The Middle East is a political outlier, the world’s least hospitable place for liberal democracy. But as popular demands for freedom spread virally across the region, they are illuminating a varied political landscape, not just monolithic tyranny.

Think of it as a continuum of despotism. On the “soft” end are Tunisia and Egypt, where longtime strongmen were ousted with surprising ease. Mostly nonviolent popular protests were sufficient to shove them into involuntary retirement.

On the “hard” end is Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi. Unlike Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the self-anointed “Brother Leader” has shown no compunction about massacring his own people to hold onto power. While rebels are fighting back valiantly, it could take a hard shove from the outside world to topple hardcore tyrants like Qaddafi.

In any case, the popular uprisings are sorting out where the region’s countries fall along the autocratic continuum. It’s also shedding light on the conditions that make some countries more receptive to political change than others.

A month ago, there didn’t seem to be anything particularly “soft” about Mubarak and Ben Ali. They were essentially dictators who ruled by decree, clamped down hard on political opponents, routinely violated basic human rights, including torturing prisoners, and tolerated pervasive corruption and cronyism.

Yet, to invoke Jeanne Kirpatrick’s famous Cold War-era dichotomy, they were authoritarians rather than totalitarians. They depended on the tacit support of respected national institutions like the army, as well as governing and economic elites who preferred “stability” to the hazards of open political competition. When the uprisings made it clear that the heretofore voiceless masses had turned against the rulers, that support quickly evaporated and they had little choice but to step down.

In contrast, the megalomaniacal Qaddafi has ruled absolutely for 42 years. Rather than use Libya’s oil and gas wealth to develop and modernize the country’s economy, he funneled much of it into overseas intrigues, including several vicious civil conflicts in Africa. Libya remains a highly tribal society where national institutions (including the army), private markets and civil society – key building blocks for democracy – are weak.

In general, America’s friends and allies in the Middle East are mostly grouped toward the soft end of the despotic continuum, while our adversaries congregate at the hard end. This should surprise no one except for foreign policy “realists,” who reject the idea that the internal political structures of countries have any effect on their conduct abroad. Yet it can hardly be a coincidence that the least open societies and most illiberal regimes in the region – Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq before 2003 – are the most likely to foment terrorism, chase after nuclear weapons, reject Israel’s existence, and brutally oppress their own people.

That Syria hasn’t seen much unrest is surely related to the fact that it’s a thoroughly nasty police state run by hereditary dictator Bashar al-Assad, whose father, Hafez al-Assad, leveled the rebellious city of Hama in 1982, at the cost of over 17,000 lives. Iran’s Green Movement has managed a few small protests in solidarity with the Arab revolt, but has been mostly kept under wraps by the Islamic Republic’s thuggish security organs.

With the exception of Bahrain, the region’s monarchies also have dodged the revolutionary bullet – so far. Arab kings evidently enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy and popular acceptance than secular strongmen. King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Mohammed V of Morocco have proven adept at creating at least a façade of parliamentary rule and at displacing popular anger onto governments they can dismiss from time to time to appease public wrath. Nonetheless, Washington should nudge such “liberal autocracies” to go beyond cosmetic reforms, lest they be engulfed by the rising revolutionary tide.

The country that really has U.S. policy-makers holding their breath, of course, is Saudi Arabia. It falls somewhere in the middle of the autocratic continuum. On the one hand, they’ve been U.S. allies since FDR’s day, sit atop oil reserves vital to America’s auto-centric culture and share our interest in destroying al Qaeda. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is a run by a deeply illiberal monarchy that enforces Sharia law, uses its oil wealth to export Wahabbist fundamentalism, and relegates women to second-class status. The appearance of a serious pro-democracy movement there would force Americans to face these contradictions and rethink our close ties with the ruling family.

The Middle East’s variegated political landscape offers grounds for measured hope about prospects for liberal democracy. Political and economic freedom will likely advance fitfully and partially in some places, hardly at all in others. There will be slippage and backsliding. But there’s a striking opportunity for the United States to nudge its friends and allies further toward the “soft” end of the despotic continuum, and eventually off it altogether.

While a revolutionary wave in the Middle East has captivated most of our attention recently, the Korean peninsula remains volatile. In recent months, North Korea has launched two unprovoked attacks, and questions remain about the best way to diffuse the tension, especially with China acting as an enabler.

Yesterday, the Progressive Policy Institute, in conjunction with the University of California Washington Center, held a panel discussion on “Defusing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: What America—and China—Should Do.”

The event featured: The Honorable Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Scott Snyder, Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation; Karin Lee, Executive Director, The National Committee on North Korea; and Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Mansfield Foundation. PPI’s Jim Arkedis moderated.

Sec. Campbell’s remarks were off the record (so I can’t report on them), but a lively discussion followed.

Flake kicked off the conversation with a blunt assessment of the obstacles of getting back to the negotiating table, arguing it’s hard to start a discussion when North Korea is beginning from such a bellicose stance.

“The fundamental problem is that if we want to get back to the negotiating track, we can’t enter formal negotiations as long as North Korea continues to assert that it’s a nuclear power and wants to be recognized as a nuclear power,” said Flake. “The question is: how do you get North Korea to change its mind and its position?”

Flake went on to argue that China had to play a major role. But while China and the U.S. used to have a good working relationship, that’s fallen off lately. Flake tried to see things from China’s perspective: “In my mind, China has always had three lousy options: no war, no collapse, and no nukes…In the last year and a half, there’s been a shift. China prioritized no collapse over no war and no nukes, and China came to the position that to do that they were going to back North Korea more openly.”

Flake criticized China for enabling North Korea by “shielding North Korea from the consequences of its actions.” He accused China of blocking investigations, ignoring information, and simply not raising issues.

Karin Lee followed by saying that in light of recent developments, she was almost nostalgic for the six-party talks. “At least the six-party talks put us in a position where China was invested in getting North Korea to do something as opposed to not to do something, and China was much better at getting North Korea to do things that not to do things”

Snyder worried that the U.S. was being torn between working with its traditional allies of Japan and South Korea and working with the more prickly but increasingly important China.

“The issue that is particularly challenging is do people perceive the U.S. as looking at North Korea through the lens of South Korea or through the lens of china,” said Snyder. South Korea is very nervous as to what happens. But the challenge is that we have to manage the tensions and interact with China, and in contrast to the situation in the past where U.S. hegemony guaranteed security, this puts tensions on the management of alliances.”

Snyder also noted that the fact that Chinese president Hu is at the end of his regime also poses some challenges.

But should the U.S. resume talks, as Sen. Kerry recently suggested?

“One trope the administration puts out is that they don’t want to reward them with talks,” said Lee. “But talks are not a reward. Talks are diplomacy.”

Flake, however, argued that until North Korea reiterates the commitment to de-nuclearization agreed on in during the last round of six-party talks, there’s no point. “We want to see some indication of serious intent and purpose,” he said. “That would at least open the groundwork.”

Snyder put it more colorfully: “In response to Obama’s invitation to engage with countries that unclenched their fist, North Koreans gave us the finger. So there should be low expectations”

On whether the Chinese can change their tune on being a little tougher on North Korea, Snyder offered some hope. “The Chinese would like to see North Korea follow in their model, but the Chinese are tired of leading the horse to water. They’re trying to make it drink. So we might be able to engage on how do we extend economic governance.”

Lee agreed: “We should say, you’re trying to get the horse to drink, and it’s not working, so how can we work with you to get the horse to drink?”

Certainly, it won’t be easy. And Snyder ended the panel on a pessimistic note: “The key issue is that North Korea has defined itself as a guerrilla state outside the international system.”

A rift seems to have opened between the Obama administration and Sen. John Kerry (D-MA), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the ever-sensitive topic of North Korea. Sen. Kerry convened a hearing today on the subject, and previewed his own views in a press statement released this morning:

[T]he best option is to consult closely with South Korea and launch bilateral talks with North Korea when we decide the time is appropriate. Fruitful talks between the U.S. and North Korea can lay the groundwork for resumption of the Six Party Talks. Right now, we simply cannot afford to cede the initiative to North Korea and China because neither country’s interests fully coincide with ours.

Let me be clear: We must get beyond the political talking point that engaging North Korea is somehow “rewarding bad behavior.” It is not. [bold mine]

This differs from what Kurt Campbell, President Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, had to say on the issue as he spoke during Sen. Kerry’s hearing:

The United States remains committed to meaningful dialogue, but we will not reward North Korea for shattering the peace or defying the international community. If North Korea improves relations with South Korea and demonstrates a change in behavior … the United States will stand ready to move toward normalization of our relationship. However, if it maintains its path of defiance and provocative behavior and fails to comply with its obligations and commitments, it stands no chance of becoming a strong and prosperous nation. [again, bold is mine]

Kerry seems ready to tango, Obama isn’t. Which is it? I could write a diatribe with my own analysis and recommendations, or I could take the easy way out and suggest you attend PPI’s event on North Korea tomorrow. We’ll have Assistant Secretary Campbell and a panel of experts there to answer your questions and see just where the US — and China — should do to defuse tensions on the peninsula. Click here to register. Details below.

Defusing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula:

What America—and China—Should Do

Keynote Address:

The Honorable Kurt Campbell

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Featured Panelists:

Scott Snyder, Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation

Karin Lee, Executive Director, The National Committee on North Korea

Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Mansfield Foundation

Date:

Wednesday, March 2, 2011, 2 p.m.

Location:

University of California Washington Center

First Floor Auditorium

1608 Rhode Island Ave. NW

Washington, DC

Click here to register

Are the current pro-democracy uprisings in the Middle East a vindication of Francis Fukuyama’s theory about the ‘End of History’? Max Borders ponders the question over at the Daily Caller, arguing that the demonstrations in Libya, Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, and elsewhere are at least partial proof of Fukuyama’s ideas.

For those uninitiated in Fukuyamaism, the now-Stanford Hoover Institute political philosopher argued in The National Interest in 1989 that “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” In a matter of time, all countries in the world would inevitably evolve in one way or another towards capitalist liberal democracy, because only it can satisfy mankind’s universal yearnings for freedom and dignity.

Looking at the current upheaval in the Middle East, there is some evidence supporting Fukuyama’s argument. The crowds are overwhelmingly calling for democracy. From the Islamists to the Communists, anti-regime protestors seem genuinely eager to put their ideas to the electoral test. For all the talk about Chinese-style market authoritarianism being a sexy ideological competitor to liberal democracy, few of the millions of individuals braving oppression on the streets are demanding local versions of the Chinese Communist Party. The accountability and equality that democracy ideally provides appears to be the most appealing form of government to most of the world. Score one for Fukuyama.

It is equally true, however, that there seems unanswered questions regarding whether the Middle East would embrace either American-style capitalism or social liberalization. For all Borders’ (and Fukuyama’s) entreaties, there is no indication of popular petitions in these protests for free markets or libertarianism. The majority of those in the streets of Egypt and Libya are practicing Muslims and may prefer some form of Islamic democracy. Polls show that the biggest values gaps between the Islamic world and the West occur over the issues of gay rights, women’s rights, and other matters of social freedom. “Muslim publics overwhelmingly welcome Islamic influence over their countries’ politics,” as a December 2010 survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found.

Surveys show that what (most) Americans see as freedom in the realms of sexual preference, marriage, and families looks to many of the world’s Muslim-majority countries as moral decay and decadence. The full separation of religion and state is also less appealing to the world outside the West, where secularism (let alone atheism) is much more frowned upon. None of this is to imply that Islam is incompatible with free markets or liberalism—only that there is no inevitability that they will all necessarily combine.

Rather than The End of History, I would suggest a variation of Fareed Zakaria’s notion of ‘Illiberal Democracy’ is a more accurate indicator of where the world seems to be heading. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1997, Zakaria presciently saw that while many countries were embracing the ballot box in the post-Cold War world, the rule of law and human rights norms were far less popular. “Since the fall of communism, countries around the world are being governed by regimes…that mix elections and authoritarianism—illiberal democracy,” Zakaria wrote in the book he based on his Foreign Affairs essay. A different form of illiberal democracy might be erupting in the Middle East, one where the full trappings of democracy are united with a deep social conservatism that cannot be considered ‘liberal’ in any sense of the word. These regimes might be more democratic than the ones Zakaria described, but they could be equally illiberal, albeit in a different manner.

Fukuyamians would likely respond, like good Hegelians, that illiberal democracy is just a bump on the inevitable path to liberal democracy. It is a phase that will be experienced but eventually jettisoned as it is realized that the universal yearning for individuals’ self-determination is stronger than any other desires. Perhaps. But history is known to thwart all predictions. But what seems clear for now is that the crowds in the Middle East like the ‘democracy’ part of Fukuyama’s cherished ideology. The liberal part? Remains to be seen.

As a progressive who strongly believes in a “whole of government” approach to ensuring the nation’s security, I cheered when the Obama administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy included this paragraph:

To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. Our military must maintain its conventional superiority … We must invest in diplomacy and development capabilities and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces our global partners. Our intelligence capabilities must continuously evolve to identify and characterize conventional and asymmetric threats and provide timely insight. And we must integrate our approach to homeland security with our broader national security approach.

That attitude goes a long way to rectifying the wrongs of the Bush administration’s philosophy, one that saw too many problems as nails, and too many solutions as a hammer. The results were obvious: squandered resources, an exhausted military, lost international credibility, and, ultimately, less security.

It’s clear that Republicans still haven’t gotten this message. In this year’s continuing resolution, they’ve voted to cut some of those whole-of-government resources that are vital to strengthening our security. Here’s a list of cuts, taken from the just-passed continuing resolution, and compiled by my friends at the Truman National Security Project that fundamentally weakens our crucial non-military national security tools:

House Republican Cuts to National Security Priorities

in 2/19 Continuing Resolution for FY2011

Compiled from: Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution, 2/14/2011, House Appropriations Committee. Analysis of HR1. 2/15/2011, Senate Appropriations Committee. Checked against Statement by Congressman Rogers on HR1, 2/19/2011, House Appropriations Committee for amendments which passed. Cuts are to FY2010 Enacted.

Contact: David Solimini, Communications Director. dave@trumanproject.org or 757-876-0295.

National Security & Ongoing Wars

·         National Security Council. Cut the President’s principle advisors on national security issues by $600,000. [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution]

·         Counterinsurgency funding. Cut USAID by $121m (9% cut), which will halt new civilian programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan that are necessary for the counterinsurgency strategy to work. These programs were called for by US military commanders. [Analysis of HR1].

·         Iraq transition, Afghanistan/Pakistan operations. Cut State Department operations by $1.2b (12%), meaning the transition from military to civilian responsibility in Iraq, and State operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, will be put in jeopardy. [Analysis of HR1].

·         Border Security. Cut funding for border fencing and border protection technology, as well as its related infrastructure, by $350m. [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution]

·         Democracy promotion. Cut the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which provides assistance to countries which meet government improvement goals, by $315m. Cut Development Assistance by $746m. [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution]

·         International First Responders. Cut, by $103m, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which trains civilians to reconstruct and stabilize war torn, disaster ridden, and unstable countries, to prevent future conflict. Cut International Disaster Assistance by $415m, and the Complex Crisis Fund by $50. [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution]

·         Starvation Prevention/Weak State Stabilization. Cut Food For Peace, which delivers bags of food stamped “USA” to the people of weak and failing states, by $687. Program details. [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution].

Terrorism Prevention

·         Transportation security. Cut transit security grants by more than 66 percent. In the last 7 years, there were over 1,300 terrorist attacks on trains, subways, and busses, killing or injuring over 18,000 people. [Analysis of HR1.] Also cut: Transportation Security Administration Threat Assessment funding by $9m. [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution]

·         Port security & Container Screening. Cut port security grants by 66 percent. [Analysis of HR1.] Also cut $61m in international container inspections. Container shipping is the most likely way a weapon of mass destruction could be brought into the country. [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution]

Nuclear Terrorism

·         Domestic Nuclear Attack Prevention. Cut, by $31m, the office which detects attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation. [Analysis of HR1] [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution] [Program details]

·         Nuclear materials security. Cut nuclear non-proliferation funding by $97m. This will prevent the US from removing hundreds of pounds of highly enriched uranium, which terrorists could use to build nuclear devices, from unsecure facilities in several countries around the world. [Analysis of HR1]

·         Weapons of Mass Destruction Training. Cut, by 51 percent, funding for first responder weapons of mass destruction training, which means that more than 46,000 first responders will not being trained in FY 2011. [Analysis of HR1]

Veterans Benefits

·         Homeless veterans. Terminated the Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing Program, the aim of which is to end veteran homelessness in 5 years. There were more than 130,000 homeless veterans in 2009. The VASH program provided housing vouchers for them. [Analysis of HR1] [Local Story, CT]

·         Veterans long term care. Cut Long Term Care facilities at the Department of Veterans Affairs by $15m. [Program info.] [Program cuts in the FY2011 Continuing Resolution]

Democrats and Republicans showed admirable bipartisanship as President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton led the nation through the crisis in Egypt. It wasn’t exactly a return to an era when politics stopped at the water’s edge, but it was a fair-minded recognition that the administration had no great choices and limited control over the direction of the Cairo protests. Stuck between a multi-decade autocracy on one side and potentially pushing a country of 75 million Muslims to the Muslim Brotherhood’s virulent political Islam through our lack of support for the protestors on the other, the President and our political establishment steered a steady course.

I only bring up the thorny issue of Egypt to point out that, in comparison, the policies we should be pursuing on Iran this morning are no-brainers. As of yesterday there’s a very real possibility that the example of Egypt has reignited the Green Movement, and that the IRGC-dominated oligarchy is again in some peril. Riots have again broken out throughout the country. Tear gas and truncheon and electric batons are again being used openly against the protesters. Videos are again being uploaded to YouTube showing that the Basij have resorted to batons and bullets.

And now there are even rumors that the protesters in Tehran are trying to set up tents in the center of the city, modeled after the Egyptians in Tahrir Square, to establish a long-term protest bent on establishing a free society. The spectacle of Ahmadinejad cheering on the anti-Mubarak protesters while denying Iranian dissenters the right to march may have finally become too much for the average Iranian to stomach.

Here there are no hard choices about whether to pursue stability or change. All of our efforts should be exerted on the side of the protesters demanding a free Iran.  The risk that the regime will exploit western support for the protestors is a stale excuse for silence.  The brave young men and women risking their lives for change deserve better than caution or indifference.

Secretary Clinton and the administration have responded admirably thus far. Yesterday the Secretary personally expressed support for the protesters, insisting that they have a right to demand freedom “as part of their own birthright” and highlighting the Iranian regime’s hypocrisy. She committed the administration to “”very clearly and directly support[ing] the aspirations of the people who are in the streets.”

The current tone, which is exactly right, is a welcome contrast to the unseemly vacillation that marked the first days of the Green Revolution, when White House and State Department spokespeople refused to throw their weightbehind the protesters. That won us no good will from the Iranian regime and it risked alienating many of the freedom-loving Iranians with whom we should have been standing in solidarity.

The truth is that we have nothing to lose and much to gain by supporting the protesters. The conspiracy-wallowing regime in Tehran reflexively blames the United States, Israel, and Britain for domestic unrest. They’ve already tagged this round of protests as a foreign plot.

The administration deserves only praise for having figured out as much the first time around, and for immediately lending the protesters our full-throated support this time. The day after the mullahcracy falls will truly be a new day in the Middle East.

Like Secretary Clinton’s comments yesterday, President Obama’s remarks today are a good start.

Now is not the time to go silent or hedge our bets in support of those seeking freedom in Iran.

It’s hardly insightful to call the events unfolding in Cairo “astounding,” though of course they are. The people of Egypt have patiently waited until their sole unifying demand was met: that Hosni Mubarak be gone. Egyptians have won a great victory, and their dedication to that objective is a remarkable testament to their resolve in the face of a regime bent on winning the day with attempts to frustrate and provoke the masses. They didn’t take that bait, and a peaceful, truly popular revolution is set to reap tangible improvements in their daily lives.

Or are they?

The hard work now begins. A transition to democracy has begun, but who remains as Egypt’s temporary steward of power and the speed with which elections are held remain critical issues.

Now that the protesters’ main demand has been met, everything else is negotiable. Surely the masses will reject any attempt by Mubarak confidant and newly-installed Vice President Omar Suleiman to remain as the heir-apparent to his erstwhile mentor’s thrown.

Will Suleiman cede his powers to a transitional council of opposition leaders, current government officials, and military representatives? How would it be composed? What role would the Muslim Brotherhood – commanding some 25 percent public support and having kept their powder dry thus far – play?

Just as critically, when would elections be held? A snap vote would probably be too risky and would prevent a truly representative government from taking hold: Lacking a unifying candidate, chances are that Mohammed ElBaradei may very well win a presidential contest but with possibly well less than 50 percent of the vote.

On the parliamentary side, nothing speaks to the bankruptcy of American policy over the last 30 years than successive presidential administrations’ failures to establish working  relationships with civil society groups, opposition parties, and democratic institutions. Or to advocate for the creation of a healthy Egyptian middle class, one from which reasonable political parties could form. As it stands, a near-term vote would be a scramble of thousands of poorly-organized, patronage-based parties that results in an incoherent, ad hoc governing coalition (see: Iraq, minus the sectarianism).

A near-term vote would also be one in which the Muslim Brotherhood, as one of the few well-organized groups, is over represented. And though the Brotherhood is not the overt Iran-styled threat that the likes of John Bolton and Fox News would like to believe, there are serious, serious questions outstanding about its governing platforms, as my colleague Josh Block has highlighted.

Where does this leave the Obama administration? It must be said that the White House has publicly waffled too much as Mubarak’s stock rose and fell, though perhaps it was much more effective that we know in its private communications with the Egyptian military and Mubarak’s inner circle. President Obama has been on the right side of history, if a disturbing half-step behind it.

Now that Mubarak is gone, the White House can double-down and strongly advocate for the expansion of representative democracy and American interests, which need not come in conflict. The president should push for a temporary, representative transitional council to establish a process to lift the emergency law and rewrite the constitution; it’s clear that those in Tahrir Square didn’t remain outdoors for weeks to see Omar Suleiman or the Brotherhood execute a back-door power grab.

As for elections, the White House could back a delay. Perhaps a year would be appropriate under a representative transitional authority, giving political parties at least some reasonable time to organize.

And as for the wider region? President Obama should start today the process of enshrining American links with civil society groups, local NGOs, and opposition parties of all stripes. This means that groups like the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, and International Republican Institute (to name but a few) absolutely must be fully funded in this year’s budget.

If Tea Partiers believe Glenn Beck’s mind-blowingly ill-informed doomsday scenario, funding NED would be a good place to start preventing it.