During his 60 Minutes interview Sunday night, President Obama underscored the point that Seal Team 6 collected a “treasure trove” of information that could prove of incredible valuable to the intelligence community. So what’s in all the thumb drives, and how might, as the president asserted, the information “serve us very well”?

To be clear, part of what you’re about to read is speculation. It’s at least informed speculation, based on my time as a DoD counter terrorism analyst. As far as I can tell, the bottom line is that we’re now entering a crucial period — the United States has a strong short-term advantage and can exploit this find to hit al Qaeda while the group is scrambling. Here’s why:

First: Whenever the IC gets a major intel dump from a high value al Qaeda target, the very act of exposing new intelligence forces the remaining leadership’s hand. You can be sure that’s why President Obama emphasized our possession of the new material in the interview. The rest of AQ Core doesn’t know what we have, but must assume that its cover has been blown, which means their current lodging has become temporary quarters. The upshot is that in the coming days, they will be making plans to move. To accomplish this task, they’ll have to activate a support network of operatives, any of whom could unwittingly expose targets while in transit. In other words, the mere act of capturing substantial information has set up the United States to execute a number of near-term raids or bombings that could strike a fatal blow to AQ’s remaining leadership.

Second: Initial post-raid intelligence indicates that OBL was more involved in ongoing operations than previously believed, including a possible railway plot. It is an IC maxim that al Qaeda has always valued successful plot execution over adherence to a specific date or timeline. Exposing existing plans effectively compromises them, and AQ operatives — rather than risk a potentially compromised plot — are likely to delay or cancel ongoing operations while sending mid-level lieutenants into hiding for a period.

Third: Al Qaeda’s hierarchy has traditionally been composed of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, plus a chief of external operations and a chief of internal operations (defined as Af/Pak). These nodes all have to communicate with one another, and have long-since abandoned the creature comforts of technology in the 21st century. The key to finding OBL was identifying the courier who was in contact with him, and new information could expose other members of this network’s identities. This means that known couriers, too, will have to go into hiding, and the remaining AQ leaders will have to develop a new cadre of trusted sources. Building trust takes time and further delays ongoing operations of all stripes.

Forth: Follow the money — Al Qaeda’s financial network has to assume it is blown. The group traditionally channels money from all over the world into a few operatives near AQ Central. If OBL was maintaining a higher operational profile than we had previously believed, it stands to reason that he was involved with collecting and distributing finances. He might not have had much of a hand in the cookie jar, but the information on his computer drives might say who did.

Fifth: New information will likely shed light on the extent to which al Qaeda’s “branch offices” in failing states like Somalia and Yemen are taking direction from the Af/Pak-based leadership. If these regions had truly taken over some operational planning, newly captured information may reveal the nodes of international contact, which could theoretically be exploited. Information on the “abroad” AQ groups should also send a powerful message to Congress on the necessity of cutting aid to failing states, as they could now take on even greater prominence in the wake of OBL’s demise.

In sum, OBL’s death and the cache of new information it has created open a stark window of opportunity for the United States. The remaining leadership may be forced to expose themselves when they don’t want to, while delaying ongoing operations and reconstituting communications and financial networks from scratch. The Obama administration has proven its willing to take risks against al Qaeda. Now it has to keep its foot on the gas.

President Obama is justifiably proud of having fulfilled his campaign vow to settle accounts with Osama bin Laden. But he might want to dial back the euphoric White House claims that killing al Qaeda’s chief marks a turning point in Afghanistan.

The Washington Post today quotes an unnamed administration official as saying bin Laden’s demise “changes everything” and begins the “endgame” in Afghanistan. In this view, it will make the Taliban more tractable and ready to negotiate an end to the fighting in return for a share in the Afghan government.

I’d love to be proved wrong, but this assessment seems wildly optimistic. The theory that the Taliban will now be eager for talks is based on two premises.

First, that America’s surgical strike on bin Laden’s compound deep into Pakistan shows Taliban leaders who have taken refuge in Quetta that we can reach them too. No doubt we could, but there must be a reason why we haven’t yet struck at Taliban chief Mohammad Omar and the Quetta Shura. Maybe it’s because there will be no one left with the authority to enforce a truce if we decimate the high command. More likely it’s because Pakistani intelligence, which helped create the Taliban, is protecting its leaders.

Second, bin Laden’s death relieves Omar of any obligation to continue protecting al Qaeda or allow it to entrench itself again in Afghanistan. After all, the Taliban suffered greatly when Omar, after 9-11, refused to expel al Qaeda. U.S. and Afghan forces routed the Taliban and sent its leaders scurrying into exile in Pakistan. Now that al Qaeda is a spent force, there’s no longer any reason for Afghans to suffer on its behalf.

There’s only one thing wrong with this theory, but it’s a big one: It overlooks the role of ideology. Omar and the Taliban, after all, are Islamist fundamentalists who imposed precisely the kind of puritanical rule on Afghanistan that bin Laden and his ilk prescribe for the whole Muslim umma. They enforced Sharia law with fanatical zeal, banned music and dancing, had women accused of adultery stoned to death in stadiums, barred girls from school, and destroyed ancient Buddhist carvings they considered idolatrous.

As Peter Bergen and other terrorist analysts have noted, al Qaeda and the Taliban have essentially experienced a kind of ideological mind-meld in recent years. Bin Laden swore allegiance to Omar, who likewise seems himself leading a jihad against foreign infidels. The assumption that Omar and his claque in Quetta are Afghan nationalists who will compromise their religious beliefs for a slice of power seems naïve.

What might induce them to sue for peace, however, is the military battering they’ve received at the hands of the United States and NATO forces. The U.S. surge has severely depleted the Taliban’s ranks and driven it out of wide swaths of the country, especially its Pashtun heartland in the south. Drone strikes in Pakistan have killed hundreds of its leaders. Sustained military pressure could crack the Taliban’s resolve, and the Obama administration ought to have a blunt talk with Pakistan about Omar and the Quetta shura. Until they decide to make peace, they, not less than bin Laden, are legitimate targets for U.S. strikes.

If, on the other hand, the United States, having killed the 9-11 mastermind, now seems over-eager to withdraw from Afghanistan, we’ll give the Taliban incentives to wait us out. The Obama administration is not wrong to seek negotiations with Taliban leaders at various levels, but we need to be persistent and patient, and not start declaring premature victory. The death of bin Laden doesn’t change the reality that the Taliban, not al Qaeda, pose the greatest threat we face in Afghanistan.

President Obama’s dramatic announcement last night that U.S. intelligence and security forces finally caught up with Osama bin Laden was deeply satisfying. Bin Laden picked a fight with America, slaughtered thousands of our citizens, and has been called to account for his crimes. That’s a huge victory for the United States in its fight against terrorism, but it’s also a vindication of universal human values.

Terrorism experts have been quick to point out that al Qaeda will survive the demise of its leader. True, but for now at least, not terribly relevant. Operational control long ago passed to subordinates, and to the chiefs of offshoots in Yemen and Somalia. But in depriving al Qaeda of its most charismatic and inspirational figure, bin Laden’s death will likely demoralize aspiring jihadists and lead to a further splintering of the terrorist network.

As more details emerge, some other significant implications of bin Laden’s violent death are coming into clearer focus:

1. The United States is creating a credible deterrent to terrorist strikes.

In an age of suicide bombers, it’s obvious that not all terrorists can be deterred by the threat of retaliation. But the certainty that America will be relentless in hunting down those who organize to attack our citizens will likely dissuade more opportunistic jihadists. While recruiting young people for suicide missions, neither bin Laden nor other top al Qaeda leaders have been in any hurry to achieve martyrdom themselves.

In addition to bin Laden, U.S. forces and drones have killed scores of al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the mastermind of al Qaeda’s 2000 attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen. Much of bin Laden’s appeal stemmed from his messianic preaching that radical Islam represents an unstoppable moral force. In his narrative, Islam’s holy warriors toppled the haughty Soviet empire in Afghanistan and would soon drive the United States out of the Muslim world, if not bring it down altogether. But it’s hard to sustain a belief in inevitable victory when U.S. intelligence and armed forces are more deeply engaged in the region than ever, and are decimating the ranks of terrorist leaders.

For this, Americans owe a debt of gratitude to our much-maligned intelligence services. The CIA evidently tracked bin Laden down, and with the help of Navy Seal Unit 6, killed him in a firefight that claimed no U.S. lives. Thanks to the long arm of U.S. intelligence agencies, other terrorist chiefs, like Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s number 2, and Anwar al-Aulaqi, a key leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, should sleep less easily at night.

2. Pakistani duplicity remains a huge problem.

Although President Obama was careful to underscore Pakistani cooperation with U.S. intelligence efforts, today’s reports suggest the killing of bin Laden was a wholly American affair. The obvious question is why Pakistani intelligence couldn’t find bin Laden. He was living in a highly fortified mansion apparently build specially for him in 2005, in a city just 35 miles north of the capital of Islamabad. That city also houses units of the Pakistani army, who apparently weren’t inquisitive about the mansion either.

Most damning are news reports that the United States didn’t notify Pakistani officials about the operation. Unfortunately, Washington has good reason to suspect that the country’s intelligence service is playing a double game on terrorism. While ostensibly cooperating with the United States, Pakistani intelligence has ties to jihadist groups that have launched terrorist attacks in Kashmir and India, as well as Taliban and affiliated groups, including the notorious Haqqani network, that launch vicious attacks on Afghan and NATO forces from its base just over the border in Pakistan’s North Waziristan province.

Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan – despite official denials – should make Washington less defensive about launching drone missile strikes against terrorist targets there. U.S. officials should also ask why we are funneling large amounts of aid to a government that can’t seem to decide which side it’s on in the struggle against terrorism, even though Pakistan itself is increasingly the target of Islamist terrorists.

3. Freedom, not jihadism, is the wave of the future in the Muslim world.

The popular revolution sweeping the Middle East advances under the banner of freedom and self-government, not Islamist purity and strict enforcement of Sharia law. The Arab street isn’t burning American flags. It’s burning with indignation against homegrown tyrants and corruption, and asking America to back its demands for political and economic reform and representative government.

Meanwhile, al Qaeda’s stock has plummeted in the region. While Americans focus on the wounds of 9/11, Muslims have been the chief victims of al Qaeda’s gruesome tactics. Suicide bombings and indiscriminate attacks have claimed tens of thousands of civilian lives in Iraq alone, and the scourge has spread to Indonesia, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries. Opinion polls show a dramatic decline in sympathy for al Qaeda and strong condemnation of its methods. The carnage also has led Islamist and al Qaeda theorists to renounce indiscriminate attacks on non-combatants.

The Arab revolt, in fact, is the ultimate repudiation of bin Ladenism, which posits a remorseless and apocalyptic struggle between Muslims and the rest of the world. What most Arabs and Muslims want is not to recreate the Caliphate and wage endless jihad, but the freedom to join the modern world on their own terms. In this sense, bin Laden’s removal is a distraction from the main drama in the Middle East – but a welcome one nonetheless.

Let’s grant that Washington has limited leverage over Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad. Let’s further stipulate that Assad’s claim that it’s either him or the Islamists, while self-serving, could turn out to be true. Even so, the White House seems strangely tongue-tied when it comes to condemning the regime’s violence against its people.

Sure, various administration mouthpieces have issued perfunctory condemnations. But even as regime tanks and snipers fire indiscriminately on civilians in Deraa and other cities, President Obama has yet to speak out forcefully against the killings, or to mobilize international efforts to bring pressure on Assad to stop.

Trotting well behind the galloping pace of the Arab revolt, the administration is just now getting around to imposing mild sanctions on Syria. Whether you come at the issue from a humanitarian or realpolitik standpoint, this lack of urgency is puzzling.

Around 400 Syrians already have been killed, and the regime has escalated attacks on protesters. The Guardian reports desperate conditions in Deraa, where people lack electricity, food and water, yet can’t leave their homes for fear of being picked off by snipers. Security forces go door to door, rounding up suspected rebels.

Already entangled in three Middle Eastern countries, the United States probably can’t intervene militarily to stop an incipient massacre in Syria. But the President can offer unequivocal moral support to Syrian demands to open up one of the region’s grimmer police states; he can dramatically stiffen sanctions against the Assad regime; and, he can challenge the international community to apply the “responsibility to protect” principle to Syrians.

Siding with the Syrian resistance also aligns with America’s strategic interests. The fall of the Assad dynasty would remove a determined foe of American purposes in the region, and likely deprive Iran of a loyal satrap in Damascus. But even a more open and pluralistic political order in Syria could moderate the regime’s rougish external conduct. For example, it might mean less Syrian meddling in Lebanon, and less clandestine support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

So why is the administration holding back? Why won’t Obama endorse the goal of regime change, as he has in Libya?

Perhaps he fears being dragged into another Libya-style intervention. Or maybe somewhere in the bowels of the State Department there are still people who think the United States should pursue “engagement” with the Syrian dictator.

But hopes that the Western-educated Assad would turn out to be some kind of closet modernizer were dashed long ago. Since inheriting the regime in 2000, Assad has made Syria a client state of Iran. His regime also has been implicated in the assassination of Lebanese democrats who oppose Syrian domination of their country. To vaunt his credentials as a leader of the rejectionist camp, Assad funnels arms to Hezbollah and Hamas. At the height of the sectarian carnage in Iraq, Syria also was a key transit point for foreign suicide terrorists who flocked to the country to kill U.S. troops as well as Iraqi civilians.

In short, Assad is a thoroughly nasty piece of work. His links to Iran and regional terrorism make him more dangerous by far than Muammar Qaddafi. Yet you don’t hear anyone in Washington (or Europe) demanding a no fly zone over Syria.

That’s probably a perverse sort of tribute to Syria’s brutally competent machinery of repression. It’s also true, though, that Assad enjoys support from other minority groups in Syria, such as Christians. Accurately or not, they accept Assad’s description of himself as their only bulwark against Sunni Islamists.

Yet Assad’s brutality is doubtless a reflection of his basic political insecurity. As a member of the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot which comprises about a tenth of Syria’s mostly Sunni population, Assad’s hold on power is intrinsically precarious and can only be sustained by intimidation and violence.

Syrians nonetheless seem increasingly willing to risk their lives to pry Assad’s grip on their country lose. They deserve America’s unqualified support.

To say Ken Adelman – Ronald Reagan’s UN ambassador – takes thin appreciation for the benefits of foreign assistance would be an understatement. Writing in response to Joe Nye’s article on the importance of “smart power,” his rebuttal piece in Foreign Policy paints is a myopic view of American foreign aid, and in Adelman’s rush to end the practice, manages to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Here’s Adelman’s conclusion:

For decades now, the United States has been the No. 1 foreign-aid donor … but this hasn’t translated in making America the most popular or most influential country around the world. …

Four of the largest U.S. foreign-aid recipients today — Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, and Afghanistan — all take contrary positions on issues of critical importance to the White House. South Vietnam once got gobs — gobs upon gobs — of U.S. foreign aid. That didn’t help much. Likewise with Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Zaire (now the “Democratic” Republic of the Congo), and other “friendly” (read: graciously willing to take U.S. money) countries. …

Put bluntly, this aspect of soft power — foreign aid, by far the biggest in dollar terms, amounting to some $30 billion* a year — may not constitute much power at all.

In Adleman’s world, the only reason America should give to impoverished countries is to buy quid pro quo support in the UN, or to compel local governments and populations to unambiguous pro-American stances.

So a thought exercise, let’s enter Adelman’s world and imagine what would happen if we distributed foreign aid on his terms. Actually, we don’t have to imagine very hard, because there’s already a glowing exemplar of Adelman’s approach: North Korea.

In America’s dealing with Pyongyang, we only dole out aid only when there’s an immediate quid pro quo. Certainly the depths of North Korea’s poverty and recalcitrance of its leadership create a truly unique situation, but the basic premise holds: America is rich, North Korea is poor, and important strategic issues must be discussed between them.

Here’s what happens: Without regular American aid, North Korea throws a two-year-old style temper tantrum by testing (or threatening to test) a nuclear warhead; the United States and Europe scramble to put together an assistance package; Pyongyang temporarily calms down… until the next time they need something. In other words, we’re negotiating with the DPRK on its terms. American- and European-led efforts to engage North Korea have only been fleetingly successful: the regime will sit down with us when it pleases and then stall without giving much up until it needs something.

The converse case is how America deals with pretty much the rest of the developing world: We provide the developing world money on a regular basis. Yes, a lot of it is skimmed off by corrupt local officials, and some is directed at narrow strategic objects that help tighten local despots’ grip on power. To fault aid for supporting individuals, rather than institutions, is perfectly valid, and has contributed to the Obama administration’s inconsistent policy across the Middle East.

But a good chunk gets to where it’s intended (to military, infrastructure, health, or civil society groups) that is appreciated for one reason or another. The sum total is that the “payoff”(if you want to be callous) of American foreign is helping to create stable, working relationships with countries the world over. Foreign governments and their populations aren’t going to side with the United States on every issue (or even most issues), but maintaining open channels of communication to the ruling class and opposition groups are critical to productive dialogue that shapes policy over the long arc. And yeah, it just may help build democratic and stable societies, which are inherently aligned with America’s values and interests.

The bottom line is that foreign aid, however imperfect, creates the contours for America’s role in the world. Take it away, and we’re left bribing everyone. Just ask Kim Jong Il.

NATO’s current strategy has effectively reached the end of its road. Divisions between member states, anti-Qaddafi forces, and the alliance’s command structure, plus Qaddafi’s forces’ adopting altered tactics, suggest that it’s now time to go after the Libyan leader’s personal pressure points if NATO wants to compel him to step down. Hitting Qaddafi’s palaces, remaining military command centers, and sources of personal wealth may be necessary to convince him that Libya’s future is best without him.

The good news is that finding a Qaddafi-specific target set shouldn’t be construed as classic mission creep: as Qaddafi has adopted new mechanisms to attack and terrorize his own citizens in places like Misrata, NATO remains justified in using “all necessary measures” to protect them. It’s clear that the only way to do that is without Qaddafi.

Over the past ten days, fighting in Libya has essentially ground to a stalemate. After a furious seesaw along the coastal road between Ras Lanuf and the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, the front line has effectively settled somewhere west of Ajdabiya, which leaves but an uneasy 100 miles of cushion before reaching the de-facto separatist capital. The lone exception to this division is Misrata, further west still, where fighting continues.

Amidst the stalemate, the anti-Qaddafi forces have become anxious that NATO isn’t doing enough. One of the rebels’ highest military commanders, Abdul Fatah Younis, complained at a press conference last week that “NATO did not provide us what we need” and threatened to take the measure back to the UN Security Council. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and his British counterpart William Hague have echoed Younis’ calls this week, and called an emergency meeting in Paris today to discuss. From Juppe’s interview with French radio:

NATO wanted to take over military operations, and we accepted that. But it must play its full role. That is to say, it must prevent Qaddafi from using heavy weapons against the civilian population.
For its part, NATO says it’s doing just fine, thank you. Commanding Brigadier General Mark van Uhm countered that NATO has maintained a high operational tempo and is doing a “great job”, given resources.

Elsewhere, discord reigns: The Obama administration is content to stand at the ready, happily leading the initial wave before transitioning into a support role. Italy wants to arm the rebels. Sweden, UAE, and Qatar are supplying planes but possibly with restrictions on what they can do. And the African Union, full of leaders purchased by Qaddafi’s petro-power, have offered a non-starter of a peace-plan.

Clearly there’s a disconnect: The rebels, France, the UK, and Italy want NATO to do more absent a consensus on what; NATO insists it is being successful; and the US thinks it has done enough heavy lifting. All are correct to a degree, but are missing a key ingredient: Qaddafi.

By adapting to the new strategic realities, Qaddafi’s forces have modified their tactics. Rather than charge headstrong up the coastal road in easily identifiable tanks, the Qaddafistes have begun to rely on more concealable methods such as ambushes, snipers, and mortar fire. These tactics don’t permit for a full offensive towards Benghazi, but do provide just enough firepower to sow chaos amongst civilians while being small and hidden enough to evade NATO strikes from above.

Qaddafi has clearly retained enough firepower to kill civilians — particularly in Misrata — as report after report continue to indicate. Arming the rebels remains an unsure prospect — the time to train and deploy heavier armaments may be too long for them to be truly effective. Covert teams, authorized by the Obama administration, seem to hold out the best prospect for success by identifying key targets closely associated with Qaddafi, his family, and his wealth. NATO is left with little choice but to target the source of the chaos and destruction if it is to bring such a tragic scene to its conclusion.

Along with its annual Human Rights Report, the State Department has unveiled a new website, HumanRights.gov, ostensibly for the cause’s promotion. I’ve spent some time browsing the site, and though I was disappointed that it doesn’t seem to be fully stocked with reports — I searched for this year’s on Iran and came up empty — I’m sure that problem will take care of itself over the long term.

The outstanding question in my mind is what a new government website can really accomplish. Yes, it’s fine and welcome that Foggy Bottom puts time and resources towards building a dedicated internet portal, but the challenge is to avoid the bureaucratic temptation to measure success by having created something, rather than judging its usefulness by the effect it has on others. Essentially, it’s a question of measuring inputs (a site) vs. outputs (what the site accomplishes).

Will, for example, the State Department just use the site as a repository for mounds of data? Or will it build a community around it through web chats, live broadcasts from human rights events world wide, and an interface enabling ideas to be exchanged with the government? A worst case scenario is if a human rights website becomes a one way mirror, with information streaming out of the administration but rarely entering it. We all know how much this White House likes to put things online, but all the information in the world is underutilized if it’s not actively contextualized.

Human rights have an indispensable role in negotiations with all of the United States’ major antagonists. In a way, Secretary Clinton got lucky when she said that human rights’ issues couldn’t “interfere” with more pressing crises in the U.S.-China relationship: the resulting outcry seems to have refocused the administration’s efforts on the issue. The White House now seems to have a better understanding that including human rights in the basket of issues discussed across any negotiating table broadens the discussion and creates new angles for American leverage. As my friend Andrew Albertson wrote with Ali Scotten in 2009 on the Iranian situation:

By broadening our support for the aspirations of ordinary Iranians, the Obama administration can continue to tilt the balance of power in its favor. Such an approach would add pressure on the Iranian regime, enhance domestic political support for talks and maximize the opportunity for successful negotiations.

And of course they’re a good thing for their own sake, too.

Discussing Iran and human rights is something we’ve done quite a lot of over the past few weeks. Please take a look at the new study group we’ve launched in conjunction with our friends at Freedom House in an effort to help the administration think of ways beyond just sanctions to bring about real change in Iran. Here are a few quotes from Ben Smith’s story in Politico on why we’re doing it:

“PPI believes a more democratic world is a safer world. The United States has failed to apply that principle to Iran, even as popular movements for freedom spread throughout the Middle East. It’s time for a new approach,” PPI President Will Marshall said in an emailed statement.

“The dominant issues in the Middle East are democracy and freedom. The Iran regime thinks that it can escape demands for change,” said Apostolou. “The United States, and its allies, therefore need a strategy that will help Iranians attain the human rights they so richly deserve.”

Not much has been made of the truly stunning events unfolding in Cote D’Ivoire over the past 48 hours. Laurent Gbagbo, the ex-president who lost last year’s vote but refuses to cede power, is on the verge of giving up the post in favor of Alassane Ouattara, the rightful victor.

Gbagbo has held his country hostage for nearly four months, as forces loyal to him had hunkered down in Abidjan, the commercial capital. But Outtara massed his own army, and in recent days made a strong push essentially pinning down Gbagbo’s forces in the city.

Everyone from the UN to the African Union to international NGOs and the ghost of Elizabeth Taylor acknowledges that Ouattara is president-elect, so there’s no question about taking sides, despite legitimate concern that Outtara’s forces could commit crimes against civilians. To that end, on March 30, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1975, which among other things, authorizes UN and the French forces supporting them to use “all necessary means … to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence… including to prevent the use of heavy weapons.”

Last night and under this mandate, UN and French forces hit the presidential palace as well as other strategic military sites around Abidjan. The pressure has apparently brought Gbagbo to the verge of ceding power, despite somewhat conflicting reports.

In the process, we’ve learned two important things about the UN: First is that the United Nations is beginning to take its “responsibility to protect” (R2P) — an international norm adopted in 2009 that obliges the international community to act in the face of humanitarian crises — quite seriously. R2P grew out of the UN’s non-intervention in the Rawandan genocide of 1994; one of its principal pillars is that the international community is compelled to take timely action to protect civilians when a state is failing to protect its population. Cote D’Ivoire is just the second potential atrocity since R2P was established (Libya was the first) that the UN has had the opportunity to act. So far, it’s 2 for 2.

It’s remarkable that Resolution 1975 passed by the Security Council by a 15-0 margin, just weeks after a very similar Resolution 1973 passed by a comparatively difficult 10-0 vote (with five abstentions) authorizing the same “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya. What compelled Russia, China, Brazil, Germany, and India to vote with the Ivoirian resolution while abstaining from the Libyan version just weeks earlier is somewhat of a mystery.

Most likely, the different vote tallies are due to a simple fact: no two situations are exactly alike and major international decisions aren’t made in a vacuum. Certainly Moscow and Beijing in particular didn’t wake up last week and decide they were liberal interventionists comfortable authorizing force to advance democracy. Perhaps the difference was in a certified election result in Cote D’Ivoire, while no election had taken place in Libya?

Second, the limited UN/French military operations in Cote D’Ivoire should underwrite the UN’s confidence that it can act with apparently effective results without more than American moral support. As any as one million Ivoirians may have be displaced by this conflict, and preventing needless harm to them is a testament to the international community’s potential as an effective arbiter.