ago was not a hope for “generally higher manufacturing output.” Rather it was an argument that metals production is important enough to national security to sacrifice the interest of machinery and auto parts makers, plus a hope that tariffs would mean a large increase in metal output and mill capacity utilization. More on this in a few weeks (and a few stats below), but the many metal-tariff experiments over the last half-century suggest some skepticism about the latter point.

3. And the Constitutional issues: Apart from the economics, how exactly would this happen?  Constitutionally, only Congress has the right to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” Asked by the Times’ political team about how a President could create an entirely new tariff system by himself, the Ambassador cites some existing trade laws that might enable a President to declare a “national emergency” and impose it by decree. Which, sounding pretty consistent with the “termination” of parts of the document, makes these policy issues look quite relevant to the year’s really basic question.

* $200 is about 0.2% of America’s $74,850 median household income. Not an extravagance at all, and even three would be manageable for a lower-middle-income household.

FURTHER READING

From the National Archives, the official Constitution transcript (see Article I, Section 8, #1 for “Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises”).

… and ex-USTR Lighthizer in the New York Times (subs. req.) on a second Trump program, national wealth through forgoing new TV sets, etc.

Metals:

The U.S. International Trade Commission models the effects of steel and aluminum tariffs five years later.

Or, from a different source — The U.S. Geological Survey’s record of steel use, trade, and production by year reports actual use and output rather than trying to model a non-tariff economy.  Their 2022 summary reports 82 million tons of “raw steel production,” 8 million tons exported, 30 million tons imported, and 96 million tons “consumed” throughout the economy. By comparison, the 2017 report has 81.6 million tons produced, 9.5 million tons exported, 34.6 million imported, and 102 million tons used throughout the U.S. economy. The Bureau of Labor Statistics likewise reports employment essentially unchanged, at 83,000 in late 2017 and 82,600 at the end of 2022.

TVs:

CNET looks at TV prices, 1950-2017.

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers remembers Fujitsu’s first flat-screen TV.

And from the Washington Post archives (also subs. req.), a report on a 1977 TV “price war,” featuring Japanese innovation, import competition, and U.S. trade law.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank ProgressiveEconomy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007). He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week.

Ritz for Forbes: Improving Financial Capability Can Help Low-Income Families Around The Holidays

By Ben Ritz

Managing money around the holidays can be tough for low-income families even in the best of times. The pressure to be generous with family and friends can often lead to overspending and a hangover of debt when the new year rolls around. But the challenge has become particularly acute for many after a prolonged period in which rising prices often outstripped modest wage gains. One relatively easy solution is to improve “financial capability” — an individual’s understanding of how to distribute their incomes, manage their debts, balance their cashflow, and protect themselves against financial uncertainties.

2021 study from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) found that an individual making between $25,000 and $50,000 was 15 points more likely to have emergency savings capable of covering three months of expenses if they scored above average on an assessment of financial literacy (another term for financial capability). Individuals in this income range demonstrating high financial literacy were also 10 points more likely to spend less than they earn, putting them on par with people who made more than $100,000 and demonstrated below-average financial literacy. These findings suggest good financial education can give many lower-income families the same financial security high-income households enjoy.

Unfortunately, those households under the most financial pressure are often the least equipped to manage it. The FINRA study found individuals with incomes over $50,000 were more than twice as likely to demonstrate high financial literacy as those without. Improving financial capability may not be a panacea for families in the depths of poverty, for whom there is no substitute for additional resources, but it would clearly make a meaningful difference for many low- and middle-income families.

Read more in Forbes.

Weinstein for Forbes: 2023 Was A Good Year For American High Speed Rail

By Paul Weinstein Jr. 

2023 has been a particularly good year for American high-speed rail. In Florida, Brightline expanded its fast train (top speed 125 mph) from Miami to Orlando with plans to break ground on an extension to Tampa. The company’s project (186 mph) to connect Las Vegas with the exurbs of Los Angeles both acquired the necessary environmental approvals and received $3 billion (about $9 per person in the US) from the federal government. The Biden Administration awarded $3 billion of the $10 billion needed to help California finish its new 171-mile central valley corridor (220 mph) between Merced and Bakersfield (220 mph). Finally, Amtrak’s new, lighter, and faster Acela train sets (160 mph) may finally hit the rails in 2024, which along with some important upgrades, will cut the journey between New York and Washington by two-and-a-half hours from about three.

But, while some believe the dream of U.S. high-speed rail is finally within reach, the reality is America is still worlds from boasting a high-speed rail network like those found in Asia and Europe. The reason is simple—cost.

U.S. rail projects are more expensive and take longer to finish than anywhere else in the world. Domestic rail/transit projects cost 50 percent more (on a per mile basis) than those in Europe and Canada. U.S. projects also take more time. According to one study, European tunnels can be completed 18 months faster than anything similar in the U.S. That extra time is costly, as companies must pay salaries and benefits during the long wait.

Read more in Forbes.