Nerd alert: My brother Bob and I have a long-standing competition to identify anonymous celebrity voice-overs on TV ads (and we’re pretty good — picking out Gene Hackman shilling for Lowes is amateur hour), but I don’t claim to ID celeb voices for a living. That’s why I can’t definitively say that the recently released Bin Laden tape isn’t him, but I suspect there’s a decent chance that it just might not be.

Last January, Bin Laden released a 22-minute tape on the eve of the Obama inauguration about everything from Israel to the economic crisis. The long-winded diatribe, replete with OBL’s standard Koranic references, was standard fare from al Qaeda’s chief taco. His tapes of May and March 2008 were also 22 minutes. That’s a far cry from this week’s version, which barely clocks in at 22 words (actually 144, but you get my drift), according to the Middle East Media Research Institute’s transcript.

Second, keep in mind that al Qaeda’s senior leadership has always had its eye on the big prize — the spectacular attack that generates either genuine fear or awe for its daring size, scale, or target. In 1998, they leveled two American embassies simultaneously; in 2000 they struck at the heart of the American military by blowing a massive hole in the side of an American Navy destroyer; and 9/11 speaks for itself. Even AQ’s latest significant attempt at a large-scale operation – the multi-flight Heathrow plot in 2006 – was an impressive feat of imagination. But in this tape, a man claiming to be Bin Laden embraces not a spectacular success that improves upon complex and sickeningly impressive plots, but a complete failure of an attempt that he likely had nothing to do with.

Then again, maybe even notable failures at small operations are enough these days. It’s possible that the combination of a tighter American safety net and the embarrassing overreaction of the pundit class has convinced AQ that small-fry attacks are sufficient to carry AQ’s fundraising and recruiting goals in the current climate. So if this was really OBL on the tape, it would signal a major degradation of AQ’s modus operandi and attack capabilities.

But the irregularity continues to bug me — it doesn’t make sense that Bin Laden would essentially admit al Qaeda is a shell of its former self. That’s why I keep thinking someone might be masquerading as the big man. By tying the Christmas Day attempt to Bin Laden, the real perpetrators of the plot — al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula — could gin up money and recruits in its aftermath.

It would be a serious scandal within Islamic extremist circles if the CIA came out in the next 24 hours and declared the tape fake, so I have to imagine that even uppity terrorists aren’t that stupid. Then again, perhaps the CIA should consider floating a trial balloon about the tape’s “questionable authenticity” just to see what sort of reaction it generates.

With a hat tip to Spencer Ackerman for flagging the video (and accompanying sentiment), scenes like this symbolize what America stands for:

Watch as LA County rescue workers pull a victim from the rubble; the crowd erupts with spontaneous applause and chants of U.S.A.! U.S.A.!

I worry that there’s a strain within progressive America that doubts our country’s place in the world. I worry that America’s actions over the last decade have irreparably damaged progressives’ image of America as a great nation that was conceived to do great things.

To be sure, the Iraq war has triggered worthy reflection on that point. But my uber-fear is that with President Obama’s decision to adopt a new strategy in Afghanistan, progressives’ degraded concept of America has been legitimized now that one of their own has allegedly–if falsely in my opinion–“followed in Bush’s footsteps.”

Not to trivialize the point by being colloquial, but with issues like Iraq, it is unfortunately and tragically true that America screws up sometimes, and royally so (and Massachusetts, don’t think I’m just looking at that ranch in Crawford). Let’s remember that though even gross misjudgments in policy may raise questions about what America is, the worst errors are ultimately set right. America will remain a great place that does wonderful and selfless acts of kindness. It does so for two reasons–because it can and because that what it was meant to do.

Scott and readers at TPM have suggested that the United States must assume nation-building efforts on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan in Haiti. Scott makes an excellent point that the silver lining of all this is that America’s humanitarian mission in Haiti is an opportunity to provide reconstruction assistance in a country where it’s welcomed by all. However, let’s keep in mind that American assistance will likely flow under the auspices of the U.N., so the rebuilding effort won’t provide the unfettered learning tool that Scott envisages.

That said, I’m nervous about the comparison drawn between Haiti and Iraq/Afghanistan. If the evocation of America’s other nation-building efforts is meant merely as a general comparison to signify the size of the U.S.’s contribution to Haitian reconstruction, stabilization, and eventual growth, then it’s right on. But the cynic in me worries that comparisons to Iraq and Afghanistan are designed to elicit a direct contrast between very different missions. It’s as if some are almost daring the Obama administration to prove that America actually cares about a country that doesn’t immediately impact America’s national security (though if reports of mass refugee influxes prove accurate, then there is a decided self-interest as well).

Haiti is neither Afghanistan nor Iraq. The circumstances of America’s involvement couldn’t be more different. Haiti is closer and smaller. It had a more stable government that could control its territory. Haiti’s geography and history of foreign occupation are less violent. Its social structures and norms couldn’t be more opposite… and on and on.

So let’s dispense with those comparisons as quickly as possible. The bottom line is that America’s contribution is, and should be, of historically large proportions. The reason for our involvement will be for no better or worse reason that what President Obama wrote:

[F]or a very simple reason: in times of tragedy, the United States of America steps forward and helps. That is who we are. That is what we do. For decades, America’s leadership has been founded in part on the fact that we do not use our power to subjugate others, we use it to lift them up—whether it was rebuilding our former adversaries after World War II, dropping food and water to the people of Berlin, or helping the people of Bosnia and Kosovo rebuild their lives and their nations.

And that’s all that matters.

I am minimally qualified to comment on the crisis in Haiti, but one of Talking Points Memo‘s readers has what sounds to me like an important perspective on American involvement in reconstructing the country over the coming years (not months). Since Haiti is in our backyard, the reader says, we will have to assume nation-building efforts on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan if Haiti is not to devolve into chaos.

I’m sure Jim will have much sharper thoughts on all of this, but I’ll just throw out there the suggestion that the great tragedy before us presents at least one silver lining — it gives us an opportunity to gain valuable experience in nation-building, and to do so in a context where our help is viewed gratefully rather than resentfully.

If soft power and nation-building are to become increasingly important in foreign policy to avoid the prospect of failed states (or to address actually existing failed states), then the United States must not only repair its image as a hegemonic bull in a china shop, but it must show that we can actually produce an unambiguously good reconstruction. Simply, we need to be trusted and seen as effective. I don’t think it’s too controversial to say that we’re not exactly effusing these qualities today when it comes to our nation-building efforts.

Of course, our efforts could go badly in Haiti, which would be another setback for us. But what alternative do we have than to hope for the best?

Christmas Day would-be bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was connected to a group called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, often referred to as AQAP. Since that attempted attack, I’ve found a disturbing lack of clarity in the public debate about who AQAP is, how they differ from AQ’s senior leadership, and what their ideological aims are. It’s very easy to say “Al Qaeda” on the news. Such generalized branding doesn’t allow the public to digest the fact that AQ’s regional branches operate very differently from the mother ship along the Af-Pak border.

So I put some questions on the issue to a real expert on the subject, my friend and ex-intelligence colleague, Hans Spielman. Hans is a former Navy lieutenant turned civilian DoD counterterrorism analyst. He studied AQAP for over four years, and his work is highly respected within the intelligence community. All of his information is backed by publicly available sources, so don’t think he’s spilling any classified material.

Q: Al Qaeda’s activities on the Saudi peninsula have long been independent of the Af-Pak based leadership. So what is Saudi AQ? What are their aims?

A: Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia historically has shown the ability to carry out large-scale complex attacks against Saudi and foreign targets in Saudi Arabia. Saudi AQ was most active in the country during the 2003-2006 time period. Saudi-based extremists conducted several major attacks/operations, including bombings in Riyadh (2003), the Khobar Towers attacks (2004), Yanbu (2004), several assassinations/kidnappings (2004), and an attack on the Abqaiq oil facility (2006). There has been a lull in activity in recent years.

Concurrent with the rise in Saudi AQ’s activity during 2003-2006, Saudi authorities stepped up their counterterrorism efforts against the network. Several wanted lists of suspected terrorists were published and widely distributed during this timeframe. Saudi efforts resulted in the killing/capturing of multiple key network members and militants throughout the kingdom.  As mentioned above, there has been a notable lull in activity in Saudi Arabia in recent years.

Q: So first there was Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, now we talk about AQAP? Are they the same?

A: The press links the Dec. 25 failed airplane bombing to AQAP. However, it is unclear (in my opinion) if today’s AQAP network really can be considered a direct descendent of the Saudi al Qaeda network that was responsible for the spate of attacks during the 2003-2006 time period, although there was some sort of merger between AQ in Yemen and AQ in Saudi Arabia in January 2009 resulting in the formation of AQAP – now based in Yemen.

But I think you have to separate Saudi AQ 2003-2006 from today’s AQAP – it is apparent that AQ-affiliated extremists remain active and capable on the peninsula, but the players have changed and the focus may have changed somewhat as well.

 

Q: Why has Yemen become attractive?

A: Yemen is a logical base of operations given the Yemeni government’s inability to govern/police the entire country and the ready supply of weapons and potential recruits.

Q: Is AQAP’s future bright?

A: If the link to AQAP is valid, the failed Dec. 25 attack demonstrates that AQAP remains active and maybe capable of international attacks (not just regional).

This is all good stuff. I think it’s important to note that, as he stated, the Dec. 25th attack actually failed, so while he says that AQAP is “maybe capable” of international attacks, my read is that AQAP’s international attack capability is even more of an open question.

The following is an excerpt from Jordan Tama’s article in ForeignPolicy.com.

In the wake of the attempted Christmas Day airline bombing, some intelligence officials are sharpening their knives, planning to lay the blame for the failure to detect this plot at the feet of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). President Obama “knows where to look” when assessing blame for the government’s inability to connect the dots prior to the attack, claimed one anonymous intelligence official quoted in the Washington Post. In particular, the CIA, which opposed the 2004 reorganization that transferred some of the agency’s responsibilities to the ODNI and NCTC, “has barely restrained itself from shouting, ‘We told you so,’” the Postreported.

This chest-thumping is not surprising. The CIA has felt vastly underappreciated since 9/11, having been faulted by senior officials and blue-ribbon commissions both for the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks and the intelligence community’s inaccurate prewar assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Some CIA loyalists clearly relished the opportunity to affix blame to another part of the intelligence community after the Christmas attack.

But the charge that we would be better off without DNI and the NCTC is more than self-serving — it is also wrong, and dangerously so. The real lesson of the failure to keep Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab off a U.S.-bound flight is that intelligence reform has not gone far enough. Rather than restoring the CIA to its pre-9/11 role as king of the hill in the intelligence community, the administration should further empower the NCTC, in particular by bolstering its analytical and technological capabilities so that it can more effectively lead the government’s counterterrorism intelligence efforts.

Ultimately, the Christmas attack presents an opportunity for President Obama to put his own stamp on intelligence reform. As the Obama administration prepared to take office in the middle of the worst recession since the Great Depression, Rahm Emanuel commented, “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” Now, we need to use the sense of crisis generated by the near miss on Christmas to give the NCTC the authority, resources, and technology necessary to inventory, analyze, and act on all of the information that washes through the intelligence system.

To read the full article, click here. The views expressed in this post do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

In today’s Washington Post, an anonymous intelligence official talked about the intelligence community’s role in the attempted Christmas bombing:

Anyone who believes that a relatively small organization like NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center] is going to connect every electron in each of those 30 databases is either disingenuous or naive, and certainly knows very little about how intelligence analysis actually works.

Bingo! We as a public have to reorient our expectations about the intelligence community’s ability to ensure 100 percent security on a 24/7/365 basis. That’s not a knock on intelligence pros. As a former intel analyst, I’ve seen time and time again just how unrealistic the expectations are.

While individual quotes that dumb down the intelligence community’s capabilities are illustrative, they fail to drive home how difficult intel work really is. I think it’s more useful to examine what it’s actually like to “connect the dots” in the case of a potential terrorist operative. From my own experience, here’s how it works:

I’d receive a lead from the CIA Station in Rabat, Morocco, about a potential bad guy. For the purposes of this explanation, let’s say he’s a Moroccan named Abdul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf, but I don’t know anything else about him, such as his date or place of birth. (I chose that name not because I want to stereotype all “terrorists” as Arab or because he’s an actual bad guy, but because – as I explain in detail below – it will help illustrate a point about transliteration’s role in analysis of suspected terrorists specifically from Muslim countries.)

My goal is to find out everything we know about this individual and determine whether he’s a legitimate threat. This is no small point — in order to raise the alarm, I need definitive intelligence corroboration that the individual in question has a reported history that solidifies him as a potential danger. In other words, we don’t just arrest people because of a single report from a source of unknown quality. For the record, 99 percent of the time, walk-in sources to U.S. Embassies are of poor-to-unknown quality. That includes friends and family members who walk into the embassy and claim their relatives are potential dangers. Why? Family relations are tangled webs, and who really knows if your uncle just might want you arrested in revenge for that unsettled family land dispute.

Therefore, I’ll take his name and plug it into NCTC’s terrorism search, a database that stores more information about terrorism suspects than you could ever imagine. Most of the information is contained in reports from the CIA, NSA, DoD, State Department, and foreign intelligence services that have shared with us. The reports range in length from just a paragraph or two about a specific individual, to tens upon tens of pages long of names, aliases, and birth dates of “suspected” individuals about whom these suspicions are undefined (thank the Italians for this).

“Abdul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf” goes in the old database, and presto-changeo, 27 reports come back. I tear through them for information that matches what I know about my guy. Say I can throw out 22 of the reports because they’re all about an “Abul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf” who lives in Indonesia and was arrested in 2004 and is now in jail.

That leaves five reports. Four are about an Egyptian. Out. And the last one is about some guy of the same name in an unknown country who doesn’t appear to have really done anything wrong. I’m interested in the last one, but need much information on him before taking action.

Here’s where it gets fun. Since there may be more information out there, I start looking for variations of Abul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf’s name, as names like Aziz, Mohammed, and Sayaf can be spelled several different ways when transliterated into English from Arabic. But rather than guess at which combination of the spellings works in our guy’s case, I would enter into the database, “Abdul Aziz* M*h*m*d Abu Say*af*,” which accounts for the different vowels and multiple consonants that may be used in variant spellings.

The result? 2,453 new reports to comb through!

I would logically cut that number down by entering what little other information I know about this guy. Next search: “Abdul Aziz* M*h*m*d Abu Say*af* AND Morocco.” Down to 372. Next search: “Abdul Aziz* M*h*m*d Abu Say*af* AND Morocco adj! 20,” which means all of the above words must appear within 20 words of one another. Down to 87.

I diligently read or skim through all the 87 reports looking for any nugget of information that could corroborate the suspicions about our man. Perhaps I find an additional report or two about an individual who might be the person in question, but I can only say that with 50 percent confidence.

The end result is that I write another report saying only what I can definitively conclude:

Abdul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf is suspected of wanting to enter the United States to conduct a terrorist attack. Sources of unknown quality indicate Abu Sayaf is interested in traveling this month, though it remains unknown whether Abdul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf is a credible threat to the United States.

I file my report, and the receiving officer – given limited resources to follow leads – deems my report interesting, but not urgent.

Two days later, an individual named Abdull-Aziz Muhammad Abou Sayyaff buys a ticket on a flight to Newark and tries to detonate an explosive belt on board. With hindsight, it’s easy to point out the flaws in my analytic process: Should the name spelling be uniform? Why did you limit your search so much? This is national security – you mean to tell me you can’t be bothered to read 327 reports? Shouldn’t we chase down every lead?  And etc… sigh.

These are easy and obvious criticisms. And certainly, some improvements can and will continue to be made. However, given the vast amount of American and internationally derived information, the pressing need to run down several searches like this on any work day, and the permanent resource constraints, these are also criticisms by those who don’t understand the tremendous complexity of intelligence work and the diminishing marginal returns of hiring thousands more additional analysts.

In short, finding bad guys is often like looking for grains of sugar on a beach. Unfortunately, we have to accept that we might not find them all.

With the news that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was linked to, and possibly directed by, a group called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), there’s much apprehension and confusion about this offshoot of Osama Bin Laden’s network.

Though I’m usually not one to lead the charge against “the media,” I’ve been most disappointed by the lack of description about the differences in organizations, targets, intentions, and capabilities between the group based in Yemen and its distant cousins along the Af-Pak border.

Consider this post an effort to explain those nuances.

Let’s get the obvious but oft-unstated out of the way: Though AQAP may trace a share of its origins to the Bin Laden-directed 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, today AQAP is a distinct, separate entity from Bin Laden’s al Qaeda (commonly referred to throughout the intelligence community as Al Qaeda Senior Leadership, or AQSL). AQAP may share a general ideological affiliation with AQSL, but its specific targeting intentions and attack capabilities vary significantly. Furthermore, AQAP’s leadership is largely independent to do as it pleases: Though it may receive occasional communications and guidance from Osama Bin Laden’s cadre, AQAP is essentially free to follow or ignore as it sees fit.

So what are AQAP’s intents and capabilities? The group certainly shares an obvious anti-American/anti-Western bent, along with its Af-Pak based brethren. Indeed, since 2003, AQAP has launched several attacks against employees of Western petroleum countries, tourists, and the American embassy and consulate. But whereas AQSL is focused on large-scale attacks on U.S. soil, the Arabian Peninsula group is primarily motivated by toppling the Saudi and Yemeni governing regimes, and likely views American/Western targets significant if not quite as important.

“But what about the Christmas Day plot?” you ask. “That seems like a pretty serious attempt to kill Americans on American soil.” True, it does. However, note that the plot failed. It’s an important point. Successful terrorism plots are the marriage of a group’s intention to hit a particular target plus its capability to do so. On that score, AQAP has a long way to go before it would attempt anything as logistically complex as 9/11. It is quite easy for a lone operative like Abdulmutallab volunteer to conduct an attack and the groups’ leadership agree to provide him the basic training and materiel to execute it. But the fact that the bomber and explosives were incompetent and/or faulty speaks volumes about AQAP’s lack of capability to conduct anything close to a 9/11-style attack from a Yemeni safe haven. That said, by displaying an intention to target Americans in America, the group should merit close attention from U.S. intelligence for any improvements in operational capability.

Finally, the best move AQAP made is adopting the “al Qaeda” brand. Franchising AQ is a no-brainer: the group in Yemen and Saudi can entice finances and recruits to its organization on the al Qaeda name. And by trading on the al Qaeda name, a failed operation now — remarkably — strikes fear into hearts worldwide as pundits, hosts, and articles flippantly repeat “al Qaeda” as if the group were under direct orders from and possessed similar strike capabilities as Al Qaeda Senior Leadership did back in 2001.

And such thin analysis is, in a word, amazing because it only fuels partisanship that drives reactionary and often ineffective security policy. If we continue to let political bickering drive policy, then fledgling groups like AQAP continue to win as they gain fame and notoriety. It’s even more incredible that Republicans have the audacity to politically exploit nearly uncloseable gaps in America’s defensive net if you bear in mind that George W. Bush constructed that architecture in the first place.

Iran is lashing out furiously at the usual suspects – America, Britain, Israel – whom it blames for stirring up domestic dissent. But no amount of ritual execration of foreign devils by pro-government demonstrators yesterday could obscure the fact that the real threat to the regime comes from within.

The Green protest movement, which arose in reaction to Iran’s rigged election six months ago, took to the streets again on December 27. At least eight people were killed in the ensuing crackdown by the government.

The regime has been deeply shaken by the protesters, who have made it clear they don’t want to live in a theocratic dictatorship. Officials yesterday even threatened to execute opposition leaders, including Mir Hossein Mousavi, who lost his bid for the presidency in the disputed election.

2009 will likely be remembered as the year the mask slipped completely from the Islamic Republic of Iran, revealing a paranoid regime increasingly dominated by Iran’s thuggish Revolutionary Republican Guard. From show trials of supposedly repentant opposition leaders to Iran’s preposterous claim that three U.S. rock climbers are actually spies, Iran now exhibits the classic trappings of a police state.

With the grotesque exception of Hugo Chavez, friend to tyrants everywhere, Iran suffers from growing international isolation. For this, President Obama deserves considerable credit, though Republicans who have cluelessly criticized his policy of “engaging” Iran will never admit it. By reaching out repeatedly to the regime, Obama has made it harder for Tehran to cast Washington as a neo-imperalist bully determined to deny Iran’s rights to acquire civilian nuclear energy. And he has deprived the Islamic Republican of the external threat it needs to justify repression at home.

That’s why, despite the regime’s harsh crackdown on its opponents, President Obama should leave open the door to engaging Tehran on the nuclear issue. Even if the regime continues to rebuff his overtures, it will bear the onus of intransigence, and the U.S. may find it easier to win Russian and Chinese support for tightening sanctions on the regime and the Revolutionary Guard.

Our best hopes for a more tractable and cooperative Iran, however, lie in the success of popular efforts to transform the Islamic Republic. Although the U.S. government can’t materially aid the opposition without fatally compromising it, NGOs here and abroad should be prepared to respond to calls for help from indigenous Iranian reformers should they come.

In the meantime, President Obama should steer clear of anti-Iran bluster, but continue to be forthright in expressing solidarity with Iranians struggling for human rights and greater freedom. He’s been walking a fine line on Iran, and recent events have vindicated the wisdom of that course.

I’ve been fortunate to spend the holidays with my family up in British Columbia. We’re not from the Great White North, mind you, but a few days in the Canadian wilderness have been a welcome opportunity to forget about my everyday professional concerns. With the health care bill passed and the pressing Afghanistan strategy speech now well behind us, I was happy to have the break.

Until our trip home, that is. Your faithful blogger sits in the Vancouver airport, having just struggled through the newly enacted, draconian security procedures enforced in the wake of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed attempt to bomb a Northwest flight into Detroit on Christmas Day. All carry-on items were banned from the main cabin (I’m fortunate to be able to hand-carry my laptop through security, one of the few exemptions), each passenger was given a full pat-down (a wad of old Kleenex in my Levis provoked a particularly displeased look from my security guard), and each of the 16 pockets in my winter jacket were thoroughly searched.

Lost amidst the rush to batten down the hatches is any sense of rationality about airport security. It’s a classic case of diminishing marginal returns — every extra dollar the TSA or DHS spends on airport security buys us far less than a buck’s worth of permanent safety. Look no further than the 2006 Heathrow plotters: in response to their desire to ignite liquid explosives in sports drink bottles, liquids on flights were banned. Guess what? You can’t bring your Gatorade on the plane, but Abdulmutallab still got through with a different device. What’s more, the present level of heightened security might make us feel safer in the short term, but it is ultimately unsustainable due to a combination of inadequate resources and an abundance of annoyed passengers.

Worse than heavy-handed is the reaction from Washington’s political classes. Rep. Peter King (R-NY) wasted little time in claiming that America’s terrorism screening system didn’t work; his colleague Pete Hoekstra (R-MI) tried to paint the administration as weak on terrorism. Questions abound: why wasn’t Abdulmutallab caught on the no-fly list? Why wasn’t his father’s warning to the U.S. embassy in Nigeria heeded?

The reaction to Flight 253 underscores the need to change the tenor of America’s national dialogue about terrorism. Implicit in the criticism of the administration’s handling of terrorism is an assumption that with the “right,” effective security measures, America can somehow erect an impenetrable wall around its borders.

It’s time to stop kidding ourselves: We can’t. With the hundreds of thousands of names on security lists, and millions of daily passengers in and out of America’s domestic airports and international destinations, someone determined, smart, careful, and — perhaps most important — lucky will be able to get through, no matter how airtight we believe America’s defenses to be. As a counterterrorism analyst for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, I would write something similar in each threat assessment for U.S. Navy ships pulling into any given port-of-call.

Improvements to the system should be made, of course. But rather than overreacting with new airport procedures, bickering over watch-lists, and politicizing the issue, we’re better off spending our energy addressing terrorism’s root causes. That’s the best way to ensure our security.