Defense Secretary Robert Gates is in China, meeting with President Hu today in a diplomatic effort to warm military-to-military relations between the two countries. Gates’ trip is in advance of the Obama-Hu summit in Washington next week.  Military relations had frosted over this summer following $6.4 billion in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Gates’ meeting with Hu followed on the heels of an encounter with Chinese defense chief Liang Guanglie, where the two agreed to begin regular strategic security talks in an effort to reduce tensions. The Pentagon believes that a structured long-term dialogue will build trust and focus on longer term issues as the United States—regardless of administration—will likely arm Taiwan for decades to come.

Top of the to-do list on military cooperation will no doubt be North Korea, and it’s hardly coincidence that Gates used this visit to highlight advances in Pyongyang’s military technology that could threaten the West Coast within five years.  Further, as Michael Chase points out in a series of PPI memos on the Chinese military, getting Chinese buy-in on North Korea may rely in part on building trust first in areas like humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and anti-piracy missions, to name a few.

Sino-American tensions in military relations are nothing new, but Secretary Gates’ trip continues to expose a fascinating—and potentially dangerous—rift inside the Chinese bureaucracy: the lack of communication between Beijing’s military and civilian leaders.

This week, China unveiled the J-20, its first and only stealth fighter.  China’s bizarre choice of this week—during Gates’ visit—to flex its newfound military muscles by test-flying the J-20 for the first time. When Gates signaled to President Hu that the test flight was unnecessarily provocative, Hu replied that it had “absolutely nothing to do” with Gates’ visit. Pointedly, Gates acknowledged his concern about the Chinese military acting independently of the political leadership, a problem that could in a worst-case scenario lead to unauthorized military action against, for example, Taiwan.

Getting China’s leaders to communicate with one another is well-outside the Obama administration’s powers, of course, but continuing to press Beijing’s political leadership on the issue is a good start.

The brutal Egyptian suicide bombing at a church on New Year’s Day has rightly outraged the world. And yet, rather than focus on those specifically responsible for this brutal attack (most likely some splinter group of Al Qaeda), some – including many right wingers – are using the opportunity to stoke anti-Islamic sentiment. Islam-hater Robert Spencer laments that “Islamic jihadists and Sharia supremacists continue, with ever increasing confidence and brutality, to prey on the Christians in their midst, while those who should be working to protect them make excuses and look the other way.” “A disproportionate share of religious persecution happens in Muslim-majority countries,” writes Gary Bauer. Marty Peretz wrote that “already in the new year there is already news of Islamist terror.”

While there certainly is a problem with jihadist violence towards minorities in the Middle East, the right’s outrage would have a lot more credibility were it not part of a broader anti-Islamic campaign. The hysterical campaign against Park51 in New York City last year was a turning point in American conservatism’s relationship to Muslims, illustrating beyond a reasonable doubt the sheer Islamophobia on the right.

“Muslim life is cheap,” Peretz infamously wrote during the Park51 non-controversy. He apologized for another line in the same article, wherein he called for Muslims to be stripped of their First Amendment rights. But about Muslim life being cheap, well, it was “a statement of fact, not value,” he said later.

The astonishing thing about Park51 was that powerful figures in the conservative movement revealed themselves as concerned with Islam, suddenly and selectively. Sarah Palin called on “peaceful Muslims” to reject the planned Islamic center, as if erecting such a building were a statement of violence. John McCain said Park51 would “harm relations, rather help.”

Here’s an idea: avoiding sweeping statements about Islam’s supposed propensity towards violence would help relations. It’s something those who claim to be so concerned with Islamist violence might want to consider.

In the new issue of Vanity Fair, journalist Peter Bergen argues that we are, in fact, winning our war against Al Qaeda. “[I]t is not the West that faces an existential threat, but al-Qaeda,” he writes. “Above all, we need to keep al-Qaeda in perspective, remembering that its assets are few, and shrinking.”

Now, Bergen is one of the few Western journalists to meet Osama Bin Laden, and among the world’s foremost experts on Al Qaeda. He also opposed the Iraq War for the same reason President Obama did, as a distraction from the hunt for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In other words, Bergen is not just another hawk or war cheerleader, reflexively supporting military action divorced from any realistic aim. He does not claim progress in this war because he always mistakes militarism for wisdom, as, say, Republican hack Bill Kristol does. So it’s very worth taking what Bergen has to say very seriously.

Even if he is wrong about the astuteness of continuing to fight in Afghanistan, as I think he is, Bergen points to a larger truth about the vast majority of commentary and analysis about Al Qaeda: most of it focuses not on Al Qaeda but on us. Our blunders, our costs, our misguided decisions and our weaknesses. Very little looks at developments from Al Qaeda’s point of view. And from Al Qaeda’s point of view, things don’t look so pretty.

Bin Laden imagined Muslims rising up worldwide and overthrowing their oppressors after 9/11, so inspired by the attacks would they be. That obviously hasn’t happened. Al Qaeda imagined the U.S. ceasing its support for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other un-Islamic regimes in the Middle East. That hasn’t happened, either.  Bin Laden’s right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, believed his organization could gain control of a state and expand its Taliban-like rule outward. Nope. In fact, all of Al Qaeda’s larger goals of restoring the caliphate and ushering in a period of worldwide ultra-Islamic rule have failed to materialize.

Nearly 10 years after the 9/11 attacks,  Al Qaeda is much further away from achieving its primary aims than it was before the attacks, when it could at least claim to have a mini-state within Afghanistan. Yes, the U.S. has expended great resources, lost thousands of soldiers, and traded away many valuable liberties and values. I think Bergen understates these costs when he writes, “During the past decade, misguided actions taken in the name of the War on Terror—notably the invasion of Iraq, the bungled war in Afghanistan, and the heavy-handed approach to the treatment of prisoners—have bought bin Laden and his allies some time.”

But for Al Qaeda, bruising America is only a means to an end. The point of hurting the United States was for it to crumble, not for it to carry on in a wounded state. After America broke apart easily, like a spider web, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel would surely follow, bin Laden thought. Taking over those lands was the purpose of attacking the U.S. in the first place. What good are spectacular terrorist events against infidels if they don’t lead to the outcomes you want?

True, Al Qaeda still exists, and arguably might even still be able to execute another attack on the American homeland. But it has not done so in nearly 10 years, and not for lack of trying. The ultimate way to defeat Al Qaeda is not just to prevent it from killing Americans—though of course that is a major sub-goal of ours—but to kill or capture its current members, and convince prospective future anti-American jihadis not to join its cause. Preventing Al Qaeda from achieving its larger Islamist aims is a prime way to do that. Even the most committed ideologues can only fight for so long without making significant progress towards its goals, after all.

All of which is to say that things probably aren’t as bad as they seem. Things probably aren’t as bad as they always seem. Al Qaeda has a fundamentally unrealistic goal and a deeply unappealing ideology. As long as the U.S. and its allies refrain from making too many too mistakes, as long as we play the long game and keep Al Qaeda isolated, as long as we protect the American homeland, we will win this war. We already are.

The Obama administration released its Afghanistan review this morning, and while everyone will be digging through it for truths and obfuscations, it’s worth simply comparing the review’s conclusions to President Obama’s “Terms Sheet” he dictated at the outset of his Afghanistan surge. Obama’s six-page terms sheet, first revealed and released in Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars, calls for measuring progress in Afghanistan by answering questions in related to governance, Pakistan, training of Afghan forces, and international support. Let’s look at the new review and compare it to some parts of the old one, shall we?

1. The new review concludes that “the momentum achieved by the Taliban in recent years has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas, although these gains remain fragile and reversible.”
   The initial review, however, called for “reversing the Taliban’s momentum” everywhere, not merely arresting it in some places (my italics). Small word change, big difference.
2. The new review says that “We are also supporting Afghanistan’s efforts to better improve national and sub-national governance, and to build institutions with increased transparency and accountability to reduce corruption – key steps in sustaining the Afghan government.”
   The initial review had specific benchmarks to measure governance progress: Has President Karzai made merit-based appointments in the areas most essential to our mission? Has the Afghan government begun to implement an effective reintegration/reconciliation program?  The new review is silent on these critical matters.
3. The new review holds that Afghanistan forces “have exceeded ANSF growth targets, implemented an expanded array of programs to improve the quality and institutional capacity of the ANSF, and sharply improved their training effectiveness.”
   The initial review called for “accelerated ANSF growth while improving quality.” On this score, the U.S. is doing quite well, according to what was released today.
4. The new review argues that “Emphasis must continue to be placed on the development of Afghan-led security and governance within areas that have been a focus of military operations.”
   The initial review insisted that we needed to establish “a program to transfer responsibility from ISAF to ANSF province by province.” No mention in the new document of what has been achieved, only on what must still be done.

Despite the negative balance sheet, on these and other scores, today’s review is cautiously optimistic. We are making progress, however fragile and recent. “Most important, al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership in Pakistan is weaker and under more sustained pressure than at any other point since it fled Afghanistan in 2001,” Obama’s new review argues. Reviewing the first assessment, however, reminds us that weakening al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan was not the primary goal. Perhaps it should have been.

Photo Credit: Truthout

The Center for New American Security (CNAS) just released a new report on the way forward in Afghanistan. As the report’s title indicates, “Responsible Transition” calls for the United States to hand over responsibility for security to the Afghans over the next few years. The plan involves leaving 25-35,000 U.S. troops behind to defeat Afghanistan, with the rest withdrawn by 2014. “Responsible Transition” also calls for America to put more pressure on Pakistan to crack down on extremists.

CNAS’s plan to scale down the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is a wise one, recognizing as it does that “all options are likely to be suboptimal” but a long-term nation-building project is particularly suboptimal. But it seems wishful thinking that more pressure on Pakistan coming from the Obama administration will do what nine years of pressure haven’t already: convince Pakistan to expel the Taliban and any other troublemakers from its territory. As long as Pakistan knows we need it more than it needs us, it can take U.S. money while doing little.

Moreover, as Michael Cohen points out, CNAS’s report entirely sidesteps the thorny issue of talking with the Taliban. This is a key issue, since the Taliban have deep roots in the Pashtun community. Any long-term peace is going to have to include elements of the Taliban, as the administration sometimes seems to realize.

A more realistic plan would be something along the lines of what the Afghanistan Study Group and the Center for American Progress have recommended. Encouraging political reconciliation must be at the forefront of U.S.’s strategy going forward, not simply an afterthought. Military operations will have to take a backseat to diplomacy and politics if long-term progress is going to be made. Deal-making will have to include bargains with the Taliban, unsavoury though that prospect is. There simply is no other way to bring a modicum of stability to the troubled region unless the Taliban are made a part of some power-sharing agreement.

It’s a positive sign that the gang at CNAS recognizes that a sizable U.S. footprint in Afghanistan is unsustainable. As the strongest boosters of large-scale counterinsurgency approaches, CNAS has an important role to play in forming a strategy that focuses primarily–and eventually, exclusively–on preventing terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland. That should always be the top priority. When the Obama administration releases its Afghanistan review next week, let’s hope it agrees.

Beijing has arm-twisted nineteen countries to not send representatives to tomorrow’s Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo.  At issue is the honoree, Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese political prisoner whose views on human rights and democracy don’t jive particularly with the Chinese Communist Party’s.  Imagine that.

On the surface, Beijing’s deft deployment of “soft power” seems impressive: to keep nineteen countries from attending supporting democratic movements is impressive. “Soft power,” as Harvard professor Joe Nye explains in an October Washington Quarterly article, is an area where Beijing is just coming into its own.

But Nye also points out that Chinese soft power has limits:

It is not easy for governments to sell their country’s charm if their narrative is inconsistent with domestic realities. In that dimension, except for its economic success, China still has a long way to go.

Such is the case with the Nobel event.  Let’s examine the nineteen no-shows, and their political and press rankings from 2009 by Freedom House, the NGO that tracks these sorts of things:

Yikes.  Only two unfettered “free”’s in the lot. In other words, as Nye acutely observes: ‘[I]f the authoritarian growth model produces soft power for China in authoritarian countries, it does not produce attraction in democratic countries. In other words, what attracts in Caracas may repel in Paris.”  How spot-on.

And if you’re interested in hearing it straight from the horse’s mouth, come see Joseph Nye, Under Secretary Michele Flournoy, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) and a host of others talk about these issues at a PPI panel discussion on China, next Tuesday, December 14th in DC.  Click here to see the invite and RSVP.

Photo credit: Adam

Taking its cues straight from Will Marshall’s keyboard, no doubt, the Obama administration  correctly labeled China as an “enabler” of North Korea over the weekend.  If Pyongyang is the crack addict in the alley behind my house, Beijing keeps it high.

Beijing’s unwillingness to curtail the Hermit Kingdom’s frustrating bellicosity falls within its national interest.  Well, in the short term, anyway: As North Korea continues to cause headaches in Washington, Beijing is probably quite content to let a distracted DC spend time and energy containing the North and placating the South. Further, China alone maintains significant diplomatic leverage over the Kim dynasty, and a mischievous Pyongyang reinforces Beijing’s position as regional powerbroker.

Consider the flip side: If North Korea starts to behave itself, China not only loses that pivotal position, but Washington can spend more time focusing the basket of issues it would prefers keeping front and center: currency valuation and debt, trade, improving military ties, freedom of international waterways, and India’s UN Security Council seat, amongst others.

But as the Korean situation continues to deteriorate, it should be dawning on the Chinese that an escalation isn’t in their interests, either.  With each Northern provocation–the Cheonan sinking, the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, and the consistent threat of another nuclear test launch–the South Korean public loses patience with diplomatic responses.  Should the day arrive when a military response is unavoidable, the egg will ultimately end up on Beijing’s face: it will be drawn into full-blown crisis-control mode if for no other reason than to manage the inevitable refugee catastrophe awaiting on its boarder.

In talks with the Chinese, the Obama administration must highlight these facts: allowing a rambunctious Kim to needle Washington’s eye is fine for today, but it serves no one’s interest to allow such behavior continue.  This is the choice China faces: regional broker or global stakeholder — it’s very difficult to be both over the long term.

If you want to learn more, you should check out PPI’s All-Star panel on US-China relationship next Tuesday, December 14th, featuring UnderSecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy, new Senator Chris Coons (D-DE), Harvard professor Joe Nye, writer James Fallows, and Naval War College professor Mike Chase.