WASHINGTON — Credit card interest rates have skyrocketed over the past few years, increasing borrowing and debt. Congress has attempted to mitigate credit card debt for Americans by introducing legislation to cap credit card interest rates at ten percent. However, this legislation would do more harm than good.
To inform the debate around new legislation proposing a 10% interest rate cap, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) today released “Cutting Credit: How Rate Caps Undermine Access for Working Americans.” Authored by Andrew Fung, Senior Economic & Technology Policy Analyst; Alex Kilander, Policy Analyst at PPI’s Center for Funding America’s Future; and Sophia Lu, PPI Public Policy Fellow, the report argues that while rising interest rates reflect inflation and increased lending risk, a blunt rate cap would strip issuers of a key tool for managing that risk — ultimately reducing access to credit for working-class borrowers.
“A 10% interest rate cap may sound like relief, but it could end up closing the door on credit for millions of Americans,” said Fung. “When lenders can’t price for risk, they stop serving lower-income borrowers.”
The authors suggest three ways that would strengthen consumer protections without cutting off access to credit:
Enhancing Transparency in Credit Terms and Disclosures: When consumers can clearly find and understand how much they will pay over the life of a loan or credit card balance, they can better evaluate their credit and spending decisions.
Expanding Financial Education in Schools and Communities: Most young Americans struggle with managing their finances, and the implementation of financial education will help them make better monetary decisions.
Investing in Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) to Provide Responsible Credit Access for Working Americans: CDFIs play an essential role in the financial ecosystem by giving those who cannot afford rising interest rates at banks a safer alternative to predatory loans.
“Rather than imposing blanket rate caps, targeted reforms expand access to responsible credit and empower consumers through transparency and education, said Kilander.”
Founded in 1989, PPI is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visitingprogressivepolicy.org.Find an expert at PPI andfollow us on X.
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Media Contact: Ian O’Keefe – iokeefe@ppionline.org
As the inflation rate surged throughout 2021 and 2022 and put pressure on consumers’ wallets, another important trend was underway: credit card interest rates were rising. With the Federal Reserve raising the federal funds rate substantially to combat inflation, credit card interest rates climbed sharply in 2022 and 2023 as a result of the increased costs of lending, rising from an average of 14.51% in Q4 2021 to 21.19% just two years later. However, even as inflation subsided and prices stabilized, credit card interest rates remained elevated.
Why is this the case? Ultimately, credit card interest rates reflect the state of the broader consumer credit market. In recent years, that market has started showing signs of stress, particularly among less creditworthy borrowers, who have higher credit card debt and more frequent delinquencies. Higher market-wide risk — alongside a still high federal funds rate — has caused banks that issue credit cards to raise interest rates and keep them high.
Consumer discontent with these high rates has spurred a bipartisan effort to address the issue. In February 2025, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) introduced legislation that would cap credit card interest rates at 10% for five years, claiming that the bill would provide “working families with desperately needed financial relief.” A 10% cap was also floated by Donald Trump on the campaign trail, to provide relief “while working Americans catch up.”
However, limiting credit card interest rates to an arbitrary 10% effectively deprives credit card issuers of their most powerful tool to manage risk. As a result, a rate cap would dramatically reduce access to credit for the very people it aims to protect, just as the economy teeters on the precipice of a recession. By significantly limiting their ability to qualify for and use credit, it would even cause many consumers to turn to predatory alternatives such as payday lenders.
The following sections of this paper dive into the consumer credit market and evaluate the different options policymakers can use to make it function better for working Americans. First, it reviews the current state of the market, highlighting the important role that consumer credit plays in the economy, how credit card issuers decide upon interest rates, and breaking down why interest rates have risen in recent years. Second, it explains the economics of rate caps, and how workingclass Americans would bear the brunt of a cap’s consequences. Lastly, the paper explores some better policy alternatives to protect consumers, including greater transparency, better financial capability for households, and alternatives to traditional credit.
WASHINGTON — Amid growing concerns about economic instability and the risk of a wider economic downturn, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) has released a new report examining the rapidly expanding “‘Buy Now, Pay Later”’ (BNPL) trend. The report, titled “Buy Now, Pay Later: The New Face of Consumer Credit,” explores the benefits and risks of this emerging form of consumer credit and advocates for targeted regulations to protect consumers while encouraging ongoing innovation in the credit market.
Authored by Andrew Fung, an Economic Policy Analyst at PPI, the report highlights the growing popularity of BNPL services among young and low-income consumers, who are attracted to the flexibility these services provide in accessing goods and services that may otherwise be unaffordable. While BNPL loans can improve financial inclusion, they also carry significant risks, especially for consumers with limited financial literacy or those prone to overextending themselves financially.
“In today’s uncertain economic climate, it’s crucial to understand the patterns of consumer spending,” said Fung. “BNPL loans present a new way for consumers to access credit, but the rapid growth of this market requires careful attention to potential financial risks.”
The report outlines the current state of consumer credit, noting that while overall debt levels remain stable, there are emerging areas of concern that should be closely monitored. BNPL loans, with their smaller, fixed payment structures, are generally less risky than traditional credit cards. However, the report recommends sensible regulations, such as interest rate caps, clear loan term disclosures, and standardized dispute resolution processes, to protect consumers and support the sustainable growth of this credit option.
“As policymakers continue to navigate economic challenges, it’s important to examine the current state of consumer credit closely,” added Fung. “Our report provides a practical approach for ensuring BNPL can benefit consumers while mitigating potential risks to both individuals and the broader economy.”
The report also examines the demographic profile of BNPL users, revealing that these services are especially popular among Black, Hispanic, and female consumers, as well as those with household incomes between $20,000 and $50,000 per year. Although BNPL has grown rapidly, it still represents a relatively small portion of the overall American economy. However, its differences from traditional credit methods and the unique risks it presents are drawing increasing attention from policymakers.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org. Find an expert at PPI and follow us on Twitter.
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Media Contact: Ian O’Keefe – iokeefe@ppionline.org
Consumer credit plays two essential roles in our everyday lives. Instruments like credit cards make it possible for Americans to purchase everything from their daily latte to groceries and furniture with less friction, even if we have enough money in the bank. Beyond these smaller purchases, consumer credit also allows us to borrow to pay for bigger ticket items that may be too expensive to buy with their current resources. The second scenario can lead to a potentially dangerous expansion of household debt, which can trap some households in a debt spiral that’s hard to escape or have larger systemic effects.
This paper will consider the economic and policy ramifications of the current rapid expansion of one form of consumer credit, known as buy now, pay later (BNPL). Buy now, pay later loans serve as an alternative to traditional payment methods like credit cards when shopping online, allowing consumers to break up the cost of their purchase into several installments to be paid over the course of a few weeks or months, often with very low or zero interest. Understanding how this new form of consumer credit fits into the larger American economy is important, and this paper will explain why BNPL falls under the first category of consumer credit but does merit scrutiny and potential regulation as it continues to develop.
At a Bitcoin conference last weekend, Senator Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.) announced forthcoming legislation that would direct the Treasury to buy 1 million Bitcoin, or roughly 5% of the global stock, over five years (which would cost between $60 billion and $70 billion at today’s prices). Lummis claimed that the federal government would be “debt-free because of Bitcoin” if her proposal is enacted, because these Bitcoin could be sold by the federal government at a profit after 20 years. Unfortunately, there are both mathematical and conceptual problems that prevent such an approach from solving the federal government’s budget problems.
Let’s start with the math: The U.S. national debt today stands at nearly $28 trillion (or $35 trillion, if one includes “intragovernmental debt” the general fund owes to other internal government accounting entities such as the Social Security and Medicare trust funds). This year alone, the federal government spent roughly $2 trillion more than it raised in revenue, which had to be covered by borrowing that gets added to our national debt.
The next administration must confront the consequences that the American people are finally facing from more than two decades of fiscal mismanagement in Washington. Annual deficits in excess of $2 trillion during a time when the unemployment rate hovers near a historically low 4% have put upward pressure on prices and strained family budgets. Annual interest payments on the national debt, now the highest they’ve ever been in history, are crowding out public investments into our collective future, which have fallen near historic lows. Working families face a future with lower incomes and diminished opportunities if we continue on our current path.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) believes that the best way to promote opportunity for all Americans and tackle the nation’s many problems is to reorient our public budgets away from subsidizing short-term consumption and towards investments that lay the foundation for long-term economic abundance. Rather than eviscerating government in the name of fiscal probity, as many on the right seek to do, our “Paying for Progress” Blueprint offers a visionary framework for a fairer and more prosperous society.
Our blueprint would raise enough revenue to fund our government through a tax code that is simpler, more progressive, and more pro-growth than current policy. We offer innovative ideas to modernize our nation’s health-care and retirement programs so they better reflect the needs of our aging population. We would invest in the engines of American innovation and expand access to affordable housing, education, and child care to cut the cost of living for working families. And we propose changes to rationalize federal programs and institutions so that our government spends smarter rather than merely spending more.
Many of these transformative policies are politically popular — the kind of bold, aspirational ideas a presidential candidate could build a campaign around — while others are more controversial because they would require some sacrifice from politically influential constituencies. But the reality is that both kinds of policies must be on the table, because public programs can only work if the vast majority of Americans that benefit from them are willing to contribute to them. Unlike many on the left, we recognize that progressive policies must be fiscally sound and grounded in economic pragmatism to make government work for working Americans now and in the future.
If fully enacted during the first year of the next president’s administration, the recommendations in this report would put the federal budget on a path to balance within 20 years. But we do not see actually balancing the budget as a necessary end. Rather, PPI seeks to put the budget on a healthy trajectory so that future policymakers have the fiscal freedom to address emergencies and other unforeseen needs. Moreover, because PPI’s blueprint meets such an ambitious fiscal target, we ensure that adopting even half of our recommended savings would be enough to stabilize the debt as a percent of GDP. Thus, our proposals to cut costs, boost growth, and expand American opportunity will remain a strong menu of options for policymakers to draw upon for years to come, even if they are unlikely to be enacted in their entirety any time soon.
The roughly six dozen federal policy recommendations in this report are organized into 12 overarching priorities:
I. Replace Taxes on Work with Taxes on Consumption and Unearned Income II. Make the Individual Income Tax Code Simpler and More Progressive III. Reform the Business Tax Code to Promote Growth and International Competitiveness
IV. Secure America’s Global Leadership
V. Strengthen Social Security’s Intergenerational Compact
VI. Modernize Medicare
VII. Cut Health-Care Costs and Improve Outcomes
VIII. Support Working Families and Economic Opportunity
IX. Make Housing Affordable for All
X. Rationalize Safety-Net Programs
XI. Improve Public Administration
XII. Manage Public Debt Responsibly
At the end of 2023, many economists and bankers predicted the Federal Reserve would cut interest rates several times over the course of 2024, leading to lower mortgage and credit card rates, and greater economic activity overall.
The Fed itself, according to its dot plot (a chart that records each Fed official’s projection for the central bank’s key short-term interest rate), projected three 0.25% cuts by the end of 2024. Yet, at the conclusion of the first quarter, the federal funds rate still remains locked in between 5.25% and 5.5%. While the stock market rally indicates that investors believe three or more rate cuts are still on the table for this year, history suggests that may not be the case.
The finance industry has, until recently, taken a collective approach to climate change, showing a united front in addressing one of the great challenges of our time. But that groupthink approach is evolving, as seen by recent third-party engagement modifications made by top asset managers such as BlackRock, JPMorgan Asset Management, and State Street Global Advisors. These coalition changes, especially in how they interact with Climate Action 100+, a climate-focused, investor-led program that was introduced in 2017 that recently announced an evolution in focus known as “phase 2,” (described by the organization as “markedly shifting the focus from corporate climate-related disclosure to the implementation of climate transition plans”), indicate a subtle recalibration as opposed to a retreat from environmental commitments.
The decision of State Street and JPMorgan to reallocate resources elsewhere, together with BlackRock’s decision to transfer its involvement to its overseas arm, demonstrate the difficult balancing act these multinational behemoths face. They find themselves at a crossroads where they must continue to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities in the face of shifting market and regulatory environments while attempting to pilot the maiden voyage toward environmental sustainability. This shift demonstrates a wider trend in the financial sector: the path to a low-carbon, sustainable future is complex and calls for a flexible multimodal strategy that respects global decarbonization targets while navigating a patchwork of regulatory frameworks and client preferences.
In its announcement, BlackRock previewed the launch of a new stewardship option that will provide clients additional decarbonization engagement and proxy voting options. Furthermore, the introduction of programs such as Decarbonization Partners by Temasek and BlackRock highlights a consistent commitment to creative solutions to climate-related problems. This pledge to make strategic investments in next-generation businesses that are necessary to achieve a net-zero global economy by 2050 is an example of how the investment landscape is changing in terms of how it approaches climate action, and- to be blunt- a more efficient use of institutional resources and expertise being applied to climate efforts. (and yes, potentially profitable.)
The shift towards proactive participation is also shown by JPMorgan Chase’s Center for Carbon Transition (CCT), which offers bespoke assistance and in-house expertise to worldwide clients as they navigate the low-carbon transition. This project, which aims to match the company’s finance portfolio with the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050, demonstrates an understanding and actionable willingness to address the challenges associated with making the transition to a sustainable energy future.
State Street Global Advisors has demonstrated its active involvement in influencing policy directions that promote sustainable investment practices by continuing to invest in research and content platforms to interact with policymakers on decarbonization and the clean energy transition. This proactive approach to innovation and policy formation shows a dedication to the ultimate objective of realizing a path to a low-carbon economy.
These calculated realignments show the extent to which the financial industry understands the challenges and opportunities associated with the shift to more sustainable energy sources. (It is also a tacit acknowledgement that a “one size fits all” approach itself, isn’t sustainable.) Rather than indicating a turnback, these organizations are improving their tactics to more effectively advance the decarbonization of the world economy. This sophisticated approach highlights the value of flexibility, client autonomy, and active participation in the dynamic field of climate action.
Ultimately, these tactical changes, however, continue to underscore a collective, if changing, commitment to helping the global energy transformation as the financial world continues to work through the great unknown of the energy transition. This journey, characterized by thoughtful analysis, demonstrates the industry’s willingness to make the tough decisions posed by a sustainable, environmentally conscious future.
Washington, D.C. — In 2010, the Durbin Amendment was enacted as part of the historic banking bill, the Dodd-Frank Act, and established a ceiling on debit card interchange fees — the cost that merchants pay each time a customer makes a purchase using a credit or debit card. While this legislation was intended to lower costs for consumers, when studied, the expected price reductions never came to pass, and in some cases, prices actually rose.
The report, written by Paul Weinstein Jr., Senior Fellow at PPI, outlines how numerous studies found no evidence that the cap on debit card interchange fees has led to savings for consumers. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that extending the Durbin Amendment to credit cards would not only fail to provide consumers with any savings, it could actually leave them worse off.
“Despite how well-intended the Durbin Amendment was, the fact remains that the law had little or no impact on prices, and in some cases, may have even led to higher costs for consumers,” said Paul Weinstein. “Extending the Durbin Amendment to credit card interchange fees could ultimately hurt consumers by ending access to rewards offered by credit card providers, and increase security risks for cardholders.”
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C., with offices in Brussels, Berlin and the United Kingdom. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
One of the greatest challenges for policymakers is the “unexpected negative consequence” of a change in law or regulation. There is a well-documented history of proposed policies that have achieved successes, but not without negative externalities. Prohibition in the 1920s United States,originally enacted to suppress the alcohol trade, drove many small-time alcohol suppliers out of business and consolidated the hold of large-scale organized crime over the illegal alcohol industry.
Tradeoffs in pursuit of greater benefits to society are worth the cost if the positives are greater than the negatives. But if the negative consequences of a policy change outweigh the benefits — or actually make the problem worse — then that policy can only be described as problematic and worth reconsidering. The “Durbin Amendment, enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, has been cited by some as an example of a policy that did not achieve the goals of the authors of the policy while imposing new costs on the financial and debit exchange sectors. Yet despite its mixed record, some in Congress want to extend the Durbin Amendment to interchange fees for credit cards.
In the wake of the collapse of crypto exchange platform FTX, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) today sent a letter to leadership of the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs calling for a functional and modern regulatory regime for digital assets.
Efforts to provide clarity to the regulatory framework of stablecoins have advanced in the House Committee on Financial Services, albeit slowly. The crash of FTX is yet another example of customers losing their savings due to the failure of unregulated institutions, highlighting the need for quick action from federal policymakers on digital assets. PPI urges the leadership of the House Financial Services and Senate Banking Committees to come together in a bipartisan way and advance regulation that balances both the benefits and risks of digital assets for investors and future consumers.
The Honorable Maxine Waters Chair U.S. House Committee on Financial Services Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Patrick McHenry
Ranking Member
U.S. House Committee on Financial Services
Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Sherrod Brown Chair U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Pat Toomey
Ranking Member
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Chair Waters, Ranking Member McHenry, Chair Brown, and Ranking Member Toomey:
The collapse of crypto exchange platform FTX underscores the need for a modern, clear, and well functioning regulatory regime for digital assets. In a moment where uncertainty for cryptocurrency investors is rising — with customers losing their savings in the failures of unregulated institutions — the need for legislation to protect investors in the market for digital assets has never been more clear. But protecting investors while enabling the innovation that drives progress will require a balanced approach.
Stablecoins can mitigate the risk of volatility associated with other cryptocurrencies and capitalize on the benefits of digital assets, such as allowing for faster and more efficient transmission of money. However, without a regulatory definition of ‘stablecoins,’ other tokens call themselves stablecoins and are listed as such but are not truly stable, hurting consumers who invest in them. The industry has seen so-called-stablecoins lose value almost overnight, as evidenced by the collapse of TerraUSD in May 2022.
Bipartisan legislative efforts by House Financial Services Committee Chair Maxine Waters and Ranking Member Patrick McHenry have sought to address the need for regulatory clarity in the realm of stablecoins. These efforts can be an important building block in the effort to provide sensible protections for investors.
In the wake of the failure of FTX, regulation may need to be expanded to a broader scope. Fundamentally, though, regulation must both ensure stability and liquidity, and put appropriate measures in place to protect consumers when that is not the case. In regard to stablecoin regulation, a first step is defining a stablecoin as something backed by dollars, allowing consumers to determine legitimate value of digital assets in the market. Additional measures could include enforceable reserve requirements for stablecoins, transparency, and disclosure requirements for the assets backing those stablecoins, compliance with anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing rules, and clear rules regarding the timely redemption of payment from the sale of stablecoins.
Innovative payment systems like stablecoins bring competition to the banking and money transmission industries and can provide less expensive, more efficient payments. But legislation is needed to make this system more sustainable. It is crucial that Congress move forward to regulate digital assets, including stablecoins, in a way that balances their benefits and risks.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
The future of Social Security and Medicare has unexpectedly become a central point of contention in the final week before the 2022 midterm elections. As the two biggest non-emergency spending programs in the federal budget and the foundation of retirement security for nearly all American workers, it makes perfect sense to have a conversation about Social Security and Medicare during election season – particularly since both programs face serious financial challenges as our population ages. Unfortunately, the debate currently playing out on the campaign trail is devoid of the serious substance voters deserve, and it’s abundantly clear that neither party has a good plan to secure these programs for current and future beneficiaries.
Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.), who leads the GOP’s Senate campaign arm, kicked off the discourse when he released a proposal that would allow all federal programs – including Social Security and Medicare – to expire if not reauthorized every five years. Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), a far-right senator who is up for re-election next week, then suggested requiring the programs be reauthorized annually. Such a radical change that would enable these essential programs to suddenly vanish every few years would be catastrophic for American workers, who must plan their retirements around them years or even decades in advance.
ESG-oriented investing (Environment/Social/Governance) is a key market-oriented mechanism for using the financial system to assess material risk around generally agreed upon societal goals that go beyond profit-maximization. Environmental goals can include such factors as carbon emissions and water usage. Social goals can include diversity, labor standards, and data protection. Governance goals can include executive compensation and board composition.
Assessing the ESG-related performance of a company or country is an extremely data-intensive enterprise. Investors usually end up relying on one of a number of different companies that provide ESG ratings (also called scores or assessments), such as Sustainalytics (a Morningstar subsidiary) and MSCI (listed on the S&P 500). Parent companies of credit rating agencies (CRA) have also moved into the business of providing ESG scores, even as the credit rating agency arms of those companies increasingly incorporate ESG considerations into their credit ratings with greater transparency and consistency.
Considering how new the practice of non-financial evaluations is, ESG ratings from different firms often give very different results, depending on which measures are factored into the scoring process and how they are prioritized. One study suggested only a 31% correlation between ESG ratings produced by Sustainalytics and MSCI. While divergence of views can often be healthy, this degree of difference suggests a lack of shared data and a lack of agreement about the key drivers of ESG risk. By comparison the credit ratings market — another example of an “information market” — has had much more time to agree on many drivers of credit risk.
We applaud the recent proposal by the SEC to require more disclosure by public companies of climate-related risks. That is a good step that will provide investors with more information, help improve the ESG ratings process, and lead to more robust ESG ratings. We will also be able to better determine the connection between ESG ratings and financial performance.
The SEC is also looking at the potential for conflicts in this new area. The agency’s 2022 staff report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSRO) raised questions about credit ratings produced by NRSROs, particularly those with ESG affiliates. The report noted that:
….in incorporating ESG factors into ratings determinations, NRSROs may not adhere to their methodologies or policies and procedures, consistently apply ESG factors, make adequate disclosure regarding the use of ESG factors applied in rating actions, or maintain effective internal controls involving the use in ratings of ESG-related data from affiliates or unaffiliated third parties. The Staff also identified the potential risk for conflicts of interest if an NRSRO offers ratings and non-ratings ESG products and services
The SEC was doing its job by raising these questions of methodology and potential conflicts as part of its regulatory oversight. Notably, the inspections did not produce any evidence of actual problems. Yet these concerns can easily be overstated, as they were in recent articles by the Wall Street Journal and Responsible Investor. It’s important to note that such issues of conflicts of interest and consistent application of methodologies arise in any market for information. In a data-driven world, companies that use data to provide third-party assessments of products, services, and other companies will always be under pressure to modify their assessments by those being assessed or with something to gain from the assessment. As I wrote in a January 2021 policy brief, available on the Progressive Policy Institute website:
In every part of the economy, the Information Age has made an exponentially increasing amount of data available to everyone. The difficult problem is extracting useful signals from the noise, especially when some market participants are actively taking advantage of opportunities to manipulate data, or to create false signals.
The key is to develop a set of processes and incentives that help manage new conflicts of interest. That’s certainly not an insurmountable problem, as the credit ratings agencies have shown. Indeed, credit rating agencies are known for their ability to apply their methodologies in a consistent and transparent fashion. In fact, that’s the essence of their business model. As I wrote in the policy brief:
The agencies assess the creditworthiness of the bonds according to published and detailed methodologies. In fact, there is literally nowhere else in the private sector that gives this level of transparency into the intellectual property of an organization, or that so rigorously documents their internal methodology for making decisions (imagine a newspaper committing itself publicly for how it chooses stories or does reporting, including reporting on advertisers).
True, the credit rating agencies came under criticism for their role in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. But the aftermath of the crisis, SEC oversight of CRAs was greatly increased. As Jessica Kane, then director of the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings, noted in a 2020 speech: “In the span of 15 years, the credit rating industry has gone from being largely unregulated to being subject to a robust disclosure and examination regulatory regime.” As a result, the CRAs consistently produce strong signals that are useful for market participants. ESG ratings firms should strive to do the same.
This week, the Progressive Policy Institute hosted an event with Rep. Jake Auchincloss (MA-04) and an esteemed panel of experts on the potential regulatory options for cryptocurrency, and the merits and drawbacks of several proposed approaches.
“My job…is to uphold market integrity, to protect consumers from fraud and abuse, and to create a regulatory sandbox in which industry can thrive. In which participants in a marketplace can transact with confidence. And in which the United States can lead the world in innovation,” said Rep. Jake Auchincloss during the event.
“I’d also like to keep this pre-partisan. Right now we haven’t yet put on the jerseys about what side is what for crypto regulation. And I think that’s healthy, because there’s no need for this to become a political football. This is something that thoughtful Members on both sides of the aisle should be able to roll up their sleeves and work together on. I’m certainly working in that fashion, and would like to see that we can get Democrats and Republicans on board with a long term regulatory architecture…” Rep. Auchincloss continued.
Cryptocurrency has taken the world by storm. Depending on the day, digital currencies are now cumulatively valued at several trillion dollars. Financial and nonfinancial corporate executives, once dismissive, increasingly understand the importance of cryptocurrency and related technologies for the future. However, the federal government is only in the early stages of deciding how to regulate cryptocurrency, which could have enormous implications going forward. PPI explored these challenges and heard from thought leaders on how to navigate this new and challenging technology.
Watch the livestream of the event here:
Representative Jake Auchincloss serves as Vice Chair on the House Committee on Financial Services and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. He has a deep background in technology and cybersecurity work.
In addition to Rep. Auchincloss, this event’s esteemed panelists included Dante Disparte, Circle’s Chief Strategy Officer and Head of Global Policy; Kirsten Wegner, CEO of the Modern Markets Initiative and a PPI Mosaic Project cohort member; and Michael Katz, Director of Legal for the Digital Currency Group. The event was moderated by Dr. Michael Mandel, Vice President and Chief Economist of PPI and featured Colin Mortimer, Director of PPI’s Center for New Liberalism.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
While the system of credit scoring used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises) has been in effect for some time, Congress recently asked them — along with the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) — to review their credit scoring model to determine if additional models could be used to increase competition. But as Fontenot explains, the incorporation of a flawed new model could have unforeseen impacts and potentially drive up borrower costs.
The report concludes that the Enterprises have used a current credit scoring model that has produced necessary liquidity in the market in both good and difficult times — and that as the FHFA oversees the next phase of testing alternative credit score models, it should ensure that the models are subjected to scrutiny concerning the cost and market affects any change would have.
Read the full paper, expanded conclusion, and questions for consideration here.
Brodi Fontenot is President of Fontenot Strategic Consulting LLC. Mr. Fontenot was previously appointed by President Obama to be the Department of the Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Management and was nominated to serve as Treasury’s Chief Financial Officer. Fontenot also served in a variety of senior roles at the Department of Transportation, including Assistant Secretary for Administration, Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO), and Senior Sustainability Officer (SSO).
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
The Federal Reserve made clear in its December 2021 meeting that it intends to raise interest rates in 2022. Interest rate changes flow through the economy and affect the rates borrowers pay on all types of loans. In particular, the increases in interest rates may place greater pressure on home mortgage rates and the credit scores that are used by financial institutions to determine who qualifies for loans.
In the area of housing finance, how credit scores are used by key market players has received attention for some time. The better the credit score, the more likely a borrower will qualify for a mortgage at the best possible rate, saving the borrower money over the life of the loan. There has been debate, however, over the models used to create those scores — should there be more competition and, more important, can new models lower costs for home buyers and ensure equity of access to loans.
Two of the most important entities in housing finance are the nation’s housing government sponsored enterprises — Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Enterprises) — which are now under government conservatorship overseen by Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). As a result, many policymakers and elected officials have encouraged the FHFA to take steps to promote more competition in the credit scoring models used by the Enterprises to help lower costs to consumers and give greater access to credit for previously underserved individuals.
These are important goals and should be pursued. However, some reforms presented would have had a less than optimal effect — decreasing competition and potentially driving up mortgage costs rather than lowering them. The Enterprises have used a valid credit score model for over 20 years. Introducing competitive reforms has merit, but it must be done in a way that does not create unfair advantages. FHFA has a clear mandate to keep the Enterprises solvent and help homeowners, as witnessed by their recent COVID assistance. But FHFA must ensure that any reforms maintain competition and keep prices low for consumers.
This paper reviews how credit scores are presently used by the Enterprises and discusses some of the issues that can be addressed to keep competition in the credit score market. This paper also discusses some of the pitfalls associated with some proposed reforms to credit score markets.
ENTERPRISES HAVE USED PROVEN CREDIT SCORE MODELS FOR OVER TWO DECADES
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Enterprises) are commonly known as housing government sponsored enterprises. Somewhat unique in their structure, they were originally chartered by Congress, but owned by shareholders, to provide liquidity in the mortgage market and promote homeownership.[1] The Enterprises maintained this unique ownership structure until their financial condition worsened during the financial crisis of 2008, when they were placed in government conservatorship under the leadership of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
The Enterprises do not create loans. They purchase loans made by others (such as banks), and then package those loans into securities which are then sold on the secondary market to investors. The loans purchased by the Enterprises can only be of a certain size and home borrowers must have a minimum credit score to qualify. The Enterprises use these and other criteria to minimize the risk that the loans they purchase will not be paid back (default) — an important step because it is this step of buying loans from banks and other lenders, thereby providing them with replenished funding that allows further home lending.
The loans purchased by the Enterprises then are packaged into securities that have specific characteristics which are told to investors — including the credit scores on the loans in the security. According to FHFA, the Enterprises use credit scores to help predict a potential borrowers likeliness to repay and has been using a score developed from a model, FICO Classic,[2] for over 20 years.[3] In discussing FICO Classic, FHFA points out that it “and the Enterprises believe that this score remains a reasonable predictor of default risk.”[4]
While the current system has been in effect for some time, Congress recently asked FHFA and the Enterprises to review their credit scoring model to determine if additional credit scoring models could be used by the Enterprises to increase competition. Specifically, FHFA was to “establish standards and criteria for the validation and approval of third-party credit score models used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”[5] Advocates of using alternatives to FICO Classic said, at the time, that using other validated credit scoring models would lead to more access.[6] While a worthy goal, incorporating a flawed new model, could have impacts and potentially drive-up costs.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST COULD LEAD TO DECREASED COMPETITION
Beginning in 2017, FHFA proposed a rule which would set the stage for reviewing the Enterprises’ credit score models. The rule FHFA finalized in 2019 directed the Enterprises to review and validate alternative credit models in the coming years.
Section 310 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115–174, section 310) amended the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charter acts and the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) to establish requirements for the validation and approval of third-party credit score models by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.[7]
At the time of the proposed rule, some thought that alternative credit scores could open access to a larger group of homeowners.[8][9] While an admirable goal, and in keeping with FHFA’s mission for the Enterprises even now, a major issue was left unresolved. The proposed rule “would have required credit score model developers to demonstrate, upon applying for consideration, that there was no common ownership with a consumer data provider that has control over the data used to construct and test the credit score model.”[10]
The proposed rule would have created a separation between those who create and control the data, from those in charge of the model creating the scores — an important goal. Not surprisingly, the proposed rule received significant comments. Sadly, the final rule did not adopt this important provision which required those submitting models to not have a conflict of interest or “common ownership with a consumer data provider that has control over the data used to construct and test the credit score model.”[11] This lack of clear independence could set the stage for a lack of competition in the future.
While the rule was being proposed, former FHFA director Mel Watt in 2017 said, “how would we ensure that competing credit scores lead to improvements in accuracy and not to a race to the bottom with competitors competing for more and more customers? Also, could the organizational and ownership structure of companies in the credit score market impact competition? We also realized that much more work needed to be done on the cost and operational impacts to the industry. Given the multiple issues we have had to consider, this has certainly been among the most difficult evaluations undertaken during my tenure as Director of FHFA.”[12]
Several at the time of the proposed rule pointed out that having one dominant player possibly replaced by another, would not further competition but could further consolidate it. One commentator stated, “to push for alternative scoring models may simply trade one dominant player (FICO) for another (Vantage),”[13] in referring to legislation which would ultimately be incorporated into the bill where the proposed rule was developed. The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) held an expert panel discussion at the time which also discussed the problems with adopting VantageScore due to conflict of interest.[14] “The reason? Because the owners of Vantage control the supply of information currently used by FICO to make its determination. And given the history of monopolies, it would not be surprising to see Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion use that leverage to the advantage of Vantage, and eventually force FICO out of business.”[15]
The proposed rule points out that “VantageScore Solutions, LLC is jointly owned by the three nationwide CRAs. The CRAs also own, price, and distribute consumer credit data and credit score. This type of common ownership could in theory negatively impact competition in the marketplace.”[16] Another writer at the time, also acknowledged the potential conflict of interest provision of the proposed rule.[17] While these issues were not resolved in the final rule, they still matter and can affect not only competition but also costs in the residential mortgage marketplace.
Competition is key to innovation and inclusiveness is important to further homeownership. Using alterative data, rent payments, utility payments, bank balances, all could potentially be used help complete the credit picture and increase access to credit.[18] Other research organizations have acknowledged that FICO has improved models and incorporated alternative sources of data that are available,[19] which would not have the conflict of interest that VantageScore would have. FHFA must ensure that competition is maintained, without creating unfair advantages.
LACK OF REAL COMPETITION COULD INCREASE COSTS
Before any changes can happen, however, FHFA must articulate all costs to consumers, lenders, the Enterprises, and investors of any change. COVID-19 proved a real-world laboratory for the Enterprises under stress. FHFA’s recent Performance Report lays out the series of actions the Enterprises took to help borrowers affected by COVID-19, including payment deferrals, forbearance, and evictions suspensions.[20] These actions likely kept many homeowners in their homes during a difficult period, and kept the Enterprises functioning. The relief provided was important and was balanced against the risk to the Enterprises — but it did come at a cost.
FHFA made their first announcement on COVID assistance to homeowners in March 2020.[21] A few months later in August 2020, FHFA announced that the Enterprises would charge a fee of 50-baisis points per refinancing to help make up for any potential losses the Enterprises might experience.[22] An initial estimate put the projected losses at $6 billion. Thankfully the Enterprises saw declining rates of loans in forbearance and the fee was ultimately ended in July 2021.[23]
Changes at the Enterprises have affects across the industry. Just as the potential increases in interest rates by the Federal Reserve this year could raise interest costs to home buyers, at time of the proposed rule, former FHFA Director Watt knew that changes to the credit scoring model could raise costs and even stated “much more work needed to be done on the cost and operational impacts to the industry,”[24] before changes were made. Clearly, the FHFA realizes that any changes to its credit scoring models will also likely have increased costs to the housing finance sector. As an aside, the related issue of changes to issues such as mortgage servicing have led to increased costs in the home purchase ecosystem.[25]
Changes to the credit scoring models could also affect prices in the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and credit risk transfers (CRT). As the FHFA pointed out, investors “in Enterprise MBS and participants in Enterprise CRT transactions would need to evaluate the default and prepayment risks of each of the multiple credit score options.”[26] While the FHFA in the final rule did not address the costs of these evaluations, incorporating multiple credit score options could raise the cost investors demand and ultimately increase the costs to home buyers via the fees the Enterprises would need to pass on.
Others have pointed out that changes to credit scoring models could have cost impacts for banks, investors, pension funds, and others.[27] These issues of cost and operational impacts need to be given serious consideration, because as the recent Enterprise actions related to COVID-19 made clear — they matter. The lending industry was upset when the Enterprises raised a temporary fee to help ensure Enterprises’ soundness through the difficult period.[28] What would the costs be with a wholesale change to the credit score model system? And who would ultimately pay those costs? These are questions the FHFA must address as they review any changes to the credit scoring model.
One of the FHFA’s current core goals is to “Promote Equitable Access to Housing.”[29] To ensure that the Enterprises can undertake their important role in addressing long standing issues of equity, they need to be in the best place possible financially to do that. A question that FHFA needs to address as they review credit scoring models is, would using a model with a conflict of interest hurt their goal of equity? Would changes raise prices or worse, limit access for those FHFA is looking to provide access into the market?
CONCLUSION AND QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
The crisis of COVID-19 and its effects on the housing market were serious, but thankfully not detrimental due to prudent planning and oversight of the Enterprises and FHFA. The Enterprises have used a current credit scoring model that has produced necessary liquidity in the market in both good and difficult times. As FHFA oversees the next phase of testing alternative credit score models, it should ensure that the models are subjected to the criteria laid out in their final rule — with emphasis placed on the cost and market affects any change would have. The Enterprises were called upon to help homeowners during the recent crisis and could do so with minimal disruption to the consumers and housing finance stakeholders. The Enterprises and FHFA should take seriously how any further changes would impact competition, soundness of the Enterprises, and how those changes could increase the costs for everyone in housing finance.
REFERENCES
[1]“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions,” Congressional Research Service, July 22, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44525.
[2] “Selling Guide: B3-5.1-01, General Requirements for Credit Scores,” Fannie Mae, September 2021, https://selling-guide.fanniemae.com/Selling-Guide/Origination-thru-Closing/Subpart-B3-Underwriting-Borrowers/Chapter-B3-5-Credit-Assessment/Section-B3-5-1-Credit-Scores/1032996841/B3-5-1-01-General-Requirements-for-Credit-Scores-08-05-2020.htm.
[3] “There’s More to Mortgages than Credit Scores,” Fannie Mae, February 2020, https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/media/8511/display.
[4] “Credit Score Request for Input,” FHFA Division of Housing Mission and Goals, December 20, 2017, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/PublicAffairsDocuments/CreditScore_RFI-2017.pdf.
[5] “FHFA Issues Proposed Rule on Validation and Approval of Credit Score Models,” Federal Housing Finance Agency, December 13, 2018, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Issues-Proposed-Rule-on-Validation-and-Approval-of-Credit-Score-Models.aspx.
[6] “Validation and Approval of Credit Score Models,” Federal Housing Finance Agency, August 13, 2019, https://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/Rules/RuleDocuments/8-7-19%20Validation%20Approval%20Credit%20Score%20Models%20Final%20Rule_to%20Fed%20Reg%20for%20Web.pdf.
[8] Karan Kaul, “Six Things That Might Surprise You About Alternative Credit Scores,” Urban Institute, April 13, 2015, https://www.urban.org/.
[9] Michael A. Turner et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” Brookings Institution, June 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20061218_givecredit.pdf.
[12] Melvin L. Watt, “Prepared Remarks of Melvin L. Watt, Director of FHFA at the National Association of Real Estate Brokers’ 70th Annual Convention,” Federal Housing Finance Agency, August 1, 2017, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Prepared-Remarks-of-Melvin-L-Watt-Director-of-FHFA-at-the-NAREB-70th-Annual-Convention.aspx.
[13] Paul Weinstein Jr., “No Company Should Have a Monopoly on Credit Scoring,” The Hill, December 7, 2017, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/363755-no-company-should-have-a-monopoly-on-credit-scoring.
[14] “Updated Credit Scoring and the Mortgage Market,” Progressive Policy Institute, December 4, 2017, https://www.progressivepolicy.org/event/updated-credit-scoring-mortgage-market/.
[16] “Validation and Approval of Credit Score Models: Final Rule,” Federal Register, August 16, 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/16/2019-17633/validation-and-approval-of-credit-score-models.
[17] Karan Kaul and Laurie Goodman, “The FHFA’s Evaluation of Credit Scores Misses the Mark,” Urban Institute, March 2018, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/97086/the_fhfas_evaluation_of_credit_scores_misses_the_mark.pdf.
[18] Kelly Thompson Cochran, Michael Stegman, and Colin Foos, “Utility, Telecommunications, and Rental Data in Underwriting Credit,” Urban Institute, December 2021, https://www.urban.org/research/publication/utility-telecommunications-and-rental-data-underwriting-credit/view/full_report.
[19] Laurie Goodman, “In Need of an Update: Credit Scoring in the Mortgage Market,” Urban Institute, July 2017, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/92301/in-need-of-an-update-credit-scoring-in-the-mortgage-market_2.pdf.
[21] “Statement from FHFA Director Mark Calabria on Coronavirus,” Federal Housing Finance Agency, March 10, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Statement-from-FHFA-Director-Mark-Calabria-on-Coronavirus.aspx.
[22] “Adverse Market Refinance Fee Implementation Now December 1,” Federal Housing Finance Agency, August 25, 2020, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Adverse-Market-Refinance-Fee-Implementation-Now-December-1.aspx.
[23] “FHFA Eliminates Adverse Market Refinance Fee,” Federal Housing Finance Agency, July 16, 2021, https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Eliminates-Adverse-Market-Refinance-Fee.aspx.
[25] Laurie Goodman et al., “The Mortgage Servicing Collaborative,” Urban Institute, January 2018, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/95666/the-mortgage-servicing-collaborative_1.pdf.
[27] Pete Sepp and Thomas Aiello, “Risky Road: Assessing the Costs of Alternative Credit Scoring,” National Taxpayers Union, March 22, 2019, https://www.ntu.org/publications/detail/risky-road-assessing-the-costs-of-alternative-credit-scoring.
