PPI’s Ben Ritz on Reaching the Debt Limit 

Ben Ritz, Director of the Progressive Policy Institute’s Center for Funding America’s Future, released the following statement in reaction to the United States officially hitting the debt limit:

“Maintaining the full faith and credit of the United States is a basic fiduciary duty of Congress that cannot be made subject to legislative haggling and horse-trading. We need to have a real conversation about bringing down inflation and the role excessive borrowing by the Federal Government played in making it worse, but that should be separate from agreeing to pay the bills policymakers have already incurred. PPI urges Congress to swiftly raise or suspend the federal debt limit and follow that up with serious bipartisan negotiations on a package of real reforms that fixes our unsustainable fiscal trajectory.“

Further Reading: 

 

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C., with offices in Brussels and Berlin. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

Find an expert at PPI.

###

Marshall for The Hill: Biden Gets Real on Immigration

By Will Marshall, President of PPI

No issue better illuminates America’s debilitating political stalemate than immigration. Everyone knows there’s a mounting humanitarian and law enforcement crisis on our southern border, but our political leaders find it safer to appease their most militant partisans than to work together to forge pragmatic solutions.

That may be changing. After ignoring an unprecedented surge of migrants for two years, President Biden has announced some modest steps toward restoring order. His reward for taking on this combustible issue is a fusillade of criticism from rightwing nativists who say he’s not serious, and leftwing activists worried that he is.

During Biden’s first visit to the border earlier this month, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott handed him a churlish letter blaming him for the whole mess. “This chaos is the direct result of your failure to enforce the immigration laws that Congress enacted,” it charged.

Read more in The Hill.

PPI Issue Brief Recommends Expanding Exports of U.S. Natural Gas to Help Global Climate Goals

Urges Deep Cuts in U.S. Methane from Gas to Maximize Climate Benefit

new issue brief authored by the Progressive Policy Institute’s Paul Bledsoe argues the United States can help become a clean energy superpower by leveraging both green innovations and exports of low-emitting U.S.-made natural gas. The issue brief is the first of a series authored by Mr. Bledsoe on the role of U.S. natural gas in the ongoing domestic and global clean energy transition, and is titled “The Climate Case for Expanding U.S. Natural Gas Exports.”

“The policy question for America is: Can and should the U.S. systemically produce and export more gas to reduce domestic and global emissions? This study suggests the answer is emphatically: Yes,” writes report author Paul Bledsoe. “But achieving large security, economic, and climate benefits from increased gas production will require additional actions by the U.S., the industry, our allies, and even coal-consuming nations, especially major reductions of methane emissions.”

Key policy recommendations from the issue brief include:

  • Increase Domestic Gas Production
  • Double U.S. Gas Exports
  • Cut Life Cycle Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas to 0.3%
  • Retire Coal Plants More Quickly
  • Improve Gas Infrastructure
  • Set Goal of Zero-Net Emissions from Gas by 2040
  • Establish Accurate Global Methane Emissions Data Center; and
  • Urge Gas-Importing Nations to Establish Methane Emissions Content Standards

 

Read and download the full report:

The Progressive Policy Institute will be releasing a series of issue briefs on key topics supporting the policy recommendations outlined in this report in the coming weeks, including briefs on how the entrenchment of global coal power locks in record global emissions; Europe’s continuing need for U.S. LNG to displace the use of coal and Russian-exported gas; the actions needed to increase U.S. natural gas production and exports; and how reducing methane and CO2 from U.S. natural gas will maximize climate benefits.

Paul Bledsoe is a strategic adviser at the Progressive Policy Institute and a professorial lecturer at American University’s Center for Environmental Policy. He served on the White House Climate Change Task Force under President Clinton, at the U.S. Department of the Interior, as a staff member at the Senate Finance Committee and for several members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Read his full biography here.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C., with offices in Brussels and Berlin. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

Find an expert at PPI.

###

The Climate Case for Expanding U.S. Natural Gas Exports

ISSUE BRIEF

A key question for current American climate, energy, and security policy is what role abundant U.S. natural gas should play in the ongoing domestic and global clean energy transition. This report finds that expanding U.S. natural gas production and exports can cut coal use, lowering domestic and global greenhouse gas emissions, along with other policies to increase renewable power and other forms of clean energy.

Studies consistently show that coal-to-liquefied natural gas (LNG) switching provides net greenhouse gas emissions reductions, usually between 40-50%, meaning the extent of global emissions reductions from coal displacement will be in part determined by how much U.S. liquefied natural gas reaches overseas coal-using nations. In China, for example, coal emissions have grown by 15% over the last decade due to new coal-fired power plants, and data shows gas power plants have the potential to reduce Chinese emissions by up to 35%.

Large reductions in coal emissions are urgently needed for climate protection. Last year, global coal consumption reached an all-time high, fueled by record coal output in China, India, and Indonesia, the world’s three largest producers. Europe, facing sharp reductions in Russian natural gas, also increased coal consumption for the second year in a row, and the U.S. still uses coal for 22% of its electricity. Global coal-fired generation reached an all-time high in 2021, pushing CO₂ emissions from coal power plants to record levels. These increases in coal use drove worldwide greenhouse gas emissions to record highs in 2022, belying any notion that current climate policies alone have been effective in rapidly reducing coal emissions.

In addition, recent investigations by Bloomberg News have found that Chinese coal mines emit massive plumes of methane so large that they accounted for roughly a fifth of total global methane emissions from all oil, gas, coal, and biomass combined. Such huge methane emissions from coal mining suggest that the overall greenhouse gas emissions footprint from China’s coal industry is larger than previously understood, making the case for coal-to-gas switching in China and other coal-producing nations around the world even more compelling.

But to maximize the climate change benefits of American gas displacing coal at home and abroad, the U.S. must also pursue increasingly aggressive reductions of fugitive emissions of methane. Not only is methane a greenhouse gas 86 times more powerful than carbon dioxide in causing warming over the next two decades, but mitigation of methane is uniquely important for limiting near-term global temperature increases that are causing dangerous and expensive climate impacts.

The good news is that ambitious new U.S. methane mitigation regulations from the Biden Administration, methane emission taxes, mitigation funding in recent legislation, and renewed efforts by industry can drive down fugitive emissions of methane from U.S. gas rapidly and far below recent levels. Moreover, three-quarters of methane emissions can be mitigated with current technology, and half can be eliminated at zero net costs to the oil and gas industry. In contrast, estimates of methane emissions from Russian gas are at least 2.8% of total gas volume, and likely much higher, since Kremlin estimates are unreliable and deliberately misleading, and are not subject to any serious new mitigation efforts, making Russian gas worse than coal for the climate.

The climate value of the U.S. shale gas revolution has been evident for many years. According to EIA data, coal to gas switching accounted for as much as 61% of the U.S. emissions reductions over the period 2005-2020. More than 100 U.S. coal plants were converted to natural gas plants from 2011 to 2020.

Meanwhile, abundant U.S. gas has lowered energy and heating prices for U.S. consumers and benefited American manufacturing, not to mention the large balance of payments benefits of revenue flowing into the U.S. from gas exports. If the geopolitical value of U.S. gas was not already evident, Russia’s war on Ukraine has dramatically illustrated its vital importance to America’s allies. U.S. gas exports to Europe over eight months of 2022 tripled, as detailed recently by PPI’s Elan Sykes, rapidly helping Europe move toward its new goal of shaking free of Vladimir Putin’s energy blackmail, while keeping EU natural gas prices far lower than expected in the last several months. Indeed, U.S. gas supplies have now been credited with lowering overall European inflation, boosting the EU economy at a crucial moment.

But Russia’s war on Ukraine shows no signs of resolution, so increased U.S. LNG exports will continue to be crucial to Europe’s emissions reductions for many years to come, helping the EU further reduce its reliance on high-methane-leaking Russian natural gas while also limiting EU coal use. 

Leading analysts like Kaushal Ramesh at Rystad Energy expect large growth in EU LNG demand from about 72mn tons a year in 2021, to more than 110mn tons each year from now until at least 2030. Trevor Sikorski of Energy Aspects anticipates tight EU and global gas supply through 2025, and says that gas will play an EU role until 2040.

Similarly, expanding U.S. gas exports to fast-growing Asian nations and others around the world now primarily reliant on coal consumption can cut emissions and help prevent Russia from dominating new global gas export markets. Economic growth in the region, particularly in China and India, is expected to drive demand for a wide range of energy sources, including natural gas. Due to low lifecycle emissions of methane, U.S. liquefied natural gas delivered to China has, on average, at least 30% lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than Chinese coal does, and according to many measures, U.S. LNG has about 50% less or even lower lifecycle emissions than older Chinese coal-fired plants. A similar industry study finds a 48% emissions reduction.

A private study by a leading environmental organization finds that net reductions from existing coal-fired power plants in Vietnam switching to U.S. LNG would be about 40%. Research by EQT, a leading U.S. gas supplier, finds that replacing older coal plants in Vietnam with Northeastern Pennsylvania gas would result between 53% and 58% life-cycle net emissions reductions. The EQT analysis finds that U.S. LNG is currently replacing ~900,000 tons of international coal per day. As noted, IEA finds in general that coal-to-gas switching reduces emissions by 50%.

On this basis, we argue that Asia should not only increase its use of natural gas to displace coal, but do so particularly by purchasing LNG imports from the United States and other lower methane-emitting sources, rather than sourcing natural gas from Russia. We find that lower methane emissions gas systems give the United States a significant competitive advantage versus other sources of gas, an advantage that is likely to grow as the U.S. institutes ever more stringent methane regulations.

U.S. proven natural gas reserves are massive and can accommodate large increases in domestic and global use for several decades, to help reduce coal domestically and globally. But as a practical matter, large increases of U.S. LNG exports will require even larger domestic production increases so that domestic gas prices stay low and popular political support for exports continues. Studies show that the U.S. can dramatically increase gas exports and production for more than two decades during the clean energy transition while keeping domestic prices low, at roughly $3 per million British thermal unit (MMBtu), which is likely to be the benchmark for cost-effective production in the long term. Additional U.S. gas production will be needed to meet growing EU demand of perhaps 7 billion and 8 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) demand in the next three to five years, but can offer export prices of less than $8/MMBtu, compared to recent peak European gas prices of $40 to $70/MMBtu.

But this will require expanding U.S. natural gas infrastructure, including gas pipelines, LNG export terminals, and other facilities as part of an overall energy deployment policy based on permitting reform, which will provide even greater benefits to renewable energy. In particular, the U.S. should prioritize efforts to provide pipelines and other infrastructure to bring low-cost Appalachian gas to domestic and international markets, helping to limit inflation. All of this suggests that along with unprecedented U.S. incentives for other forms of cleaner energy passed in major bills over the last two years, American policymakers should now add the climate change benefits of expanding U.S. gas production and exports to the already strong geopolitical and domestic economic case for greater gas production in the near-term.

Indeed, the combination of a huge build-out of American clean energy technologies and low-emitting natural gas puts the U.S. in a uniquely enviable position to both dramatically reduce its domestic greenhouse gas emissions and help catalyze major global greenhouse gas reductions, in effect becoming a clean energy superpower. The U.S. will increasingly export not only natural gas, but also key technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and electricity storage, and others. CCS, in particular, will be necessary for economies around the world to not just limit emissions from natural gas power plants, but to decarbonize heavy industries like steel, cement, aluminum, and other sectors that make up roughly 20% of U.S. and global carbon dioxide emissions. Advances in using CCS in natural gas plants can play a role in this process, especially if industrial use brings down costs. Overall, one can imagine a sustainable U.S. system in which renewable energy, electric vehicles, electricity storage, nuclear power, hydropower, and natural gas with carbon capture create a near-or-net-zero emissions energy economy well before 2050.

Yet, ironically, some left-leaning climate advocates oppose coal-to-natural gas fuel switching, even as worldwide coal consumption has continued to grow. These doctrinaire advocates insist on grouping coal and natural gas together as sources that must be immediately curtailed, despite the fact that gas displaced roughly half of U.S. coal in the last 15 years, and coal-to-gas switching was responsible for more than 60% of U.S. emissions cuts during that period. It’s time honest climate advocates faced a fundamental fact: Natural gas production can have a crucial role in a successful global climate and clean energy transition, especially in the near-term. Indeed, it seems clear that as a practical economic and geopolitical matter, the greatest extent of near-term climate progress cannot be made without gas (along with renewable power) helping to balance electricity grids and rapidly phase out coal, in the West, in Asia, and elsewhere.

At the same time, small but vocal elements on the political right are in denial about the need to deeply and quickly cut methane emissions from natural gas (and, over time, CO₂) so that gas can reduce emissions to the greatest extent possible. But analysis consistently finds that both coal-to-gas switching and deep methane cuts must take place to maximize the economic, geopolitical and climate value of overall U.S. energy approaches. Policymakers should ignore these ideological, not factual, appeals emanating from both fringes of the political debate. 

In the next two decades, much more electric power will be needed in America and globally. Electricity demand will grow significantly, in part due to the electrification of transportation through the adoption of electric vehicles, which could raise U.S. electric power demand alone by as much as 38%. One underappreciated advantage of natural gas power plants is their ability to provide rapid onset baseload power to balance electric grids increasingly dependent on intermittent renewable energy, with gas plants able to cycle up to full power within five or 10 minutes, providing synchronicity with renewable energy. In contrast, other forms of baseload power like nuclear and coal plants take far longer to deliver power to the grid when the sun stops shining and the wind stops blowing. Natural gas-fired plants that operate in a combined-cycle configuration are more efficient than coal-fired plants, producing electricity with significantly less energy input than coal, helping to further lower CO₂ emissions.

But U.S. gas must continue to dramatically reduce emissions of both methane and carbon dioxide. As new methane detection technologies are deployed, the U.S. gas industry will be able to prove that American natural gas can achieve among the lowest emissions of methane of any gas exports in the world, gaining a competitive advantage over higher-leaking systems and rival exports like those from Russia. Currently, many

gas-importing nations, especially in Europe, are skeptical of large methane emissions reductions achieved by the U.S. in recent years. Such a competitive advantage of proving low fugitive emissions of methane from U.S. gas should also jumpstart global efforts by other major gas exports to limit methane leaks from their gas exports, as importers favor lower methane-leaking gas.

This “race to cut methane” can greatly increase the climate benefits of using gas to displace higher-emitting coal globally, and has already begun as evidenced by methane emissions reductions programs by major gas exports like Qatar. More rapid adoption of carbon capture technologies on gas fired power plants will be needed to cut overall GHG emissions from gas.

Total U.S. LNG exports increased only slightly in the first eight months of 2022, since short-term capacity is largely fixed, so the main way that gas shipments to the EU increased involved exporters redirecting shipments away from other destinations, mainly Asia. Europe received 23% of U.S. LNG in 2021, but 54% through August of 2022.

Of course, a main reason U.S. LNG was redirected to Europe was the higher price, with European spot natural gas prices often running several times those in other markets, including Asia. But for now, thanks in part to U.S. LNG, European prices have moderated.

In 2022, U.S. exports of natural gas as LNG rose 8% to 10.6 bcfd, just behind Australia’s 10.7 bcfd. The United States remained ahead of Qatar, which in third place shipped 10.5 bcfd., though the U.S. is set to take the global lead on LNG exports early in 2023.

Overall, the U.S. gas industry is forecast to produce approximately 100 bcfd in 2023, so exports are likely to be somewhat more than 10% of national production. 

Total U.S. LNG exports are expected to rise in 2023, although by how much is uncertain, as major new export facilities are not expected to reach full output until 2025.

The long-term role of gas beyond this decade is less clear. It may turn out that over the coming years renewable energy will continue to see dramatic price reductions making it far cheaper than other sources, although renewable energy would still need to be built more quickly and at tremendous scale. And other technologies like electricity storage may see advances that allow for electric grids to absorb greater amounts of intermittent renewable energy. But these developments are also uncertain. What is clear is that both the U.S. and EU have used gas to displace coal in large amounts, and to stabilize their electric grids to use more renewable energy, while much of the rest of the world has not. That presents a near-term opportunity for U.S. LNG exports to reduce global coal use significantly, limiting emissions in the process.

The policy question for America is: Can and should the U.S. systemically produce and export more gas to reduce domestic and global emissions? This study suggests the answer is emphatically: Yes. But achieving the security, economic, and climate benefits from increased gas production will require additional actions by the U.S., the industry, our allies, and even coal-consuming nations. To gain these benefits from increased gas production and exports, this report recommends the following policy actions.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Increase Domestic Gas Production

The United States should increase natural gas production substantially to allow for expansion of exports to Europe, Asia, and other markets through this decade, while at the same time keeping domestic natural gas prices low to help U.S. consumers, America’s industrial economy, and further phasing out of domestic coal. The precise size of U.S. gas production and export increases will be dependent on a range of market, gas price, regulatory, and investment factors, but a national goal of increasing overall gas production from 2022 levels by 2028 is achievable and in U.S. economic, security, and climate interests. For example, to account for a doubling of new LNG exports, U.S. overall gas production would expand by about 10%.

Double U.S. Gas Exports

Internationally, the U.S. should increase LNG export levels as an explicit goal of U.S. policy, as articulated by President Joe Biden in 2021, specifically to help Europe end its dependence on Russian gas and help the EU reduce their dependence on high-emitting coal. The U.S. should also increase LNG exports to many other coal-dependent nations, including China, to encourage

coal-to-gas switching as a critical element in reducing overall global greenhouse gas emissions. The total size of U.S. LNG export growth will be in part dependent on natural gas prices in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. But given new LNG export facility construction, we propose an overall U.S. goal of doubling LNG exports over 2022 levels by 2028, in keeping with increases in total U.S. gas production with some of that increase going to phase out domestic coal more quickly. Today the U.S. has six major LNG export terminals. Three new U.S. LNG export facilities now under construction will be at full output by 2025, and provide about half the LNG needed to meet the doubling goal. But several additional export facilities would still need to be built or existing exports expanded. The U.S. Energy Information Agency expects U.S. LNG exports to increase 65% by 2033.

Retire Coal Plants More Quickly

The U.S. should increase the pace of unabated coal-fired power plant retirements (coal still provides 22% of U.S. electricity) as a climate policy priority, using all available methods, including new power plant emissions regulations, increased energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear and hydropower, and coal-to-natural gas switching; the latter which has been responsible for well over half of U.S. emissions reductions since 2005.

Improve Gas Infrastructure

Meeting these objectives will require significant new investments in and permitting of U.S. natural gas pipelines and export facilities, as well as broader energy permitting reforms that will benefit renewable energy, gas, long-distance, high voltage electric power lines, and other elements of America’s clean energy infrastructure. U.S. policy should encourage all of these investments consistent with broader U.S. decarbonization and clean energy goals.

Cut Life Cycle Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas to 0.3%

The U.S. should adopt a national goal of driving down lifecycle methane emissions from domestically-produced gas to less than 0.3% of overall gas volume by 2030, from about 1.7% in recent years, so that U.S. gas has demonstrably the lowest methane emissions in the world. New methane detection technologies in the U.S. can help prove these reductions. Overall, the net cost of such mitigation is low, and will be more than made up for on a national level by revenue from increased LNG exports.

Set Goal of Zero-Net Emissions from Gas by 2040

The U.S. should also embrace a goal of near-zero methane emissions by 2040, as well as net-zero carbon dioxide emissions from U.S. natural gas power plants by 2040, through carbon capture and storage, hydrogen, direct air capture, and other technologies.

Establish Accurate Global Methane Emissions Data Center

OECD nations should within two years establish a definitive, accurate inventory of methane emissions from major natural gas producing and exporting countries, to improve on the current situation in which wildly differing methane data are offered by governments, industry, and NGOs, each with their own agendas and methods. It is in the interest of the U.S. that such definitive and accurate methane emissions data numbers be derived, since U.S. methane emissions are far lower than many other global exporters, specifically Russia, and falling rapidly. New satellite, drone, and other methane detection technologies should allow the accumulation of accurate statistics regarding methane emissions in the next year or two if needed investments are made. The International Energy Agency could be one organization considered to act as a clearinghouse for such accurate methane emissions data.

Urge Gas-Importing Nations to Establish Methane Emissions Content Standards

As accurate methane data is established, major gas-importing regions like the EU should establish methane emissions regulations for all gas imports, driving the global system toward stringent methane standards to make gas even more beneficial to the climate while freezing out Russia’s antiquated, leaky system, and in the long-run forcing it to reform.

NOTE TO READERS

PPI will be releasing additional Issue Briefs on key topics supporting these recommendations in the next few weeks, including on:

 

  • Entrenchment of Global Coal Power Locks in Record Global Emissions
  • Europe’s Continuing Need for U.S. LNG to Displace Coal and Russian Gas
  • Asia’s Growing Opportunity for Coal-to-Gas Switching
  • Actions Needed to Increase U.S. Natural Gas Production and Exports
  • Reducing Methane and CO₂ from U.S. Natural Gas to Maximize Climate Benefits

 

Taken together, today’s recommendations and these upcoming briefs will compromise a comprehensive report on the topic.

The UK Online Safety Bill is well intentioned but will undermine privacy

In Britain, Parliament is debating the oft-revised U.K. Online Safety Bill, which seeks to regulate harmful and illegal content on the internet for children and adults. Without further modifications, however, the bill could undermine that laudable goal.

Fashioned by Ofcom, the U.K.’s digital communications regulator, the bill creates a formal “duty of care” for online platforms to remove harmful content on their websites with additional responsibilities for websites that also serve young people. If passed, adult websites would need to establish age verification and commit to removing illegal content such as content depicting hate crimes, sexual abuse, and terrorism. Websites with youth users would need to prevent young people from seeing illegal content as well as potentially harmful, but not illegal, content such as that promoting eating disorders, self-harm, or suicide. Penalties for failure to comply with these requirements include fines and potential criminal liability for platforms and tech executives if they fail to comply with Ofcom’s information requests.

As I’ve written previously, managing harmful content online, and creating specific youth-protection schemes, raises a host of thorny questions. In a recent blog looking at a U.S. youth online safety bill, I wrote that content moderation is technically challenging, because content moderation systems aren’t perfectly accurate at flagging inappropriate content. The systems can overcorrect and potentially censor acceptable information. In another piece about children’s privacy, I noted that definitively identifying internet users’ age online is both technically challenging and undermines everyone’s privacy.

The latest version of the U.K. Online Safety Bill fails to strike the right balance on content moderation versus censorship, or on privacy.

Content moderation creates a host of challenges, like defining what content is harmful, censorship of content that is not illegal, and encoding all the rules into an algorithm. Even with clear definitions, content moderation is technically challenging.

Content moderation algorithms are not perfectly accurate at flagging harmful content. This means that if an algorithm is 98% effective, 2% will slip through the cracks. On popular websites, 2% could be millions of posts. It remains unclear if firms will be punished if some illegal content passes through the filters. Free speech advocates worry that firms will overcompensate content removal because of the harsh penalties and the technical compliance challenge.

In addition to challenges of censorship, the bill also threatens privacy. First, by requiring users to disclose more personal data to access websites. Second by requiring a backdoor on encrypted messaging platforms for Ofcom to scan private messages for illegal conversations or content.

There is no easy way currently to verify age online without the user voluntarily giving up personal information. While the main trend in privacy legislation is toward decreasing the amount of personal information consumers have to provide to apps and websites, the U.K. bill points in the opposite direction, requiring users to make accounts and verify age through technologies like facial recognition checks or uploading a government-issued ID card to a website.

If personal information disclosure for every website wasn’t enough, the bill also contains provisions to allow Ofcom to search private messages on encrypted platforms. The bill as currently written gives new, large scale, citizen surveillance abilities to Ofcom regardless of wrongdoing. Seventy organizations, cyber security experts, and elected officials signed a letter to warn against allowing Ofcom to search private messages. Their main message is that creating a backdoor for the government creates a backdoor for anyone and undermines the rights of British citizens to privacy.

The U.K. government isn’t the only entity searching for a better solution to make the online space safer for users. This bill, however, stifles free speech online while undermining too many peoples’ privacy.

Platform Work and the Care Economy the Focus of New PPI Webinar

Event featured a rideshare app driver from California speaking on how flexible platform work enables her unpaid caregiving 

 

Today, the Progressive Policy Institute hosted a webinar on how platform work – including companies such as Lyft, Uber, Doordash, and Instacart – can offer flexible earning opportunities for unpaid caregivers across America. The webinar also discussed the possibility that platform work may help narrow the longstanding gender gap in unpaid caregiving.

Webinar panelists included PPI’s Vice President and Chief Economist Dr. Michael Mandel, author of PPI’s “Platform Work and the Care Economy” report, and Cora Mandapat, a rideshare driver and caregiver from California. 

Watch the event livestream here:

This event discussed the Progressive Policy Institute’s (PPI) recently released report on the intersection of caregiving and the gig economy. The report shows that on the average day, 36% of working-age Americans provide unpaid care for children, parents and other loved ones. This unpaid labor is worth $980 billion per year. Report author Dr. Michael Mandel examines how the stress of this immense burden can be eased by the availability of flexible platform work, including companies such as Lyft, Uber, Doordash, and Instacart. He also explores the possibility that platform work may help narrow the longstanding gender gap in unpaid caregiving.

Read and download the report here:

Dr. Michael Mandel is Vice President and Chief Economist at the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington DC and senior fellow at the Mack Institute for Innovation Management at the Wharton School (UPenn). He was chief economist at BusinessWeek prior to its purchase by Bloomberg.With experience spanning policy, academics, and business, Dr. Mandel has helped lead the public conversation about the economic and business impact of technology for the past two decades. His work has been featured by the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, and Financial Times, among others.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow PPI on Twitter: @ppi

Find an expert at PPI.

###

Media Contact: Aaron White; awhite@ppionline.org

The internet as we know it relies on Section 230

With the Supreme Court set to take on Gonzalez v. Google this term — a case with momentous implications for the legal viability of internet services as we know them — the fate of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is in question.

Section 230 is the statute that grants online platforms protection from liability for the content posted by their users, a fundamental protection that has been integral to the internet ecosystem’s explosive growth. By allowing internet platforms to take down third-party content that they deem harmful to their users in “good faith,” while also ensuring that they are not treated as the publishers of such content, Section 230 is the legal mechanism that has facilitated innovative business models which give a platform to user-generated content, shaping a robust digital economy enjoyed by both consumers and entrepreneurs today.

From a consumer standpoint, these business models provide a plethora of free resources, entertainment, and educational materials. In the case of entrepreneurs, the online creator economy is estimated to be worth more than $100 billion worldwide, with more than 425,000 full-time equivalent jobs reportedly supported by the YouTube platform alone.

In Gonzalez v. Google, however, the central question goes beyond Section 230’s protections for third-party content, asking instead whether the targeted algorithms employed by these platforms enjoy the same protections.

Most major online platforms use data at various levels to recommend content to users, whether by using specific personal or demographic information to tailor the experience to a user’s specific interests, or by presenting users with popular or relevant content at the top of the feed. These automated decisions curate a feed appealing to the user and beneficial to the content creator, whose work is then highlighted to new audiences.

Colloquially, those referring to social media algorithms are most likely referring to the sophisticated code used by many of these companies to target content to their users. However, from a technological standpoint, the term “algorithm” refers to any type of content sorting — whether it be a simpler iteration that might show content ordered chronologically or alphabetically, or the more complex, individually curated version. There is no default method of content sorting, meaning that every company or developer must choose an algorithm to sort content. The only difference lies in the complexity of the algorithm they chose to employ.

It is difficult to draw legal lines around this complexity. For example, if a platform lists a seemingly harmful piece of content first, thus making it the most obvious choice for users to select, are they liable for that content only if proven to be the result of a curated algorithm, or are they also liable if the reason it is listed first is that the feed is shown chronologically? Either way, there is some risk of exposing users to harmful third-party content. Prohibiting one platform’s algorithms — say Google’s — thus doesn’t provide a general solution.

That means the Supreme Court would either have to define algorithms in such a way that only specific types are implicated for liability, or rule that Section 230 liability protections are lost for all types of content displayed online.

Let’s be clear: A court decision that ended Section 230’s liability protections would make hosting third-party content functionally impossible for websites. On YouTube alone there are over 500 hours of content uploaded every minute, making vetting every video prior to each upload a monumental task. The risk of getting sued will lead most companies to conclude that it’s not worth it for them to offer third-party content. And in the case where only data-driven, targeted algorithms are ruled to be exposed to liability, how likely is it that users would sort through 500 hours of content with no curation in hopes of discovering useful information?

Moreover, the ramifications of making all content providers liable to lawsuits will spread across the entire Internet ecosystem, including online shopping, travel sites, and app stores, all of which rely on user reviews that are curated to reduce fakes and “ballot-stuffing.” In an era of deep fakes and sophisticated artificial intelligence chatbots, it’s all the more essential for online platforms to be able to apply algorithms that users can trust.

There’s no doubt that Section 230 raises difficult issues that need to be carefully considered by policymakers. But subjecting online platforms to lawsuits because their algorithms occasionally highlight content that someone objects to would fundamentally destroy the internet economy, while failing to address the threat posed by truly dangerous online content.

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: The number of extremely poor people has fallen by two-thirds since 1990

FACT: The number of extremely poor people has fallen by two-thirds since 1990.

THE NUMBERS: Number of people in extreme poverty* in Pakistan –

2018     10.5 million (5% of the population)

2010     16.8 million (9% of the population)

2000    48.6 million (33% of the population)

1990     70.1 million (65% of the population)

* At or beneath the “extreme poverty” line is defined by the World Bank, at $2.15 per day, PPP basis, in constant 2017 dollars. World Bank estimates; 2018 is the most recent available year.

 

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Looking back at the post-Cold War/globalization era, what should we see first? Four obvious nominees: the launch of the internet and the creation of the digital world; the China boom; the acceleration of climate change and biodiversity loss; an extended and historically anomalous time of peace among great powers? Here’s a fifth and less visible candidate: the best period in human history for the very poor.

The World Bank’s definition of “absolute” or “extreme” poverty is life at “$2.15 per person per day in constant 2017 dollars as measured in purchasing-power parities.” This is not necessarily “income,” but consumption of a minimal level of food, clothing, and shelter in very poor countries. To illustrate: estimates of annual per capita income in Burundi, currently thought to be the world’s poorest country, range from $700 to $865. This is $1.92 to $2.37 per day, essentially the $2.15 level. A Bank database calculates the cost of a minimally “energy-sufficient” diet at $1.10 per day, about half the typical daily spending of a rural Burundian. A “nutrient-adequate” diet, at $2.93 per day, would be out of reach.

Just after the breach of the Berlin Wall in 1990, about 2 billion of the world’s 5.3 billion people lived this sort of life. A bit more than half, 1.055 billion by the Bank’s estimate, lived in East and Southeast Asia. Another 563 million were close by in South Asia, among them 70 million of Pakistan’s then 115 million people. Sub-Saharan Africa counted 271 million, Latin America and the Caribbean 73 million, just past-Soviet Eastern Europe and Central Asia 15 million, and the Middle East and North Africa 14 million. Over the next three decades:

1990-2000: In the decade of democracy promotion, trade liberalization, and the early Internet, the count of extremely poor people fell by about 200 million as world population grew by 800 million. This left 1.8 billion extremely poor, or 29% of the world’s 6.1 billion people.

2000-2010: As the China boom and its gravitational effects in Southeast Asia, South America, and Africa took hold, another 650 billion moved above the line. Extreme poverty counts fell by two-thirds in East Asia and Southeast Asia, and by half in Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, to end at 16.9% of world population in the midst of the financial crisis of 2010.

2010-2019: In the decade just passed, extreme poverty fell by another 350 million, nearly vanishing in East and Southeast Asia — down 98% from the 1.06 billion of 1990 to 24 million — and showing the largest absolute-number drop in South Asia (from 430 million to 157 million; as Pakistan’s population topped 230 million, the number of extremely poor Pakistanis fell to 10.5 million). = The global total just before the COVID-19 pandemic was 649 million, or 8.4% of a worldwide 7.8 billion people.

To 2023: The COVID pandemic interrupted this steady downward curve, but perhaps only temporarily. The Bank’s early estimate is that 70 million people fell back into extreme poverty in 2020, but that by last year the total was nearly back to the levels of 2019. With estimates for 2020-22 still tentative, the numbers look like this:

2022     ~655 million of 8.0 billion?

2020     ~714 million of 7.9 billion?

2019      649 million of 7.8 billion

2010      1127 million of 7.0 billion

2000     1782 million of 6.1 billion

1990      1995 million of 5.3 billion

To move above an extreme-poverty line, of course, is to escape destitution and chronic hunger, but to remain poor. But poverty at higher income levels has also fallen, if a bit more slowly — from 56% of the world’s people living on $3.65 per day or less in 1990, for example, to 23% as of 2019%; turning back to Pakistan, 91% lived below this level in 1990, and 40% now. This suggests not only a worldwide reduction in extreme deprivation and chronic malnutrition, but a broader shift toward lower-middle-class life. Social indicators bolster this impression, with world infant mortality down by two-thirds since 1990, girls’ literacy in low-income countries up by half, from 48% to 69%; and life expectancy up 7 years worldwide and 13 years in low-income countries.

Searching for a verdict on the post-Cold War world, then, the creation of the digital world, the growth of Chinese power and industry, environmental stresses, and the era’s then-unappreciated and now-vanishing geopolitical calm remain strong candidates. But the escape of a third of the world’s people from destitution easily stands with them.

 

Further Readings

Worldwide data and analysis: 

The World Bank’s center for poverty data.

Our World in Data has poverty totals and rates by country from 1967 through 2021.

And the World Bank’s review of poverty in Burundi, 2022.

Two questions:

Why? Explanations for the decline of poverty — extended peace, lower trade barriers and more open markets for poor-country goods, dissemination of new medicines and technologies, better basic education and public health policies — seem mostly complementary rather than contradictory or “enough in itself.” A nominee for “most important,” though, comes from economist Charles Kenny, whose prescient Getting Better: Why Development is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More (2012) noticed the fall in poverty early and views the core issue as growing intellectual consensus in developing-country governments on good and relatively low-cost policies:

“Poor countries and poor people aren’t stuck in the nightmare of ever-growing and unsupportable population, living on bare subsistence. Instead, those countries with the lowest quality of life are making the fastest progress in improving it — across a range of measures including health, education, and civil and political liberties. The progress is the result of the global spread of technologies and ideas – technologies like vaccination, and ideas like ‘you should send your daughter to school.’”

Read Kenny’s Getting Better.

And can this continue? Some factors suggest it should. Extreme poverty now is concentrated in three ways: (a) in remote rural areas as opposed to cities, where flows of young people to cities and improved infrastructure can help; (b) in sub-Saharan Africa, and the rate of extreme poverty has fallen from 53% to 35% since 1990, though rapid population growth has kept the total number high, and growth and policy trends seem likewise mostly positive, and (c) in conflict zones as opposed to peaceful regions. Others are less promising: a world landscape of high great-power tension, weaker commitment by major economies to openness and integration, and rising economic costs of climate change for poor countries may not be so severe as to reverse the positive trends of 1990-2019, but is likely less friendly to the poor.

Views from Pakistan:

The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in Islamabad reviews trends over the past two decades (urban vs. rural, by province, children, income vs. nutrition, etc.).

Hina Shaikh at the International Growth Centre looks at next steps.

And a World Bank snapshot.

The role of trade? Three perspectives:

Carolyn Freund and Sanchez-Paramo on trade, poverty, and pro-poor reform, drawn from close analysis of trade impacts in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa.

PPI’s Ed Gresser last year on renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences, the main U.S. trade preference program for low- and middle-income countries (quick summary: renew and update the GSP, but don’t overdo new eligibility rules).

And the potential of intra-African trade integration to accelerate current growth in per capita income in low-income African countries.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week

The Economic Performance of the Digital Sector Since the Pandemic Started

As we move into 2023, the digital sector still faces the key regulatory issues that dominated the previous year: Competition, privacy, and content moderation. But as the legislative, executive, and judicial branches tackle these critical questions, it is important to look back and assess the performance of the digital sector on the key economic metrics of job growth and inflation.

For clarity we split the digital sector into three subsectors:

  • E-commerce/retail (“movement of goods”)
  • Internet/content/broadband (“movement of data”)
  • Computer/communication manufacturing (“hardware”)

 

E-commerce/retail: To compete with e-commerce leaders such as Amazon, retailers with a large physical presence such as Walmart and Target have been scaling up their investment in online sales and fulfillment. At the same time, smaller retailers increasingly use online ordering, so the boundary between “brick-and-mortar” and e-commerce has become increasingly porous.  Moreover, privacy and content moderation issues such as accountability for user reviews impact all retailers. In addition to retail, this subsector also includes local delivery (NAICS 492) and fulfillment (NAICS 493).

Internet/content/broadband: With the advent of social networks and streaming, the line between content creation and content distribution has become blurry. Considerations of privacy and content moderation are high on the policy checklist. This subsector includes content creation and distribution (video, audio, print); broadband and broadcasting; wireless; software; internet publishing and search; and computer systems design.

Hardware: Especially with the funding from the CHIPS Act and the focus on export controls, this subsector is facing a different set of policy issues. We include computer and electronic equipment manufacturing, and related wholesaling.

Job Growth

(Note:These figures have been updated to account for the 2/3/23 revisions to the job data)

As of December 2022, the United States currently enjoys a 3.5% unemployment rate, the same as pre-pandemic February 2020. To a large extent, this strong labor market has been driven by job growth in the digital sector. In total the digital sector added 1.4 million net new jobs from 2019 to 2022,  accounting for 67% of net private sector job gains over the same period. Table 1 breaks down the pandemic job growth by digital subsector.

We see that the e-commerce/retail subsector accounted for net job growth of 926,000 jobs from 2019 to 2022, or 44% of private sector job growth, as consumers embraced online shopping during the pandemic, and retailers and third-party logistics companies built and staffed fulfillment centers.

The internet/content/broadband subsector created 472,000 jobs, accounting for 22% of private sector job growth. Altogether, the digital sector accounted for 67% of private sector job growth from 2019 to 2022.

The importance of the digital sector for job growth is emphasized when we look at production and nonsupervisory workers, who generally are less educated and lower-paid (Table 2). The digital sector has created 1.1 million net new production and nonsupervisory jobs from 2019 to 2022,  while the rest of the private sector has lost almost 500,000 production and nonsupervisory jobs.

In particular, the e-commerce/retail subsector has added 812,000 production and nonsupervisory jobs during the three pandemic years. That’s likely to reflect the growth of e-commerce fulfillment and delivery workers. This gain was essential to the recovery because the rest of the private sector has still not regained its pre-pandemic level of production and nonsupervisory employment.

From the perspective of policy, the current regulatory structure turned out to encourage strong job growth in a difficult economic environment. That’s not to say the current regulations cannot be improved, but we should be wary of making major changes without understanding the consequences for jobs.

Table 1. Digital Sector Drives Job Growth During Pandemic
2019-2022
Increase in jobs, thousands Share of private sector growth
Private sector 2,133
E-commerce/retail* 926 44%
Internet/content/broadband** 473 22%
Hardware*** 22 1%
Data: BLS, PPI calculations

 

 

Table 2. …Especially for Production and Nonsupervisory Jobs
2019- 2022
Increase in production and nonsupervisory jobs, thousands Share of private sector growth
Private sector 665
E-commerce/retail* 812 122%
Internet/content/broadband** 306 46%
Hardware*** 24 4%
Data: BLS, PPI calculations

 

Inflation

Before the pandemic, the digital sector had significantly lower inflation than the economy as a whole, whether measured by producer prices or consumer prices. During the pandemic period, overall consumer price inflation accelerated by approximately 3 percentage points, from roughly 1.5% annually in the pre-pandemic period (2012-2019) to roughly 4.5% annually during the pandemic years (2019-2022).

However, the acceleration of inflation was much smaller in the digital subsectors. For example, inflation in the internet/content/broadband subsector only accelerated by 0.3 percentage points when measured by producer prices, and 1.7 percentage points when measured by consumer prices.

Please note that the BLS does not publish a separate measure of e-commerce inflation for consumer goods and services, which is why that line is missing from Table 4. However, in a 2022 paper written for PPI’s Innovation Frontier Project, Marshall Reinsdorf wrote that “the pandemic greatly accelerated adoption of digital innovations such as e-commerce, so it’s reasonable to suspect that the price statistics are undercounting the impact of low digital inflation.”

From the perspective of policy, it’s reasonable to say that the current regulatory structure allowed digital companies to behave in a way that muted the pressure to increase prices. Especially given the inflationary bias in today’s economy, the government should be wary of making changes that impose large new costs on digital companies.

Table 3. Digital Producer Price Inflation Stays Low
Average annual price increase
2012-2019 2019-2022 Increase in inflation rate, percentage points
Final demand less food and energy 1.7% 4.7% 3.0%
Electronic and mail order shopping services* 1.5% 1.8% 0.3%
Internet/content/broadband** 0.7% 1.6% 0.9%
Hardware*** -1.0% 1.1% 2.1%

Based on median inflation for subsectors with multiple products or industries.

Data: BLS, PPI calculations

 

Table 4. Digital Consumer Price Inflation Stays Low
Average percentage price increase
2012-2019 2019-2022 Increase in inflation rate, percentage points
Consumer prices 1.5% 4.6% 3.1%
Internet/content/broadband** -0.4% 1.3% 1.7%
Hardware*** -7.6% -5.6% 1.9%

Based on median inflation for subsectors with multiple products or industries.

Data: BLS, PPI calculations


Appendix: Categories

In this section we define the three digital subsectors, and which statistical series we use to calculate jobs, producer price inflation, and consumer price inflation for each of them. Please note that for subsector inflation measures, we aggregate multiple price series using median inflation rather than weighted means.

*E-commerce/retail

In previous work, we distinguished between ecommerce and brick-and-mortar retail. That distinction is no longer appropriate, because retailers with large physical presence such as have also been building out their online ordering and fulfillment operations. Moreover, the latest NAICS codes do not break out electronic shopping as a separate industry anymore.

Employment data

  • Retail sector (including online ordering and fulfillment operations for single companies)
  • Couriers and messengers (including local delivery)
  • Warehousing and storage (including fulfillment centers)

 

Producer price inflation data

  • Electronic and mail order shopping services

 

** Internet/content/broadband

In earlier work, we used a narrower definition of tech. As barriers have become blurred between content and distribution, and various modes of distribution, it has become appropriate to broaden the definitions.

Employment data

  • Motion picture and sound recording industries
  • Publishing industries, including software
  • Broadcasting and content providers, including social networks and streaming services
  • Telecommunications
  • Computing infrastructure providers, data processing, and web hosting, including cloud computing
  • Web search portals, libraries, archives, and other information services.
  • Computer systems design and related services

 

Producer price inflation data

  • Bundled access services
  • Cable and other subscription programming
  • Data processing and related services
  • Internet access services
  • Internet publishing and web search portals (including advertising)
  • Software publishers
  • Video programming distribution
  • Wireless telecommunications carriers
  • Information technology (IT) technical support and consulting services (partial)

 

Consumer price inflation data

  • Wireless telecom services
  • Residential telecom services
  • Internet services and electronic information providers
  • Cable and satellite television service
  • Video discs and other media
  • Recorded music and music subscriptions

 

***Hardware

In previous work, we did not split out hardware. But the recent CHIPS legislation, and the focus on rebuilding the U.S. domestic semiconductor industry, means that it is appropriate to break out hardware separately. We note that the employment data includes relevant wholesalers, who may be “factoryless” firms designing and marketing digital products, but not actually manufacturing them.

Employment data

  • Computer and electronic product manufacturing
  • Computer and computer peripheral equipment and software merchant wholesalers

 

Producer price inflation data

  • Communications equipment manufacturing
  • Computer & peripheral equipment manufacturing
  • Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing

 

Consumer price inflation data

  • Computers and peripherals
  • Computer software
  • Telephone hardware, calculators, and other consumer information items
  • Televisions

PPI’s Mosaic Project Announces Applications Open for Upcoming Women Changing Policy Workshop Focused on Broadband and Bridging the Digital Divide

PPI’s Mosaic Project announced today that the application portal for the project’s upcoming “Women Changing Policy Workshop” is now open. The next cohort of women will meet March 27 to March 29, 2023, and will focus exclusively on empowering broadband experts and women working to bridge the digital divide.

“Between the Biden Administration’s American Rescue Plan Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law alone, the federal government has pledged to spend an unprecedented $90 billion to ensure affordable and accessible internet connection. Now more than ever, we need strong female voices leading these policy conversations around equitable allocation and responsible spending,” said Jasmine Stoughton, Project Director.

This is the sixth Women Changing Policy workshop. Previous workshops have included exclusive and candid conversations with seasoned media professionals, policy leaders, and representatives from the U.S. Congress.

Applicants should be well-established in their careers and eager to grow their public profile with the goal of positively impacting the policy landscape. This workshop will be held in person in Washington, D.C., and the deadline to apply is Friday, March 10.

Interested applicants should apply here.

The Mosaic Project is an initiative of the Progressive Policy Institute that aims to put more women at the forefront of policymaking. The same handful of well-known men have dominated key policy conversations for decades, resulting in legislative outcomes that fail to reflect the richness of our society. It is the project’s mission to empower expert women with the tools and connections needed to engage with the media and lawmakers on today’s toughest policy challenges.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org.

Follow the Progressive Policy Institute.

Follow the Mosaic Project.

###

Media Contact: Aaron White – awhite@ppionline.org

Ritz for The Hill: New House Majority Shows Its True Colors on ‘Fiscal Responsibility’

By Ben Ritz, Director of PPI’s Center for Funding America’s Future

Republicans in Congress have been eager to position themselves as the fiscally responsible counterweight to what they consider budget-busting and inflation-increasing overspending from the Biden administration. But just two weeks into their new majority, House Republicans have shown their true colors and it’s more likely than not that they will make our nation’s fiscal problems even worse.

The first bill passed by the new majority would repeal $71 billion in new funding for taxpayer services and enforcement by the IRS that Democrats passed last Congress. But an official score from the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office found that this bill would also reduce revenue collections by $186 billion over the next decade because it would undermine the agency’s ability to make wealthy tax cheats pay what they owe. As a result, the first act by the new House majority would actually increase deficits by roughly $114 billion.

Read the full piece in The Hill

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: The U.S. has not in the past defaulted on debt

FACT: The U.S. has not in the past defaulted on debt.

THE NUMBERS: Countries defaulting on debt obligations in this decade

2023?      United States??
2022        Ghana
2022        Sri Lanka
2022        Russia
2020        Zambia
2020        Argentina
2020        Ecuador
2020        Lebanon

WHAT THEY MEAN:

Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit (January 1790) recommends borrowing for public investment and rigorous commitment to pay the bills.  His take on defaults:

“[W]hen the credit of a country is in any degree questionable, it never fails to give an extravagant premium, in one shape or another, upon all the loans it has occasion to make. Nor does the evil end here; the same disadvantage must be sustained upon whatever is to be bought on terms of future payment. From this constant necessity of borrowing and buying dear, it is easy to conceive how immensely the expenses of a nation, in a course of time, will be augmented by an unsound state of the public credit.”

Hamilton’s 77 successors as Treasury Secretary have followed this guidance, paying the bills steadily (with a minor, technical, and instructive exception in 1979) through troubles ranging from the extinction of Hamilton’s Federalist Party in 1808 to the foreign military occupation of Washington in the War of 1812, the Civil War, the Depression, etc. Rogoff & Reinhart list 15 other governments in a relatively small group of never-defaulters: Canada, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.

The post-Hamilton streak is now in some danger, as Congressional Republicans threaten to refuse to raise the U.S.’ “debt ceiling” later this year. This is an accounting device unique to the United States, invented during World War I to avoid separate Congressional votes on every Treasury bond issue; its thesis is that Congress must not only authorize spending and borrowing but later and separately authorize repayment of borrowed money. PPI’s budget and tax director Ben Ritz explains:

“This vote is separate from the decision to set tax and spending policies — raising the debt limit merely allows the Treasury to borrow money to cover the difference between spending and revenue levels as determined by legislation Congress previously enacted.”

What would it mean to go into default?  Even the theoretical possibility can be costly: similar threats to block a debt-ceiling increase in 2011 led ratings agency Standard & Poors to cut the U.S.’ credit rating from AAA to AA+, on the grounds that though that summer’s agreement “removed any immediate threat of payment default,” the agreement itself meant that “the statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy,” thus making the U.S. less credit-worthy. The U.S. has not since regained its AAA rating. Alternatively, the 1979 event, when the Treasury Department missed an interest payment not deliberately but because its check-writing machines freakishly broke down and took a few hours to fix, led to an 0.6 percent increase in U.S. interest rates lasting almost a year.

Obviously, a deliberate and prolonged default would carry much higher costs.  In practical terms, after 23 default-free decades, this week’s ten-year Treasury bonds carry yields of 3.58 percent and U.S. government net interest payments for 2022 were $399 on $30.9 trillion in debt.  Analysts guess that each additional interest point would raise U.S. taxpayers’ interest bill by about $180 billion per year, and as one point of reference, Greece’s financial crisis default left the country with a bond yield of 10.14%. Borrowing Hamilton’s vocabulary, this could probably reasonably be termed an “extravagant premium,” an “immense augmentation” of public expense, and an “evil” that would not end quickly.

Nor would interest rates and payments be the only consequence.  The International Monetary Fund’s terse summary of Lebanon’s 2022 economic outlook reads “sovereign default in March 2020, followed by a deep recession, a dramatic fall in the value of the Lebanese currency, and triple-digit inflation”. Should the U.S. enter a Lebanon- or Sri Lanka-like situation after a Congressional failure to raise the debt ceiling, the details are unpredictable but the outlook for the domestic economy would be broadly similar, amplified by a potential global financial crisis given the scale of the U.S. economy and the role of Treasury bonds as a foundation of worldwide finance.

With all that in the offing, here is Ritz’s advice for the administration.

Further Readings

Then:

Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit, 1790

Now:

PPI’s Ben Ritz on the debt ceiling, default, and administration options, 2023

The Congressional Budget Office on current debt.

Council of Economic Advisers Chair Cecilia Rouse on the potential consequences of default.

And the International Monetary Fund explains its most recent agreement with post-default Lebanon.

And three perspectives from the 2011 debt-ceiling threats:

Standard & Poors explains the U.S.’ downgrade from AAA to AA+.

The Tax Policy Center’s Donald Marron recalls the unintentional but costly micro-default of 1979.

And former IMF economist Simon Johnson speculates on the gruesome private-sector consequences of a U.S. default. Samples: “A collapse in U.S. Treasury prices … would destroy [private banks’] balance sheets. … There would be a massive run into cash, on an order not seen since the Great Depression … private sector in free fall, consumption, and investment would decline sharply.  … [u]nemployment would quickly surpass 20 percent.”) The full text, short but grim.

 

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week

Ritz for Forbes: How Washington Can Avert A Disastrous Debt Default With A Weak House Speaker

By Ben Ritz, Director of PPI’s Center for Funding America’s Future

It took Representative Kevin McCarthy 15 ballots to be elected House speaker last week — the longest such contest since before the Civil War. Now McCarthy’s concessions to the far right in that process will leave him as the weakest speaker in generations and likely lead to the most dangerous game of budget brinkmanship in Washington since 2011. Leaders across both parties must work quickly to avoid an unprecedented debt default disaster.

Read the full piece in Forbes

MOSAIC MOMENT: 4 Bipartisan Financial Imperatives for the 118th Congress

On this month’s Mosaic Moment, program director and host, Jasmine Stoughton sits down with Kirsten Wegner, CEO of the Modern Markets Initiative to talk about her latest op-ed outlining the four bipartisan imperatives to ensure safe and sound capital markets.

Kirsten unpacks what’s working well for investors and shares her bipartisan recommendations for improving the existing market structure. They talk about ideas for regulating the digital assets market and explore the role Congress can play in advancing the research and development of financial technologies such as AI and automated traders.

Check out Kirsten’s op-ed “Safe and Sound Capital Markets Are a Bipartisan Imperative” in RealClearMarkets.

Follow Kirsten Wegner on Twitter.

Follow Mosaic on Twitter.

Follow PPI on Twitter.

Pankovits for The Hill: Charter school innovation shouldn’t come at the expense of constitutional protections for students

By Tressa Pankovits, Co-Director of PPI’s Reinventing America’s Schools Project

On Monday, we’ll likely learn whether the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari(review of a lower court’s decision)during its first conference of 2023 on Jan. 6 in a public charter school case with constitutional implications. The case is a battle over school uniforms — skirts, to be precise. But don’t let the seemingly trivial subject matter fool you. Much more than a mere sartorial regulation is at stake, as demonstrated by the plethora of amicus briefs filed by conservative religious organizations urging the court to take the case.

Peltier et al. v. Charter Day School was prompted by three North Carolina parents’ distaste for Charter Day School’s (CDS) requirement that their daughters wear only skirts to school. Pants, after all, are warmer in winter. The girls also complained of feeling reticent to use playground equipment or crawl on the floor during active shooter drills and felt discouraged that they weren’t as deserving of freedom of movement as their male classmates.

After the school refused to change its policy, the parents sued for discrimination under the equal protection clause of the Constitution, Title IX and CDS’s contractual agreement with the North Carolina Board of Education, which requires charter schools to abide by all constitutional mandates.

Read the full piece in The Hill. 

PPI’s Trade Fact of the Week: American families have cut their bills for clothes and shoes by nearly two-thirds in 50 years

FACT: American families have cut their bills for clothes and shoes by nearly two-thirds in 50 years

THE NUMBERS:  Average purchases per person –

2021:       69 garments, 7.4 pairs of shoes; 2.6% of family budgets
2000:     66 garments, 6.6 pairs of shoes; 4.9% of family budgets
1991:       40 garments, 5.4 pairs of shoes; 5.9% of family
1972/3:   28 garments, shoes n/a (3 to 4 pairs?); 7.8% of family budgets

* Purchasing totals from American Apparel & Footwear Association; budget share from BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey. As noted below, the 1972/3 survey (like other pre-1991 Consumer Expenditure surveys) was a two-year composite.

WHAT THEY MEAN:

A look at affluence through a couple of shopping stats:

(1) According to the American Apparel & Footwear Association, American families bought 69 garments and 7.4 pairs of shoes in 2021. And
(2) the Bureau of Labor Statistics “Consumer Expenditure Survey” (“CEX”), which has tracked spending on these items for 121 years, reports that in that year the average family spent $1,754 on this wardrobe upgrade, which was about 2.6% of their year’s total $66,928 budget.

To scroll back through a half-century of CEX archives* is to see, as time passes, these life necessities taking up steadily smaller shares of family spending as the vanished exotic world of the early 1970s (black-and-white TV, AM radio, phone booths, energy crises, smoky air) evolved into 2020s America. Changes in logistics, retail practices, and trade policy (computer networks, on-line shopping, and big-box stores; goods carried in slow and small break-bulk shipping rather than large-scale container lines; emergence of large light-manufacturing industries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa; elimination of a complex clothing import-quota system and some tariff-cutting mainly in luxury goods) mean that annual clothing and shoe spending in dollar terms has barely changed even as incomes rose, inflation nibbled at dollar value, and mall trawls and on-line shopping binges returned larger and larger sacks of shirts, shoes, socks, brassieres, etc. The figures look like this:

2021:      2.6% of family budget ($1,754 of $66,298)
2011:       3.5% of family budget ($1,740 of $49,705)
2006:     3.9% of family budget ($1,835 of $48,398)
2001:      4.4% of family budget ($1,743 of $39,518)
1991:        5.9% of family budget ($1,735 of $29,614)
1984/5:   6.0% of family budget ($1,319 of $21,975)
1972/3:   6.8% of family budget ($565 of $8,270)

* The 1972/1973 and 1984/1985 editions are two-year surveys. Regular annual CEX’s begin in the late 1980s.

Thus Americans (a) buy about twice as many garments and pairs of shoes as their grandparents did 50 years ago but (b) have cut their budgets for these products by almost two thirds. This is the equivalent of shifting about 4.2% of family spending in 2021 –$2,800, the equivalent of two weeks’ worth of income — away from necessities and toward savings, education, entertainment, and so on. On a shorter scale since 2001, the shift is about 1.8% of spending, or about $1,200.

The families most in need of help — single parents — see slightly larger benefits from this evolution than wealthier households. The CEX reports show that in 2021 the 9 million single-parent families spent an average of $49,811 to spend, with $2,254 or 4.5% of the family budget** used for shoes and clothes. These figures don’t go back quite as far as whole-family reports, but the comparable single-parent figure was $1,763, or 8.1% of a $21,653 budget, on shoes and clothes; thus single parents have been able to re-purpose about 3.6% of their budget.

Note: PPI staff thanks the AAFA for providing the figures on shoe and apparel purchasing, and BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey staff for quick and efficient help in sending archived CEX surveys.

 

Further Readings

Data:

The homepage for the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure survey.

Trade policy summary:

To what extent does “trade policy,” in the sense of negotiations and agreements, deserve credit for these falling costs? Two background points:

(1) Shoe and clothing tariffs have changed little over time, having been excluded from tariff reductions in the GATT agreements of 1969 (“Kennedy Round”), 1974 (“Tokyo Round”) and 1993 (“Uruguay Round”). The main change is that a “quota system” regulating in extraordinary detail the number of sweaters, socks, towels, etc. countries could send to the U.S., introduced by the Nixon administration in 1974, came to an end in 2004.

(2) Since 1983, Congress along with the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations developed a series of “preference” programs for clothing and passed a set of Free Trade Agreements, which together removed tariffs from $17 billion of the U.S.’ $102 billion in clothing imports in 2021, and a very modest $0.9 billion of $27.2 billion in shoe imports.

The end of the quota system likely had a large price effect; those of the FTAs and preferences were smaller, but not zero. Tariffs on lower-priced clothes and shoes continue to be the big sources of tariff money, accounting for about half of the permanent tariff system but a lower share of overall tariff revenue since the Trump administration. PPI’s Ed Gresser on the tariff system’s regressive nature, and its ineffectiveness as a job or production protector.

The really big picture:

The Consumer Expenditure Survey is one of the world’s oldest continuous social-science surveys, launched in 1888 by the otherwise unmemorable administration of Benjamin Harrison.  In 2006, the BLS reprinted the core data from the surveys of 1901, 1936, 1950, 1960, 1972/73 and 1984/1985. Their long look back finds that in times remembered as opulent, sunny and calm — the Gilded Age, the post-war boom, the New Frontier, etc. — Americans lived pretty close to the bone. The three big necessities — food, shelter, and clothes — ate up four-fifths of family income a hundred years ago, and over two-thirds in the 1950s.

Food costs, a gigantic share of family budgets a century ago, fell by half from 1900 to 1970, and by another third since. Clothing costs have drifted steadily down with postwar trade opening and logistical innovation, halving from 1950 to 1980, and then halving again since. Spending on housing, meanwhile, has steadily risen* – 23.3% in 1901, 30.6% in 1972, 32.9% in 2001, 33.8% in 2021 — eating away some of the benefits of lower food and clothing costs. Only until quite recently, however, have the three big life necessities — food, shelter, and clothing — fallen below half of a typical family’s budget. A summary of budget shares for all households over 121 years:

BLS’ long look back at a century of consumer spending.

* The CEX includes home furnishings, utilities, repairs, and laundry services in its “housing” category, so this goes beyond rent and mortgage payments. The available services before 1984 also include these payments, but unlike the post-1991 series does not separate them out. So the table above uses the larger category, which includes some discretionary spending going beyond the ‘roof over the head’ necessity.

ABOUT ED

Ed Gresser is Vice President and Director for Trade and Global Markets at PPI.

Ed returns to PPI after working for the think tank from 2001-2011. He most recently served as the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Economics at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). In this position, he led USTR’s economic research unit from 2015-2021, and chaired the 21-agency Trade Policy Staff Committee.

Ed began his career on Capitol Hill before serving USTR as Policy Advisor to USTR Charlene Barshefsky from 1998 to 2001. He then led PPI’s Trade and Global Markets Project from 2001 to 2011. After PPI, he co-founded and directed the independent think tank Progressive Economy until rejoining USTR in 2015. In 2013, the Washington International Trade Association presented him with its Lighthouse Award, awarded annually to an individual or group for significant contributions to trade policy.

Ed is the author of Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Global Economy (2007).  He has published in a variety of journals and newspapers, and his research has been cited by leading academics and international organizations including the WTO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. He is a graduate of Stanford University and holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Columbia Universities and a certificate from the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.

Read the full email and sign up for the Trade Fact of the Week