FACT: Denmark is a four-generation ally and a good neighbor.

THE NUMBERS:

Denmark NATO membership:	1949-present
Danish soldiers killed in action, Iraq and Afghanistan 2002-2020:	50

WHAT THEY MEAN:

When Americans asked for help, they came. Ten years ago, Marine Gen. Daniel Yoo expresses gratitude for the U.S. Armed Forces as Danish allies rotate out of Helmand:

“I want to thank you for your steadfast partnership. We are grateful for all of your support. Your soldiers should be proud of their multiple deployments here and accomplishments, and for distinguishing themselves with valor on the modern battlefields of Afghanistan. Your country should take pride in your professionalism and commitment.”

A founding North Atlantic Treaty signatory in 1949, Denmark has been a NATO member ever since. The 21,000 Danes who served in Afghanistan and Iraq, including in high-risk provinces Helmand and Anbar, served as allies responding to the Bush administration’s call for assistance under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Fifty never returned, 43 of them killed in Afghanistan and 7 in Iraq.

If we were to call again, what might they say?

This year, the Danes have been the target of a bizarre pressure campaign by the Trump administration, which says it wants to “acquire” Greenland. (Which, see below, is a self-governing country within the Kingdom of Denmark, not a possession.) To justify this the administration has raised some questions of security and critical-mineral policy, which aren’t trivial but also (a) aren’t new and (b) are now, and always have been, addressed perfectly well through international law, alliance management, and standard diplomacy. We noted last January that the opening of this campaign, along with similar decisions to pick fights with Canada and Panama, was among the most disturbing events of the transition period. Four months later our view is the same: unwarranted, lacking public support (whether in the U.S., Denmark, or Greenland), and destructive to American and Atlantic security. Some background, and then our advice for the administration:

Greenland is a close American neighbor: Nuuk, the capital, is 1300 miles from Maine and a four-hour direct flight from New York.  Its 56,000 people live on 2.16 million square miles of land — a gigantic space about three times the size of Texas, though 80% of it lies under a mile-high ice sheet. Politically under the Danish Crown since 1397, and a part of the Kingdom of Denmark since 1814, Greenland is a self-governing country whose local government runs fiscal matters, schools, economic policy, and domestic affairs including control over mining and natural resources. Since 2009 it has had a “right of self-determination” extending in theory to independence. (Puerto Rico may be the closest U.S. analogue, though an imperfect one.) Greenlanders — mostly Inuit by ethnicity; the official language is Greenlandic — have been pondering the options, without any great urgency, for several decades.

Greenland participates in NATO via the Danish Armed Forces, and has an important alliance role through the U.S. military space facility at Pituffik (which, to pin down some security detail, works under the direction of the Joint Force Command in Norfolk, Virginia.) Its place in the world economy is legally complex — though Denmark is an EU member Greenland is not, having opted out of the EU for fishery policy reasons in 1979. Its economy mostly rests on tourism and about $1 billion worth of annual halibut, cod, Arctic crab, and cold-water shrimp exports to European, Chinese, and other Asian buyers.*

The independence option, though not likely to materialize in the near term, does raise some questions — principally for Danes and Greenlanders, but also for Greenland’s near neighbors in Iceland, Canada, and the United States.

With respect to security policy: Arctic security does raise important questions, in particular given Russia’s attack on Ukraine and threats against its northern neighbors. These include naval passage, the future of the Pituffik base (not a facility Greenlanders are interested in scaling back; to the contrary, it’s widely supported and both Denmark and Greenland are spending more on security these days) and commercial shipping lanes as Arctic ice retreats.  As in the past, they are perfectly manageable through normal alliance relationships, diplomacy, and defense and intelligence coordination.

With respect to mining and resources: Though Greenland’s largest resource is fresh water (the ice sheet holds about 2.9 million cubic meters of water, ten times as much water as the rest of the world’s surface lakes, rivers, glaciers, etc. combined), it also has lots of rocks and would be happy to sell some of them to Americans. The U.S. Geological Survey cautiously estimates 1.5 million tons of rare earth reserves (their rare-earth estimate for the U.S. itself is 1.9 million tons) along with gem mining, and more generally Greenland has at least some of 39 of the USGS’ 50 designated “critical minerals.”

The resource endowment naturally draws interest from mining businesses worldwide, but as with the security issues, that doesn’t at all mean a crisis. To the contrary, Greenland’s government has been hoping for a while that American mining firms would show more interest than they’re now doing: this year, they count 23 British and 23 Canadian mining companies operating in Greenland, as against only one American. Here’s the relevant Minister, Naaja Nathanielsen, pitching Americans for more business last January:

“Greenland has high hopes of signing a new agreement with the United States as soon as possible. We are searching for ways to increase investments in our mining sector. …  At the moment, companies in Canada and Britain own the most mining licenses in Greenland. They each hold 23 licenses. The United States holds just one. I am sure this picture can change.”

In sum, without any obvious rationale, the Trump administration has been berating Denmark in the press, insisting that the U.S. has some sort of need to acquire and administer Greenland, sending J.D. Vance to walk around in the snow looking for supporters of the idea that Greenland should join the United States (he couldn’t find one), and shifting U.S. intelligence community professionals from the useful work one hopes they’re now doing to an embarrassing, Inspector Clouseau-like mission of finding the acquisition-supporters Mr. Vance couldn’t. This has accomplished nothing useful and done much harm. PPI’s National Security Director Peter Juul sums up the consequences:

“Trump’s alienation of America’s oldest and closest allies leaves the United States less safe in the world — and raises the risk of conflict in Europe and the Pacific by sowing doubts about America’s commitments to its allies and their security.”

Now to the advice, which starts with three pretty obvious points:

• There is no “Greenland problem.” The U.S., Denmark, the Greenland government, and NATO can handle any “issues” related to Greenland policy per se, or to Arctic security more generally, perfectly well and have done so for decades.
• Both the Danish government and Greenland’s elected local government have said repeatedly (including during the first Trump term) that Greenland’s sovereignty isn’t up for discussion.
• Helmand Province in 2014 wasn’t long ago. Mistreating a four-generation ally and good neighbor, which in the very recent past has made considerable sacrifices in a shared cause, reflects poorly on the United States and erodes America’s reputation as an honorable partner.

And then the bright spot: The world is full of unpleasant choices among lesser evils, complex long-running challenges with no simple solutions, etc., etc. This isn’t one of those things. To the extent any problem exists, it is quite new and the Trump administration can choose at any moment to stop causing it. The alternative — just be a trustworthy ally and good neighbor – shouldn’t be hard at all.

*  The U.S. is a minor customer, spending about $30 million a year on 2000 tons of fish and 1000 tons of crab, and selling in return about $10 million in airplane parts, weather-monitoring and telecommunications gear, and navigation equipment. Greenland escaped the Trump administration’s April 2 “reciprocal” tariff decree (though this still imposes a 10% tax on the fish and crab) because in 2024 its government bought a plane and some aircraft parts for $40 million, leaving the U.S. with a bilateral trade surplus that year. 

FURTHER READING

PPI’s four principles for response to tariffs and economic isolationism:

• Defend the Constitution and oppose rule by decree;
• Connect tariff policy to growth, work, prices and family budgets, and living standards;
• Stand by America’s neighbors and allies;
• Offer a positive alternative.