By Eric Leeper
Contributing Author for the Progressive Policy Institute
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) gained popularity at a time when U.S. inflation was benign, income and wealth inequality was on the rise, and progressive politicians saw a political opportunity to pass big-ticket spending programs. To the nagging perennial question, “How do we pay for it?,” MMT serves up a tasty answer. You don’t need to raise taxes or reduce other spending. You don’t need to secure low-cost borrowing. A monetarily sovereign nation, like the United States, can create more currency to buy the goods and services that the programs require.
Large new spending programs often invoke in U.S. voters fears of persistent budget deficits and rising inflation. MMT delivers the reassuring message that those fears are grounded in defunct “orthodox” economic reasoning that limits the federal government’s capabilities: we have nothing to lose but our outmoded fiscal bromides and much to gain by replacing historic policy norms with fresh ideas. MMT explicitly ties itself to populist policies, self-labeling their plans “the birth of the people’s economy” [subtitle of Kelton (2021)]. Any sensible elected leader, whose vision is not impaired by conventional economic thought, would happily gobble up such a fiscal banquet.
MMT is the progressive counterpoint to supply-side economics. It supplants the claim that tax cuts pay for themselves with the claim that “…[federal] spending is self-financing” [Kelton (2021, p. 87), emphasis in original]. Both claims contain a germ of economic substance. Both claims are carefully crafted to provide elected officials seemingly plausible economic grounds to support their preferred fiscal policies (though at opposite ends of the political spectrum). Both offer policy makers an ideology freed of trade offs.
Because economic policy is too important to be reduced to catchy phrases and clever marketing, this essay analyzes MMT economics dispassionately. It does not assess the worthiness of MMT’s goals. Instead, it asks if MMT can achieve its goals without doing grave damage to America’s fiscal standing and, quite possibly, its economy. The answer: probably not.
MMT suffers from several flaws:
1. It denies a fundamental concept in economics: in a society with finite resources but unlimited wants, market prices adjust to induce individuals and policy makers to make trade offs that ultimately align supply and demand. Economics quantifies the costs and benefits of those trade offs to inform policy makers.
2. That denial leads MMT to see no need to offer a comprehensive theory of inflation. It maintains that inflation gets triggered when economy-wide demand for resources exceeds the economy’s resource limit, but has little to say about inflation and its determinants when, as it usually does, the economy operates below that limit.
3. MMT’s solution to inflation from high resource utilization is to raise “taxes,” without specifying which taxes. Governments have many tax instruments at their disposal—labor, sales, capital, wealth, and inflation—and each tax affects individuals and the macro economy differently. Generic advice to control inflation with higher taxes is vacuous until MMTers provide far more detail.
4. MMT does not acknowledge that even well-intentioned policy makers face incentives to use inflation to achieve employment or fiscal financing goals. Because those incentives to inflate are especially powerful for elected officials, many countries, including the United States, have adopted the norms of (i) independent central banks tasked with inflation control and macroeconomic stabilization and (ii) fiscal policies that largely pay for government spending with current and future taxes. Those policy norms have improved inflation performance and social welfare. MMT overthrows those norms to move inflation control and countercyclical policies from the Federal Reserve to Congress, to finance federal spending by creating new currency, and to subjugate monetary policy to fiscal needs.
5. It does not appreciate the central role that safe and liquid U.S. Treasurys perform in the global financial system. Neither does it apprehend the extent to which its policy proposals may destabilize financial markets and undermine the special status of Treasurys and the dollar in the world economy, a status that strengthens the U.S. economy.
The problems begin with the basic assumptions that underpin MMT. Its advocates attribute all unemployment to insufficient demand for workers and believe unemployment should be alleviated through a federal guaranteed jobs program. Weak demand frequently underlies unemployment, particularly during economic downturns. But workers themselves have a say in their employment status. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a broad cross section of workers left the labor market and voluntarily have not re-entered. From March 2020 to October 2021, labor force participation rates were depressed relative to the previous year: 2.5% for men, 2.6% for women, and 3.8% for workers 55 and older. Employers across the country have positions that remain unfilled. COVID is surely an unusual situation, but it serves to illustrate that employment outcomes are not always driven by insufficient demand.
MMT is at its weakest when addressing inflation, how it gets determined and how policies can control it. Its most common argument reduces to: inflation control is not a problem until it is. Problems arise when resource utilization reaches some limit, at which point higher taxes can keep inflation in check. But resource utilization is not the only factor that affects inflation. In late 2021, consumer price inflation hit a 40-year high of over 6%, yet compared to their pre-COVID levels, employment, capacity utilization, and industrial production are lower, while the unemployment rate is higher. Inflation is not rising because the overall economy has hit its resource limit. To be sure, supply-chain issues have driven up some prices relative to others, but these issues are not what anyone means by economy-wide resource limits. MMT’s weak theory of inflation is stunning because the potential of the MMT agenda to trigger inflation is the most frequently voiced criticism of the theory [Summers (2019), Cochrane (2020), Hartley (2020), Mankiw (2020)].
The guaranteed jobs program points to a more general theme of MMT: the federal government can solve big problems once policy makers grasp the key tenets of MMT. Kelton (2021) identifies seven “deficits,” defined in terms of both quantity and quality, that MMT can help to close: good jobs, saving, health care, education, infrastructure, climate, and democracy. MMT promises to address each of these deficiencies by first altering policy makers’ understandings of fiscal financing matters.
MMT abandons two long-standing policy norms. The first came from Alexander Hamilton in 1790 and can be summarized as “federal budget deficits beget budget surpluses,” meaning that debt-financed spending is backed by future taxes. This norm has contributed to less costly financing and bestowed on U.S. treasurys status as the world’s go-to safe and liquid assets, enabling their critical role in global financial markets. The second norm evolved from the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord to make monetary policy operationally independent. Legislation houses countercyclical policy primarily in the Federal Reserve with the mandate that the Fed achieve price stability, maximum sustainable employment, and low long-term interest rates, and facilitate financial stability.
MMT instead posits that a dollar of new government debt need not carry any assurance of tax backing. It regards treasury securities solely as a means for the central bank to achieve its interest rate target. MMT shifts responsibility for achieving full employment and controlling inflation from monetary policy to fiscal policy. The central bank’s primary tasks are to serve as the Treasury’s bank and to maintain zero interest rates. Despite MMT claims to the contrary, monetary policy is completely subservient to fiscal policy, tossing aside Federal Reserve independence and the social benefits that accrue from it.
Full embrace of MMT’s policy proposals and new norms—whatever they may be—carries significant risks. Those risks include higher and more volatile inflation and interest rates and financial market instability, which would disrupt and depress real economic activity and harm most the people MMT aims to benefit.
Eric Leeper is a contributing scholar for the Progressive Policy Institute. He is also the Paul Goodloe McIntire Professor in Economics at the University of Virginia, a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, director of the Virginia Center for Economic Policy at the University of Virginia, and a visiting scholar and member of the Advisory Council of the Center for Quantitative Economic Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.*
* The author thanks Joe Anderson for many helpful discussions and insights and Campbell Leith, Jim Nason, and PPI staff for detailed comments.
Jasmine Stoughton, Program Lead for the Mosaic Economic Project at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), released the following response in reaction to Biden’s Federal Reserve Nominations:
“President Biden’s nomination of the Hon. Sarah Bloom Raskin, Dr. Lisa Cook, and Dr. Philip Jefferson to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is a key step toward ensuring stable economic growth that will be felt by every American, and it is a demonstration of Biden’s commitment to uplift leaders that reflect the diversity of our country.
“Raskin, Cook, and Jefferson are well-respected and highly qualified to serve on the Board. Combined, they have decades of experience in academia and government and have each shown extraordinary judgement and skill throughout their careers.
“Diversity in leadership is among the most important elements of successful governance. If the Senate confirms Biden’s nominations, the complete Board will be majority women for the first time in its 108-year history. Incredibly, Cook will be the first Black woman to serve on the Board, and Jefferson will be the fifth Black governor — representation that is long overdue.”
TheMosaic Economic Projectis a network of diverse women with expertise in the fields of economics and technology. Mosaic programming aims to bring new voices to the policy arena by connecting cohort members with opportunities to engage with top industry leaders, lawmakers, and the media.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) released the following statements ahead of the Senate Banking Committee’s hearing on the nominations of the Hon. Sarah Bloom Raskin, Dr. Lisa Cook, and Dr. Philip Jefferson for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:
“President Biden has overseen a year of remarkable achievement in restoring economic growth, with steady job creation and strong evidence of wage increases. With the economy stabilized after the COVID-19 pandemic experience but concerns about inflation rising, the country needs both professional management and imaginative policy in the coming years,” said Ed Gresser, Vice President and Director of Trade and Global Markets for PPI.
“President Biden’s excellent nominations for the Federal Reserve Board of Governors demonstrate his awareness of this challenge. The current chair and nominee for vice chair, Jerome Powell and Lael Brainard, are exceptional public servants who have helped to steer the Fed through the turbulence of the Trump years and the COVID crisis, and fully merit confirmation. New nominees Lisa Cook, Sarah Bloom Raskin, and Phillip Jefferson are outstanding economists who will bring a diversity of strengths and experience to the Fed, with its dual mandate of price stability and full employment, and will help ensure that the Board of Governors takes its next steps with consideration for both macroeconomic consequences and impacts on Americans at all income levels and in all walks of life. This is a very strong group of nominees which will serve the country well during a very complex time, and deserves support,” concluded Gresser.
“The Progressive Policy Institute applauds President Biden and the Biden-Harris administration for this historic, diverse, and highly qualified slate of nominees to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. At a time when our nation faces several economic challenges — caused primarily by the COVID-19 pandemic and evolving variants — this group will bring steady, competent leadership. America is getting back on track after an unimaginable health and economic crisis, and President Biden is proving his commitment to Build Back Better by prioritizing strong leadership in every facet of the federal government,” said Sarah Paden, Vice President and National Political Director.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
Today, the Innovation Frontier Project (IFP), a project of the Progressive Policy Institute, released a comprehensive research deck on the threats facing American innovation. The authors of the deck, innovation experts Ashish Arora and Sharon Belenzon of Duke University, found the United States has lost a substantial amount of corporate research since the 1980s, with only a handful of present-day U.S.-based companies investing in research at a meaningful level.
This deck also lays out clear political implications for lawmakers. The Biden Administration’s top strategic economic priorities are based on a foundation of strong U.S. competitiveness and innovation, yet Congress’s percolating anti-tech antitrust legislation would undermine these priorities by impairing the ability of America’s few leading R&D performers to develop new products and enter new markets. The restrictions on these companies will reduce our national investment in R&D and hurt American economic prosperity and national security.
“America’s technological leadership is being challenged, and if we undermine our business research leaders we risk losing this fight with China. The Biden Administration has identified key priorities in emerging technologies, but Congress’s anti-tech antitrust legislation would hurt these priorities. Our policymakers need to get smart about the steps needed to regain our footing as a technological leader,” said Dr.Michael Mandel, Chief Economist for the Progressive Policy Institute.
The deck findings issue a stark warning:
America’s technological leadership is under challenge.
The United States has lost a substantial amount of corporate research since the 1980s.
Corporate research is the source of many breakthrough innovations.
American leadership in emerging technologies depends on corporate research and only a few companies continue to invest in research at a meaningful level.
The antitrust proposals will impair the ability of these few leading R&D performers to develop new products and enter new markets.
The loss of tech companies with scale and scope would reduce U.S. investments in R&D and hurt American economic prosperity and security.
This deck was authored by Ashish Arora and Sharon Belenzon of Duke University. Mr. Arora is the Rex D. Adams Professor of Business Administration at the Duke Fuqua School of Business. He received his PhD in Economics from Stanford University in 1992, and was on the faculty at the Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University, where he held the H. John Heinz Professorship, until 2009. Mr. Belenzon is a professor in the Strategy area at the Fuqua School of Business of Duke University and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). His research investigates the role of business in advancing science and has been featured in top academic journals, such as Management Science, Strategic Management Journal and American Economic Review. Mr. Belenzon received his PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science and completed post-doctorate work at the University of Oxford, Nuffield College.
Based in Washington, D.C., and housed in the Progressive Policy Institute, the Innovation Frontier Project explores the role of public policy in science, technology and innovation. The project is managed by Jack Karsten. Learn more about IFP by visiting innovationfrontier.org.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
As senators prepare to vote on the bipartisan infrastructure bill they negotiated with President Biden, they should be applauded for incorporating several provisions that would help control costs and give taxpayers the most bang for their buck.
One of the reasons infrastructure projects cost significantly more in the United States than similar ones in other countries is our byzantine permitting process. The bill directs permitting agencies to cut average approval times to less than two years for major projects and includes several provisions to help make that happen without sacrificing important social and environmental protections.
While President Biden has called for higher taxes on wealthy Americans and corporations to finance a $3.5 trillion budget agreement, some Democrats in Congress are undermining this agenda by demanding that the agreement cut taxes on their affluent constituents. These lawmakers argue that the $10,000 cap on the state and local tax (SALT) deduction created by the GOP’s 2017 tax law undermines their states’ ability to raise revenue through progressive tax policy.
But in reality, any effort to weaken or repeal the cap would simply be a pointless giveaway to the rich. Democrats should reject this regressive tax cut that would draw critical resources away from needed public investments.
On this week’s Radically Pragmatic Podcast, Veronica Goodman, Director of Social Policy at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), sits down with Representative Veronica Escobar (TX-16), to discuss the Child Tax Credit.
“We learned very early on when we passed the Child Tax Credit, just what a resounding, powerful impact it would make in our effort to combat child poverty,” said Rep. Escobar on the podcast. “Something that should be the utmost priority for every lawmaker is to ensure that children don’t go hungry, that children are not homeless, that children have every opportunity possible to live prosperous, wonderful lives.”
Congresswoman Escobar is a member of the New Democrat Coalition. She is a Vice Chair for the Democratic Women’s Caucus and serves on the prestigious House Judiciary Committee, House Armed Services Committee, House Ethics Committee, and the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis. In addition, she serves as Vice Chair of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel.
The American Rescue Plan Act, crafted by the Biden Administration and passed by Congressional Democrats, included a historic expansion of the Child Tax Credit (CTC). Qualifying families will see an increased tax credit of $3,000 for each child between the ages of six and 17 years old and $3,600 for each child under the age of six. The increased credit funds — $250 for children between six and 17, and $300 for each child under six — will be provided monthly, giving over 36 million eligible families relief as we recover from the pandemic. The expansion of the Child Tax Credit could lift one-half of all children in America out of poverty.
The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
The $3.5 trillion budget blueprint unveiled earlier this week by Senate Democrats would fund many policies from President Joe Biden’s American Jobs and Families Plans not covered by the $579 billion Bipartisan Infrastructure Framework. But among many worthwhile public investments is a new proposal that should give lawmakers pause: a costly expansion of Medicare paid for entirely by young Americans. Although lawmakers should be open to thoughtful improvements to Medicare, any changes must be financed in a way that is fair to Americans of all ages.
There are two possible changes to Medicare that Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, wants to include in the next major spending bill. The first proposal is to offer vision, dental, and hearing services not currently covered by Medicare at no additional cost to beneficiaries. The second proposal is to give Americans ages 60-64 the option to enroll in Medicare with the same premiums and benefits currently available to those over age 65 (which are heavily subsidized by income and payroll taxes paid by younger workers).
The problem with these proposals is that Medicare is already struggling to pay for the current suite of benefits it offers. Medicare Part A, which offers hospital insurance that is supposed to be fully funded by payroll taxes, will face a 10% budget shortfall five years from now. The amount of general revenue needed to subsidize Medicare Parts B and D, which cover physician services and prescription drug benefits, is projected to nearly double as a percent of gross domestic product over the next 20 years. These costs will impose a significant burden on young Americans, either by crowding out investments in their future or requiring them to pay higher taxes than current retirees did when they were in the workforce.
Giving today’s seniors, who have collectively enjoyed greater gains in income and wealth than younger Americans, a suite of new benefits they didn’t finance over their working lives or in retirement would only compound the intergenerational inequity built into current policy. That’s especially true if the Senate blueprint foregoes some investments in clean energy or child welfare, such as a permanent expansion of the Child Tax Credit, to make room for this costly expansion of Medicare.
There are better alternatives. Americans ages 60-64 could be allowed to buy into Medicare at a premium that covers the full cost of their coverage rather than the heavily subsidized one currently paid by people aged 65 and over. This option would still be cheaper for most beneficiaries than private insurance because Medicare is able to negotiate lower prices for services than private insurers. Any new vision, dental, or hearing benefits should have a significant share of the cost covered by income-based premiums and co-pays, as is currently the case for Parts B and D. A broad-based consumption tax that is paid by all consumers regardless of age could also help finance benefits in a way that doesn’t place the burden on anyone generation. Lawmakers should also consider pairing or preceding any benefit expansion with measures to close the existing financial shortfall in Medicare, such as the bipartisan TRUST Act.
For too long, Washington has allowed the growth of retirement programs to crowd out critical public investments in infrastructure, education, and scientific research. The new budget agreement is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to right this intergenerational wrong. It would be shameful for lawmakers to choose affluent retirees over working families yet again. Any expansion of Medicare should require some contribution by those who would benefit, or it should be dropped from the budget agreement altogether.
As lawmakers return to Washington this week, one of their top priorities will be crafting legislation based on the bipartisan infrastructure framework agreed to by President Biden and Senate negotiators last month. Although that agreement set top-line numbers for broad categories of spending, the details for how the money would be spent still need to be fleshed out. Congress should maximize the impact of this transformative investment by including provisions to reduce construction costs and direct funds towards the most beneficial projects.
The costs of building infrastructure in the United States are significantly higher than they are in other countries. New York is home to some of the world’s most expensive mass transit projects, sometimes costing several billion dollars per mile, while costs in other American cities also dwarf those of comparable projects internationally. Roads are no better: A recent tunnel in Seattle cost more than three times as much as a similar project in Paris and seven times as much as one in Madrid. If policymakers can bring the cost of each project down closer to international norms, they can build more infrastructure with the same pool of funds.
For the firms that adopt them, artificial intelligence (AI) systems can offer revolutionary new products, increase productivity, raise wages, and expand consumer convenience.[1] But there are open questions about how well the ecosystem of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across the United States is prepared to adopt these new technologies. While AI systems offer some hope of narrowing the recent productivity gap between small and large firms, that can only happen if the technologies actually diffuse throughout the economy.
While some large firms in the U.S. are on the cutting edge of global AI adoption, the challenge for policymakers now is to help these technologies diffuse across the rest of the economy. To realize the full productivity potential of the U.S., AI tools need to be available to 89% of U.S. firms that have fewer than 20 employees and the 98% that have fewer than 100.[2] An AI-enabled productivity boost would be particularly timely as SMEs are recovering from the effects of the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.
The report discusses the promise for AI systems to increase productivity among U.S. SMEs, the current barriers to AI uptake, and policy tools that may be useful in managing the risks of AI while maximizing the benefits. In short: there is a wide range of policy levers that the U.S. can use to proactively provide the underlying digital and data infrastructure that will make it easier for SMEs to take the leap in adopting AI tools. Much of this infrastructure operates as a type of public good that will likely be underprovided by the market without public support.
Benefits of AI adoption:
The central case for AI adoption is that human cognition is limited in a variety of ways, most notably in time and processing power. Software tools can improve decision-making by increasing the speed and consistency with which decisions can be made, while also allowing more decisions to be planned out ahead of time in the event of various contingencies. Under this broad framework, we can think about “AI” as being a broad suite of technologies that are designed to automate or augment aspects of human decision-making.
While many of AI’s most eye-catching use cases will likely remain the preserve of large platforms, the technology also holds tremendous promise for SMEs. The adoption of third-party AI systems will notably enable SMEs to streamline mundane (but often costly) tasks such as marketing, customer relationship management, pre- and post-sales discussions with consumers, and Search Engine Optimization (SEO). These systems can provide a lifeline for SMEs who are overwhelmed by the many challenges of running a business, and they can expand the number of businesses that are eligible for certain financial supports. For example, AI tools can be used to improve the accuracy of credit risk underwriting models and using alternative data sources and a streamlined process, they can make it easier for SMEs to take out loans they otherwise might not qualify for under traditional methods. Along similar lines, research shows that AI-driven robotics have (and will continue) to boost the productivity of SMEs in the manufacturing industry.
Importantly, this upcoming wave of AI technology can help SMEs catch up with larger, international firms because it can democratize the benefits of large information technology (IT) investments that superstar firms have been seeing over the last decade.
The economist James Bessen has argued that the top 5% of firms in many industries have been increasingly pulling away from the rest of the field because they’ve made large investments in proprietary IT systems. Their smaller rivals struggle to develop their own systems because they lack the necessary scale to hire a large stable of in-house technical talent. Amazon, for example, has a team of 10,000 employees working to improve their Alexa and Echo systems.
While AI tools can’t fully reverse this trend, they can help shrink the gap when embedded into Software as a Service (SaaS) platforms that smaller firms can make use of without the same level of investment. Essentially, through general-purpose AI tools, SMEs can have access to a host of productivity enhancements that these proprietary IT systems offer, but at a price point that is economical for SMEs. By shrinking this productivity gap, smaller firms can begin to compete in earnest while differentiating from large firms through improved customer service and greater product diversity. This will give a large leg up to SMEs who adopt these AI systems and help them better compete with large global incumbent firms.
Consider a firm like Keelvar Systems, which uses advanced sourcing automation to help businesses rapidly shift supply chains around the globe in the event of disruptions or delays. Essentially, it replaces or augments the work that a large supply chain and sourcing office would do within a firm. By using their service, or others like it, SMEs have the ability to benefit from similar levels of sophistication in their supply chain management without having employees spend hundreds of hours on tedious tasks or maintaining expensive proprietary IT systems.
There are firms like Legal Robot that have created a series of tools to help small businesses access legal services that would otherwise require a small army of in-house lawyers. With their service, SMEs can use smart contract templates based on their industry, receive instant contract analysis to make sure they are receiving fair terms and can automate certain aspects of compliance with laws like the GDPR.
Likewise, companies like Bold360 have helped SMEs improve their customer service experiences by offering a variety of AI-powered-chatbots and tools. Many basic customer concerns about products or delivery can be handled by these basic chatbots, freeing up human customer representatives to focus their time on the hard or advanced cases. Again, the pattern here is there is a service that large, multinational companies have been investing billions of dollars to create proprietary versions of, and now the customizability of AI is helping this service become more accessible to SMEs.
What are the barriers to AI adoption for SMEs in the U.S. and what can policymakers do to help create a welcoming environment?
Data investment as a public good
Depending on the context, data can often have the same traits as other public goods. First, it is non-rival—the marginal cost of producing a new copy of a piece of data is zero. Stated differently, multiple individuals can use the same dataset at almost no additional cost. The second important trait is that data is hard to exclude. Consider this report. Once it has been posted online, it is difficult to prevent people from accessing and sharing it as they see fit. This is one of the reasons why copyright infringement is so hard to stamp out.
Oversimplifying, these two features can lead to two opposite problems. On the one hand, economic agents might underinvest in public goods, absent government-created appropriability mechanisms (such as patent and copyright protection). Conversely, public goods tend to be underutilized (at least from a static point of view). Any price that enables economic agents to recoup their investments in a public good will be above the good’s “socially optimal” marginal cost of zero. Public good policies thus involve a tradeoff between incentives to create and incentives to disseminate. For example, patents give inventors the exclusive right to make, use and sell their invention; but inventors must disclose their inventions, and these fall into the public domain after twenty years.
What does this mean for data and artificial intelligence? If policymakers think that data is an essential input for cutting-edge AI, then they should question whether obstacles currently prevent firms from investing in data generation or disseminating their data.
While policies in this space involve significant tradeoffs, some offer much higher returns to social welfare. For instance, to the extent policymakers believe existing datasets are being underutilized, purchasing private entities’ data (through voluntary exchanges) and placing it in public data trusts would be a better policy than imposing data sharing obligations (which could undermine firms incentive to produce data in the first place). This is akin to the idea of government patent buyouts.
Of particular interest for policymakers, however, is the fact that some SMEs are sitting on top of data flows that are not being fully utilized because it is expensive to make data usable and these datasets may not be very valuable in isolation. As an example, industry-level manufacturing data might be quite valuable to all firms in a sector, but the dataflows from one SME are much less valuable. The U.S. could align incentives by providing investment funds to quantify various aspects of business flows and then submit them to public data trusts, which could be accessible for use by all firms in the industry. This would essentially be treating valuable dataflows as a type of public infrastructure that needs government investment to be fully realized.
This kind of public investment can happen not only through incentives for private firms but through the public sector as well. Governments at all levels (state, local, and national) have valuable dataflows regarding infrastructure development, the organization of public transportation, and general macro-level economic data that can be turned into open datasets for public and commercial use. Particularly on the national level, the U.S. should consider investment in IT infrastructure that can coordinate the submission of open datasets on the state and local level.
Indeed, if key scientific or commercial datasets do not yet exist, the public sector may be best positioned to create them in the first place as a type of digital infrastructure provision. One notable structure that may help in this regard is the idea of a Focused Research Organization, which would provide a team of researchers with an ambitious budget and a nimble organizational structure with the specific goal of creating new public datasets or toolkits over a set time period.
Provide regulatory certainty
For SMEs deciding whether to invest in adopting AI tools, regulatory and compliance costs can be a significant deterrent. Policymakers should recognize that regulation is often more burdensome for small firms that generally have less ability to shoulder compliance costs. Especially in industries with low marginal costs, such as the tech sector, larger firms can spread fixed compliance costs across more consumers, giving them a competitive edge over smaller rivals. Regulation can thus act as a powerful barrier to entry. For instance, a study found that the European experiment with GDPR led to a 17% increase in industry concentration among technology vendors that provide support services to websites.
This is not to say that additional regulation is, or is not, necessary in the first place. Indeed, there are a host of malicious or unintentional harms that can occur from improperly calibrated AI systems. Regulation can be a powerful tool to prevent these harms and, when well-balanced, can promote greater trust in the overall ecosystem. But potential regulation should follow sound policymaking principles that reduce the regulatory burden imposed on firms, notably by making regulation easy to understand, risk based, and low-cost to comply with.
In the U.S. there is to date no overriding national AI regulation. Instead, each sectoral regulator (i.e. Federal Aviation Administration, Security and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission, etc.) has been steadily increasing their oversight over the use of algorithms and software in their specific area. This is likely an appropriate approach, as the kinds of risks and tradeoffs at play are going to be very different in healthcare or financial decision-making when compared to consumer applications. As this approach develops, it would be prudent to develop a risk-based framework that allows for more scrutiny of algorithmic decision-making in sensitive areas while giving SMEs confidence to invest in low-risk areas with the knowledge they will not later take on large compliance costs.
However, regulation over data protection has been far more segmented and piecemeal. And the state-by-state patchwork of rules that has developed can be a significant deterrent for SMEs when considering whether to invest in the use of certain AI tools. Policymakers should consider an overriding national privacy law that would be able to set standard rules of the road over the protection of data in all 50 states so that U.S. SMEs can invest with confidence.
Finally, U.S. policymakers should consider aggregating all this information through the creation of a dedicated AI regulatory website that provides a toolkit of resources for SMEs about the benefits of AI adoption for their business, the potential obligations and roadblocks that they need to be aware of, and best practices for cybersecurity hygiene and data sharing.
Expand the AI talent pool
A lack of skilled talent is one of the biggest barriers to AI adoption as the technical skills required to build or adapt AI models are in short supply. In the U.S., especially, smaller companies struggle to compete with the high salaries paid out by large tech firms for top-end machine learning engineers and data scientists.
In broad strokes, this skills shortage can be alleviated in two ways: through upskilling the domestic population and by improving immigration pathways for global talent.
To upskill the domestic population, one relatively simple lever would be to pay some portion of the costs of individuals and businesses who wish to upskill. In the U.S., a portion of a worker’s retraining costs may be written off as a business expense so long as the worker is having their productivity improved in a role they currently occupy. But this expense is not tax deductible if the proposed training would enable them to take on a new role or trade.
For example, if a small manufacturing firm has technically competent IT staff who wish to attend a specialized training course on using machine vision systems in a warehouse environment, this expense would not currently be deductible as it would enable them to take on a new role within the company. This inadvertently creates an incentive to spend more on capital productivity investments than labor productivity investments. Addressing this imbalance would incentivize more firms to invest in worker retraining and help speed the creation of an AI workforce in the U.S.
Secondly, the U.S. needs to urgently address the shortcomings in the U.S. immigration system which make it more difficult for startups to compete with large incumbents on the basis of talent. Approximately 79% of the graduate students in computer science (and related subfields) studying in the U.S. are international students, which means a large majority of potential AI workers U.S. firms may look to recruit must operate through the immigration system. The cost, complexity, and length of this process inevitably favors large, incumbent firms who can afford to navigate the regulatory maze of procuring an H-1B or related work visa.
A recent NBER paper showed in detail the myriad ways in which access to international talent is important for startup success. Utilizing the random nature of the H-1B lottery system, the paper compared startups that randomly received a higher percentage of their visa applications approved to those who did not. The random nature of the H-1B lottery makes an ideal policy experiment because it allows for a clean test in which other potentially confounding variables are controlled for. The study found that a one standard deviation increase in the likelihood of successfully sponsoring an H-1B visa correlated with a 10% increase in the likelihood of receiving external funding, a 20% increase in the likelihood of a successful exit, a 23% increase in successful Initial Public Offering, and a 4.8% increase in the number of patents filed by the startup.
Policymakers could begin to counter this effect by waiving immigration fees for firms of a certain size and by streamlining the application process.
Further, policymakers should look to create a statutory startup visa so that international entrepreneurs have a viable pathway into the U.S. to launch firms of their own. According to research by Michael Roacha and John Skrentny, international STEM PhD students are just as likely to report wanting to work for or launch their own firm as native-born students, but the difficulty of our immigration system pushes them towards working at large incumbent firms.
Using these two levers of upskilling and immigration reform, the U.S. should increase the supply of AI talent available to SMEs or to launch SMEs themselves and thereby spur the adoption of AI adoption.
Conclusion
Artificial intelligence systems hold great potential to streamline the costs of doing business in a modern economy, particularly for SMEs. The last 20 years of the information technology revolution have helped large, established firms reach the cutting edge of productivity while smaller firms have been left behind. But general-purpose AI tools now provide an opportunity for SMEs to take advantage of many of these IT advancements at a cost and a scale that is feasible for them. Policymakers should attempt to proactively build out the digital infrastructure that will make it easier for SMEs to take the leap in adapting AI tools.
Summary of policy recommendations:
Data investment as a public good:
Where appropriate, align incentives for the private sector to contribute industry-level SME data to public and private data trusts that could be used by everyone.
Invest in making more government datasets open to the public.
Fund Focused Research Organizations or similar groups with the explicit goal of creating new scientific and commercial public datasets.
Provide regulatory certainty:
Clarify existing regulations and the obligations that SMEs must meet when utilizing a new AI tool.
Encourage the development of a risk-based framework that allows for more stringent regulation of sensitive applications while giving certainty to SMEs on investment in low-risk applications.
Pass an overriding national privacy law so that SMEs aren’t deterred from investing by a patchwork of differing state-by-state laws.
Consider the creation of a new SME regulatory website that provides informational resources to SMEs about the benefits of AI adoption for their business and the potential roadblocks that they need to be aware of.
Expand the AI talent pool
Encourage upskilling of the U.S. population by making worker retraining deductible as a business expense.
Reevaluate U.S. immigration pathways to make them more attractive for international technical talent.
Streamline the immigration application process and waive fees for firms below a certain size to make it easier for SMEs to compete for technical talent.
[1] This report is an adaptation of an earlier paper coauthored with Dirk Auer titled “Encouraging AI Adoption in the EU”.
[2] Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs – Characteristics of Businesses: 2016 Tables, United States Census Bureau
It’s rare when a single acquisition can offer insight into two different important questions in innovation. But the proposed purchase of cancer-diagnostic developer Grail — a startup with tremendous potential — by gene-sequencing leader Illumina is just that pivotal. First, is it pro-innovation for European antitrust regulators to have the power to block a deal involving two American biotech companies that do no substantial business in Europe? We argue that such “regulatory imperialism” by the EU has the potential to slow down biotech innovation, especially given the region’s generally lagging performance in biotech (BioNTech notwithstanding).
Second, under what conditions is vertical integration a socially beneficial strategy for accelerating innovation? Successful innovation in the biosciences often combines risk-taking by small companies with the development and regulatory resources of larger companies. We conclude that excessive antitrust focus on blocking vertical integration in the biosciences could impede the development of important new products and treatments.
These issues go far beyond Illumina and Grail. But it’s helpful to have the facts about this particular case. Grail has spent the past five years developing a diagnostic capable of screening for 50 different cancers at once — a test set to launch this year — while Illumina makes the hardware that performs those tests. Illumina offered to buy Grail, with the idea of integrating Grail’s technology with its own, to simplify the process of using gene sequencing for clinical diagnostics on a massive scale. If successful, this would dramatically reduce the cost of performing cancer screenings.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) intervened to block the acquisition, worried that Illumina would block potential competitors of Grail from using its gene sequencers. Illumina promised to supply these competitors with gene sequencing equipment and supplies without price increases. The FTC, through a complicated series of maneuvers that are not relevant to this paper, temporarily pulled back from its intervention to allow the European Commission to take the first swing at blocking the acquisition. The EU antitrust regulators are planning to rule by July 27 on whether to clear the merger.
And here’s where we come to the first issue: Should the EU antitrust regulators be considering a biotech deal that by the ordinary rules would not come under their jurisdiction? As the Wall Street Journal notes, “Since the merger doesn’t qualify for antitrust review under the bylaws of the European Union or any member states, the Commission asked countries to invoke Article 22 of the EU’s Merger Regulations. This rarely used provision allows countries to refer transactions to the Commission when their governments lack jurisdiction.”
This fits the general EU strategy of “regulatory imperialism.” Rather than focusing on innovation, the EU has tried to position itself as the global leader in regulation in a variety of areas, from artificial intelligence to chemicals to GMOs to data privacy. The European approach to regulation has been framed by the precautionary principle, which puts less weight on the benefits of innovation and more on the potential harms.
That risk-avoiding approach is one important reason why Europe has consistently lagged in biotech. European biotech is not nonexistent — after all, Pfizer partnered with a German biotech firm, BioNTech, to develop a very successful COVID-19 vaccine. Nevertheless, data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development shows that business spending on biotech research and development (R&D) in the EU comes to roughly one-third that of the U.S.
Tacitly accepting European jurisdiction over American biotech deals has the potential to slow down commercialization of important technologies. According to the New York Times, Europe has been “a world leader in technology regulation, including privacy and antitrust.” In a recent speech, Emmanuel Macron said that during its turn at the helm of the EU presidency, France would “try to deliver a maximum of regulation and progress.” When the EU sets the global standard on regulation and companies choose to comply with it everywhere (even where standards are lower), that’s known as the “Brussels effect.”
First, on privacy, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has become a de facto floor on policy for many large multinational companies. The problem for companies — especially in biotech and software — is that there are very high fixed costs to product development (and low marginal costs for distribution), and reworking a product for a different regulatory environment is often more trouble than it’s worth. That leads to a race to the top (or bottom, depending on your perspective) in terms of regulation.
In its first few years in effect, GDPR’s flaws have become manifest and EU policymakers are starting to consider reforms to the law. According to a recent joint report from three academy networks, “GDPR rules have stalled or derailed at least 40 cancer studies funded by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH).” The authors go on to note that “5,000 international health projects were affected by GDPR requirements in 2019 alone.” This flawed model for privacy regulation has unfortunately been exported around the globe.
Second, mergers between globally competitive firms with a presence in multiple jurisdictions have to get clearance from multiple antitrust enforcement agencies. If a single agency in a large market objects to the merger, the deal might fall apart completely. For example, a merger between U.S.-based Honeywell and U.S.-based General Electric collapsed after the EU competition enforcement agency decided to block the deal out of concern it would create a monopoly in jet engines. Of course, the EU’s investigation of the Illumina-Grail merger takes that one step further, given the fact that Grail doesn’t conduct any business in the EU, and Illumina’s business there isn’t substantial, with revenues below the usual threshold for antitrust scrutiny for both the European Commission and individual countries.
The next important question raised by the Illumina-Grail purchase is the role of vertical integration. We start with the simple observation that innovating in complex systems is both risky and expensive. That’s true in frontier industries such as electric vehicles and e-commerce, and it’s especially true in the biosciences, with the high hurdle set by the need for safety and efficacy.
The cost to bring a drug to market is a huge barrier for startups to remain independent. A 2020 paper in JAMA examining 63 of the 355 new therapeutic drugs and biologic agents approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration between 2009 and 2018 found that the median capitalized research and development cost per medicine was $985 million. Other studies using private data have found even higher figures. A 2019 study published in the Journal of Health Economics estimated the average cost to reach approval at $2.6 billion (post-approval R&D costs nudge the total up to $2.9 billion).
Should these complex systems be built by one company, which is better able to integrate all the pieces of the puzzle? (Tesla comes to mind when we are discussing electric vehicles). Or is it better to distribute the risk over multiple companies? The biotech industry has mostly followed this second strategy. Risky R&D is done by small firms with financing by high-risk capital such as venture firms. Then the resulting product, if successfully passing clinical trials, is acquired by a larger firm for commercialization.
In some cases, both strategies are important. The initial stages of research and development of a new idea are farmed out to a smaller company and financed by risk capital. And then when it comes time to build the idea into a complex system, the actual integration is done by a larger company, which has an established distribution network and marketing resources for reaching patients in a targeted fashion. This can greatly accelerate the development process.
The question, then, is whether this integration would be easier within one company or at arms-length. Illumina has made an offer to buy Grail, which was originally spun off from Illumina in order to get funding from risk capital. The goal, obviously, is to accelerate the development of this game changing integration.
The FTC has objected to the acquisition, because the agency worries about Illumina prioritizing its internal customer over other potential cancer diagnostics systems. Certainly, it’s true that some vertical mergers are anti-competitive. “Killer acquisitions” are one type of merger in biotech that is anti-competitive in nature. A recent paper from Ederer, Cunningham and Ma found that between 5% and 7% of acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry are killer acquisitions, meaning the incumbent firm purchased the startup with the intention of shutting down one or more of its products, because the legacy company offers a competing product that is more profitable.
There is increasing agreement among regulators on both sides of the Atlantic that acquisitions — especially in the pharmaceutical sector — need to be scrutinized more closely if products have the potential to be killed off post-acquisition. One heuristic a regulator might use is to look at how much overlap there is between the acquired product and the incumbent, especially in terms of benefits and use cases. If the incumbent’s product is still on patent, then there is a significant incentive to acquire a competitive product that might be disruptive to an acquirer’s portfolio and shut down the new product.
But there’s little evidence that most vertical acquisitions are anti-competitive. Vertical mergers — or the combination of two companies at different layers of the supply chain — are less likely than horizontal mergers — acquisition of a direct competitor — to be anticompetitive as both economic theory and empirical evidence show. Regarding the theory, firms are engaged in “make or buy” decisions all the time. If they choose to produce an input in-house instead of buying it from the market, then they have vertically integrated (either by developing the capacity on their own or by acquiring another firm with that capacity). Prohibiting firms from vertically integrating via acquisition would forgo some of the benefits of economies of scope and economies of scale. A literature review by Lafontaine and Slade showed that vertical mergers were procompetitive on average.
One of the most common reasons vertical mergers are less suspect than horizontal mergers has to do with “double marginalization.” If you assume two products are monopolies in their respective markets, then the producers of those products will each charge the monopoly price, which is higher than socially optimal. If the two products are complementary, then the companies can merge and create a positive sum scenario by lowering prices. Lower prices reduce deadweight loss, which is good for consumers, and lead to higher profits for the combined firm.
We note that if the FTC ruling stands, it will mean that developers of complex integrated systems will choose to keep their technologies in house rather than spinning them out and run the risk of having an acquisition blocked. And innovative development will be slowed rather than accelerated.
President Biden has proposed to finance his $4 trillion American Jobs and Families Plans by raising taxes exclusively on corporations and households that earn above $400,000 — the top 1.5 percent of taxpayers. Biden is right that the rich should pay more than they currently do given the staggering income inequality in America that’s been made worse by the COVID pandemic.
Almost 60 percent of Americans support funding Biden’s spending plans with his proposed tax increases — seven times the share that supports debt-financing them. But while taxing the rich is smart policy and politics, funding America’s future and realizing Biden’s policy vision will also require asking more taxpayers to contribute to the public good.
The Biden administration released its American Jobs Plan yesterday – a bold package with critical investments in infrastructure and America’s workers. Among its more ambitious aims is $100 billion set aside for workforce development. This includes a long overdue investment to diversify career pathways, through approaches such as apprenticeship programs, a focus on sector partnerships, and a new and robust program for dislocated workers. There is a lot to cheer for in the AJP—here are five ways it gets it right in pairing job creation with next-generation training programs.
Investing in Workforce Development and Worker Protection. For decades, the United States has lagged other high-income countries in workforce development. The AJP calls for a $48 billion investment in workforce development and worker protection, which includes funding for registered apprenticeships and pre-apprenticeship programs. In total, this would create one to two million new registered apprenticeships. PPI has long-called for the U.S. to increase apprenticeships 10-fold and provide workers with career pathways that do not require a four-year degree. We’ve also advocated for two specific ways to modernize apprenticeships: Congress should formalize and incentivize intermediaries (public or private) by subsidizing them to create “outsourced” apprenticeships, and government at all levels should create public service apprenticeship opportunities and programs, including in industries such as information technology, accounting, and health care.
Expanding Career and Technical Education. The plan recognizes the need for investments to expand career and technical education (CTE) and workforce-readiness programs for middle- and high-school students. The 10 million jobs lost by Americans at the pandemic’s onset disproportionally impacted young adults between the ages of 16 and 24, and some estimate that as many as 25 percent of our youth will neither be in school nor working when the pandemic ends. According to the U.S. Department of Education, high school students enrolled in programs with a CTE concentration are more likely to both graduate and earn higher median annual salaries than those who did not participate. These investments will set up students to be better prepared to enter the labor force upon graduation and gain their economic footing as they transition to adulthood.
Addressing Inequities. Women and minorities have been disproportionately impacted by job losses during the pandemic and have historically been excluded from infrastructure jobs. Acknowledging these inequities, the plan calls for “strengthening the pipeline for more women and people of color to access apprenticeship opportunities,” such as through the Women in Apprenticeships in Non-Traditional Occupations program. Another option would be to increase training programs and increase apprenticeship slots in industries dominated by women that face worker shortages, such as early childhood education and care, and pair these jobs with competitive wages.
Supporting Job Training with Smart, Evidence-Based Policies. The AJP acknowledges that we need forward-looking, evidence-based approaches to train the next generation of American workers and help those who might need to reskill or upskill, including laid off workers during the pandemic. The White House calls for a “a $40 billion investment in a new Dislocated Workers Program and sector-based training.” These funds would be allocated to help train workers get trained with skills in high-demand industries, such as clean energy, manufacturing, and caregiving. To ensure the success of such programs, the White House draws on evidence that completion rates are highest when workers are provided with wrap-around services, income supports, counseling, and case management to overcome the barriers to finishing their training.
Empowering Workers and Unions. Lastly, the AJP emphasizes the important role of union jobs as the backbone of the American middle class. The proposed legislation includes important provisions for strengthening the rights of workers to organize and for making sure that employers who benefit from the plan adhere to appropriate labor standards and do not interfere with workers’ exercise of their rights. Enhancing the power of workers in our economy is critical to supporting good jobs and a strong middle class.
The Covid recession has left over 10 million Americans out of a job and millions of workers might not have a job to return to when the pandemic is over. For them, the AJP would create a diverse set of pathways to connect them with quality jobs offering livable wages. We hope that when Congress takes up this package in the coming months, they will pursue equity not just for underrepresented groups in workforce development, but also for those who lack a college degree yet make up a majority of the labor market. For them, access to pathways that do not require a four-year degree will be critical to help them regain their economic footing. Overall, the AJP meets the moment to address historic job losses and infrastructure in need of significant public investment.
Washington, D.C. – Today, Congress passed the Biden Administration’s American Rescue Plan Act, a $1.9 trillion emergency pandemic relief package that will help ramp up COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution, support small businesses and workers, and provide the necessary resources to safely reopen schools and communities.
Will Marshall, President of the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), released the following statement:
“Passage of the American Rescue Plan is a landmark achievement for President Biden and the new Democratic Congress – one that gives us reason to hope our government may not be broken after all.
It’s not a perfect bill, but after a long, grinding year of sickness, economic privation and social isolation, this isn’t the time to make the perfect the enemy of the good. Policy disagreements aside, President Biden has rightly gauged the magnitude of the nation’s health and economic emergency and responded resolutely. His decision to “go big” was right, as was his desire to avoid vilifying his political opponents and deepening the nation’s paralyzing cultural rifts.
That’s the way our democracy is supposed to work.
By clearing his first big hurdle, President Biden has dealt himself a strong political hand for the next one: Winning passage of his coming “Build Back Better” plan for building a more just, clean and resilient U.S. economy.”
The Progressive Policy Institute is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.
This week’s episode is a joint episode of the Neoliberal Podcast and the PPI Podcast, featuring guest host Colin Mortimer of PPI’s Center for New Liberalism. Colin sits down with Oregon State Treasurer Tobias Read to talk about the ways Oregon is optimizing its treasury to support and empower Oregonians. Colin and Treasurer Read discuss the day-to-day role of a State Treasurer, and how his team uses the state’s investment power to help citizens, as well as how behavioral ‘nudge’ programs can increase retirement savings.
On Monday, congressional Democrats unveiled a proposal to dramatically expand the Child Tax Credit (CTC), one of the bigger policies in President Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan. On the same day, Sen. Mitt Romney (R-Utah) gave the concept bipartisan backing by offering a Republican proposal for turning the CTC into an expanded child allowance. Both proposals would raise the current benefit from $2,000 per child to $3,000, provide additional credit for children under age six, make the full value of the benefit available for low-income families, deliver the payments in a monthly installment instead of a lump sum at the end of the year and dramatically reduce child poverty in America.
It’s no surprise that policymakers in both parties are prioritizing child poverty. As many as one in seven children, or close to 11 million, are poor. The United States consistently has among the highest levels of child poverty among the world’s wealthiest countries, many of which offer so-called “child allowances” to support low-income parents. The Democratic proposal would not just help these kids in the short term by lifting an estimated five million children out of poverty. It would also have long-run benefits for social mobility and support Black and Hispanic families the most. This Democratic proposal is estimated to cut child poverty nearly in half while the Romney proposal would reduce it by one-third.
