President Obama’s dramatic announcement last night that U.S. intelligence and security forces finally caught up with Osama bin Laden was deeply satisfying. Bin Laden picked a fight with America, slaughtered thousands of our citizens, and has been called to account for his crimes. That’s a huge victory for the United States in its fight against terrorism, but it’s also a vindication of universal human values.

Terrorism experts have been quick to point out that al Qaeda will survive the demise of its leader. True, but for now at least, not terribly relevant. Operational control long ago passed to subordinates, and to the chiefs of offshoots in Yemen and Somalia. But in depriving al Qaeda of its most charismatic and inspirational figure, bin Laden’s death will likely demoralize aspiring jihadists and lead to a further splintering of the terrorist network.

As more details emerge, some other significant implications of bin Laden’s violent death are coming into clearer focus:

1. The United States is creating a credible deterrent to terrorist strikes.

In an age of suicide bombers, it’s obvious that not all terrorists can be deterred by the threat of retaliation. But the certainty that America will be relentless in hunting down those who organize to attack our citizens will likely dissuade more opportunistic jihadists. While recruiting young people for suicide missions, neither bin Laden nor other top al Qaeda leaders have been in any hurry to achieve martyrdom themselves.

In addition to bin Laden, U.S. forces and drones have killed scores of al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the mastermind of al Qaeda’s 2000 attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen. Much of bin Laden’s appeal stemmed from his messianic preaching that radical Islam represents an unstoppable moral force. In his narrative, Islam’s holy warriors toppled the haughty Soviet empire in Afghanistan and would soon drive the United States out of the Muslim world, if not bring it down altogether. But it’s hard to sustain a belief in inevitable victory when U.S. intelligence and armed forces are more deeply engaged in the region than ever, and are decimating the ranks of terrorist leaders.

For this, Americans owe a debt of gratitude to our much-maligned intelligence services. The CIA evidently tracked bin Laden down, and with the help of Navy Seal Unit 6, killed him in a firefight that claimed no U.S. lives. Thanks to the long arm of U.S. intelligence agencies, other terrorist chiefs, like Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s number 2, and Anwar al-Aulaqi, a key leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, should sleep less easily at night.

2. Pakistani duplicity remains a huge problem.

Although President Obama was careful to underscore Pakistani cooperation with U.S. intelligence efforts, today’s reports suggest the killing of bin Laden was a wholly American affair. The obvious question is why Pakistani intelligence couldn’t find bin Laden. He was living in a highly fortified mansion apparently build specially for him in 2005, in a city just 35 miles north of the capital of Islamabad. That city also houses units of the Pakistani army, who apparently weren’t inquisitive about the mansion either.

Most damning are news reports that the United States didn’t notify Pakistani officials about the operation. Unfortunately, Washington has good reason to suspect that the country’s intelligence service is playing a double game on terrorism. While ostensibly cooperating with the United States, Pakistani intelligence has ties to jihadist groups that have launched terrorist attacks in Kashmir and India, as well as Taliban and affiliated groups, including the notorious Haqqani network, that launch vicious attacks on Afghan and NATO forces from its base just over the border in Pakistan’s North Waziristan province.

Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan – despite official denials – should make Washington less defensive about launching drone missile strikes against terrorist targets there. U.S. officials should also ask why we are funneling large amounts of aid to a government that can’t seem to decide which side it’s on in the struggle against terrorism, even though Pakistan itself is increasingly the target of Islamist terrorists.

3. Freedom, not jihadism, is the wave of the future in the Muslim world.

The popular revolution sweeping the Middle East advances under the banner of freedom and self-government, not Islamist purity and strict enforcement of Sharia law. The Arab street isn’t burning American flags. It’s burning with indignation against homegrown tyrants and corruption, and asking America to back its demands for political and economic reform and representative government.

Meanwhile, al Qaeda’s stock has plummeted in the region. While Americans focus on the wounds of 9/11, Muslims have been the chief victims of al Qaeda’s gruesome tactics. Suicide bombings and indiscriminate attacks have claimed tens of thousands of civilian lives in Iraq alone, and the scourge has spread to Indonesia, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries. Opinion polls show a dramatic decline in sympathy for al Qaeda and strong condemnation of its methods. The carnage also has led Islamist and al Qaeda theorists to renounce indiscriminate attacks on non-combatants.

The Arab revolt, in fact, is the ultimate repudiation of bin Ladenism, which posits a remorseless and apocalyptic struggle between Muslims and the rest of the world. What most Arabs and Muslims want is not to recreate the Caliphate and wage endless jihad, but the freedom to join the modern world on their own terms. In this sense, bin Laden’s removal is a distraction from the main drama in the Middle East – but a welcome one nonetheless.

Let’s grant that Washington has limited leverage over Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad. Let’s further stipulate that Assad’s claim that it’s either him or the Islamists, while self-serving, could turn out to be true. Even so, the White House seems strangely tongue-tied when it comes to condemning the regime’s violence against its people.

Sure, various administration mouthpieces have issued perfunctory condemnations. But even as regime tanks and snipers fire indiscriminately on civilians in Deraa and other cities, President Obama has yet to speak out forcefully against the killings, or to mobilize international efforts to bring pressure on Assad to stop.

Trotting well behind the galloping pace of the Arab revolt, the administration is just now getting around to imposing mild sanctions on Syria. Whether you come at the issue from a humanitarian or realpolitik standpoint, this lack of urgency is puzzling.

Around 400 Syrians already have been killed, and the regime has escalated attacks on protesters. The Guardian reports desperate conditions in Deraa, where people lack electricity, food and water, yet can’t leave their homes for fear of being picked off by snipers. Security forces go door to door, rounding up suspected rebels.

Already entangled in three Middle Eastern countries, the United States probably can’t intervene militarily to stop an incipient massacre in Syria. But the President can offer unequivocal moral support to Syrian demands to open up one of the region’s grimmer police states; he can dramatically stiffen sanctions against the Assad regime; and, he can challenge the international community to apply the “responsibility to protect” principle to Syrians.

Siding with the Syrian resistance also aligns with America’s strategic interests. The fall of the Assad dynasty would remove a determined foe of American purposes in the region, and likely deprive Iran of a loyal satrap in Damascus. But even a more open and pluralistic political order in Syria could moderate the regime’s rougish external conduct. For example, it might mean less Syrian meddling in Lebanon, and less clandestine support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

So why is the administration holding back? Why won’t Obama endorse the goal of regime change, as he has in Libya?

Perhaps he fears being dragged into another Libya-style intervention. Or maybe somewhere in the bowels of the State Department there are still people who think the United States should pursue “engagement” with the Syrian dictator.

But hopes that the Western-educated Assad would turn out to be some kind of closet modernizer were dashed long ago. Since inheriting the regime in 2000, Assad has made Syria a client state of Iran. His regime also has been implicated in the assassination of Lebanese democrats who oppose Syrian domination of their country. To vaunt his credentials as a leader of the rejectionist camp, Assad funnels arms to Hezbollah and Hamas. At the height of the sectarian carnage in Iraq, Syria also was a key transit point for foreign suicide terrorists who flocked to the country to kill U.S. troops as well as Iraqi civilians.

In short, Assad is a thoroughly nasty piece of work. His links to Iran and regional terrorism make him more dangerous by far than Muammar Qaddafi. Yet you don’t hear anyone in Washington (or Europe) demanding a no fly zone over Syria.

That’s probably a perverse sort of tribute to Syria’s brutally competent machinery of repression. It’s also true, though, that Assad enjoys support from other minority groups in Syria, such as Christians. Accurately or not, they accept Assad’s description of himself as their only bulwark against Sunni Islamists.

Yet Assad’s brutality is doubtless a reflection of his basic political insecurity. As a member of the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot which comprises about a tenth of Syria’s mostly Sunni population, Assad’s hold on power is intrinsically precarious and can only be sustained by intimidation and violence.

Syrians nonetheless seem increasingly willing to risk their lives to pry Assad’s grip on their country lose. They deserve America’s unqualified support.

To say Ken Adelman – Ronald Reagan’s UN ambassador – takes thin appreciation for the benefits of foreign assistance would be an understatement. Writing in response to Joe Nye’s article on the importance of “smart power,” his rebuttal piece in Foreign Policy paints is a myopic view of American foreign aid, and in Adelman’s rush to end the practice, manages to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Here’s Adelman’s conclusion:

For decades now, the United States has been the No. 1 foreign-aid donor … but this hasn’t translated in making America the most popular or most influential country around the world. …

Four of the largest U.S. foreign-aid recipients today — Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, and Afghanistan — all take contrary positions on issues of critical importance to the White House. South Vietnam once got gobs — gobs upon gobs — of U.S. foreign aid. That didn’t help much. Likewise with Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Zaire (now the “Democratic” Republic of the Congo), and other “friendly” (read: graciously willing to take U.S. money) countries. …

Put bluntly, this aspect of soft power — foreign aid, by far the biggest in dollar terms, amounting to some $30 billion* a year — may not constitute much power at all.

In Adleman’s world, the only reason America should give to impoverished countries is to buy quid pro quo support in the UN, or to compel local governments and populations to unambiguous pro-American stances.

So a thought exercise, let’s enter Adelman’s world and imagine what would happen if we distributed foreign aid on his terms. Actually, we don’t have to imagine very hard, because there’s already a glowing exemplar of Adelman’s approach: North Korea.

In America’s dealing with Pyongyang, we only dole out aid only when there’s an immediate quid pro quo. Certainly the depths of North Korea’s poverty and recalcitrance of its leadership create a truly unique situation, but the basic premise holds: America is rich, North Korea is poor, and important strategic issues must be discussed between them.

Here’s what happens: Without regular American aid, North Korea throws a two-year-old style temper tantrum by testing (or threatening to test) a nuclear warhead; the United States and Europe scramble to put together an assistance package; Pyongyang temporarily calms down… until the next time they need something. In other words, we’re negotiating with the DPRK on its terms. American- and European-led efforts to engage North Korea have only been fleetingly successful: the regime will sit down with us when it pleases and then stall without giving much up until it needs something.

The converse case is how America deals with pretty much the rest of the developing world: We provide the developing world money on a regular basis. Yes, a lot of it is skimmed off by corrupt local officials, and some is directed at narrow strategic objects that help tighten local despots’ grip on power. To fault aid for supporting individuals, rather than institutions, is perfectly valid, and has contributed to the Obama administration’s inconsistent policy across the Middle East.

But a good chunk gets to where it’s intended (to military, infrastructure, health, or civil society groups) that is appreciated for one reason or another. The sum total is that the “payoff”(if you want to be callous) of American foreign is helping to create stable, working relationships with countries the world over. Foreign governments and their populations aren’t going to side with the United States on every issue (or even most issues), but maintaining open channels of communication to the ruling class and opposition groups are critical to productive dialogue that shapes policy over the long arc. And yeah, it just may help build democratic and stable societies, which are inherently aligned with America’s values and interests.

The bottom line is that foreign aid, however imperfect, creates the contours for America’s role in the world. Take it away, and we’re left bribing everyone. Just ask Kim Jong Il.

NATO’s current strategy has effectively reached the end of its road. Divisions between member states, anti-Qaddafi forces, and the alliance’s command structure, plus Qaddafi’s forces’ adopting altered tactics, suggest that it’s now time to go after the Libyan leader’s personal pressure points if NATO wants to compel him to step down. Hitting Qaddafi’s palaces, remaining military command centers, and sources of personal wealth may be necessary to convince him that Libya’s future is best without him.

The good news is that finding a Qaddafi-specific target set shouldn’t be construed as classic mission creep: as Qaddafi has adopted new mechanisms to attack and terrorize his own citizens in places like Misrata, NATO remains justified in using “all necessary measures” to protect them. It’s clear that the only way to do that is without Qaddafi.

Over the past ten days, fighting in Libya has essentially ground to a stalemate. After a furious seesaw along the coastal road between Ras Lanuf and the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, the front line has effectively settled somewhere west of Ajdabiya, which leaves but an uneasy 100 miles of cushion before reaching the de-facto separatist capital. The lone exception to this division is Misrata, further west still, where fighting continues.

Amidst the stalemate, the anti-Qaddafi forces have become anxious that NATO isn’t doing enough. One of the rebels’ highest military commanders, Abdul Fatah Younis, complained at a press conference last week that “NATO did not provide us what we need” and threatened to take the measure back to the UN Security Council. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and his British counterpart William Hague have echoed Younis’ calls this week, and called an emergency meeting in Paris today to discuss. From Juppe’s interview with French radio:

NATO wanted to take over military operations, and we accepted that. But it must play its full role. That is to say, it must prevent Qaddafi from using heavy weapons against the civilian population.
For its part, NATO says it’s doing just fine, thank you. Commanding Brigadier General Mark van Uhm countered that NATO has maintained a high operational tempo and is doing a “great job”, given resources.

Elsewhere, discord reigns: The Obama administration is content to stand at the ready, happily leading the initial wave before transitioning into a support role. Italy wants to arm the rebels. Sweden, UAE, and Qatar are supplying planes but possibly with restrictions on what they can do. And the African Union, full of leaders purchased by Qaddafi’s petro-power, have offered a non-starter of a peace-plan.

Clearly there’s a disconnect: The rebels, France, the UK, and Italy want NATO to do more absent a consensus on what; NATO insists it is being successful; and the US thinks it has done enough heavy lifting. All are correct to a degree, but are missing a key ingredient: Qaddafi.

By adapting to the new strategic realities, Qaddafi’s forces have modified their tactics. Rather than charge headstrong up the coastal road in easily identifiable tanks, the Qaddafistes have begun to rely on more concealable methods such as ambushes, snipers, and mortar fire. These tactics don’t permit for a full offensive towards Benghazi, but do provide just enough firepower to sow chaos amongst civilians while being small and hidden enough to evade NATO strikes from above.

Qaddafi has clearly retained enough firepower to kill civilians — particularly in Misrata — as report after report continue to indicate. Arming the rebels remains an unsure prospect — the time to train and deploy heavier armaments may be too long for them to be truly effective. Covert teams, authorized by the Obama administration, seem to hold out the best prospect for success by identifying key targets closely associated with Qaddafi, his family, and his wealth. NATO is left with little choice but to target the source of the chaos and destruction if it is to bring such a tragic scene to its conclusion.

Along with its annual Human Rights Report, the State Department has unveiled a new website, HumanRights.gov, ostensibly for the cause’s promotion. I’ve spent some time browsing the site, and though I was disappointed that it doesn’t seem to be fully stocked with reports — I searched for this year’s on Iran and came up empty — I’m sure that problem will take care of itself over the long term.

The outstanding question in my mind is what a new government website can really accomplish. Yes, it’s fine and welcome that Foggy Bottom puts time and resources towards building a dedicated internet portal, but the challenge is to avoid the bureaucratic temptation to measure success by having created something, rather than judging its usefulness by the effect it has on others. Essentially, it’s a question of measuring inputs (a site) vs. outputs (what the site accomplishes).

Will, for example, the State Department just use the site as a repository for mounds of data? Or will it build a community around it through web chats, live broadcasts from human rights events world wide, and an interface enabling ideas to be exchanged with the government? A worst case scenario is if a human rights website becomes a one way mirror, with information streaming out of the administration but rarely entering it. We all know how much this White House likes to put things online, but all the information in the world is underutilized if it’s not actively contextualized.

Human rights have an indispensable role in negotiations with all of the United States’ major antagonists. In a way, Secretary Clinton got lucky when she said that human rights’ issues couldn’t “interfere” with more pressing crises in the U.S.-China relationship: the resulting outcry seems to have refocused the administration’s efforts on the issue. The White House now seems to have a better understanding that including human rights in the basket of issues discussed across any negotiating table broadens the discussion and creates new angles for American leverage. As my friend Andrew Albertson wrote with Ali Scotten in 2009 on the Iranian situation:

By broadening our support for the aspirations of ordinary Iranians, the Obama administration can continue to tilt the balance of power in its favor. Such an approach would add pressure on the Iranian regime, enhance domestic political support for talks and maximize the opportunity for successful negotiations.

And of course they’re a good thing for their own sake, too.

Discussing Iran and human rights is something we’ve done quite a lot of over the past few weeks. Please take a look at the new study group we’ve launched in conjunction with our friends at Freedom House in an effort to help the administration think of ways beyond just sanctions to bring about real change in Iran. Here are a few quotes from Ben Smith’s story in Politico on why we’re doing it:

“PPI believes a more democratic world is a safer world. The United States has failed to apply that principle to Iran, even as popular movements for freedom spread throughout the Middle East. It’s time for a new approach,” PPI President Will Marshall said in an emailed statement.

“The dominant issues in the Middle East are democracy and freedom. The Iran regime thinks that it can escape demands for change,” said Apostolou. “The United States, and its allies, therefore need a strategy that will help Iranians attain the human rights they so richly deserve.”

Not much has been made of the truly stunning events unfolding in Cote D’Ivoire over the past 48 hours. Laurent Gbagbo, the ex-president who lost last year’s vote but refuses to cede power, is on the verge of giving up the post in favor of Alassane Ouattara, the rightful victor.

Gbagbo has held his country hostage for nearly four months, as forces loyal to him had hunkered down in Abidjan, the commercial capital. But Outtara massed his own army, and in recent days made a strong push essentially pinning down Gbagbo’s forces in the city.

Everyone from the UN to the African Union to international NGOs and the ghost of Elizabeth Taylor acknowledges that Ouattara is president-elect, so there’s no question about taking sides, despite legitimate concern that Outtara’s forces could commit crimes against civilians. To that end, on March 30, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1975, which among other things, authorizes UN and the French forces supporting them to use “all necessary means … to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence… including to prevent the use of heavy weapons.”

Last night and under this mandate, UN and French forces hit the presidential palace as well as other strategic military sites around Abidjan. The pressure has apparently brought Gbagbo to the verge of ceding power, despite somewhat conflicting reports.

In the process, we’ve learned two important things about the UN: First is that the United Nations is beginning to take its “responsibility to protect” (R2P) — an international norm adopted in 2009 that obliges the international community to act in the face of humanitarian crises — quite seriously. R2P grew out of the UN’s non-intervention in the Rawandan genocide of 1994; one of its principal pillars is that the international community is compelled to take timely action to protect civilians when a state is failing to protect its population. Cote D’Ivoire is just the second potential atrocity since R2P was established (Libya was the first) that the UN has had the opportunity to act. So far, it’s 2 for 2.

It’s remarkable that Resolution 1975 passed by the Security Council by a 15-0 margin, just weeks after a very similar Resolution 1973 passed by a comparatively difficult 10-0 vote (with five abstentions) authorizing the same “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya. What compelled Russia, China, Brazil, Germany, and India to vote with the Ivoirian resolution while abstaining from the Libyan version just weeks earlier is somewhat of a mystery.

Most likely, the different vote tallies are due to a simple fact: no two situations are exactly alike and major international decisions aren’t made in a vacuum. Certainly Moscow and Beijing in particular didn’t wake up last week and decide they were liberal interventionists comfortable authorizing force to advance democracy. Perhaps the difference was in a certified election result in Cote D’Ivoire, while no election had taken place in Libya?

Second, the limited UN/French military operations in Cote D’Ivoire should underwrite the UN’s confidence that it can act with apparently effective results without more than American moral support. As any as one million Ivoirians may have be displaced by this conflict, and preventing needless harm to them is a testament to the international community’s potential as an effective arbiter.

Bowing to criticism across the political spectrum, President Obama will try to clarify U.S. goals in Libya tonight in a speech to the nation. Expect him to argue that, however confusing our policy may seem, it’s working.

Aided by NATO airstrikes, Libya’s rebels have resumed the offensive and are driving westwards toward Tripoli. Meanwhile, an economic embargo is making it difficult for the regime to provide people under its control food, water, gas and other necessities.

Whether the rebels can defeat Moammar Qaddafi’s better-trained security forces remains to be seen. But there’s no question that international intervention has prevented Qaddafi from quashing the rebellion, indiscriminately slaughtering civilians, and carrying out his vows to exact merciless vengeance on regime opponents.

Obama’s critics, nonetheless, have a point. He has not spelled out with precision what our ultimate goal there is, or how we will achieve it.

The reason for this seeming incoherence, however, is not as mysterious as Obama’s critics make it out to be. Put simply, U.S. aims in Libya and those of the international community are not aligned. What America wants – and no doubt France and Britain as well – is Qaddafi’s ouster. But the United Nations doesn’t do regime change. Russia and China, with long histories of autocratic and repressive rule, are adamantly opposed to political interference in the sovereign affairs of other countries.

U.N. Resolution 1973 therefore authorized only a humanitarian intervention aimed at protecting civilians from attack. The problem, of course, is that humanitarian crises invariably have political roots, and the Libyan opposition will never be safe from retaliation until Qaddafi and his henchmen and mercenaries are gone.

With NATO airstrikes clearing the way for rebel advances, it’s clear that the humanitarian mission is something of a fiction, a fig-leaf for the coalition’s real aim, which is to hasten Qaddafi’s fall. Our European allies fear that their publics have little stomach for a long engagement in Libya. So the international coalition has taken sides in the Libyan revolt, and must now confront the reality that rebel offensives in Tripoli and other regime strongholds will put civilians at risk.

This is a strategically and morally sustainable position. In the long run, it’s the best way to minimize civilian deaths and free Libya from a loathsome tyrant. Yet the Obama administration has been less than forthcoming about its true aims, for fear that absolute candor will unravel the international consensus behind the Libyan intervention.

At the same time, the White House has been eager to toss the hot potato of leading the Libyan intervention to NATO. Yet its attempts to downgrade America’s role from lead actor to stagehand have failed to answer doubts about the operation shared by liberals and conservatives. On the contrary, they’ve made the administration look both weak and furtive.

Obama needs to do a better job tonight of acknowledging the tensions between U.S. and international policy towards Libya, and reaffirm his resolve to see Qaddafi go. But his critics also need to understand that Obama can’t simply issue unilateral ukases if America is to share the burden of intervening with others.

Armchair strategists demand that Obama spell out America’s policy with Euclidean precision. Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose, in The Washington Post, offers out an eminently logical set of criteria for intervention, in which Presidents clearly define mission and goals, select means to match the ends, develop plans for what happens when the fighting ends, and have backup contingencies in place when things don’t go as expected.

But military interventions, especially multilateral ones, unfold in the context of international politics. And international politics is just as illogical, imprecise, and unscientific as domestic politics. Sometimes, candor and coherence have to be sacrificed to achieve enough consensus to get traction against big problems. That’s why humanitarian or other kinds of interventions launched in the name of collective security today are likely to be messy affairs, to have limited and even muddled aims, and be prosecuted in a spirit of continuous improvisation rather than rigid adherence to war plans.

Rigorous rules of intervention are useful intellectual and strategic exercises. But ultimately what matters to Americans are results, not theory. They support wars – yes, even wars of choice like Panama, the 1991 Gulf War, and Bosnia and Kosovo – that entail manageable costs and are over quickly. Over time, they come to oppose those that drag on, cost too many lives and too much money, and begin failing a cost-benefit test of national interest.

Whatever President Obama says tonight to rally support for his policies, he should act in ways that ensure the endgame in Libya – Qaddafi’s fall – comes sooner rather than later.

UPDATE: We are re-posting this piece from Friday as events over the weekend continue to highlight the need for American attention on pro-democracy protests in Syria. Over the weekend, 12 people have reportedly died during demonstrations in the northern port city of Latakia–where the military has reportedly been deployed–and some 4,000 people gathered again in Daraa.

You may not have noticed between the new war in Libya and the nuclear crisis in Japan, but the latest Arab country to see popular protests is Syria. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Syria has been an opponent of the peace process and allied with Iran.

Yet, like President Mubarak and President Ben-Ali, President Assad is following what seems to be the traditional playbook in response to a week of intensifying and pitched protests, again making noises about reexamining the country’s decades-old emergency law barring free political expression. Unlike these gauzy allusions to “reform,” however there has been nothing vague about the soldiers and anti-terrorism units attacking Syrian citizens in the streets.

The Obama administration must do more to help Syrian democracy and human rights activists to expose this regime for what it is. The Administration should start by dispatching Ambassador Robert Ford to Daraa, where dozens were slaughtered in the streets this week by government security forces firing on crowds and attacking those rallying for freedom from Bashar al-Assad’s tyranny. From Daraa, Ambassador Ford should call for a full UN Security Council investigation into what happened during the recent protests. His mere presence can bring hope to those brave enough to stand up to Assad’s thugs. America owes them that much.

Not many more died in Egypt, where the armed forces never fired on crowds. Yet we’ve heard far stronger words from the White House about Egypt than we have about Syria thus far. A statement by the White House Spokesman was a start, but the President should speak out himself and up the ante.

The Assad regime should also be put on notice that interfering with the Ambassador in this context would vitiate the purpose of our renewed high-level presence in Syria. The entire point of sending Ambassador Ford to Damascus – a move welcomed by Syria – was to establish an American presence on the ground. It’s time to put it to use.

We can do more. Congress should enhance the Syria Accountability Act to account for Assad’s renewed crackdowns on dissidents, and the Treasury Department should sanction those responsible for attacks on the Syrian people. IAEA pressure on Syria’s illicit nuclear program, which bears increasing scrutiny in any event, should be ratcheted up. The censure of the United Nations should be brought to bear on the murder of Syrian citizens by their government. Syrian opposition and institution-building groups should be funded and supported by the U.S. and our Western Allies – all the better to create an alternative to Assad’s rancid regime. The benefits of weakening the Assad regime cannot be underestimated.

This regime plays a pivotal role in the arming of Hezbollah, a non-state military that has killed more Americans than any terrorist group except Al Qaeda. It is the host to eleven terrorist groups based in Damascus and for years its border was like a turnstile at an amusement park for terrorists heading to Iraq to kill American soldiers. And none of that takes into account violence and repression that Assad visits on his own people.

For decades the United States has been denigrated across the Middle East for our policies, not chiefly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, but more fundamentally for our hypocrisy. President Obama has a historic opportunity to align our interests with our values in helping dissidents and democracy activists repressed by an unfriendly regime find their voice. We need to seize the opportunity, and stop looking this gift horse in the mouth.

This administration has gambled that communication with hostile regimes is preferable to stubborn silence, and that being on the ground is preferable to self-righteous absenteeism. Fair enough. Now is the time to talk advantage of the diplomatic presence we have in Syria. Ambassador Ford should head to Darra, and he should demand explanations.

Though it would be fair to say Obama administration has struggled to keep pace with the groundswell of popular protest from Morocco to Yemen, the White House’s rhetoric and actions have thus far enshrined it on the proverbial “right side of history.” That is, through the lens of historical scholarship, the president’s course of action in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya will be judged as just in the face of non-democratic and violent forces.

Then there’s Bahrain.

The small island nation — home to a non-democratic Sunni ruling family and allied with the U.S. as host to the Navy’s 5th Fleet — has had a steady stream of pro-democracy demonstrations since January. While paying lip service to Shi’ite Bahrainis’ grievances, last week the royals called in Saudi and Emirate military muscle to quash a popular uprising before it gained steam. Pearl Square — the protesters’ main gathering place — was shut down immediately after the foreign troops’ arrival; at least eight people have been killed and dozens are reported missing.

As it stands, the Obama administration runs a serious risk of ending up on the wrong side of history in Bahrain. Until the weekend, the administration had said and done comparatively much less than the multiple statements on Egypt, issuing just one quiet statement from a (relatively) lowly National Security Council spokesman. Secretary Clinton reiterated the original statement on Saturday, saying:

We have made clear that security alone cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain… Violence is not and cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so.

Fair enough — sounds good enough, right? But whereas statements regarding Tunisia and Egypt, as well as the UN resolution and subsequent military action on Libya outpaced events (if barely), the White House’s attention to Bahrain may be too little, too late.

Are the U.S. Navy base and Saudi/ Emirate support for the Libyan situation complicating factors in America’s flat-footed response? Of course. But rather than sitting on its hands, the White House would do well to channel former Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel’s mantra — never let a crisis go to waste — and use the opportunity to start reorienting American policy that corrects over 30 years of an inherently unstable Faustian bargain with Arab despots. I’ll pass on the specifics of “how” for now, but getting on the right side of history in Bahrain through tougher and earlier public diplomacy is a good start if the protest movement beats the odds and rekindles itself.